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Changing history: the Republic and Northern Ireland since 1990

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Someone asks me for directions, and I think again. I turn into
A side street to try to throw off my shadow, and history is changed.
(Ciaran Carson, ‘Turn Again’, Belfast Confetti, Gallery, 1989)

Given the variety and energy of Irish creative and critical writing and its contribution to re-thinking relationships, histories and futures within and beyond Ireland, the first decade of the twenty-first century seems an opportune moment to examine and evaluate the literary voices that continue to enhance and enrich contemporary Irish culture. The book that follows consists of seventeen chapters focusing on the drama, poetry and autobiography fiction published since 1990, but also reflecting upon related forms of creative work in this period, including film and the visual and performing arts. The ‘diverse voices’ in the title refers not only to the variety of creative talents currently at work in Irish letters, but also to the range of perspectives brought to book here, from scholars scrutinising Irish writing in very distinct parts of Europe. As well as from Ireland, contributors have been drawn from the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, the UK and USA, which in itself reflects the strong and sustained international interest in and popularity of Irish literature.

The period covered by the book, 1990–2007, has witnessed significant developments within Irish culture and society, which have shaped and transformed the writing and reading of identity, sexuality, history and gender. In order to set this remarkable, transformational time into some perspective, it is appropriate to look back at Ireland’s sorry political and economic state during the first half of the 1980s. A sharp, general downturn in western economies, generated partly by the 1979 oil crisis, had left Ireland particularly vulnerable. Unemployment reached alarming levels between 1979 and 1984, when an estimated 16.4 per cent of the workforce were jobless. ¹ As a result of the recession, at least a million people in the Republic were reliant on social benefits,
a European report established in 1983. Crime levels began to soar particularly in the major cities, like Dublin and Cork, and drug abuse became an increasingly pressing issue. Despondency seems to be on the increase, noted one commentator working for the Institute of Public Administration, adding that ‘the intractability of our problems’ appeared to have ‘sapped our will to solve them’. Not least among the seemingly intractable problems faced by the Irish and the British Governments in the 1980s was the continuing violence in Northern Ireland. There the 1980–81 Hunger Strikes ‘seared deep into the psyches of large numbers of people . . . Community divisions had always been deep, but now they had a new rawness’. One unanticipated outcome of the strikes, however, was a profound and enduring change in the republican movement’s long-term strategy. Sinn Féin’s success in mobilising votes for the hunger-striker, Bobby Sands, and then subsequently his agent, Owen Carron, in the Fermanagh/South Tyrone by-elections of 1981 had convinced republicans of the merits of contesting elections. As a consequence, between 1982 and 1985 the party contested four polls in Northern Ireland and began to campaign with greater conviction in the Republic. It was alarm at their results in Westminster and the Dáil that provided much of the impetus for the Anglo-Irish Agreement of November 1985, which would transform British–Irish relations and the whole course of the Troubles. This arose directly from the fears of Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, that in rejecting the New Ireland Forum and its findings she had placed in jeopardy the possibility of ‘a new relationship’ and ‘joint action’ by Britain and Ireland to resolve the northern crisis. However, unionists in the North were outraged by the Agreement, in particular by the creation of an Intergovernmental Conference, in which for the first time ministers and officials from the Republic would be given the opportunity to discuss not only security issues, but also political and legal matters. They also strongly objected to Article 4 in the Agreement, which made it clear that if devolved self-government were to be restored this would have to be on the basis of power-sharing. In an attempt to destroy this pact between the British Government and a foreign state which ‘coveted their land’, the Ulster Unionist and Democratic Unionist Parties combined forces to mount a massive demonstration at Belfast City Hall on 23 November, attracting a crowd estimated variously at between 100,000 and 200,000 people. Following the overwhelming endorsement of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in the House of Commons, all fifteen unionist MPs resigned their seats in order to force by-elections which they believed would demonstrate the strength of hostility in the Protestant community. In the event the strategy proved
at best a partial success; they did secure 418,230 votes for their anti-Agreement stance, but lost a seat to their main nationalist opponents. In the wake of what was supposed to be a peaceful ‘day of action’ in March 1986, there were major clashes between protestors and the RUC, which resulted in forty-seven policemen requiring medical treatment and over 230 complaints about intimidation. Over the next three months over 500 police homes were attacked by loyalist gangs, forcing 150 families to flee for their safety. Almost immediately after the DUP leader, Ian Paisley, condemned these attacks, they ceased. One lesson that took another twenty years to be absorbed by both British and Irish Governments was that a political settlement in Northern Ireland could not be made to work if a major grouping there withheld its consent.

