Federalism and political asymmetry: executive versus legislative power

As we have noted, political institutions are of crucial importance during transitions to democracy, and for Mainwaring, among all the choices of institutions ‘none is more important than the system of government: presidential, semipresidential, parliamentary or some hybrid’. There is now a general consensus in the literature that parliamentary systems are more stable than presidential ones and that it is much easier to consolidate democracy in parliamentary regimes. As Zvi Gitelman notes: ‘Parliamentarism is generally more favourable to democratic consolidation than presidentialism because it gives the political system greater efficacy, the capacity to construct majorities and the ability to terminate a crisis of government without it becoming a crisis of the regime’. One of the major problems with presidential systems is that they are, ‘prone to creating two opposing centres of power’, and often ‘legislative paralysis can set in when neither parliament nor president are strong enough to break the deadlocks which ensue’. Politics quickly becomes a zero-sum game where the winner takes all. As we noted in chapter 6, presidential systems are thus often prone to chronic conflict, legislative stalemate and even complete paralysis. This is particularly the case, where, ‘the executive does not have sufficient support in the congress to pass legislation but does have sufficient strength to have his or her vetoes sustained’. And furthermore, as Mainwaring has shown, the deadly combination of a presidential system with a fragmented multi-party system, as in Russia, ‘can have pernicious results’.

In Russia, deadlock at the national level lead to outright physical violence and the dissolution of the Russian Parliament in October 1993. And this struggle between parliament and president also gravitated downwards to the local level with similar battles occurring between regional soviets (assemblies) and executive bodies of power. What followed were presidential decrees fundamentally seeking to increase the powers of the executive at the national and local levels and parliamentary (Supreme Soviet) laws which sought to enhance the powers of the
national legislature and local assemblies. Soon Russia was faced with the horrifying possibility of eighty-nine battles between regional executives and assemblies.

Striking the first blow in his ‘war of laws’ with the Russian Parliament, Yeltsin adopted a decree on August 22, 1991 which granted him powers of appointment over all the chief executives (governors) in the regions. Although the local assemblies were in theory supposed to approve the appointment of these executives, in many cases chief administrators were simply imposed upon them without any prior consultation. However, in March 1992 the Russian Supreme Soviet struck back adopting its own law on regional assemblies which significantly increased the powers of the soviets (regional assemblies) vis-à-vis the governors. As Gel’man notes, this law instituted the dual subordination of the chief executive of a region before the regional assembly and the President, and the dual subordination of the regional administration before the assembly and the governor. The regional assemblies were also given the right to name four key members of the regional cabinets (the first deputy chief of the administration, and heads of the departments of finance, property, and social affairs). Moreover, they could also declare a vote of no confidence in the governors, and appeal for the removal of governors to the President or the Constitutional Court. The chief executives in their turn were given the right to veto the decisions of the assembly but their vetoes could be overturned by a simple majority of the assembly.

In December 1992 as the battle between Parliament and President intensified, the Russian Parliament adopted a further resolution which stripped Yeltsin of his ‘authority to appoint regional heads of administration, and called for the abolition within one month of the presidential representatives in Russia’. Yeltsin responded to this attack from the Parliament with a presidential decree which he promulgated on February 5, 1993. This decree made the presidential representatives a permanent body under the direct supervision of the head of the presidential administration, and he simply ignored the parliament’s moves to rescind his powers of appointment of regional governors. During this period, 1991–93, Gel’man argues there was a presidential–parliamentary type system in operation in the regions.

The assault on local assemblies 1993–96

Yeltsin’s victory over the parliamentarians in October 1993 signalled a victory of executive power over legislative power. As Gel’man notes, from 1993 we see the development of a hierarchical chain of executive authority. Presidential decrees adopted over the period 1993–94 brought an end to the assemblies’ rights of confirmation of the appointment of chief executives and members of regional administrations, and of their right to...
bring sanctions against the executive, or to express a vote of no confidence in the governors.\textsuperscript{16} The right of a legislative veto over decrees of the chief executive now required the vote of two-thirds of the deputies and not as previously a simple majority. Indeed, Gel’man notes, that if you compared the competence of the regional assemblies in 1994 with the powers of the two chambers of the federal assembly, then the President had significantly less rights than the regional governors. Thus, for example, the Duma may express a vote of no confidence in the government and also may express its disagreement with this or that law. No such rights were given to regional soviets. The regional soviets were also to be part time bodies with only a small percentage of the deputies engaged in full time parliamentary work. Once again it is important to note that this legislation was aimed only at the regions, and the republics were given the go ahead to forge their own political institutions.

