The reasonableness of pluralism
in The culture of toleration in diverse societies

This chapter explores how the injustice of imposition might follow from the reasonableness of pluralism, and considers several epistemological arguments designed to effect the transition. It begins with Brian Barry's sceptical argument and argues that in presenting the case for scepticism and against epistemological restraint, Barry misrepresents epistemological restraint. Barry's appeal to a form of scepticism that is grounded in the degree of certainty that the agent is entitled to feel about his or her beliefs is one that yokes the 'existential' condition of the agent and the justification of liberal impartiality. The chapter argues that underpinning the injustice of imposition with scepticism exacts substantial existential costs given the connections that there are between conceptions of human flourishing and views on the status of conceptions of human flourishing.


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