(Re)cognising the corpse: individuality, identification and multidirectional memorialisation in post-genocide Rwanda

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Leontius … saw some dead bodies lying near the executioner, and he felt a desire to look at them, and at the same time felt disgust at the thought, and tried to turn aside. For some time he fought with himself and put his hand over his eyes, but in the end the desire got the better of him, and opening his eyes wide with his fingers he ran forward to the bodies, saying, ‘There you are, curse you, have your fill of the lovely spectacle.’

Plato, *The Republic*

**Introduction**

The moment of interaction between the corpse and the living subject has been profound since some of the earliest moments in literary history, possessing a unique intensity borne of the complex processes of identification at work in the instance of their meeting. In the words of Diana Fuss, self-identification is ‘the psychical mechanism that produces self-recognition … the play of difference and similitude in self–other relations … the detour through the other that defines a self.’ Self-perception, in Fuss’s model – facilitated by one’s recognition of intersubjective similarity and alterity – is a constant, evolving and dynamic interaction with an acting other. When the place of the other is occupied by a corpse, however, processes of identification enter a new dimension. Dispossessed of self-agency and no longer possessing the life force on which the
active difference/similitude component of identification relies, the corpse is both alien and simultaneously utterly, corporeally known to its viewer. The corpse's strange subjectivity renders its otherness radical and abject: it is, as Julia Kristeva writes, that which is 'not my correlative' – that which is 'opposed to I'. The discomforting sense of the uncanny induced by the corpse's visibility can be understood as partially motivating the many cultural dictums whose rituals of burial advocate the seemingly necessary invisibility of both death and the dead. When, however, the corpse remains visible, the living subject faces an eerily abject figure that forces processes of self-identification to shift, almost seismically, on the axes on which they traditionally turn. While the human form of the corpse elicits recognition from the living subject, its death-state is too radically other to be incorporated within any process of self–other identification. The corpse's rude, exposed lifelessness and lack of vitality 'show me', as Kristeva states, 'what I permanently thrust aside in order to live'.

Although ordinarily representing the pinnacle of alterity, the decidedly extraordinary occurrence that is genocide uniquely transforms the corpse's abject status by allowing it, in certain circumstances, either to retain its force as subject or stand as object. Enabled by a context of mass violence in which death ceases to singularly signify exceptional abjectness because of the ubiquity with which it is seen and experienced, identifications between the living subject and the corpse are enacted within new parameters.

Rwanda's corpses – viewed by many as the ultimate evidence of her genocidal history – have become a literal part of the country’s landscape. At memorial sites such as Murambi, Nyamata and Nyarubuye, decomposing bodies and the bones of the dead commemorate the victims of the genocide and evoke the violence to which they fell prey; memory, in Rwanda, is largely corporeal. However, the corpse's very ability to memorialise – and, indeed, what it specifically signifies – depends on the identifications it is able to elicit between itself and its viewer. The following analysis sets out to explore the differing corpse–living subject relations and identifications at work at Rwanda's memorial sites through the literature describing the experiences of those that encounter them. In the chaotic aftermath of genocide-based trauma, literature retains the ability to individualise an experience that the annals of history often reduce to statistics. Indeed, recapturing language to memorialise the loss of people and places is to refuse complicity with the genocidal act of silencing a population.
Memory is created by the very act of writing the lives of those who remain to speak of the past; their testimonies are both eulogies to the dead and simultaneous imperatives to the living regarding the banality of violence. Philip Gourevitch’s *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families* (1998), Jean Hatzfeld’s *Into the Quick of Life* (2005) and *A Time for Machetes* (2003) and Boubacar Boris Diop’s *Murambi, The Book of Bones* (2006) are texts that transcribe the experience of survival – a post-genocide state so inextricably twinned with the shadow of death that identifications with the corpse for both the survivor and the perpetrator are unavoidable.

