Building Beirut, transforming Jerusalem and breaking Basra

Empires collapse. Gang leaders
are strutting about like statesmen. The peoples
Can no longer be seen under all those armaments.
So the future lies in darkness and the forces of right
Are weak. All this was plain to you.

Walter Benjamin, *On the Suicide of the Refugee*

Cities of Salt, a novel by Abdelrahman Munif set in an unnamed Gulf kingdom tells the story of the transformation of Wadi Al Uyan by Americans after the discovery of oil.¹ The wadi, initially described as a 'salvation from death' amid the treacherous desert heat, played an important role in the lives of the Bedouin community of the unnamed kingdom – although the reader quickly draws parallels with Saudi Arabia – and its ensuing destruction has a devastating impact upon the people who lived there. The novel explores tensions between tradition and modernity that became increasingly pertinent after the discovery of oil, outlining the transformation of local society amid the socio-economic development of the state. The narrative reveals how these developments ride roughshod over tribal norms that had long regulated life, transforming the regulation and ordering of space, grounding the exception within a territorially bounded area. It was later banned by a number of Gulf states.

Although fictional, the novel offers a fascinating account of the evolution of life across the Gulf. World Bank data suggests that 65% of the Middle East's population live in cities, although in Kuwait this is 98%, in Qatar it is 99%, but in Yemen it is only 35%.² Legislation designed to regulate life finds most traction within urban areas, where jobs and welfare projects offer a degree of protection. The city is a fluid entity, often viewed through the lens of networks that go some way into ordering life.³ Beyond this, the aesthetics of a city can be used to develop a national identity, which also brings about exclusion. Decisions over infrastructural and development projects are taken for political reasons, driven by domestic and regional concerns, yet impacting on the lives

of citizens and non-citizens within states and across space. This chapter explores the role of urban environments as sites of sovereign power and contestation. It considers the way in which urban environments simultaneously shape – and are shaped by – political projects across the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

Understanding the concept of sovereignty entails exploration of relations between peoples and their leaders within space. A range of factors shape the essence of these interactions, from identity and ideology to the nature of the political system. The environment within which interactions occur can also shape relations between rulers and ruled. As Henri Lefebvre argues, space is ‘a social project ... the space thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and action ... in addition to being a means of production it is also a means of control, and hence of domination, of power.’⁴

Urban space is the physical representation of aspects of the *nomos*, as an arena through which life clashes with an array of identities and values that may impact upon the capacity of the life to live. A range of factors shape the (re)construction of space – both urban and rural – and the movement of people within and across spatial borders. Existential challenges emerging from environmental issues coupled with the nature of state building has left a large percentage of the region’s population living in urban environments. This relocation positions the city as the main arena of contemporary politics, the dominant space where life is regulated.

Migration from rural to urban environments was an integral part of the transformation of political organisation. A range of strategies were then deployed in an effort to regulate this space, but amid contestation, alternative sources of governance have emerged, providing legitimacy to those groups well placed to develop social welfare programmes. Reflecting the growing penetration of neoliberal ideas, as the century progressed state institutions took less of a role in urban planning, creating space for private entrepreneurs to act. This type of strategy serves to reinforce neopatrimonial networks that support sovereign power and often occur along sectarian lines, regulating life in the process.

Within the urban environment, identities, groups and networks interact and collide, simultaneously reinforcing and challenging national projects. Amid an array of tribal, ethnic, religious, political and ideological loyalties, regulating life within the city is of paramount importance for regime survival. As such, the city is the arena through which networks of patronage – family, tribal, religious or bureaucratic – can be mobilised to retain power. While legal structures go some way to restricting agency, norms have also been used to reduce the capacity of civil society to challenge regime stability.

The governance of a city goes beyond enforcing the laws of a state as it also aims at *letting life live*. But the city is also a site and perpetrator of urban violence, encapsulating both direct and indirect forms of violence and repression, regulating life in the process. This violence takes a range of different forms, from that enforced by security personnel, to imagery and structural violence, while also possessing a spatial aspect. Thus we should not view the city as a neutral zone; in turn, the city plays both a regulatory role and also a performative role, wherein the buildings and streets take on additional meaning, becoming the bearers of identities and ideologies. Yet neither

are cities solely the zones of performance, stages wherein political dynamics are played out; they are also landscapes of the mundane, where the routine of daily life is a product of regulatory structures.

A great deal of work has been written on spaces of exclusion within and beyond the contemporary city that are typically populated by refugees and displaced peoples⁵ and also the militarisation of the city,⁶ but very little has explored broader understandings of violence and its impact upon agency. It is through this that we can see how daily life is regulated across the Middle East, combining both the laws of a state and the normative structures of ideology, imagery, rhetoric and narratives in the manifestation of a clash between *ordnung* and *ortung*, the regulatory aspects of sovereign power interacting with the spatial characteristics.

The evolution of the urban

Territory is no doubt a geographical notion, but it's first of all a jurido-political one: the area controlled by a certain type of power.⁷

Urban planning and development are not a neutral process; development will, almost certainly, have implications for people affected areas. The city is the space in which contemporary politics occurs, with the interaction of people with institutions, infrastructure, ideas, capital and the regulatory mechanisms of a state.⁸ The city landscape is routinely structurally – and symbolically – violent. With this in mind, the urban landscape becomes a canvas for regime and nationalist narratives. Amid times of crisis, where the legitimacy of regimes is challenged, the canvas of the cityscape evolves to take on additional forms of representative violence.

Given the rapid urbanisation across the twentieth century, the city quickly became the arena within which life is regulated and contested.⁹ Population density meant that politics was increasingly played out within urban environments, bringing together laws, religion, ethnicity, sex and class into a melting pot of identities, issues and agendas. Development projects transform the social dynamics of a city, not only through the need to house workers responsible for undertaking the changes – often in deplorable conditions – but also through the changing social fabric of the state, wherein indigenous populations within a number of Gulf states are often in the minority.

Urban violence can be seen in two ways: the first is the structural violence of the architecture and depiction of civic loyalty within the city, which supports regime interest and nationalist projects. This may occur in the guise of latent structural and symbolic violence along political, ethnic, sectarian, tribal or national lines. The second is the regulation of life within the city, or the means through which security is enforced and regime stability is maintained, often through the guise of direct violence. These two concepts of violence often intertwine, feeding into one another and contributing to marginalisation and discrimination. Of course, this landscape reflects broader political trends within and between states. Moreover, the means through which life is regulated within the city can also be used as a mechanism of political control. Enforced by the security apparatus of the state, access to public space in lieu of civil society or

political space can be restricted in times of crisis. The interaction of these instances of violence can result in the emergence of a transformative space, a site of becoming or, put another way, a zone of indistinction, both possibility and repression.