The collapse of the Soviet empire in eastern and central Europe in the late 1980s was not without its repercussions for the crisis in Northern Ireland. Unlike constitutional nationalists like John Hume and Seamus Mallon, with whom they were engaged in secret talks, Sinn Féin believed that the British still harboured colonialist and imperialist designs on Ireland, and that they were hanging on there because of a need to protect Atlantic air and sea routes from the Soviet threat. In November 1990 a key speech by the Northern Ireland Secretary, Peter Brooke, sought to disabuse them of this view and reiterated the British government’s willingness to engage in dialogue with them. Instigated by Hume, and forwarded to the Provisional IRA in advance, Brooke’s speech declared that the British Government had ‘no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland: our role is to help, enable and encourage. Britain’s purpose . . . is not to occupy, oppress or exploit, but to ensure democratic debate and free democratic choice’.

Quickened partly by the ongoing northern crisis, cultural debate in the Republic reached a higher level of intensity and sophistication in the 1980s as a result of interventions by a diverse range of writers, artists and intellectuals from both sides of the border. Journals like the *Crane Bag* and *Irish Review*, organisations like the Derry-based Field Day, poems like those of Seamus Heaney and Eavan Boland, plays like those of Brian Friel and Frank McGuinness, all enabled re-readings and re-imaginings to occur, and so paved the way for the new perspectives associated with the 1990s. The preceding decade witnessed increasing strains in the intricate relationship between the Catholic Church and the State, particularly over the ethics of family policy. These were very much a sign of what was to come in the following decade when many of the traditionalists’ victories were overturned. Conservative groups in Ireland in the early 1980s who backed the Catholic Church’s
opposition to abortion sought to prevent the Irish Constitution ever legalising the procedure. They proposed an amendment to the Constitution guaranteeing the foetus ‘the right to life’. Their proposals were put to a referendum in September 1983, and won the day; of the 50 per cent of the electorate who voted, just over 42,500 more people supported the amendment than opposed it. The same year witnessed Senator David Norris’s attempt to decriminalise homosexual acts between adults. Although Norris’s bid to liberalise Irish law was rejected in the Irish Supreme Court, five years later the European Court of Human Rights declared that such law breached his and other gay men’s ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’. In what turned out to be one further setback for those seeking change in Ireland, a plan by Garret Fitzgerald’s Fine Gael administration to reverse the 1937 Constitution’s ban on divorce suffered a heavy defeat in June 1986, again as a result of the ability of traditionalist forces to mobilise opposition to change.

By general consensus, one of the most conspicuous signs of the seismic cultural shift that was beginning to take place in Irish society was the election of Mary Robinson to the Presidency of the Irish Republic in November 1990. A 46-year-old lawyer, she had an impressive record of successful advocacy behind her, and had been preoccupied with women’s rights since the early 1970s and gay rights in the 1980s. In the mid-1980s she had resigned from the Labour Party out of principled opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, on the grounds that it had sidelined and ignored unionist opinion. When her candidacy as an independent was first mooted, few would have credited her with much chance of securing the post, particularly in a competition which included such experienced and gifted politicians as Fianna Fáil’s Brian Lenihan or Fine Gael’s Austin Currie. Yet following an inspired and energetic campaign – and in spite of mean-spirited, chauvinist, personalised attacks on her – she triumphed in the second count. Tellingly, in a victory speech she thanked the women of Ireland ‘who instead of rocking the cradle rocked the system’, but commended all those who ‘with great moral courage’ had ‘stepped out from the faded flags of the Civil War and voted for a new Ireland’.11 As Alvin Jackson notes, Robinson’s election serves an example of ‘the extent to which Irish women have been responsible for their own empowerment’.12 One of her first acts as President was to light a candle and set it in the window of Aras an Uachtaráin, her official residence, in a symbolic attempt to re-connect the new Ireland with the lost millions of the Irish diaspora, whom she was effectively calling back home.

