Between international relations and European studies
Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen
This chapter offers a reflection upon an European Union (EU) foreign policy complex that seeks both to address the major definitional issues surrounding the nature and direction of the EU's external relations but which also draws our attention to contemporary theoretical debates in both international relations and European integration. Many texts on the international capacity of the EU focus upon the development of decision-making and policy within Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The field of study in European political cooperation (EPC)/CFSP has been dominated by empirical accounts of decision-making, policy-making and regional or issue-based case studies. Fewer studies have sought to make explicit theoretical claims upon CFSP and to situate it in broader debates within either European studies or international relations. In the early twenty-first century, the EU is making massive leaps to expand both geographically and sectorally.
This chapter is concerned with the formation of West German strategic culture. It examines several aspects of the rearmament process during the 1950s and estimates the external and internal factors in the rearmament of West Germany. It then tries to draw out the antecedents of (West) German strategic culture, before it presents an account of the creation of the Bundeswehr, which uses the lens of strategic culture. This chapter concludes that the creation of a new strategic culture in West Germany happened through two principal channels, namely the post-war domestic conditions in West Germany and the burden of the demands and will of the allies with regards to the kind of role the Federal Republic should play.
Launched in 1970, Europe's common foreign policy has, to some degree, come of age. This chapter aims at exploring possibilities of theorising the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 'the constructivist way'. Most theory-informed research on the CFSP employs the deductive method and a large number of theories or frameworks of analysis have been applied in research on the CFSP. The chapter describes how the balance between deductive and inductive theorising is quite asymmetrical. It discusses nine rules for creative theorising - developed by Rosenau and Durfee - as a point of departure and combine their rules with social constructivist ways of framing research questions and designs. For each rule there is consideration of how theories would have been, had Rosenau and Durfee's prescriptions been informed by a social constructivist perspective.
The European union’s policy in the field of arms export controls
Sibylle Bauer and Eric Remacle
European foreign policy functions as a 'system' of multi-level policies structured in four levels (conflicting, cooperative and institutionalised intergovernmentalism, and supranationalism), each of which refers indirectly to one of the main integration theories. This chapter discusses the following three dimensions of European foreign policy-making with reference to the case of arms export controls: convergence or vertical coherence, consistency or horizontal coherence and variable geometry. The various levels of foreign policy-making inside the European Union (EU) allow for different speeds and degrees of integration in different policy areas of the three pillars as well as within the pillars, and also in various aspects of the same policy area. Each area of foreign policy decision-making in the EU seems to be inspired by different ideological approaches to integration favoured by the different foreign policy actors.
This chapter looks at the situation of Turkey before and after the Gulf War, from the mid-1980s to the end of the 1990s, analysing the claims surrounding Turkey's unequivocal readiness to serve as the West's policeman in the Middle East. It discusses the problems of Turkey during this period, which include the decline in its strategic value, the Greco-Turkish conflict over Cyprus and the persistent territorial quarrel with Syria over the Hatay province, explaining how Turkey coped with these problems through its relations with the West.
Turkey's involvement in the Gulf War in 1991 paved the way for the country's acceptance into the European Union. This book traces that process, and in the first part looks at Turkey's foreign policy in the 1990s, considering the ability of the country to withstand the repercussions of the fall of communism. It focuses on Turkey's achievement in halting and minimising the effects of the temporary devaluation in its strategic importance that resulted from the waning of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union; the skilful way in which Turkey avoided becoming embroiled in the ethnic upheavals in Central Asia, the Balkans and the Middle East; and the development of a continued policy of closer integration into the European and western worlds. Internal politics are the focus of the second part of the book, addressing the curbing of the Kurdish revolt, the economic gains made and the strengthening of civil society. The book goes on to analyse the prospects for Turkey in the twenty-first century, in the light of the possible integration into Europe, which may leave the country's leadership free to deal effectively with domestic issues.
This chapter examines wars, attempts to create regional order, and how these have impacted on the structure of the Middle East regional system, which, in turn, has reshaped the states that make it up. The search for solutions to regional conflict, for a basis on which to create a secure order, has been ongoing since the founding of the Middle East states system. However, each of the major attempts to build regional order proved defective, in varying degrees ameliorating or containing conflict but also either failing to deal with its roots or sometimes actually exacerbating it. War has originated in domestic level dissatisfaction shaped by these struggles which, when institutionalised in rival states, is expressed in conflict at the states system level, frequently over territory. Everywhere, in a region afflicted with irredentism, domestic politics encourages nationalist outbidding.
The Washington summit was useful to Lyndon B. Johnson mainly because it allowed him to impress upon the British the need for them to retain their traditional 'great power' role and also to allow him to bring the multilateral force (MLF) to a conclusion. Harold Wilson accepted the American view that Britain should preserve its current position in defence, telling the Cabinet on 11 December that 'the most encouraging fact about the conference was America's emphasis on Britain's world wide role'. Johnson not only wanted Wilson to maintain Britain's defence commitments, but to extend them into South Vietnam. After Wilson's visit to Washington, most observers, including the President, anticipated that he would face a serious challenge in explaining what he had agreed to in Washington to the House of Commons in the foreign affairs debate scheduled for 16-17 December.
This chapter focuses on Turkey's relations with Greece. There are several factors that combine to explain the surprising turn for the better in Greek–Turkish relations, one of which is the political and strategic changes occurring around Turkey from the late 1980s, which have intensified since the Gulf War. Another is the violent earthquakes that both Turkey and Greece experienced in 1999, after which each sent humanitarian aid to help ease their neighbour's plight. However, the chapter suggests that, despite the improvement in Greek–Turkish relations, there remain several serious differences between the two countries, particularly over questions of sovereignty and flying rights over the Aegean Sea.
It is demonstrated throughout this chapter that US financial assistance, in the guise the British Prime Minister James Callaghan wanted never materialised during the IMF Crisis of 1976-77. Callaghan believed that Britain’s position with the Western alliance would ensure that the US would pressure the International Monetary Fund into providing preferential loan conditions for the United Kingdom. The Ford administration, however, did not believe Britain warranted such treatment and even efforts by the Callaghan government to link the continuation of British security efforts to a preferential loan were rebuffed. Ultimately, the years of economic and military decline meant that the United Kingdom was no longer important enough in Washington’s opinion to warrant such preferential treatment. Therefore, the efforts of Wilson and Callaghan to build a closer ‘special relationship’ failed to ultimately deliver the political capital when it was most needed.