An additional point of tension that manifests in the urban environment is the clash between the public and the private. Understanding the interaction between such concepts within particular contexts is at the heart of exploring the role of the city in shaping political life. Ultimately, as Mark Wigley explains,

What binds violence and space together is not the discrete events which appear to disturb the spaces we occupy but the more subterranean rhythms that already organize those very spaces ... In the end there is no space without violence, and no violence that is not spatial. Violence is the very structure of space. Each discourse maintains a strategic silence about the particular forms of violence which makes both it and what it appears to address possible.¹⁰

As such, to understand urban violence we must combine the analysis of terrain with both legal and pragmatic structures that regulate life and those contextual 'rhythms', currents or norms that shape political action. This interaction helps to reveal the nature of sovereignty and the extent to which rulers can regulate life or strip it of political meaning. Ultimately, the interactions of such structures and rhythms feed back into ordering of space and the demarcation of borders.

Transformations occurred as local actors sought to secure their rule and to engage with processes of globalisation. The transformation of society exposed a tension between old and new, traditional and modern forms of public space. The evolution from mandate to independence fuelled such dichotomies. Those able to facilitate urban development projects were immediately positioned as those with power and influence and, as a consequence, the transformation of urban landscapes secured political power. Gaps in marginal regions result in a vacuum, filled by a range of documentary practices, including the face of martyrs on billboards, lamp posts, walls, commemorative structures and across public spaces.¹¹ Such zones of indistinction thus become zones of possibility wherein agency can be exerted amid efforts to regulate life.

Urban development and the transformation of life from rural to urban brought with it serious changes to the organisation of life, a great deal of which went against indigenous values. Ensuring that such networks and traditions continued albeit within a territorially defined space was a key part of the state-building process.¹² Maintaining control over fluid networks was an essential feature of laying claim to power but with the onset of urbanisation, which dramatically altered the organisation of life, bringing in territorial rights and with it, private property, this became increasingly difficult.

The legacy of empire and mandate rule played a prominent role in the transformation of Middle Eastern cities. Those cities that had played important roles during the Ottoman Empire, facilitating trade links with Europe such as Beirut, Alexandria and Izmir, experienced rapid transformation,¹³ while new mandate capitals also experienced rapid developments as they took on burgeoning importance. The establishment of political institutions and bureaucracies in new states also facilitated

transformation of both formal and normative structures, as people moved from the countryside to the cities in search of work.

As Charles Tripp suggests,

For those who inherited the colonial state and then proceeded to claim the exclusive right to rule it, the very languages and practices of power that gave them dominion were eventually turned against them. Idioms that had been used to buttress the power of a restrictive elite were taken up by their opponents and given a very different significance, while retaining their potency.¹⁴

Idioms, language and practices differ within and between states and, as a consequence, the nature of political life within cities differs, once again shaped by contingent factors. For instance, the cities of the Persian Gulf range from company towns, secondary port cities and aspiring global metropolises,¹⁵ which differ from the more historic seats of regional power in Baghdad, Beirut and Cairo. It is then important to make distinctions between cities across the region, not only by considering their expressions of political power, but also by considering their engagement with the global *nomos*. The discovery of oil in the 1920s and 1930s facilitated the development of so-called 'company towns', where the city dominated all forms of life, political, cultural and social, creating hierarchical structures of control.¹⁶ Dammam, Al Khobar, Dharan, Abadan, Ahmadi and Awali were all formed as company towns by the activity of external oil companies, who brought with them Western architects and ideas, seemingly with little regard for the impact on people who had been living there, for whom this was yet another damning criticism of modernity.¹⁷

This transformation of life across the Gulf states required large-scale investment and with it a workforce that had its own impact upon life in the Gulf; an influx of non-indigenous workers meant that by the 1950s around 40% of employees in the oil and gas sector were from abroad.¹⁸ Even states without oil reserves profited as they sent off workers to oil states and received vast remittances in return, facilitating the transformation of the homeland, enabling the purchase of land and rapid commercial ventures.¹⁹ Some, such as the Lebanese businessman Rafik Hariri, earned a great deal in the Gulf, which funded his involvement in political life before his assassination in 2005.²⁰ The legacy of such transformations remains evident in the commercial districts of cities and the high-rise structures that dominate skylines. To their critics, such structures 'often ignore the living tissue of their surroundings in their physical outlook and in catering to new, exclusive sections of the local economy. High-rise dwellings, often located in the midst of less-affluent city spaces, further exemplify this novel, decontextualised urban reality.'²¹

Of course, this position within the networks of a global economy came at a social – and indeed political – cost. As Fuad Malkawi suggests, traditional forms of urban organisation, cityscape and construction have been transformed in the quest for new spaces of global consumption, materialism and communication.²² These new urban spaces were carefully planned to restrict and monitor life, tailoring it to the needs of the company and contemporary visions of the state.²³ In Turkey, Ottoman architecture was removed to prevent recourse to erstwhile normative structures.²⁴ Moreover, there was,

as Kaveh Ehsani articulates, an increased obsession with the idea of using the urban environment as an instrument of coercion over the population.²⁵ Such processes were driven by Western experience, where once again, architecture, necessity and political calculations trumped local contexts and values and were designed in accordance with an imaginary construction of 'Arabia'.²⁶

In the first half of the twentieth century, a burgeoning scholarship on cities in the region – underpinned by Orientalist tropes – was concerned with the defining characteristics of an 'Islamic city'. From this scholarship, a mosque, suq and public bathhouse were deemed necessary criteria to become a city in the Middle East in spite of conclusions being derived from North Africa alone.²⁷ While cities undoubtedly share similar characteristics, contingent factors create difference as a consequence of climate, technologies of production and distribution, social dynamics and political systems. The interaction of these factors produced urban forms of organisation that differed across the region amid competing visions of political organisation. Cities became spaces of contestation as tradition and modernity collapse into zones of indistinction and possibility, simultaneously drawing on the past and future, underpinned by Orientalist interpretations of the 'Islamic city' in the process.²⁸ Yet one Emirati woman told me that Emirati traditions such as pearl diving had largely been discarded unlike in neighbouring Qatar, where the *dhow*s (boats commonly found in the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and East Africa) were turned into tourist attractions.²⁹