However, it was not long before regional assemblies fought back against executive dominance. Russia’s weak and inchoate form of federalism played into the hands of the regions. Yeltsin (as we showed in chapter 3) in a search to maintain stability and to win the support of regional voters, went out of his way to grant recalcitrant regions and republics special deals and favours. Many of the bilateral treaties allowed the republics and regions to develop their own political systems.\textsuperscript{17} Articles 72 and 77 of the Russian Constitution also grant republics and regions the right to independently structure their political institutions as long as they do not contradict the Constitution and federal laws. No such law delineating the powers of regional soviets was forthcoming until 1999.

Taking advantage of this lack of clarity in federal directives, and bolstered by new electoral mandates, a number of regional assemblies began the process of drawing up charters which, if adopted, would radically increase their powers and status, reinstating many of the rights taken away from them by presidential edicts in 1993. In some cases the assemblies drew up charters which called for the abolition of the ‘presidential’ systems in their regions to be substituted by fully-fledged ‘parliamentary’ regimes (e.g. Altai Krai, Chita, Tambov, Saratov and Kemerovo oblasts).\textsuperscript{18} Thus, for example, in Altai Krai and Chita Oblast regional elites were able to create strong ‘parliamentary charters’\textsuperscript{19} which, ‘sought to make their regional executives accountable to the regional assemblies, establish legislative control over cabinet appointments and structure, and allow for votes of no confidence in the head of the region’.\textsuperscript{20} In many other regions there were wide variations in the specific powers which assemblies were granted vis-à-vis the executive.\textsuperscript{21} Constitutional asymmetry soon led to political asymmetry. By 1995 there was a highly varied system of executive–legislative relations in operation in the regions (see box 7.1). In particular, the right of assemblies to ratify nominations for executive posts...
varied substantially across the federation. The most traditional variant was
where the chief executive appointed and dismissed cabinet members and
other officials of executive power. However, in other cases legislative
organs of power were required to give their approval for: chairs of the gov-
ernment (Adygeya, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Karachaevo-
Cherkesiya, Tatarstan, Mordovia, Sakha, North Ossetia-Alaniya), first
deputy and/or deputy chiefs of executive power (Irkutsk, Saratov,
Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, Kareliya, Sakha, Tyva, Tambov oblast), all mem-
bers of the government, ministers, and leaders of state committees
(Altai, Buryatiya, Tatarstan, Marii El, Mordovia, Sakha (Yakutiya),
Tyva), individual ministers (Adygeya, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, Kareliya,
Khakassiya, Saratov, Tambov, Perm). In some regions (e.g., Tver and
Khakasiya) assemblies had the exclusive right to sign and promulgate
laws (see box 7.1).

However, regional assemblies suffered yet another blow when in
January 1996, the Constitutional Court declared that the ‘parliamentary
charters’ of Altai Krai and Chita Oblast violated the constitutional prin-
ciple of the ‘separation of powers’. In March 1996 the legislature of Altai
Krai reluctantly agreed to withdraw from its charter those articles which
had granted it the right to directly elect the governor and members of the
regional administration. And legislators in Chita oblast were soon forced
to follow suit. Armed by this constitutional precedent, governors in many
other regions across the federation were able to strengthen their powers
of control over the assemblies. Thus, as Gel’man notes, federal legislation
over the period 1993–96 transformed politics in most regions from a
‘parliamentary-presidential’ system to a fully fledged ‘presidential’ one.

Nonetheless, it was still far from the case that there were uniform laws in
practice throughout the federation. In some regions it was regional elites
and not presidential decrees or parliamentary laws which determined the
specific institutional structures that were put in place.