The years of Robinson’s and subsequently Mary McAleese’s Presidencies have coincided with a period of unparalleled expansion in
the Irish economy, which one investment banker at Morgan Stanley likened to the roaring economic advances in the Asian Pacific by coining the phrase ‘Celtic Tiger’. Amongst the most important contributory factors behind the boom was the development of the European Single Market and surge in the US economy. Multinational corporations and investors from Europe and the USA found the Republic highly attractive because of its exceptionally low corporation tax, its stability in industrial relations, and its highly skilled, well-educated, English-speaking workforce. Successive Irish governments proved adept at fiscal management, and the restructuring of the economy and taxation initiated by Haughey and his Finance Minister, Ray MacSharry, in the late 1980s continued under Bertie Ahern and Charlie McCreevy. Between 1995 and 2001 growth in the industrial sector averaged 15 per cent, far outstripping increases in the rest of Europe. In a reversal of the situation that had existed for much of the twentieth century and the whole of the 1800s, emigration ceased to be a major factor in the Irish economy and immigration, necessary to supplement the workforce, became an increasingly important issue. While unemployment fell to 4 per cent, half the EU average, domestic property prices and sales of what hitherto might have been deemed ‘luxury’ goods soared. As critics of the Celtic Tiger phenomenon point out, however, this sudden wealth has not been distributed equably. Most of its beneficiaries are located in the major cities and their suburbs, in which roads are now often gridlocked, public transport unable to cope, schools oversubscribed and houses unaffordable for young first-time buyers. Alarmingly, 20 per cent of the Irish population still exist below the poverty line. Opposition parties made much of this social and economic imbalance during the May 2007 election, yet still lost.

What came to be seen as the Robinson era witnessed also major changes in social legislation, particularly in relation to the politics of sexual relations and reproductive practices. An early sign that several issues seemingly ‘addressed’ in the 1980s required revisiting was the X case of February 1992. This involved the fate of a fourteen-year-old rape victim, who, as a result of the 1983 amendment act, was initially denied legal permission to travel to Britain for an abortion. Subsequently the Supreme Court overturned this ruling, on the basis that ‘a threat to the life of an expectant mother (including the possibility that she might commit suicide) was grounds for an abortion’. Around this same period of time, controversy was reignited over the sale of contraceptives. This had been legalised in 1979, but contraceptives were only available on prescription to married couples. Partly because of threat posed by AIDS, in the mid-1980s and early 1990s
these restrictions were relaxed and there was an increase in the availability of condoms to young unmarried people. Following the passing of a government bill of 1993 homosexual acts between consenting adults were made legal, and two years later after another acrimonious, hard-contested referendum the Irish people agreed to modify the Constitution permitting divorce when couples had been living apart for more than four years.21

These liberalising measures made it onto the statute books in part because of a series of crises that destabilised the Catholic Church in Ireland during the 1990s, which caused considerable diminution in its authority. Even before the Bishop of Galway, Eamonn Casey, was exposed as the father of a child in May 1992, unease at the Church’s near-hegemonic position within the state had been growing.22 A succession of exposés in the press and on television soon established the fact that he was far from being the only cleric to have abused his power. In another high-profile case, Father Brendan Smyth spent three years resisting extradition to Northern Ireland, where he faced charges of child sexual abuse going back to the 1960s. It was not until January 1994 that he agreed to stand trial at Belfast Crown Court, where he admitted his guilt in respect to seventeen charges. Catholics and non-Catholics north and south of the border were particularly shocked by revelations in an Ulster Television documentary that Church authorities were aware that he was a paedophile, yet had simply shifted him from one parish to another in the vain hope that this might curtail his activities.23

Further equally disturbing evidence of cruelty, abuse and clerical hypocrisy was placed before the public once more in States of Fear, a three-part film broadcast on RTE broadcast in the spring of 1999.24 This detailed the physical, sexual and psychological violence meted out in a variety of institutions managed by religious orders until quite recent times. Responding to these revelations in her book, Goodbye to Catholic Ireland (2000), the journalist Mary Kenny denounced not only the Church, but also the Irish state, the middle classes and the media for utterly failing in their duty of care.25