This contemporary construction of an imaginary 'Arabia' is perhaps best seen amid recent developments in Kuwait, where an architectural firm involved in designing Madinat Al-Hareer, the City of Silk, plays upon such concepts while also serving as a beacon of Kuwaiti power. The new city will be home to the 'Tower of a Thousand and One Nights', and upon completion, it will be the largest tower in the world, dwarfing both the Freedom Tower in Saudi Arabia and the Burj Khalifa in Dubai. For Kuwait, the Madinat Al-Hareer is supposed to represent life on the Arabian Peninsula inspired by 'the defiant flora of the desert as much as the rich folklore of Arabic heritage described in Kitab'Alf Layla wa-Layla'.³⁰

The means and extent to which urban landscapes have transformed has serious implications for the political environment of a state. In Abu Dhabi, after Sheikh Zayed's decision to embark on an ambitious development programme, 40% of the workforce was dedicated to construction projects.³¹ Similar stories are found across the Gulf. Doha's journey from Bedouin rule to global hub occurred at vast speed amid independence movements and the British withdrawal.³² In Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, the speed of transformation created contradictions within society between traditional values and modernity, many of which were reflected within architecture and the incongruence of suq and skyscraper.

Urban landscapes, public space and symbolic architecture

Attempts to rewrite the social contract impact on cities first. Furthermore, when state-run bureaucracies retreat from public service amid an array of socio-economic

challenges, citizens are forced to find other sources of employment, welfare and support. Inhabitants of the major cities of the developing world live in challenging conditions, where many survive on the few resources they can access. The move to informal networks of support creates space for groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizballah, Hamas and Fatah to gain large-scale support. Open space within urban environments provided scope for contestation, transformation and expressions of political dissent, where urban landscapes become canvases for counter-hegemonic narratives of martyrdom and resistance. Of course, this resulted in the increased policing and regulation of urban space through coercion and violence.

Religion, tradition and culture provide guidance for the structuring of space in accordance with regulatory goals. The type of mosque – or temple or church – helps to shape the identity of the area yet this must also be placed within economic contexts.³³ Although people are seen to reside within homogenous areas, such a reductive argument serves to reify sectarian identities, at the expense of class and economic factors.³⁴

Endogenous and exogenous forces – both with and without consent – shape the spatial dimensions of the urban space, with implications for the capacity of people to live their lives.³⁵ Cities themselves are exclusionary projects in their governance and their architecture, which has violent spatial properties. Within cities, political, social, ethnic or religious differences can have spatial implications, which are then amplified by national and regional aspirations. One such way in which power and aspiration can be demonstrated is through architecture and imagery. In addition to security mechanisms such as armed police, barbed wire and security cameras, violence also possesses a symbolic side, playing a political role and bearing an identity.

Urban environments provide an array of opportunities for such domination and violence to be displayed and for latent structures to manifest. The rising importance of urban environments also provides scope for authority to be challenged, often in visual form using the urban landscape as a canvas. The power of the image across the Middle East should not be ignored. From the martyrdom posters in Lebanon and Palestine, to the posters of Khomeini and Khamenei in Iran and Iraq, taking in the images of Gulf leaders, it is hard to ignore the presence of political narratives that remind people of their *nomos*, of the context and contingency that regulates their life.

Regulating and transforming life in rural and urban contexts is thus a demonstration of sovereign power:

The reorganisation of towns and the laying out of new colonial quarters, every regulation of economic or social practice, the construction of the country's new system of irrigation canals ... the building of barracks, police stations and classrooms, the completion of a system of railways – this pervasive process of 'order' must be understood as more than mere improvement or 'reform'. Such projects were all undertaken as enframing, and hence had the effect of representing a realm of the conceptual, conjuring up for the first time the prior abstraction of progress, reason, law, discipline, history, colonial authority and order.³⁶

Transformation also occurs through expropriation, gentrification, occupation and ethnic redistribution as a range of strategies facilitate demonstrations of sovereign power, brought about by formal and normative structures but contingent upon context-specific factors.³⁷ Such actions shape political landscapes, creating a metaphysical environment wherein people resort to extralegal strategies as mechanisms of exerting agency.³⁸

Amid such challenges, public space became monopolised by regimes. For many Egyptians, public space was synonymous with space that is 'owned by the government'.³⁹ In spite of this, Tahrir Square had long been a place in which dissent was expressed, such as Evacuation Day in 1946, which called for the British withdrawal from Egypt. This was later followed by an occupation by a student movement in 1972; sympathisers of the second *intifada* in 2001; people protesting against Hosni Mubarak's support for the US-led Iraq War; and political reform movements in 2005 and 2006.⁴⁰ In the following years, the area around Tahrir Square underwent what was ostensibly the development of the Cairo metro and a parking garage, but as crowds entered the square in early 2011, it became evident that the work had instead been a move to prevent symbolic protest, albeit unsuccessfully.

Myriad efforts were undertaken to regulate life across cities in the region. As Stephen Graham notes, the city is the arena within which tracking, surveillance and targeting have all begun to play an integral role in daily life.⁴¹ Of course, this demonstrates the power of formal security structures – supported by security agencies, the police and military – along with the speed at which such techniques can evolve. Yet we must also consider the architecture and the symbolism deployed across the city, which acts as a daily reminder of sovereign power.

While state mechanisms routinely used violence as a mechanism of control, urban violence occurs in a number of other guises. The careful development of nationalist iconography was a prominent part of the urban environment in the formative stages of nationalist projects, which often revolved around a leader's cult of personality and benevolence. In a nod towards aspects of totalitarianism, roads and buildings were often adorned with images of rulers and their families, in explicit displays of power. This imagery is representative of the social contract in operation across many Gulf societies where ruling families have become almost synonymous with political projects in states.

Gentrification and transformative violence

The evolution of the city, much like the city itself, should not be viewed as a neutral process. Investment, change and urban planning all reflect political decisions and aspirations with regard to regulating political life and the urban environment. While this contains aspects of improving life for people living within the city, such decisions are loaded with political meaning. Transformation is often a violent process, uprooting people from homes and radically altering daily life. In addition, the ongoing gentrification of a number of areas simultaneously erases history and creates a more precarious life. Gentrification offers a process through which dilapidated areas are

renovated. In a number of contexts, these areas are also home to dissident groups and thus, while there is an economic dimension at play, there is a clear political dimension to processes of gentrification.