Elites and regional politics

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union regional elites largely
determined their own institutional structures. This was a time when
institutions were in flux, and there was a power vacuum at the centre.
Thus, those elites (parliamentary or presidential) which commanded the
most political and economic resources and support during the period
1991–93 were largely able to impose their institutional designs on the
regions. In those regions where there was a strong political affinity
between the governor and the deputies compromises over the provisions
of the charters were soon achieved. In others where there was no such
affinity there was often a fierce and prolonged conflict. As Vladimir
Lysenko observed:
Box 7.1 Variations in the powers of legislative and executive bodies of power as stipulated in regional and republican charters and constitutions

1 Exclusive right to sign and promulgate laws:
   • Assemblies in Tver Oblast and Republic of Khakasiya.

2 Right to call referendums:
   • Executive has right: Buryatiya, Ingushetiya, Marii El, Leningrad Oblast.
   • Assembly has right: Bashkortostan, Mordovya, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, Kareliya, Khakassiya, Komi, Kostroma, Primorski Krai, Sakha, Vologda and Voronezh.
   • Both executive and legislative bodies have such a right: Kalmykiya, North Osetiya, Tatarstan and Irkutsk.

3 Legislative agreement/consent required for appointment of key members of the executive:
   • Chairs of government: Adygeya, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Ingushetiya, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, Tatarstan, Mordovya, Sakha and North Osetiya.
   • First deputy and/or deputy chiefs of executive power: Irkutsk, Tambov and Saratov oblasts; Republics of Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, Kareliya, Sakha and Tyva.
   • All members of the government/administration, ministers, and leaders of state committees: Republics of Altai, Buryatiya, Tatarstan, Marii El, Mordoviya, Sakha and Tyva.
   • Heads of specific ministries, administrations: Republics of Adygeya, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, Kareliya, Khakassiya; Saratov, Tambov and Perm oblasts.

4 Right to dissolve the assembly:
   Executive has right:
   • If assembly refuses three times to ratify the governors appointment of chief of government (e.g., Irkutsk, Yaroslavl’ and Sverdlovsk).
   • If there is an absence of a quorum in the assembly. Assembly: requires two-thirds of the votes of assembly members.


If relations are calm and business like, the charter will be calm and relatively terse . . . But if relations have not been going well, the draft charter will resemble a blanket that each side is trying to put to its side of the bed. A great many alternative drafts will appear, and there will be struggle for every word, every letter and every comma.  

In some regions executive bodies dominated the process of constitution building and subsequently were able to implement strong presidential systems much as Yeltsin did at the national level. In other regions
Executive versus legislative power

legislative bodies were able to take the upper hand and to push for strong parliamentary charters and the installation of parliamentary regimes. As Vladimir Nechaev shows in his careful study of institution building in four regions, elites in the Republic of Kareliya and Pskov Oblast were able to carve out strong and independent assemblies whilst Kursk and Astrakhan both created weak regional assemblies under the control of powerful executives. The most important determining factors in these four regions were the specific powers of the legislative and executive bodies at the time of drawing up the charters/constitutions; and the date when the charters were ratified. As Nechaev notes, in Kursk the administration controlled the process whilst in Pskov and Kareliya it was representatives of the legislative assemblies. In Astrakhan both participated. Here it was the respective powers of these bodies at the time of the formation of the charter that was crucial. In Pskov work on the charter began in the first half of 1993, that is, before the dissolution of the parliament and the adoption of the 1993 federal Constitution. Those charters drawn up before the dissolution of the soviets in 1993 were more likely to see a victory of the assemblies over the executives.

In some regions there was elite stalemate and a settled political structure failed to materialise. This was most graphically seen in the conflict between executive and legislative bodies of power in Tver Oblast where conflict between the legislature and executive held up the adoption of its regional charter for a number of years. In the republic of Udmurtiya, stalemate between elites, and the realisation that in a presidential system the ‘winner takes all’, led elites to originally opt for a parliamentary regime.