The authorial and textual origins of the three works under scrutiny in the following analysis are as disparate as they are compelling. Gourevitch, an American journalist and writer, reported extensively on Rwanda’s genocide before publishing *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families* to considerable international critical acclaim, despite the concerns of notable Africanist René Lemarchand. French journalist Jean Hatzfeld devoted himself to genocide research after being posted as *Libération*’s war correspondent in Rwanda in 1994. While his curiosity regarding the traumatic aftermath of genocidal catastrophe manifested itself in the publication of *Into the Quick of Life*, which was well received in francophone literary circles, his fascination with the génocidaires themselves led to the writing of *A Time for Machetes*, which was similarly popular. Hatzfeld’s determination to collect testimonies of both perpetrators and victims not only distinguishes his work from that of the other writers included in this chapter, but represents a conferral of judgement-related agency to the reader. For rather than providing a narrative of victimhood alone, Hatzfeld’s collection of largely unedited perpetrator testimonies allows the reader to come to their own conclusions regarding the motivations, actions and reactions of these men turned murderers. *Murambi, The Book of Bones* is the work of Senegalese novelist and screenwriter Boubacar Boris Diop. The text was written as part of the ‘Rwanda: écrire par devoir de mémoire’ initiative, during which, in 1998, ten African writers were invited to Kigali reflect upon and write about Rwanda’s genocide in an effort towards its commemoration. But despite Diop’s resolution to employ fiction as a narrative vehicle separating him from both Gourevitch and Hatzfeld, each of these writers have in common a commitment to memorialising the genocide and those who perished. Despite these texts’ differences in generic format and authorial origin each works towards a common goal – a
remembrance of, and warning against, the sickening barbarity of which humans are capable.

The differences in the texts’ genres are abundantly clear. While Gourevitch’s text is a work of non-fiction and Hatzfeld’s offerings are characterised by the distinct tone of journalistic reportage, Diop’s *Murambi* is a fictional account of an all-too-real genocidal catastrophe. The rationale behind their selection for conjunctive analysis in this chapter despite their generic disparity is elucidated in Elie Wiesel’s now-famous pronouncement that ‘our generation invented a new literature, that of testimony’. Writing about extreme catastrophe has always tested pre-existing modes of written representation; the aftermath of unfathomable violence has, historically, been met by new turns in literary form and genre since ‘no genre or discipline “owns” trauma as a problem or can provide definitive boundaries for it’. As a blurring of the spoken and the unspeakable, testimonial accounts maintain the ability to resonate across genres. Indeed, the breakage of generic boundary is often itself testimony to the uncontrollable incomprehensibility of the human brutality exposed by genocide. Thus, it is perhaps an inability to comfortably identify with a recognisable form that enables a truthful witnessing of the horror of Rwanda’s history. Reflected in the literature that represents the genocide, it is sometimes – as this chapter will proceed to discuss – the impossibility of direct identification that produces the most fitting commemoration to unintelligible violence.

Hatzfeld’s and Diop’s texts – originally written in French – will be worked with in their English translation. This decision is influenced by the indirect identifications produced by Rwanda’s corporeal memorialisation and the commitment of these international authors to a global commemoration of Rwanda’s genocide. The perils of translation are widely recognised, and there is always the risk of losing culturally specific vocabulaic connotations and idioms. Indeed, within the Rwandan context specifically, Kinyarwanda has already been largely subsumed by French as part of Belgium’s colonial project, and more recently by English as the age of globalisation has dawned. However, the possibility also exists that the translator, to borrow from translation theorist Susan Bassnett, ‘can at times enrich or clarify the SL [Source Language] text as a direct result of the translation process’.

Testimonial writing is a genre that needs no enriching because its potency is generated by the horror it contains, and attempts to enrich it would signify a problematic interference with what is supposed to be a personal, subjective transmission of
experience. These translations, however, do not seek to reshape or repackage the narrations they relate. Having read these texts both in their original French forms and in their translated manifestations, it is clear that a substantial effort has been made to minimise semantic disruption. What these translations achieve, however, is accessibility. The rendering of these experiences into English, reflecting the memorial compulsions driving the production behind these texts, allow Rwanda’s genocide to be communicated and remembered far beyond its borders alone. Additionally, reading in translation is representative of a process of indirect intersubjective relation that is mirrored by the indirect identifications here demonstrated as being produced by Rwanda’s corporeal memorials.

How, though, do these identifications facilitate or resist the memorial function required by displays of corporeal memory? This is the question that the following analysis sets out to answer. Rwanda’s efforts to remember its genocidal history through the corporeal representation of violence is a multifaceted process, and the memorial effect of Rwanda’s corporeally commemorative strategy relies upon the corpse–human identifications it elicits. These identifications, however, vary enormously. As the following textual interrogations will demonstrate, it is sometimes through the very refusal of any living subject–corpse identification that the corporeal memory embodied by the dead is at its most commemorative.

**Anonymity and the impossibility of identification**

Literary analysis of Rwanda’s hundred days of devastation reveals that perceptions of the corpse have had a fascinating journey through Rwandan consciousness that have shifted with the start, duration and end of the violence. This phenomenon results from the shifting processes of identification that attend the shock of persecution, the instinctive impulses towards survival and the need for post-violence commemoration, respectively. Rwandan corpse–human intersubjective relations possess a history that precedes the corpse’s literal embodiment of the historical moment to which it becomes testimony. Thus, considerations of the corpse’s memorial quality must take into account the circumstances of its creation.