Gentrification serves both to facilitate further transformation away from prior incarnations of the urban environment and to reinforce new identities. With the increased ease of access to knowledge and imagery, this has taken on paramount importance, particularly in areas that have large numbers of tourists. With lower land prices on the peripheries of cities, the desire for property is higher than in the historic centres. This is exacerbated by economic developments within the global economy that have had an impact in local areas. Take the suq in Manama, previously occupying a central role in daily life, it has now become almost peripheral to economic developments such as the Financial Harbour, built upon land reclaimed from the sea. Moreover, the historic suq has begun to play a lesser role to the malls that have emerged across the island and even to the shops close to the nearby Bab al Bahrain, which was itself part of a land reclamation process. Within the suq, traditional shops have been occupied by migrants from the Asian subcontinent, reflecting both the changes in identity and urban life across Bahrain, along with the emergence of new hierarchies.

The city of Jaffa, once an Arab city overlooking the Mediterranean Sea, is another example of the extent to which cities can play a transformative role. In the British mandate era, Jaffa became a site of protest between Arabs and Jews, which resulted in the establishment of Tel Aviv to the north. During the struggle to establish the state of Israel, Jaffa was defended by a group identified as the Muslim Brotherhood who surrendered to the Zionist forces after five months of intense fighting.⁴² The regulation of life in Jaffa under the British was done in accordance with martial law established by mandatory rule. Under martial law, house demolitions were a common part of daily life along with the militarisation of the city. Such experiences were later adopted by the Israeli security services as a means of maintaining control of life in the West Bank and Gaza. In recent years, the gentrification of Jaffa has seen the restoration of traditional Arab monuments, such as the Mosque of the Sea and the Hassan Bek Mosque, turning the Old City of Jaffa into a tourist area.⁴³ Additionally, other reports have noted efforts to 'Judaize' the area by building Jewish only complexes.⁴⁴ As a consequence, retail and rent prices have been driven up, disproportionately affecting Palestinian-Israelis, referred to by a legal defence coordinator as 'ethnic cleansing'.⁴⁵

Efforts to improve the infrastructure of cities can also have negative social implications. Across Beirut, urban planning has detrimentally impacted upon local communities⁴⁶ and their engagement with life across the city. Massive investment from Saudi nationals transformed the area between Ras Beirut and Ain al Mraieeh, which is now largely empty. The construction of bridges and highways such as the Yerevan Bridge in Bourj Hammoud, the Hawd Al Wilaya Bridge in Basta and the Charles Helou Avenue have all divided neighbourhoods, resulting in economic and social repercussions.⁴⁷ After all, the fundamental point of a city is to provide a home and welfare to people and as an urban environment experiences transformation, there will be consequences for people.

While urban planning is undertaken by regimes and actors empowered by regimes through networks of patronage or cronyism, there are a number of examples of societal actors driving the transformation of political terrain. Perhaps the most obvious example of this is found in the settler movements in the West Bank who seek to use architecture and building projects as a means through which the borders of the state of Israel can be pushed. The establishment of such settlements, deemed illegal under international law yet both legal and illegal under Israeli law, brings with it infrastructural programmes that facilitate such transformations, including the development of roads and water supplies. Such projects have symbolic importance, along with a transformative sense of permanence, impacting on facts on the ground.

In addition to transformation of land for settlement, land has also been renovated for tourist purposes. Much like in Jaffa, the process of gentrification was designed to increase the flow of tourists to the Old City and the development of the old harbour and transformation into a market area with bars and restaurants was a prominent part of this goal. Yet perhaps the best example of such forced exclusion is the case of the Jordanian Bedouin living in Petra, who were evicted to provide the Jordanian state with access to a vast revenue stream from tourism.

Of course, other cities have experienced similar transformations, as the rhythms of state politics clash with hegemonic globalising forces. In Mecca, the need to accommodate large numbers of pilgrims resulted in dramatic change to the city.⁴⁸ In the Grand Mosque, a seventeenth-century portico was removed, meaning that around 95% of Mecca's old buildings had been destroyed in the past two decades, later described as 'cultural vandalism' by the head of the Islamic Heritage Research Foundation, Irfan Al Alawi.⁴⁹ The development of the Mecca Royal Clock Tower was erected on the graves of around four hundred culturally significant sites, while the house of Khadijah, the Prophet's first wife, has been transformed into a block of toilets.⁵⁰ Earlier renovations at the Grand Mosque resulted in the destruction of the Ottoman Al Ajyad Fortress and claims from Ankara that such developments were an 'act of barbarism' and the destruction of shared Islamic heritage.⁵¹ The politicisation of Mecca continued as developments cost the lives of thousands of pilgrims, when in 2006 the Al Ghaza hotel collapsed and in 2015, a crane collapsed into the Grand Mosque, killing 118 people. The same year, between 2,000 and 4,000 pilgrims were crushed close to the Jamaraat Bridge.

As a number of scholars have shown, violence maintains a regulatory capability, in some cases restricting the capacity of people to travel within certain areas. The case of Palestine provides a harrowing example of how the Israeli state has used architecture as a means of exerting control.⁵² In Khuzestan, the south-western province of Iran, political aspirations of Arabs residing in towns such as Abadan were a source of existential concern to the Iranian regime. In addition to concerns about the territorial integrity of the state,⁵³ the province was home to around 80% of Iran's oil reserves yet lacked substantial economic investment and infrastructural development, resulting in large-scale political and social grievances including suggestions of widespread drug addiction.⁵⁴ In response to perceived irredentist agendas, Tehran embarked on a process of ethnic redistribution, moving ethnic Persians into Arab-Iranian areas in an attempt

to erode unrest and ensure stability.⁵⁵ This strategy would later be used by Bashar Al Assad in an attempt to create order and maintain power in post-uprisings Syria.⁵⁶

Existential transformation and becoming

The transformation of Jerusalem provides scope to explore how urban landscapes take on political meaning, while the regulation of the urban environment feeds into broader, existential political projects. Jerusalem offers an example of how cities serve both as a means through which life is regulated but also how identity and ideology is performed. Jerusalem has long occupied a central role in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, with both claiming the city as capital of their states. Consideration of architecture and symbolism across the city reveal mechanisms of control and the way in which life has been regulated reveals a great deal about the nature of sovereignty within Jerusalem and Israel more broadly.