In the course of the 1990s and since, several prominent politicians and leading business-figures in the Republic found themselves under investigation, facing charges of criminality, corruption and hypocrisy. One of the earliest tribunals set up by Charles Haughey’s government, the Hamilton enquiry, uncovered crooked business practices and tax evasion in the beef trade. In January 1992, while Justice Hamilton’s investigations were in their early stages, Charles Haughey felt compelled to resign as Taoiseach over renewed allegations that in the early 1980s he had been aware that two ‘unfriendly’ political journalists had had
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their phones tapped by officials working in the Justice Ministry. It
was not, however, until the McCracken, Moriarty and Flood Tribunals
delivered their verdicts that the extent and scale of corruption in the
Republic became widely known. From the McCracken hearings in July
1997 it emerged that Haughey had received payments from Ben Dunne
of Dunne’s Stores totalling £1.3 million, most of which was deposited
in a Cayman Islands account so as to avoid detection and tax; when
called to account about these matters Haughey claimed at first to be
ignorant of the details of his affairs, which were handled entirely by
his old friend and financial adviser, Des Traynor. From the Moriarty
Tribunal (1999–2000) the Irish public learnt that since the 1960s
Haughey had consistently lived far beyond his means, and had frequently
relied on ‘donations’ from unidentified businessmen and property
developers to help him manage his debts.

Haughey’s good name was not the only casualty of the tribunals. What
they exposed was that ‘a culture of tax evasion had been tolerated among
Ireland’s elite for many years’, and how, in the words of Fintan O’Toole,
‘organized crime’ was not the sole ‘preserve of shifty working-class men’,
but also ‘carried out by respectable, beautifully tailored members of the
upper middle class’. That the Irish people were able to cope with so
many shameful disclosures about their political, business and religious
leaders is, as Terence Brown suggests, indicative of the new confidence
and national self-belief generated by the economic, social and cultural
advances of the 1990s, presided over by Mary Robinson and Mary
McAleese. Questions about their probity continue to be asked of politi-
cians. In response to a newspaper article, in late September 2006 the
Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, admitted that in the early 1990s, when he was
serving as Finance Minister, he had been given loans of £33,000 to enable
him to pay legal fees arising from separation proceedings. Taking the
stand at the Mahon Tribunal a year later, Ahern stressed that to date
‘no evidence had ever been unearthed that he took bribes’, and that
his heavy ministerial responsibilities in the 1990s meant that he had
not been in the habit of retaining receipts for funds received. In spite
of continuing allegations and intense media scrutiny of his financial deal-
ings, Irish voters returned Ahern for a record third consecutive term in
office following the May 2007 elections.

Not least among the factors which fostered a new, positive mood on
the island was the considerable progress made during the 1990s in resolv-
ing the crisis in Northern Ireland. Another key turning-point in what
came to be termed ‘the peace process’ came in 1993. The year began
with nineteen civilians murdered by paramilitaries and, in March, the
bombing by the Provisional IRA of a shopping precinct in Warrington,
which killed two children, Johnathan Ball (aged 3) and Tim Parry (aged 12). The degree of revulsion generated by these murders in Britain and Ireland matched that which followed the 1987 Enniskillen bombing. At this very juncture, separate, secret talks between leading members of Sinn Féin and Albert Reynolds's Dublin Government, British Government representatives, and John Hume of the SDLP were gathering in momentum. In mid-December 1993, another important development occurred when the British and Irish Prime Ministers, John Major and Albert Reynolds, signed a joint statement declaring their commitment to removing ‘the causes of conflict’, enabling all parties ‘to overcome the legacy of history’, fostering the ‘healing’ of ‘divisions’.

The Downing Street Declaration incorporated both the Irish people’s right to self-determination and the principle of consent, without which there would be no prospect of Irish unification. The British offered no timetable for withdrawal from the province, though it did commit itself ‘to encourage, facilitate and enable’ dialogue on the ‘new political framework’.

While keen to encourage republicans to abandon armed struggle in favour of constitutional politics, Major could not afford to alienate unionist opinion. Five times the issue of consent features in the Declaration; in which the British Government promised ‘to uphold the democratic wish of a greater number of the people of Northern Ireland’, whether to remain within the Union or become part of ‘a sovereign united Ireland’.

Throughout spring and summer 1994, the Sinn Féin leadership engaged its core supporters in dialogue over their proposed strategy in the radically altered, post-Declaration political climate. Despite the fact that a Provisional IRA ceasefire had been mooted as a possibility at several points in the preceding years, their announcement on Wednesday, 31 August, that ‘a complete cessation of military operations’ would take effect ‘as of midnight’ was greeted with amazement and euphoria by large numbers of people in Ireland and Britain. A headline in the northern nationalist Irish News hailed the Provisionals’ statement as marking the start of ‘A New Era’, while The Guardian spoke of ‘The Promise of Peace’, and ‘an historic resolution of Northern Ireland’s bloody Troubles’.