At its core, genocide’s ideology necessitates the creation of its victims’ faceless anonymity, a goal often achieved through the proliferation of prejudicial mythologies that themselves disrupt intersubjective identifications. To read Hatzfeld’s compilation of
perpetrator testimonies, *A Time for Machetes*, is to encounter the unsettling echo of Nazi Germany’s ideological and irrational hatreds, both in content and delivery. Testifying to the pedagogic entrenchment of anti-Tutsi sentiment, one perpetrator identified only as Adalbert comments that ‘Hutu children grew up asking no questions, listening hard to all this nastiness about Tutsis … a Tutsi might always be a deceiver … He had to be a natural target of suspicion.’ Educationally induced prejudices were corroborated by state-backed radio stations that, in the words of one Hutu named Pancrace, had been ‘yammering at us since 1992 to kill all the Tutsis … The Hutu always suspects that some plans are cooking deep in the Tutsi character, nourished in secret.’ The parallels between these statements and the testimonies of Nazis during the Second World War are chillingly apparent. But unlike the physical caricature of the large-nosed hunchback that the Nazis utilised to propagate the notion of the Jew as subhuman, Hutu propaganda portrayed the Tutsis as suspiciously physically superior: ‘the Tutsi women’, claims a man identified as Jean-Baptise, ‘seemed too slender … their fingers were too delicate’, while the Tutsi males possessed an unnaturally ‘great height.’

It is crucial to understand that these largely constructed corporeal stereotypes resist Hutu–Tutsi identification in the moment of their utterance. The creation of genocidal enmity is, necessarily, the refusal of the victims’ humanity. It is a denial of any physical human resemblance between victim and persecutor that could otherwise elicit a mutually affirming confirmation of identity. If Fuss is correct in saying that self-identification relies on the other to produce an individual identity based upon one’s recognition of the delicate balance of intersubjective similarity *and* alterity, the conceptual framework of genocide refuses this possibility by casting the victim as wholly unrecognisable and placing them within a crucially unrelatable sphere of existence.

There is, of course, the possibility that there *is* a sense of Hutu–Tutsi identification at work in Alphonse’s statement that ‘Tutsis take up too many plots of land … these people are too in the way.’ It could be convincingly argued that identification-as-enemy is a recognition cognisant of the manifest, threatening humanity of the opposed group. Escalations of animosity, however, prove ultimately transformative. Indeed, as the Rwandan context demonstrates, the Hutu campaign against the Tutsis eventually succeeded in painting them as a faceless and dangerous entity that required annihilation. Equally compelling is Alphonse’s next statement that ‘to kill
so many human beings we had to hate with no second thoughts’. Despite being capable of existing alone, it is the conflation of hatred and murder that produces genocide. What Alphonse testifies to here is the necessarily forced suspension of identification with his Tutsi neighbours in order to ‘kill so many … with no second thoughts’. The move from hatred to genocidal murder requires a categorical erasure of both agency and recognition despite pre-existing knowledge of the victim’s humanity – a reality corroborated by the lexical and semantic shifts Rwanda’s literature showcases. Although pre- and post-genocide testimonies record the Hutu referral to Tutsis as such, literary depictions of genocidal violence highlight a radically different form of both reference and address. ‘The intimidators,’ testifies Pancrace, ‘shouted, “Just look at these cockroaches – we told you so!” And we yelled, “Right, let’s go hunting!”’ This schematic and semantic referential move to the animalistic can be understood here both as the conscious effort towards, and the product of, non-identification. By literally defining the Tutsi as inhuman, an intersubjective relation irretrievably breaks down – representing a failure of human recognition that ultimately gave rise to one hundred of Rwanda’s darkest days.

At a time of extreme social turbulence, however, it is not only perpetrator groups that experience a shift in intersubjective identifications. In fact, where the Hutu perpetrators suspended recognition in order to kill, there is much literary evidence to suggest that Tutsi victims employed a similarly self-estranging technique in order to survive.