In the summer of 1943, the Zionist Planning Committee was established to develop a plan to transform the urban landscape of Jerusalem, five years before the formal establishment of the state of Israel. The aim of the group was 'the economic recovery of Jerusalem to enable the city to attract large numbers of residents', which was central to the broader Zionist project.⁵⁷ In support of this, a subcommittee was established, focusing entirely upon industry in Jerusalem to facilitate its rebirth. For David Ben Gurion, the subcommittee was to facilitate a rise in 'Jewish settlement in Jerusalem and its environs, to rehabilitate and strengthen its economic basis, and to ensure that the capital of our country will have a Jewish majority in population and building'.⁵⁸

In spite of such demands, before the establishment of Israel in 1948 Jerusalem became peripheral to the transformation of other areas of Palestine, notably Jaffa and Tel Aviv, amid concerns that mistakes in Jerusalem could prevent the establishment of the state. It was only by 30 July 1980 that the Jerusalem Law was passed by the Israeli Knesset, which formalised the regulation of eastern parts of Jerusalem. Facts on the ground, however, reflected de facto control of Jerusalem, which had been declared as the capital of the Israeli state on 13 December 1949.⁵⁹

In the aftermath of the seizure of East Jerusalem in 1967 with the historic Old City as its symbolic prize, Israeli strategists sought to solidify their state-building efforts. Ensuring the retention of a unified Jerusalem under Israeli control was the main goal.⁶⁰ The importance of this was stressed by Moshe Dayan, who on entering the city stated that 'we have reunited divided Jerusalem, the dismembered capital of Israel. We have returned to our most holy places; we have returned and we shall never leave them'.⁶¹ In his memoirs, Abba Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister, wrote how 'we had come back to the cradle of our nationhood to stay there forever'.⁶² Reflecting this existential transformation, shortly after the capture of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, Israeli maps were ordered to stop using to the 1947 'Green Line' as the border of Israel.⁶³

In a speech at the UN headquarters in New York, Abba Eban described Israel's emergence 'from grave danger to successful resistance', attempting to shape public sentiment in what was described by the *Chicago Tribune* as 'one of the greatest

speeches of modern times.⁶⁴ Yet the aftermath of the 1967 war would have serious territorial repercussions for both Israel and Palestine. On 22 September 1967, Israeli newspapers published a 160-word statement by a group calling itself the Movement for a Greater Israel:

The victory of the Israeli defense forces in the Six Day War has brought the nation and the state into a new and fateful era. Undivided Israel is now in the hands of the Jewish people, and just as we had no right to renounce the State of Israel, so are we commanded gratefully to receive what this era has granted us: namely, the entire Land of Israel.

We owe allegiance to the integrity of our land; to its past and its future. And no government in Israel has the right to give up this wholeness.⁶⁵

With this statement, the political landscape of Israel was dramatically transformed, resulting in Palestinian territory becoming the site of decades-long contestation between Israelis, Palestinians and settler movements.

Within this context, the regulation and retention of land took on existential importance. Urban planning became a central aspect of an existential strategy designed to normalise the occupation and create cohesion among territories held by the Israeli state. In doing so, the city became a site of contestation deployed by the Israeli state against Palestinians in the name of sovereignty. A ring of settlements was built around East Jerusalem, cutting off the city's Palestinian population from other Palestinians in the West Bank. In the city itself, the Maghriba Quarter located in front of the Western Wall was destroyed immediately after military victory to facilitate access to the wall. Further architectural moves were undertaken, demonstrating the power of the new Israeli state. Architectural and archeological efforts were reflective of the broader Zionist project, which David Ben Gurion suggested required 'digging the soil with our own hands'⁶⁶ as a necessary part of transformation. This process of transubstantiation serves as a form of creative destruction, an opportunity for *becoming*, where destruction is a form of regulation, an attempt to shape the future by destroying the past.

The transformation of the city of Jerusalem quickly took shape, combining old British colonial laws with the establishment of new urban planning institutions. Policy briefings such as *Israel Builds* became a prominent feature of Israeli political and security discourse. In this volume, Ram Karmi, wrote that, 'Home means more than just the narrow confines of one's apartment; it also implies a sense of belonging to the immediate surroundings.'⁶⁷ Transformation took on both personal and nationalist characteristics where the two feed into one another and, as a first order of business, the barriers separating the two sides of the city were removed. Of course, sovereign power also regulates space through placing restrictions on land ownership. In accordance with Israeli law, 80% of the land comprising the territorial area of Israel can only be purchased by Jews.⁶⁸ Such regulation has changed the demographic status of the Old City, as previous Arab inhabitants have given way to Jewish owners, many of whom are bankrolled by Zionist organisations.

Such symbolic violence is also seen in rural areas of the West Bank under military control. When travelling towards Nablus from the south of Israel at night, one is struck by the bright lights of a Star of David on the Palestinian hills, while Stars of David are also found within the Old City of Jerusalem, in the Christian and Muslim Quarters, once again demonstrating the extent of structural violence within the urban environment. Life for Palestinians living in Jerusalem is increasingly difficult, regulated by police and security apparatus and subjected to structural violence across the city. Checkpoints are routinely used across the Old City to regulate movement, most recently seen in the installation of metal detectors at the entrance of the Al Aqsa mosque, which resulted in widespread demonstrations in the summer of 2017.

Since 1967, East Jerusalem and the West Bank have themselves undergone existential transformation, not only in the structure of urban life but also in the capacity of agency to live within these structures. The development of infrastructure within territorial borders was politically contested but integral to the development of Israel. In ensuring that Jerusalem remained united, successive governments supported settlement building in the east of the city in predominantly Arab neighbourhoods. Such moves were not without consequence and seemingly little thought was given to the implications for Palestinians. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol reflected, 'What are we going to do with a million Arabs?' Eshkol paused for a moment and then responded, 'I get it. You want the dowry, but you don't like the bride!'⁶⁹ Addressing this question brought security officials and urban planners together to develop an urban landscape that served as a symbol of a sovereign Jewish state while also protecting its territorial borders, citizens and identity.

Gentrification and urban development processes have facilitated the transformation of East Jerusalem from Arab to Jewish, as part of broader political projects. Speaking on a tour of East Jerusalem in September 2017, Israeli Public Security Minister Gilad Erdan articulated his excitement to see Jewish families in East Jerusalem, along with the claim that, 'Our sovereignty in the State of Israel and the Land of Israel begins here'.⁷⁰ Governance of East Jerusalem reveals a great deal about political dynamics. Since 1967 one can see power disparities between Arab and Israeli communities, reflected in access to land, education, electricity and mobility.