Nationalist Belfast and Derry witnessed instant scenes of jubilation, yet these only served to fuel suspicions within the unionist community that the Westminster Government must have struck a deal with republicans. However, six weeks later, on 13 October 1994, there was further cause for optimism when loyalist paramilitaries declared their own ceasefire. Quickly, however, the issue of arms decommissioning proved a stumbling-block to progress, and the IRA’s unwillingness to destroy their weapons resulted in Sinn Féin’s exclusion from all-party talks.
Over the next two and a half years unionist scepticism and republican frustration intensified. In early 1996 the Provisional IRA ended its ceasefire. It was only restored after Labour’s victory in the Westminster General Election of May 1997. Evidence that Tony Blair, the new Prime Minister, viewed Northern Ireland as a priority can be seen from meetings with David Trimble of the UUP and John Bruton, the Taoiseach, which he hosted on successive days soon after his arrival in Downing Street. His Northern Ireland secretary, Mo Mowlam, repeatedly stressed the need for a new ceasefire and the government’s keenness to include Sinn Féin in talks. Tony Blair’s announcement on 25 June that all-party discussions in Northern Ireland would be resumed in September was designed to lure the republican movement back into dialogue. The restoration of the ceasefire in mid-July facilitated Sinn Féin’s admission into political negotiations, initiating the process which eventually resulted in what came to known as the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement of 1998. The Agreement reiterated that a united Ireland could only come about ‘with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland’.

In the immediate aftermath of the signing of the Agreement, the omens looked positive. In the referendum held on 22 May 1998, 71.1 per cent of Northern Ireland’s voters supported its attempt at creating a historic compromise. However, an exit poll carried out on behalf of the *Sunday Times* suggested that while 96 per cent of nationalists approved of the deal, 45 per cent of unionists did not. Over half of unionist ‘No’ voters cited plans for early prisoner release as the principal reason for their opposition, though 18 per cent spoke of their fear that the Agreement signalled a drift towards a united Ireland. A few months later, dissident republicans were responsible for the worst single atrocity in the Troubles’ history, when on Saturday 15 August they exploded in Omagh’s town centre a 500lb bomb which claimed the lives of twenty-nine people and two unborn children, and injured 360.

The Omagh bombing highlighted the need for progress on decommissioning. Throughout the following year the republicans’ unwillingness to destroy their weapons remained a major cause of contention, delaying the formation of the Executive. It was not until midnight on 1 December 1999 that devolved government was finally restored in Northern Ireland. Following a report in January 2000 from the
International Commission on Decommissioning that they had received ‘no information from the IRA as to when decommissioning will start’, the power-sharing Executive was immediately faced with a huge crisis. After only seventy-two days of self-government, the province’s new institutions were suspended by the Northern Ireland Secretary, Peter Mandelson. On this occasion devolution was restored after a relatively brief period, following an undertaking from the Provisionals that they would ‘initiate a process’ to put their arms ‘completely and verifiably . . . beyond use’ and consent to allow regular inspections of their sealed arms dumps by two leading international statesman, the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and the ANC’s Cyril Ramaphosa.

By the time the Executive and Assembly resumed work on 29 May 2000, unionist community support for the Agreement was increasingly ebbing away. A by-election in the autumn saw the second safest UUP seat in the province fall into DUP hands. Many unionist voters clearly preferred the uncompromising line on power-sharing with republicans taken by Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party. In the years following the Good Friday Agreement, political support for the parties that figured so prominently in the negotiations – the Ulster Unionist Party and the SDLP – continued to decline.

While paramilitaries from both communities considerably curbed the scale of their violence from the mid-1990s onwards, they continued to be involved in racketeering, robberies, drug-dealing and punishment beatings. Incidents such as the robbery of the Northern Bank in December 2004 and the fatal stabbing by republicans of Robert McCartney, a 33-year-old Catholic, in January 2005, fuelled distrust in the province. As a consequence, the announcement by the Independent Monitoring Commission in September 2005 that the Provisional IRA had completed the process of decommissioning did not lead to the Executive resuming office. Although the Irish and British Prime Ministers regarded this as a ‘landmark development’, they regretted that it had not ‘happened a long time ago’.