To literally chart the breakdown of Tutsi communal identifications is to understand both the process, and necessity, of cognitive estrangement as a response to persecution. This phenomenon is overtly apparent in survivors’ descriptions of their encounters with the corpses created by Rwanda’s violence; these descriptions bear witness to the changing processes of identification attending the impulse to survive extermination. At the start of the violence when inter-communal identifications remained intact – even, it may be argued, strengthened by fears surrounding the potential breakdown of group identity – Tutsi reactions to Tutsi corpses are visceral, painful and personal. Diop’s Rwandan protagonist Cornelius writes of being ‘mad with rage seeing all those heaps of dead bodies’ and feeling a personal anguish at the sight of a man approaching a pile of corpses, exclaiming, ‘It’s my Damien, I recognize his shoe!’ Similarly, in Hatzfeld’s Into the Quick of Life, Cassius Niyonsaba states that ‘in the beginning, I felt a tendency to cry on seeing these
skulls without names’.21 Identifications, both individual and communal, remain evocative by virtue of their retention. Both Diop’s mention of the name ‘Damien’ and Niyonsaba’s specific emotive reaction to skulls without names imply that the root of tragedy here is the Hutu refusal to endow their Tutsi victims with human identities. The pain experienced by these survivors is a reaction to the witness’s enduring identification with the corpses meeting the realisation of the fatal non-identification that produced them.

As these texts portray an escalating violence that forces an inevitable confrontation between the dead and the living, however, there is a distinct referential shift in the way that surviving Tutsi victims encounter both the bones and corpses of their slain brethren. Indeed, describing his experience of continued persecution, Niyonsaba states that while before he cried at the lack of humanity attributed by the Hutus to his Tutsi family and the facelessness that made their deaths possible, he now forces himself ‘not to think of particular faces when I look at the skulls … if I were to venture to think of someone I knew, fear catches up with me’.22 In addition to highlighting a remarkable shift within intersubjective recognition, Niyonsaba’s words make clear that the refusal of identification in this context works in tandem with the instinct to live. The fear that Niyonsaba avoids is a potentially lethal one; a scream, a wail or a cry would fatally expose his hidden position in the marshlands – survival, for him, depends upon a silence necessarily produced by a forced suspension of intersubjective recognition. To sustain his own identity, he must now refuse to identify others.

The dead bodies that scatter Rwanda’s landscape in the immediate aftermath of the killing also become literal concealers of the living. Recounting the story of his unlikely escape from death, fourteen-year-old Janvier Munyaneza tells Hatzfeld that to avoid detection, ‘I dropped onto the bodies … I made dead man’s eyes … I was completely covered in dead people’.23 Viewed by the living as articles of concealment, the corpse is excluded from any intersubjective process of identification; instead of retaining its status as subject, the corpse is rendered object. Moreover, the lack of identity now attributed to the dead is shown to extend to the living. Diop’s narrator-survivor Jessica recounts the moment ‘a woman they’ve wounded but are waiting to finish off later comes toward me, the right part of her jaw and chest covered in blood … I move away from her very quickly … I tell her dryly to leave me alone’.24 Although it may be argued that this woman occupies a liminal and ambiguous state that is neither life nor death the pervasiveness of the
anti-identification impulse and its necessary relationship to survival is clear. What is most striking here is the refusal of compassion, an emotion that relies upon the eliciting of intersubjective identification. Thus, it is precisely the absence of compassion that signals the death-knell of human relation in the context of extreme violence.

The Tutsi refusal to identify with others for the purposes of physical self-preservation can also be understood as functioning on a psychological level. In his testimony, Munyaneza states that the corpses ‘offended our spirits … we did not dare speak of them. They all too bluntly showed us how our life would end.’ This utterance implies the literal excommunication of the dead, of the corpses who now embody – in their very death state – the threat of extinction that demands their non-identification by those closest to them. I would also like to suggest at this juncture that the scale of Rwanda’s genocide itself resists intersubjective identification – a claim corroborated by the numerous survivor testimonies that attempt to describe the sheer number of Tutsi victims. ‘I step over corpses,’ remembers Christine Nyiransabimana, ‘but still they keep turning up before me, I keep stepping over more corpses, and it never stops.’ The blanket anonymity the Hutus attributed to their Tutsi victims comes to be reflected by the Tutsis themselves as a result of the scale of death to which they have been exposed. As a consequence, the deficit of identification renders the corpse an objective element of Rwanda’s landscape. Alexandre, a survivor of the genocide who, in conversation with Gourevitch, explains his decision to walk over a mass of corpses to reach safety, affirms the corpses’ materiality. ‘It was very unreal and very insane,’ he says, ‘this decision to walk on dead people. I don’t know. I don’t know what was right or wrong, or if I feel guilty, but I feel bad. It was necessary. It was the only way to get through.’ Testifying to the inversion of normality inherent in genocidal contexts, Alexandre’s words neatly summarise the corpses’ shift from recognisable subject to objects lacking certain subjectivities that make non-recognition desirable. This is a psychological and perceptual shift that demonstrates the painful forced suspension of identification as the price of survival.