Another common source of conflict is the rivalry between the heads of regional executive bodies of power and mayors of capital cities. In Primorskii Krai the struggle between the regional governor and the mayor of Vladivostok took on epic proportions. Such tensions and conflicts were complicated and exacerbated by the dominance of independents in the majority of assemblies and an absence in all but a few of strong disciplined parties.

However, the specific nature of executive–legislative relations in a region depend on a number of other factors other than the powers of the respective elites at the time the charters/constitutions were laid down. Other important factors determining this relationship are the electoral support of the chief executive, the social composition of the assembly (see section on corporatism and clientelism below) and the relationship between the governor and the federal government. In a study of executive–legislative relations in twenty-seven regions Turovskii classifies regional assemblies according to: (a) the degree of governor’s control over the legislature (strong, partial, or weak), and (b) the balance of political forces in the legislature. A combination of these two criteria allows Turovskii to posit five possible ‘ideal types’ of legislature:
1. **Nomenklatura dominated legislatures under strong governor’s control:** Such legislatures (Kabardino-Balkariya, Novgorod, Samara, Saratov, Tomsk and Komi-Perm AO) are dominated by economic and administrative elites, as well as representatives of organisations funded by the regional budget. Party representation is negligent or non-existent. Here we see a fusion of executive and legislative power with the vast majority of the deputies supported by the governor in the elections, and the chair of the assembly fully in the pocket of the governor.

2. **Legislatures with sizeable party representation under strong governor’s control:** (Sakha, Astrakhan, Tambov, Moscow and Yevreiskaya AO.) For example, in Moscow city Duma a majority of party and independent deputies support the mayor.

3. **Nomenklatura under partial governor’s control:** In several regions the governor’s control over a nomenklatura-dominated Duma was far from complete (Leningrad, Murmansk and Perm).

4. **Party/nomenklatura legislature under partial governor’s control:** This type is the most common. Several groupings compete for power but none is predominant. The governor’s ‘party of power’ normally manages to ensure a majority, but to build it the governor has to strike alliances with various influential elite groups (Krasnoyarsk, Primorskii Krai, Stavropol’, Khabarovsk, Belgorod, Kamchatka, Moscow Oblast, Novosibirsk, Penza, Smolensk and Tver’).

5. **Nomenklatura legislature under weak governor’s control:** In some of the legislatures the majority belongs to elite groups which do not support the governor (Altai Republic and Tyumen Oblast) (see table 7.1).

As noted above, one of the reasons why regional bodies have been able to create such varied political structures is the fact that it took until

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**Table 7.1** Turovskii’s classification of regional legislatures, 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of governor’s control</th>
<th>Nomenklatura domination</th>
<th>Parties + nomenklatura</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Kabardino-Balkariya, Novgorod, Samara, Saratov, Tomsk, Komi-Perm AO</td>
<td>Sakha (Yakutiya), Astrakhan, Tambov, Moscow, Jewish AO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Leningrad, Murmansk, Perm</td>
<td>Krasnoyarsk, Primorskii Krai, Stavropol’, Khabarovsk, Belgorod, Kamchatka, Moscow Oblast, Novosibirsk, Penza, Smolensk, Tver’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Altai Republic, Tyumen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
October 1999 before the Duma adopted the long awaited federal law, ‘On the general principles of organising the legislative (representative) organs of state power in the subjects of the Russian Federation’. But, as Mendras notes, by the time the law was promulgated: ‘all the territories had already adopted their own constitution or statute (Ustav) and had shaped their relations with federal authorities through years of daily bargaining and compromise’. Moreover, as Gel’man observes, the new law was adopted just before the 1999 Duma elections at a time when the Yeltsin regime did not want to alienate the regions. Thus, Gel’man concludes, the ‘law does not provide any political or legal innovations and merely served to codify the existing regional state of affairs’.

Elites, clientelism and corporatism

As O’Donnell observes, when democratic institutions are weak and inchoate their place is soon taken over by informal practices, such as clientelism, patronialism, and corruption. The chronic weakness of parties has left open the door for other groups to enter politics. Two of the most powerful are industrial executives and state bureaucrats. In a new post-communist corporatist alliance, regional economic and political elites (many of whom were formerly members of the Soviet nomenklatura) have joined forces to plunder the wealth of their regions. Politics in Russia is built upon a myriad of patron–client networks which cut across the formal administrative, rational–legal and constitutional boundaries of the state. Behind the formal façade of federalism lies a network of informal vertical and horizontal ties which have created a kind of ‘pluralism of elites’ which prevent any one individual, group or clan from controlling all the levers of power either at the national or regional levels.