Amid rising violence stemming from two *intifadas*, a separation wall 422 miles long was built east of the so-called Green Line⁷¹ with the declared objective of 'regulating the entry of Palestinians from the West Bank into Israel'.⁷² Regulating access are twenty-seven permanently manned checkpoints that punctuate the wall while access into and out of Gaza is subject to approval from Israeli security officials. Within the West Bank itself, Palestinian life is also restricted, as the development of settlements means that there are around forty roads in the West Bank that Palestinians are not able to use.

Since then, those on the east of the wall have restricted access to Jerusalem. Although initially designed as a mechanism to reduce the threat of terrorism, what has developed is a formal security structure that also serves to regulate life and embed the occupation within the fabric of Palestinian daily life, referred to by many as apartheid.⁷³ Checkpoints are spaces of exception where life is reduced to its barest form as people are caught in a zone of indistinction, routinely subjected to violence, humiliation and

harassment.⁷⁴ While checkpoints restrict access from the West Bank into Israel, they also have a broader impact in terms of Palestinian efforts to situate any future capital in Jerusalem, restricting connectivity – emotional and logistical – through limiting access to and communication with Palestinian East Jerusalemites. Similar restrictions are also found across the West Bank. Checkpoints in Hebron regulate movement across the city as a consequence of the presence of a large number of Palestinians and a small settler population that is protected by soldiers from the IDF. The Abed checkpoint, which is permanently staffed, is situated fifty metres away from the Ibrahimi Mosque, requires passage through cages and under the watchful eye of heavily armed soldiers.

Transformation of the urban architecture can also be used in a punitive manner: Those deemed guilty of violence against the Israeli state may have their houses demolished, creating more space for future settlement building, while such measures are justified by emergency legislation from the British mandate that legalised the transformation and militarisation of Jaffa. Such moves show the transformative power of the city, while also demonstrating how urban environments can themselves be violent towards inhabitants. While initially latent, this structural violence often manifests in direct acts of violence against individuals or representatives of the state as marginalised individuals seek to assert their agency. As we shall see, similar practices took place across the region, as space and architecture took on political meaning.

Camps and enclaves

The ‘national state’, having lost its very foundations, leads a life of a walking corpse, whose spurious existence is artificially prolonged by repeated injections of imperialist expansion.⁷⁵

The urban environment possesses a strong, restrictive element that is inherently violent. The sovereign order has restricted political life across the Middle East, resulting in all people *having the potential* to become *homo sacer*. For Agamben, *the camp* is the hidden paradigm of modernity, the means through which all of life is captured, comprised of particular zones where life is stripped of meaning and also a broader site of potentiality. Urban environments contain both of these aspects, but the centrality of the city within daily life means that governance of urban environments is an attempt to regulate this potential. Urban planning requires taking decisions about the manner in which life is regulated, through the design of the city, the installation of fences, traffic management, surveillance and access to welfare systems. Yet it can also contribute to marginalisation and political evisceration through structural violence and the perpetuation of normative structures of control.

Exclusionary narratives in support of regime and nationalist interest manifest in the architecture of the city and the imagery that adorns it, creating norms that are violent towards those not included within such projects. Of course, amid urban transformation and the ensuing repercussions, such moves may, in turn, provoke people to resort to violence, shaped by context-specific contingent factors.⁷⁶ Here, not only do we see the

emergence of a logic of necropolitics but also the emergence of war machines as groups seek to contest sovereign power.

Although Agamben argues that in bare life one has to accept this position of 'being thus,' the denial of agency is not reflected in events on the ground.⁷⁷ Amid challenges to regime monopolies on violence, the urban environment becomes an arena for actors from a range of backgrounds to exert agency. While urban landscapes impact upon people in different ways, it is obvious that life in a camp has similar consequences for people, albeit shaped by the intricacies of local context and contingency. The widespread reduction of political agency, restrictions on movement and labour and general structural violence serves to reinforce the idea of life being stripped of political meaning, abandoned by the law yet bound by it. In some cases, camps themselves are subjected to raids from security forces as a means of preventing the emergence of agency, yet in others, camps are left to self-regulate.⁷⁸

Widespread restrictions have eviscerated political life, creating zones where individuals and communities are cast aside by legal and normative structures, receiving no protection yet bound by law. Within this zone, individuals seek to assert agency, adorning the streets with new meaning through graffiti, martyrdom posters and other ideological motifs.⁷⁹ Yet in some cases, the city serves as a zone of possibility. The power of imagery, narratives and community gains traction in urban environments, as such factors can transcend economic, class, gender and political divides, serving to empower groups. In Lebanon, Palestinian groups such as Fatah al Islam and Shi'a groups such as Amal and Hizballah all sought to improve their socio-economic positions through engaging with the urban environment. In Iraq, parts of Baghdad took on new meaning amid the empowerment of Shi'a groups, with repercussions for Sunni minorities and the stability of the city. Spaces with sectarian divisions became zones of indistinction, brought about by suspension of the rule of law. Underpinning this was the political climate of the state, which revealed the influence of formal and normative structures and the power of a range of groups to capitalise on urban disenfranchisement.⁸⁰

While the city is a space of exception where formal structures operate to remove political meaning from life and create bare life, it is also the space where norms are (re)created and facilitate the process of stripping meaning from life. The camp is the example of bare life par excellence, seen in both forms routinely across the Middle East. As a consequence of exclusionary policies across the region, large-scale displacement of peoples has resulted in the establishment of physical camps to provide refuge to those affected. Although initially deemed temporary, the Belata camp outside Nablus has existed since 1948. Following large-scale displacement of peoples as a consequence of conflict, organisations such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) have taken on responsibility for refugees. In Lebanon, UNRWA has been tasked with protecting around four hundred and fifty thousand Palestinian refugees.⁸¹ As crises across the region continue, this number increases; estimates put the number of Syrian refugees living in Lebanon at around 1.5 million.⁸²

Across the first decade of Palestinian camps in Lebanon, the Lebanese security forces remained outside of the refugee camps, resulting in the creation of internal mechanisms of control. The intelligence wing of the Lebanese army – the Deuxième

Bureau – maintained a presence in the camps and the state began to play a more repressive role in both political life and the architecture of the camps, where roofs were banned, cement was prohibited and cartographical boundaries were stringently enforced.⁸³ Life in the camps became increasingly violent, particularly during the PLO clashes with Israel and the civil war, as Palestinians sought to assert a form of political agency, yet urban planning meant that access to the camps was restricted, subject to checkpoints and monitoring.⁸⁴