**Corporeal commemoration**

In light of the preceding analysis, it becomes clear that to discuss the role of the corpse in Rwanda’s memorial sites without due consideration of their physical and psychological contexts is to do a disservice
to the complexity of these circumstances. For Rwandans, the relationship between the living and the corpse is defined and challenged long before the corpse takes its place within the formalised memorial context. Before Murambi, Nyamata and Nyarubuye were established, the corpse had already had its transformative encounter with both its Hutu murderer and its Tutsi kin. Choosing to display both corpses and bones with little mediation and through only minimally curated exhibits, the whole, lime-covered, partly clothed bodies and stacks of bones at Murambi, the still-bloody and clothes-filled pews at the church of Nyamata, as well as the rows of skulls and bones at Nyarubuye, give commemoration a corporeal character. Reasons for the decision to display violence's consequences in all their rawness are both literarily and critically disparate; while Hatzfeld himself claims that the memorial at Nyamata is an attempt ‘to restore some dignity … to the forgotten victims’, anthropologist Susan E. Cook writes that ‘the three dimensionality of a physical location, the sight of hastily dug pits and mass graves, and the smell and look of human remains make locations where genocide has taken place haunting reminders that genocide is an artefact of human society’. These diverging theoretical preponderances are representative of the enduringly oscillating perceptions of Rwanda’s commemorative sites. But do they memorialise the country’s specific genocidal killing – remembering the individuals whose identities were eradicated by both the conceptual framework and physical manifestation of Hutu violence – or commemorate what Sara Guyer terms ‘death-in-general’?

The argument for the restoration of a sense of individualism through the construction of a site of corporeal memory is, in this chapter’s opinion, essentially flawed when applied to the Rwandan context. Indeed, the mass display of human remains that constitute these sites seem, conceptually at least, to be at odds with Eileen Julien’s comment that in the aftermath of the mass depersonalisation that makes genocide possible, ‘the most human response is to seek the uniqueness of individual experience … to tell the individual’s story’. Displayed en masse with no identifying markers, the bodies at these memorial sites continue to signify the anonymous non-identification that was the condition for their killing and, for many others, the price of survival. Through their mass corporeal nature, Rwanda’s memorial sites themselves become testimonies to the disastrous and painful forced suspension of intersubjective identification that facilitated the country’s violence – a theory compounded by the seemingly puzzling and complete detachment the
survivor-guides display towards the bodies that represent their past. When Diop’s Cornelius visits Murambi, his survivor-guide appears almost entirely emotionally removed from the events Murambi memorialises. Telling Cornelius that ‘between forty-five and fifty thousand’ people were murdered at Murambi and that ‘there are sixty-four doors’ in the memorial building, the guide is armed only with statistical facts about the scale of what is being commemorated and the physical practicalities of the site itself. The most striking statement, however, appears a page later: noticing that Cornelius is struggling to stomach the stench of death that attends the memorial, his guide asks if he would like to leave, remarking dismissively that ‘You’ll see the same bodies everywhere.’

Cook notes a similar phenomenon. Visiting Murambi, her survivor-guide Emmanuel ‘told us that there were many classrooms to see, so we shouldn’t spend too much time in any one of them.’ Emmanuel, she writes, ‘seemed determined to impress upon us both the monotony of room after room filled with the bodies of now faceless, nameless victims, as well as the enormity of the simultaneous death of so many.’ Although contesting the claim that the namelessness and facelessness of these corpses is simply the result of a mass corporeal display, due to the anonymity being clearly meant to reflect the non-identifications engendered at the very start of the conflict, both Diop and Cook attest to the fact that for the Rwandan, corporeal commemoration must be the memorialisation of the depersonalisation through which the country’s violence occurred. To individualise the bodies would be to betray the horror of mass anonymity that, in the Rwandan context, was so specific to the genocide’s operation. Guyer, too, acknowledges this. She writes that the Rwandan corpse ‘is exemplary, not individual, no one rather than someone, a synecdoche of all the dead. This is someone whose identity must remain unknown … so that this body can stand in for all of the others.’