Representation of economic elites

As Fillipov notes, ‘compared to the first round of legislative elections in the regions which took place over the period 1993–94, we have witnessed a meteoric rise in the importance of financial resources’. Key members of the Soviet economic and administrative elites now dominate and control the work of Russia’s local assemblies. Thus, for example, in the 1995–97 elections for regional assemblies there were 4,120 candidates from industry, and many of these were high ranking executives or directors of enterprises and collective farms. Of these 23.0 per cent were successful in winning seats. And members of the economic elite have been able to turn their economic power into political power and victory at the ballot box. Thus for example, enterprise directors have been able to ‘persuade’ their employees (whom they provide with not only wages, but other vital services and goods, such as healthcare and housing) to bring home the votes.
As Lallemand notes, ‘In times of uncertainty employees find they have an interest in maintaining the factory’s paternalism, and they willingly vote for a member of their management’.36

In his 1998 study of 27 regional assemblies Turovskii concluded that by far the largest groupings in the assemblies were directors of industrial enterprises and chairs of collective farms. In ten of the assemblies entrepreneurs made up a majority or near majority of the deputies corps. Indeed, so great was the representation of business interests that the list of deputies in some assemblies read like a ‘Who’s Who?’ of local business.37 For example, 80 per cent of the members of the legislature of Kabardino-Balkaria represented the economic elite of factory directors and businessmen.38 In Sakha’s regional assembly, the firm Russian Diamonds was represented not only by its president but also by two vice presidents, and there were also two managers of the Sakha Gold Company. In Tyumen oblast at least five deputies, including the speaker of the assembly, belonged to the top leadership of the gas giant Gazprom.39 Of the 130 members of the Tatarstan parliament elected in 1999, 48 were directors of enterprises and banks.40 In 1998 representatives of large business concerns won twenty of thirty seats in the Ishevsk city Duma:

The new members of the legislature control two of the largest banks in the city, all the private television stations, 90 per cent of private newspapers, two-thirds of the market for oil products, all three large construction companies, and the two trading companies that control produce sales in the city. Among the winners was the Chairman of ‘Udmurtneft’, which extracts 80 percent of the oil in the region. No political party member was elected.41

Members of the economic elite have also sought to win elections for governor. Thus, for example, in the elections for 70 governors conducted over the period 1995–97 there were 102 candidates from industry and commerce, of which, 6 were finally victorious. And in a recent round of gubernatorial elections conducted in 1999–2001 there was a gradual increase in the number of top businessmen among the governor’s ranks. Thus, for example, the new governor of Chukotka, Roman Abramovich, is one of the heads of Russian Aluminium, a giant conglomerate which controls 70 per cent of Russia’s aluminium production. Aleksandr Kholponin the new governor of Taimyr AO is the head of Norilsk Nickel. Others with backgrounds in business are Vladimir Loginov of the Koryak AO, Aleksandr Tkachev of Krasnodar, and Yurii Trutnev of Perm.42 The former first vice president of the YUKOS oil company Viktor Kazakov was appointed first deputy governor of Samara in July 2000.43

**Representation of members of the state**

A number of republican presidents and regional governors have also been successful in creating weak ceremonial parliaments. In a flagrant viola-
tion of the democratic principle of the separation of powers they have packed legislative bodies with their subordinates from the state administration. Thus, for example, in elections conducted over the period 1995–97, 332 heads of city and district administrations won seats in 45 regional assemblies. Although federal laws prohibit deputies from combining state and municipal service there has been some confusion over the interpretation of what constitutes ‘municipal service’. In most regions, heads of district administrations have not been considered by the courts to be ‘municipal servants’. Thus, for example, in Samara oblast the regional court declared that one could combine legislative duties with a post as chief of a local administration, but in Tver this was declared illegal. In 1998 the state Duma passed a law prohibiting heads of local administrations from being elected deputies but this law was vetoed by the Federation Council.