The case of Nahr el-Bared is one that provides an example of clashes between competing forces within the spatial borders of the camp. In the summer of 2007 the camp was the site of a fierce battle between the Lebanese military and Fateh al Islam, a militant Islamist group. Over the course of the summer, large swathes of the camp were destroyed and Palestinian residents were forced out. This is, as Adam Ramadan suggests, a case of urbicide within a spatialised exception⁸⁵ as violence transcended necessity and became

the deliberate and systematic erasure of the camp ... made more possible by the very nature of the political spaces of the camp, which are in Lebanon but not of Lebanon, in which Lebanese sovereignty and law are not fully enforced, in which a whole range of non-Lebanese actors exercise political power outside the control of the Lebanese state.⁸⁶

Here, the rule of law was suspended allowing for the Lebanese armed forces to undertake vandalism, looting and destruction without sanction as a consequence of the declaration of the exception. The fighting resulted in a large number of deaths and worsened the conditions facing Palestinians in the camps. Across present-day Beirut, Syrians fleeing conflict endure similar challenges. Similar experiences and stories can be told of camps across the Middle East, in Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, where processes of self-regulation emerge amid the suspension of the rule of law.

Historical examples of Palestinian resistance show how agency can be expressed within the context of bare life. Both Jordanian and Lebanese camps for Palestinians were sites of resistance – in Al-Wihdat and Shatila respectively – and symbolic of the burgeoning Palestinian nationalism. The failure of assimilation and legacy of both *nakba* and *naksa* (the day of the setback, commemorating the displacement of Palestinians after the 1967 Six Day War) facilitated this mass mobilisation of Palestinians in refugee camps – known as *al thawra* (the revolution) – across the region, creating narratives of heroism and resilience. Camps were seen to be liberated areas, furnaces in which *Fedayeen* (guerilla fighters) were forged, while Palestinian symbolism fuelled this nationalist sentiment.⁸⁷ Such symbolism remains an integral part of the Palestinian camps, resulting in the perception that such spaces remain militant zones. These tensions have longer-term ramifications for assimilation within host countries and their own state-building projects, yet their expression demonstrates the capacity for political agency.

Amid the fragmentation of urban environments, typically along communitarian lines, there has typically been an increase in the development of infrastructure and welfare programmes by non-state actors as a means of expressing agency and rejecting being thus. When state sovereignty fragments and regimes either choose not to – or are unable to – provide welfare and governance strategies that help people meet basic needs then other actors are required to care for peoples, reinforcing socio-political divisions. Filling this space provides opportunities for other actors to gain legitimacy by playing the role of a state and fulfilling its responsibilities under a social contract.

The nature of political life across the region has meant that such conditions are rife. From the Muslim Brotherhood to Hizballah, a range of groups have gained prominence through offering social care and physical protection to those in urban environments who have been excluded or marginalised by state structures. In Lebanon, Shi'a Muslims have long been marginalised, while poverty, disenfranchisement and marginalisation has been a prominent part of daily life dating back to the nineteenth century.⁸⁸ A century later, similar conditions remained. By 1974, Shi'a Muslims comprised somewhere in the region of 30% of the Lebanese population but received less than 1% of the state budget.⁸⁹

The combination of these factors contributed to creating conditions of bare life in Lebanon.⁹⁰ Furthermore, election laws required those wishing to vote to return to the villages of their birth in an attempt to provide an accurate demographic snapshot of life across Lebanon.⁹¹ Such a law failed to recognise the large-scale migration to urban centres, further adding to the disenfranchisement facing Shi'a groups. Within this context, it is hardly surprising that a group such as Hizballah, supported by the financial and logistical might of Iran, would garner support through the provision of welfare services.

In contemporary Beirut, the situation is much improved, but Hizballah remains the most influential actor in the city, if not the whole of Lebanon. The Party of God regulates life across Shi'a areas such as Dahiyya, where the group's ideology is visible across the fabric of the streets as flags, images of Nasrallah and Khomeini and martyrdom posters adorn buildings around the area. Even the road names reveal key figures and ideologues. The governance of Dahiyya, with its own particular security concerns, combines the old and the new; with video cameras on every corner and armed guards on prominent crossroads, relying on a delicate relationship with the formal mechanisms of power in the Lebanese to retain control, evoking questions about the ordering of space within Beirut, a veritable state within a state.

In post-2003 Iraq, which experienced an Al Qa'ida insurgency, increasingly sectarian violence taking place between a range of militias, a counter-insurgency campaign and serious economic challenges, US forces established the so-called Green Zone to facilitate governance efforts. The influx of political figures who had been ostracised by the Ba'ath regime, along with Iranian officials such as the senior Revolutionary Guards General Qassem Soleimani created a new form of political life in Baghdad. The Green Zone is secured by a range of different security structures, including military, police, members of the Ministry of Interior and the Prime Minister's regiment. Life within the Green Zone

is heavily securitised and regulated, wherein individuals are unable to walk around the streets without the correct credentials.⁹² Yet it is situated in an area that is socially and economically impoverished. If one walks out of the Green Zone and crosses the road, there is a dramatically different form of life. Post 2003, the influx of Iraqis from the diaspora has established a new, hierarchical form of Iraqi politics – and disenchantment – and additionally, a form of class politics that is tangible at the very heart of governance.⁹³

In the south of the country, a range of obstacles challenge both state sovereignty and the capacity of people to live their lives. The city of Basra has long been a source of political unrest, from the establishment of the state to the present day. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, dissent against Saddam's rule began in Basra before spreading across the south, revealing the failure to assimilate into political projects. Post 2003, sectarian divisions were exacerbated by financial support for groups such as Thra'allah, who were implicated in efforts to incite sectarian tensions and to penetrate the local police force amid support from Iran.⁹⁴ This Iranian support is perhaps best acknowledged in a comment from a senior advisor to the Ministry of Interior, who referred to the city as 'the Iranian city of Basra'.⁹⁵

Although shared religious ties helped facilitate an Iranian presence, revealed through posters and banners of Khomeini and Khamenei, such a presence was not always popular, particularly in light of excessive violence against protesters.⁹⁶ More important are socio-economic challenges that often escalate amid tensions between tribes and Shi'a militias such as the Asaib al-Haq.⁹⁷ Tribal tensions manifest in regulatory struggles, creating conditions of uncertainty for people who are trapped in an increasingly precarious position. Amid a range of economic challenges, drug dealing is prevalent as a means of raising money, with crystal meth a popular choice. One Iraqi analyst referred to the problem as *Breaking Basra* after the popular TV series *Breaking Bad*.⁹⁸ Such problems are not limited to Iraq, as people in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen will attest. As conditions deteriorate, black economies emerge as actors seek to fund their actions. In spite of proclamations of Islamic purity, drug dealing is rife as a means of raising funds quickly and easily.