In addition to being literal embodiments of testimony, the Tutsi guides’ detachment from the corpses and bones can also be read as highlighting the irreversible extinction of a forced psychological suspension of identification and recognition. Representing a past that remains hauntingly present to the Tutsi survivor, the sight of these corpses is potentially transportive and thus damaging. As the horrors of genocidal violence are so easily visible in the corpse, to see them is to be brought back to a time when survival depended on the absence of intersubjective relation. Thus, even in the post-genocide present, the survival instinct prompted by the sight of the
thousands of dead induces a suspension of personal relation and recognition that itself becomes testimony both to the experience of violence and its enduring consequences. For the Rwandan survivor, the restoration of identity to the dead is both psychologically impossible and conceptually incongruous with the memorial’s effort to emphasise the dehumanising nature of the violence these sites represent. Corporeal memory, therefore, is not about the re-endowment of the individual identities of those it remembers. Rather, by placing an emphasis on scale and mass, these sites commemorate the indiscriminate, non-distinguishing enormity of Hutu violence. Reading these sites as a direct address to the Hutus who carried out the killings is supported by much critical writing that works towards theorising these memorial’s dynamics. In fact, writes Cook, ‘because not all Hutus were perpetrators, the majority of Rwandans have a large stake in establishing the facts of what happened so that responsibility can be assigned to individuals, not groups.’

In a stunning reversal, therefore, of the memorial site’s common function – to restore individuality to its victims – corporeal memory in Rwanda, through the very anonymity of the mass from which it is constituted, damningly exposes the barbarity of the perpetrators of its violence. In so doing, these sites simultaneously apportion culpability, support commemoration and demand justice.

**Non-Rwandan = non-identification?**

‘A divide’, says Innocent Rwililiza, ‘is growing between those who lived through the genocide and other people. An outsider … cannot quite understand … he cannot share the same vision as us.’ Despite the impossibility of any first-hand memory of Rwanda’s violence for the non-witness, corporeal memory is necessarily encountered by the non-witness as one of the few avenues to engage with the country’s history. The analysis above has dealt with Rwandan processes of non/identification that both produce the corpses of genocide and radically affect their perception and placement in the memorial context. The following readings, however, move to explore how identification functions across boundaries of the impersonal, forming an enquiry into the identifications between, and ethical implications of, corpse/non-witness interaction and the impact of this meeting on the commemorative value of corporeal memory. This chapter’s focused texts do somewhat imply that the unnerving and unsettling strategy of corporeal memory is employed, in some
sense, for the benefit of outsiders. On his visit to Nyamata, Hatzfeld is struck by how ‘some corpses are already on display for the benefit of emotional visitors’, while Diop describes an anthropological technician ‘arranging human remains’, and that ‘She picked up a tibia and placed it next to others of the same length … Important people would sometimes come in delegations from far off countries to visit the Murambi Polytechnic. She did her best to receive them properly.’ Arranged to evoke a sense of tragic gravity for the overseas visitor and non-witness, the rude exposure of memory in its corporeal form can be understood as an assault on the senses specifically designed to emotionally provoke. This provocation can be multiply understood. In addition to potentially satisfying the post-violence impulse to ‘make the world understand the scope of the tragedy’, the need to shock can also be rationalised as a response to Rwandan frustration. This is expressed by Diop’s Cornelius in response to the mass dead in the press: ‘what do foreigners say when they’re shown such things? … Nothing.’ The confrontation with the dead is thus rendered as a shocking encounter with a violent reality that, at the time of the genocide, was glossed over by many world leaders as a faraway tragedy. Furthermore, the visceral corporeality of Murambi, Nyamata and Nyarubuye can be read as a purposeful retaliation against the global apathy of 1994 that many Rwandans continue to view as an unforgivable act of desertion by the international community.

What can this shock tactic hope to achieve in terms of eliciting the identifications that would make corporeal commemoration an effective memorial strategy? Ironically, answers to this question imply that where many Rwandan survivor-witnesses sought to perpetuate the image of mass slaughter through these corporeal constructions of memory, many foreign non-witnesses relate to Rwanda’s violence primarily through their impressions of individual corpses. These responses are provided in Gourevitch, Hatzfeld and Diop’s texts, and it is a phenomenon that can be attributed to Western conceptions of the primacy of the autonomous individual. Commenting that many corpses ‘looked a lot like people, which they were once’, Gourevitch attributes a humanity to the corpses that runs counter to Tutsi survivor Claudine Kayitesi’s humanity-denying statement that the corpses ‘were no longer themselves, nor were they … us’. Similarly, Cook describes how ‘as visitors, as foreigners … we felt compelled to be silent, to allow our gaze to fall on each individual body’. While many Rwandan survivors therefore perceive the genocide as a crime of mass violence that produced
necessarily anonymous victims, some Western non-witnesses such as Cook identify here with a broader sense of human tragedy, rather than with the specific pain of the depersonalising catastrophe of the Rwandan genocide. They identify with a lost individuality that neither the Hutu perpetrator nor the surviving Tutsi victim attribute to the corpses that constitute these memorials.