Part of the explanation for allowing full time administrators to be elected deputies is explained by the fact that, as we noted in chapter 6, most deputies do not work on a full time professional basis and the majority combine their deputies’ duties with some other kind of occupation.

Representatives of executive bodies of power in regional assemblies made up 18.6 per cent of all deputies in 1997. However, in some regions this figure was much higher. The highest representation of state officials in regional parliaments were to be found in Bashkortostan (50.0 per cent), Novgorod (46.2 per cent), Sverdlovsk Oblast (35 per cent), Kabardino-Balkariya, and Komi (30 per cent, respectively).

Indeed, in some cases where there are bicameral assemblies, the upper chamber was specially created to include heads of local administrations. In Bashkortostan, 73 of 74 heads of district administrations were elected members of the upper house of the parliament. As Farukshin observes, in Tatarstan we find what would appear to be a contradiction in terms, a ‘bureaucratic parliament’ where 60 of the 130 members elected to the legislature (the State Council) in 1999 held full time posts in the state apparatus. These included, the Prime Minister, the head of the Presidential Administration, a deputy head of a branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and 57 heads or deputy heads of district administrations. Moreover, the majority of these state officials were directly appointed to their posts by the President. And if we also consider the fact that the heads of the district administrations also hold the post of chair of district legislatures, then the idea that there is any real separation of powers in Tatarstan is patently absurd.

A similar situation exists in the Komi Republic, where the 1997 law on local government contains numerous contradictions with federal law. Thus, for example according to this law President Spiridonov is granted the powers to appoint local government heads, and local legislatures are given the task of selecting the mayors on the recommendation of the pres-
ident. In Bashkortostan the Republic Constitution also gives President Rakhimov the power to directly appoint mayors. In Marii-El administrative territorial districts were created to allow the heads of seventeen districts to enter the Republic’s Legislative Assembly. In Kursk’s charter the governor has the right to name the heads of 28 district administrations, and the communist party governor Aleksandr Mikhailov has packed the administration with appointees from the communist party. In Kalmykiya there is no conflict between executive and legislative bodies for the simple reason that the republic’s legislative assembly (the Khural), is made up of just thirty or so unelected deputies, personally selected by the President.

Elites, institutions and democracy

Whilst a great deal of the conflict between regional parliaments and executives can be explained by the political orientation of their members, as for instance, when we have a communist governor and a reformist assembly or vice versa, often there are also deeper institutional factors at work. Theorists of the ‘new institutionalism school’ argue that democracy depends not only on economic and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions. According to this school, ‘Political actors are driven by institutional duties and roles as well as, or instead of, by calculated self-interest’. Fundamentally, ‘institutions shape politics’, and they ‘influence outcomes because they shape actors’ identities, power and strategies’.

Furthermore, institutions are not neutral, as they both incorporate and exclude certain actors, and ultimately, ‘determine which agents, on the basis of which resources, claims, and procedures, are accepted as valid participants’ in the decision making process. Thus, institutions matter, and they matter more the longer they are in existence. As O’Neil notes, over time institutions as ‘self-replicating structures’, develop their own particular characteristics – resources, values, norms, routines, and patterns – which are passed on to individuals both inside and outside the structure.

Elites and institutions

The above authors stress the primacy of institutions over individual actors. However, for other scholars who take an ‘elite centred’ approach, it is elites that are responsible for the creation of institutions in the first place. Institutions are created out of elite conflict and bargaining. Elites are the primary actors in crafting democracy or bolstering authoritarian regimes. Here democratic elites are necessary for democracy.