Conclusions

As the majority of the region live in urban environments, cities are the arenas within which politics occurs. They are camps in both forms, the space in which *ordnung* and *ortung* clash, with devastating consequences. The structure and organisation of cities and their architecture and symbolism all serve as a means of *doing* politics. The symbolism found within cities across the Middle East displays a legacy of political activity and with it makes visible the colonial legacy of external penetration. The evolution of political organisation is a direct consequence of securing territory and the evolution of a state-building project. The delineation of territorial borders and efforts to exert sovereignty over this territory results in the establishment of governance structures within particular territories, but with this comes a serious change.

There remains little doubt that cities in the Middle East have been simultaneously the arenas and perpetrators of violence. The urban landscape provides a means through which life can be regulated but also the mechanism to demonstrate power and structural violence through the use of force, governance and architecture itself. For scholars of urban geopolitics, the city is increasingly the site of political violence: of terrorism, war and protest; direct and indirect; latent and manifest. Planners and strategists seek to design cities that can respond to such challenges, yet the design of cities also serves to reflect both formal and normative structures within political environments. In spite of the literature focusing upon the militarisation of urban landscapes, we must not solely consider cities as battlegrounds of insurgent struggles; they are much more.

While the camp can be both the physical and metaphysical sites of exception, the suspension of the rule of law creates zones of indistinction and conditions of potentiality where individuals can easily be reduced to bare life.⁹⁹ Beyond this, life is all too often subjugated to death, seen in the manifestation of urbicide across the region. Beyond these examples, we can also see the emergence of migrant compounds across the Gulf, where workers reside in squalor, abandoned by the law yet bound by it. Within such spaces, they are reduced to bare life.

Sovereign structures are imposed on to pre-existing socio-economic experiences, on communities that have a history of political interaction and organisation. With this in mind, we should not ignore the role of norms within the development of the sovereign state. Other scholars have argued for the existence of 'informal sovereignty' within political projects, but this approach is problematic when considering the already contested – and from this, hierarchical – nature of sovereignty. Instead, history, norms and cultural practices all shape the capacity of people to act, with groups often filling the role of the state when regimes are either unwilling or unable to regulate activity within a particular area. This type of regulation ranges from security, as seen in Hizballah-controlled southern Beirut, to the provision of hospitals by the Muslim Brotherhood across Cairo. As suggested in Chapter 3, Islam provides space through which civil society actors can engage in informal politics and, in doing so, providing much needed infrastructural support to those within society who did not have access to state-run institutions.

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- 75 Hannah Arendt, *Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954* (New York: Harcourt Brace) (1994), p. 143.
- 76 Rassem Khamaisi, 'Resisting Creeping Urbanization and Gentrification in the Old City of Jerusalem and Its Surroundings', *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 3:1 (2010), 53–70.
- 77 Interview with Saudi-Syrian academic, 2017.
- 78 The Palestinian camp of Belata in the city of Nablus is one such example of a site that is self-regulating, yet also subjected to intermittent raids by Israeli security forces amid fears of political unrest. The camp is on land that has a ninety-six-year lease, which is due to run out in 2046.
- 79 Perhaps the most incongruent I encountered were environmental slogans in Dahiyya, written in both Arabic and English.
- 80 Such remarks were made in interviews with people across the region, including an Iraqi analyst and film-maker, Lebanese journalists, a Syrian academic, Yemen analyst and others between 2015 and 2018.
- 81 Ghada Hashem Talhami, *Palestinian Refugees: Pawns to Political Actors* (New York: Nova Science, 2003), p. 147.
- 82 'Lebanon: Events of 2017' (Human Rights Watch, 2017), available at www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/lebanon (accessed 12.12.18).
- 83 Nasser Abourahme, 'Assembling and Spilling-Over: Towards an "Ethnography of Cement" in a Palestinian Refugee Camp', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 39:2 (2015), 207.
- 84 Ramadan and Fregonese, 'Hybrid Sovereignty'.
- 85 Urbicide in the Lebanese context was not a new phenomena, as Sara Fregonese suggests, having taken place across Beirut during the course of the Lebanese civil war as geopolitical meaning was 'multi-sited' and renegotiated across urban spaces. See Fregonese, 'The Urbicide of Beirut?'. This process of renegotiation continues across Beirut today amid competition over the institutionalisation of memory.
- 86 Ramadan, 'Destroying Nahr el-Bared'.
- 87 Luigi Achilli, 'Disengagement from Politics: Nationalism, Political Identity, and the Everyday in a Palestinian Refugee Camp in Jordan', *Critique of Anthropology*, 34:2 (2014), 234–57.

- 88 David Urqhart, quoted in Augustus R. Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1987).
- 89 Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a*, p. 18.
- 90 Mabon, 'Circle of Bare Life'.
- 91 Fuad I. Khuri, 'The Social Dynamics of the 1975–1977 War in Lebanon', *Armed Forces and Society*, 7 (Spring 1981), 383–408.
- 92 Interview with Iraqi analyst, 2017.
- 93 Interview with Iraqi film-maker 2017.
- 94 'Building a House on Shifting Sands: Iran's Influence In Iraq's Center-South, (WikiLeaks, 20.07.05), available at www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05BAGHDAD3015_a.html (accessed 12.10.15).
- 95 "'The Street Is Stronger Than Parliament': Sadrist Vows Opposition to LTSR, (WikiLeaks, 27.01.08), available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BAGHDAD239_a.html (accessed 12.10.15).
- 96 'Iraqi Views on Events in Iran and Impact on Iraq' (WikiLeaks, 05.01.10), available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10BAGHDAD22_a.html (accessed 12.10.15).
- 97 Mabon and Royle, *The Origins of ISIS*, p. 79.
- 98 Interview with Iraq analyst, 2017.
- 99 See Dilken, 'Zones of Indistinction'; and Edkins and Pin-Fat, 'Introduction: Life, Power, Resistance'.