As Cook goes on to note, the non-witness seeks an engagement with a general sense of tragedy at these sites. Because their non-presence at the violence would render any expression of direct empathy false, identifications formed between the corpses and the non-witness are necessarily indirect and resonate entirely differently from that experienced by the survivor. Further, Cook writes of her desire for Rwanda’s memorial sites to ‘teach me some history, shock me morally, and deepen my understanding of the human experience of genocide’. For Cook, learning of Rwanda’s specific history is secondary to an acquisition of a more general moral disturbance.

In the aftermath of genocidal violence, visiting these memorial sites can be understood as an attempt to understand, by virtue of encountering the corporeal products of a world almost without compassion and morality, the nature and consequences of human evil. Crucially, memorials to catastrophic brutality are visited not only to pay respects to the dead but to identify oneself as morally and ethically opposed to such violence. Identification, as played out here between the corpse and the non-witness, is as much a process of Cook’s own self-identification as it is a recognition and remembrance of the dead. This self-identification can be understood as problematic in the sense that in this process the corpse remains an objective emblem of violence rather being acknowledged as subject. In cementing his or her own self-identification, the non-identification of the corpse-as-subject – the very condition that produced the corpse as such – is reproduced and perpetuated by the non-witness. However, the determination to face the reality and consequences of violence through a voluntary encounter with the corpse can be understood as a form of memorialisation that does not do the dead dishonour. For if, by acquiring the moral shock she seeks, Cook leaves the memorial with a strengthened resistance to prejudicial violence and a recalibrated ethical register, then these corpses – despite their strange and, in some cases, continually denied subjectivity – have been instrumental in a process of self-identification that not only commemorates the tragedy they represent but is an acknowledgement and rejection of the process by which the tragedy unfolded.
Taking into account the hypothesis that visiting a memorial is an attempt to reassert an ethics unhinged by the reality of genocide, is the failure of self-identification at the site of catastrophe the simultaneous failure of ethical re-engagement? Despite attempting to reclaim his Rwandan heritage through his visit to Murambi, Cornelius took fright … he started pacing … as if looking for a place to flee. Saliva was collecting in his throat and he swallowed it to conceal his disgust … He was … silent, horrified. Instead of engaging with the corpse to affirm or reject his identifications with the form and the violence represented, Cornelius is ‘literally propelled outside by the stench that came from within’ Now symbolising the pinnacle of abjectness, the corpse inspires neither reflection nor identification in any direction. Despite appearing to negate his visit, this incident becomes representative of another reaction to corporeal memory – that of the creation and internalisation of an experience of memory that becomes psychologically equivalent to the memory that the bodies themselves are intended to represent. Although his recognition of the corpse’s abject state renders Cornelius unable to identify with or relate to the corpse in any way, the revulsion to death is the reinforcement of a pre-existing aversion to violence. Furthermore, Cornelius’s inability to psychologically engage with the macabre is, quite literally, to render the violence these corpses represent as unthinkable. He reflects on the unintelligibility of mass slaughter and the necessity, as testified to by many Hutu perpetrators, of being unthinking while acting as a conduit of the baseless ideology from which incitements to genocide spring. Furthermore, his blankness can be read as parallel to the violence before him. Once again, non-identification acts as a form of non-direct commemoration that nevertheless pays tribute to the complex reality of Rwanda’s genocide.