When on 4 October 2006 the Independent Monitoring Commission issued a report concluding that the Provisional IRA was no longer a threat to peace and stability in Northern Ireland, the stage was set for a further attempt by Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern to resolve outstanding differences between the main parties, the DUP and Sinn Féin. The St Andrews Agreement, unveiled by Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern on 13 October, called on them to embark on a consultation process to encourage their supporters to accept power-sharing (DUP) and to endorse the authority and police in Northern Ireland (SF). Days
later, a senior British Government official commented that: ‘This time everybody will be inside the tent, including Ian Paisley. If he is in government with Martin McGuinness, then it is well and truly over’. His optimism proved well-founded, as in early May 2007 devolved government returned to Northern Ireland when the DUP’s Ian Paisley and Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness were sworn in as leader and deputy of the Northern Ireland Executive. A vital task yet to be undertaken is how officially to commemorate the 3,600 dead of the Troubles. Writing within three months of the restoration of power-sharing, Fintan O’Toole argues that

it demands an approach to the past that is not exclusive; and it requires a belief that truth is a value in itself, rather than a form of tribal vindication. A process that could meet those needs would not merely honour the dead, but disarm the habits of thought that helped to kill them.

It is fitting to see in Northern writing since 1990 just such an attempt to remember the dead.

Certainly since the 1990s, much has changed utterly on the island of Ireland. As will be seen from the chapters that follow, writing in the Irish Republic and in the North has begun to accommodate an increasing diversity of voices which address themselves not only to issues preoccupying their local audiences, but also to wider geopolitical concerns, particularly since 11 September 2001 and the outbreak of the war in Iraq in 2003. One of many manifestations of this growing global consciousness was an anthology entitled Irish Writers Against War, published by Conor Kostick and Katherine Moore, which brought together writers from both sides of the border to deprecate the proposed invasion as ‘not-thought-through’ and ‘wildly disproportionate’. The anthology included a Preface written by Brian Friel, poems by Seamus Heaney, Brendan Kennelly, Medbh McGuckian, Sinéad Morrissey and Theo Dorgan, and prose extracts by Roddy Doyle, Jennifer Johnston, Eugene McCabe and Bernard Mac Laverty.

The work debated and celebrated in Irish Literature Since 1990: Diverse Voices reflects the greater and growing cultural self-belief which has developed under both political jurisdictions. This new confidence in encompassing worldwide issues in their writing is perhaps not unconnected to the example offered by Ireland’s former President, Mary Robinson, who took up the post of UN High Commissioner on Human Rights on leaving office in September 1997. In both positions she has workedimaginatively, bridging differences by sensing parallels between the history of her home country and that of vulnerable states today.
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**Contexts**

**Notes**

2. Ibid., pp. 317–18. Whereas in 1970 a total of 70 people in the Republic were convicted of drug offences, by 1983 the figure was 1,822.
7. Seamus Mallon, the SDLP’s deputy leader, won Newry and Armagh. His party only chose to contest four marginal seats.
9. In a speech of November 1989, quoted in McKittrick and McVea, p. 99, Brooke stated that ‘at some stage a debate might start within the terrorist community’ about the efficacy of armed struggle. He continued, ‘Now, if that were to occur, if in fact the terrorists were to decide the moment had come when they wished to withdraw from their activities, then I think the government would need to be imaginative in those circumstances’.
14. This is picked up in the essays that follow, particularly in the drama section. See also Brown, p. 386.
18. Davis et al., p. 45.
19. Elements of the X case were fictionalised by Edna O’Brien in her 1996 novel, *Down by the River*.
21. Davis et al., p. 72.
23. Following exposure of the shortcomings in the Irish government’s handling of Smyth’s extradition, the Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, felt compelled to resign his post.
24. Liam Harte points out that throughout the 1980s and 1990s evidence of institutional abuse had emerged, particularly following the publication

25 See Brown, pp. 370–1.


28 Brown, p. 378.

29 Qtd in Brown, p. 378.


33 Ibid.


36 A poll in the *Belfast Telegraph* in early September found that 56 per cent of respondents believed the ceasefire formed part of a secret deal.


38 Ibid., ‘Policing and Justice’, p. 3.

39 See Hennessey, *Peace Process*, p. 192. Here he draws attention to the massive slippage in unionist support for the Good Friday Agreement in the period leading up to the referendum. In mid-April, 70 per cent of UUP voters endorsed the Agreement, but by mid-May this had fallen to 52 per cent; the drop in approval from DUP voters was even more dramatic, slipping from 30 per cent to 3 per cent over the same period.

40 Quoted on cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch00.htm.

41 Quoted in English, p. 329.


43 Ibid.

