This paper provides a critical analysis of post-humanitarianism with reference to adaptive
design. At a time when precarity has become a global phenomenon, the design principle has
sidelined the need for, or even the possibility of, political change. Rather than working to
eliminate precarity, post-humanitarianism is implicated in its reproduction and governance.
Central here is a historic change in how the human condition is understood. The rational
Homo economicus of modernism has been replaced by progressive
neoliberalism’s cognitively challenged and necessarily ignorant Homo
inscius. Solidarity with the vulnerable has given way to conditional empathy. Rather
than structural outcomes to be protected against, not only are humanitarian crises now seen as
unavoidable, they have become positively developmental. Post-humanitarianism no longer provides
material assistance – its aim is to change the behaviour of the precariat in order to
optimise its social reproduction. Together with the construction of logistical mega-corridors,
this process is part of late-capitalism’s incorporation of the vast informal economies
of the global South. Building on progressive neoliberalism’s antipathy towards formal
structures and professional standards, through a combination of behavioural economics,
cognitive manipulation and smart technology, post-humanitarianism is actively involved in the
elimination of the very power to resist.
An Interview with Caroline Abu Sa’Da, General Director of SOS MEDITERRANEE
In this interview, Caroline Abu Sa’Da, General Director of SOS MEDITERRANEE Suisse,
discusses search-and-rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea, in particular those conducted
by her organisation. She explains that as a European citizen movement, SOS MEDITERRANEE has
adopted a hybrid and politicised approach, which represents a new kind of humanitarian
engagement. And she reflects on the challenges of protecting and supporting those crossing the
This paper questions the extent to which the (arguable) end of the liberal humanitarian order
is something to be mourned. Suggesting that current laments for the decline of humanitarianism
reflect a Eurocentric worldview, it calls for a fundamental revision of the assumptions
informing humanitarian scholarship. Decoloniality and anti-colonialism should be taken
seriously so as to not reproduce the same by a different name after the end of the liberal
The modern global humanitarian system takes the form it does because it is underpinned by
liberal world order. Now the viability of global liberal institutions is increasingly in doubt,
a backlash against humanitarianism (and human rights) has gained momentum. I will argue that
without liberal world order, global humanitarianism as we currently understand it is
impossible, confronting humanitarians with an existential choice: how might they function in a
world which doesn’t have liberal institutions at its core? The version of global
humanitarianism with which we are familiar might not survive this transition, but maybe other
forms of humanitarian action will emerge. What comes next might not meet the hopes of
today’s humanitarians, however. The humanitarian alliance with liberalism is no
accident, and if the world is less liberal, its version of humanitarian action is likely to be
less liberal too. Nevertheless, humanitarianism will fare better than its humanist twin, human
rights, in this new world.
An Interview with Celso Amorim, Former Brazilian Foreign Minister
In this interview, Celso Amorim, former Brazilian foreign minister, discusses changes in
global governance and their likely impact on international cooperation. He critically reflects
on his experiences in positioning Brazil on the world stage and democratising human rights. And
he considers whether the influence of Brazil and other Southern states is likely to continue
The months May-December 1965 saw several developments in the Harold Wilson-Lyndon B. Johnson relationship. The White House feared, in the light of London's ongoing Defence Review, that economic troubles might compel the Wilson government to reduce its military commitments East of Suez, leaving the United States as the only world policeman. Wilson wanted to reduce the cost of Britain's defence commitments, but he still supported the idea that Britain should continue to play a global role. The documentary record contains few of President Johnson's direct comments about a bargain with Wilson. The measures of the United States to try to ease its own, substantial balance of payments deficit compounded British economic difficulties. A Foreign Office analysis from June 1965 examined the Vietnam War in the context of the Anglo-American relationship. On 25 and 28 June respectively, China and North Vietnam dismissed the Commonwealth Peace Mission.
Labour's handling of the British economic crisis occasioned a great deal of concern on the part of the President, given the possibility that sterling might have to be devalued or that any rise in the Bank of England lending rate could precipitate a run on the dollar. There was also concern about the multilateral force (MLF), a matter due to be discussed at the planned summit meeting in Washington early in December. President Lyndon B. Johnson had never feared a Labour victory in Britain, but he felt it necessary to ease any concern in the world at large (especially in financial markets) about the British 'socialists' entering office. Britain's role in the world would depend in large part on the country's economic health. Some of Harold Wilson's colleagues disdained his efforts to gain American help for Britain's economic problems.
This chapter examines Turkey's relations with Israel, suggesting that Israel and Turkey have been motivated to weave their close ties by mutual interests, some of them existential. Israel aids Turkey with arms and equipment denied by an indifferent Europe and hostile American public opinion, while Turkey is making its space, ports and other installations available to Israel. The chapter contends that Turkey's relations with Israel and the inevitably pro-Israel position which that relationship projects offer a further expression of Turkey's growing involvement in the Middle East. It also argues that the development in Turkish–Israeli relations adds a more solid element to the much-publicised Turkish–Israeli military cooperation, implying long-term relations, even if Middle Eastern military and political circumstances change.
This chapter uses comparative analysis to elucidate how the interaction between the system level and particular state formation paths shapes similarities and differences in states' international behaviour. What explains the similarities and differences in the foreign policy behaviour of Middle East states? As this chapter shows, neither state features nor systemic forces alone have an impact on foreign policy but the interrelation between a state's specific position in systemic structures and its particular internal features determines its foreign policy behaviour. The level of consolidation determines whether a state remains a victim of its systemic environment or becomes an effective actor in it. Finally, leadership, by virtue of its location at the intersection of the systemic and the domestic, can make choices that set states on new tangents.