In Russia the founding charters and constitutions (‘rules of the game’)
emerged out of elite conflict in the regions. Political elites struggled to create the rules (e.g., a presidential or parliamentary system, a unitary or federal system, a majoritarian, proportional, or mixed type of electoral system) so that they could win the game. Moreover, elites are liable to be more powerful in transitional societies such as Russia, where institutions tend to be weak and in flux. However, we should not dismiss the importance of regional institutions in Russia and their development over the last ten years. Elections, parties, constitutions and charters, assemblies, presidencies and courts, are now a normal part of the political landscape even if not all the major political actors have accepted the democratic process as the ‘only game in town’. But Russia’s fledgling democracy is still far from consolidated, especially in the ethnic republics where, as we discuss in chapter 9, ‘elective dictatorships’ and ‘delegative democracies’ are the norm rather than the exception.

Notes

1 S. Mainwaring, ‘Presidentialism, multipartism, and democracy’, *Comparative Political Studies*, 26:2 (July 1993), 199.
5 Ibid.
6 Mainwaring, ‘Presidentialism, multipartism’, 216.
7 Decree no. 75, August 22, 1991, ‘О Некоторых Вопросах Действительности Органов Исполнительной Власти в РСФСР’.
8 The first chief administrator appointed by the President was D’yakonov, in Krasnodar krai.
11 Ibid., 95.
13 Presidential Decree no. 186, 5 February 1993, ‘О представителе Президента...
Rossiiskoi Federatsii v krae, oblasti, avtonomnoi oblasti, avtomnon okruge, goradakh Moskve i Sankt-Peterburge’.

14 See, Clark, ‘Presidential Prefects’, p. 41.
15 Gel’man, ‘Regional’naya vlast’’, 95.
19 See, Rossiiskaya gazeta (February 1 and 17, 1996).
21 A number of regions and republics entrench the separation of powers in their constitutions and charters. Thus according to article 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Altai state powers is divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. Organs of these three branches function independently and have no right to interfere in each other’s areas of competence. Analogous norms are stipulated in the charters of Sverdlovsk and Nizhegorod oblasts, St Petersburg, Khanty-Mansi AO, and many other subjects of the federation. In the charter of Primorskii krai it clearly states that no organ of state power has the right to adopt decisions which infringe the rights and competence of other state bodies. See, A. S. Avtonomov, A. A. Zakharov and E. M. Orlova, Regional’nye Parlamenty v Sovremennoi Rossii, Nauchnaya Doklad, no. 18 (Moscow: MONE, 2000), p. 77.
23 See Gel’man, ‘Regional’naya vlast’’.
http://pubs.carnegie.ru/p@c/Vol5–2000/1/04nechaev.asp
26 For a discussion of regional elites and democratisation see V. Gel’man, ‘Regime transition, uncertainty and prospects for democratisation: the politics of Russia’s regions in a comparative perspective’, Europe–Asia Studies, 51:6 (1999), 939–56; V. Gel’man, ‘Democratisation, structural pluralism and fragile


29 See, the Federal Law, no. 184–F3, ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Zakonodatel’nykh (Predstavitel’nykh) i Ispolnitel’nykh Organov Gosudarstvennoi Vlasti Sub’ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, which was ratified by the president on October 6, 1999 and was published in *Rossiskaya gazeta* (October 19, 1999).


31 Vladimir Gel’man, ‘New law on regional institutions preserves status quo’, *EWI Russian Regional Report*, 4:42 (November 11, 1999), 12.


34 See, D. Lane and C. Ross, *The Transformation from communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites From Gorbachev to Yeltsin* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999).

35 *Vybor v Zakonodatel’nye Predstavitel’nye Organyi*.


45 A. Fillipov, ‘Vybor zakonodatel’nykh (predstavitel’nykh) organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub’ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii (1990–98)’, in *Vybor i Partii*,

46 Vyborg v Zakonodatel’nye Predstavitel’nye Organy, p. 636.


49 Also elected was 1 deputy chair of Kazan City Soviet, 3 chief doctors, 1 deputy head of a department in a hospital, 1 chief editor of a journal, 1 trades union boss, 1 professor, 1 head of a scientific-research institute, 1 deputy head of a department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1 chair of the Union of Writers’, and 48 directors of enterprises and banks. See, Farukshin, ibid.


53 By institutions here we refer to constitutions, elections, parties, parliaments, executives, judicial and other such bodies.


55 Ibid., p. 159.