Fascinatingly, the literature analysed here also indicates that the opposite can happen; instead of coming to represent the revoltingly abject, the corpse can alternatively denote aesthetic beauty. This was the experience of Gourevitch, who, on arrival at Nyarubuye, comments that ‘the skeleton is a beautiful thing. The randomness of the fallen forms, the strange tranquillity of their rude exposure … I couldn’t settle on any meaningful response: revulsion, alarm, sorrow, grief, shame, incomprehension, sure, but nothing truly meaningful.’ While Cook’s rendering of the corpse-as-object was crucial to her ability to self-identify at the site of catastrophe, Gourevitch’s objectification here seems purposeless. Despite the litany of emotions he describes himself as experiencing, he is yet to find meaning in the corpses’ form or number. In her influential essay ‘Rwanda’s
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Bones, Guyer writes that ‘any body can make bones … only testimony … turns the bones from trans historical icons of death into markers of a historical event’. These words, in conjunction with her statement of Rwanda’s ‘intensely non-anthropomorphizing style of commemoration’, suggest that without accompanying written or verbal testimony to the specifics of the violence being commemorated, these memorial sites represent only what she terms ‘death-in-general’. For Guyer, piles of bones do not make a person. If we are to accept this hypothesis, Gourevitch’s reaction to the dead before him is understandable. He sees their beauty because they do not represent the specific violence that produced them in their unexplained exposure. However, this theoretical offering crucially ignores Rwanda’s sites of catastrophe as a context in which these remains exist. After all, narratives of suffering and violence can be spoken through place as well as through word. Nyarubuye, Nyamata and Murambi are not randomly selected sites of exhibition; the bloodstained troughs at Nyarubuye, the forcefully twisted metal gates at the entrance to Nyamata and the mass grave at Murambi themselves testify to the catastrophe that befell them. These sites speak, loudly, both for and by themselves.

The more pressing issue of the corpse’s failure to signify concerns the fact that Gourevitch did not need to see the dead, as he ‘already knew, and believed what had happened in Rwanda … it was still strangely unimaginable’. These corpses alone do not conjure images of violence, scenes of brutality or flashes of horror; despite visiting Nyarabuye to acquire ‘the experience of looking at them [the corpses]’, Gourevitch comes away unsatisfied by the extent to which he is not moved and by the identifications he cannot make. The reason for this – another consequence of non/identification – can perhaps be located in a statement Gourevitch makes later on in his text. ‘Does the spectacle’, Gourevitch asks, ‘really serve our understanding of the wrong? … I wondered whether people aren’t wired to resist assimilating too much horror. Even as we look at atrocity, we find ways to regard it as unreal. And the more we look, the more we become inured to – not informed by – what we are seeing.’ The ultimate in morbid spectacle, corporeal memory’s effectiveness relies upon the horror it is able to inspire. In a world that is inundated, daily, with images of pain both in print and online, the very real possibility emerges that we are a generation with an ever-increasing habituation to images of death, violence and brutality. Indeed, the more we process, the less we are able to empathetically identify with the subjects in those images. Like the complex
identificatory exchanges that exist between the corpse and its Hutu murderer or fellow Tutsi before it enters the memorial context, the non-witness may also arrive at the Rwandan memorial site with a pre-existing empathetic limit to images of death and violence. Corporeal memory, then, may fail to shock when no identifications are created or experienced. In this scenario, the corpse does not become testimony to the violence that produced it, but comes to represent an object of aesthetic beauty or personification of abject horror that refuses meaningful interpretation.

The multidirectionality of corporeal memory: the case of Andrew Blum

While identifications may fail to materialise for those accustomed to images and representations of death, there is another fascinating reaction to Rwanda’s corporeal memory that triggers an alternative form of self-identification. One may understand and recognise one’s own history, facilitated by these sites of corporeal testimony to Rwanda’s violence. This was the experience of Andrew Blum who, writing for the New York Times, stated that his trip to the site of the Wannsee Conference in Germany where the Final Solution was decided ‘made no sense,’ resisting his attempt to understand the context and reality of the suffering experienced by his Holocaust refugee grandparents. ‘For us; he writes, ‘born three decades after 1945, the stories of loss and the bitter memories exists at a remove. We feel compelled to try and grasp their meaning, but the horrors are abstracted and refracted by film, literature and time.’ Blum testifies to the limbo in which his self-identification exists. Although he is aware of the history of his family, his inability to form meaningful identifications with that past renders it a partial, non-emotive memory with little personal salience. Corroborating Gourevitch’s implication of the pervasiveness of the death image, Blum’s statement indicates that artistic and literary representations of the horrors of the Holocaust have emerged with such frequency that they have both disabled the potency of these visual manifestations of history and rendered the Holocaust a collective history of the Jews from which Blum, as an individual third-generation child, feels frustratingly disconnected. However, Blum writes, ‘in Rwanda … genocide is still fresh’. Describing himself as a ‘genocide tourist … seeking answers to the unanswerable’, Blum attempts to overcome the unintelligibility of his own history by absorbing what he perceives as the
more relatable violence of recent genocidal tragedy. What is curious about this statement is his acknowledgement of the fact that genocide defeats understanding. Yet, yoked to these words is a determination to nevertheless seek what he himself designates as impossible answers. This suggests that what Blum seeks is not necessarily an understanding of any specific violence. Rather, Blum’s desire is to capture an experience of memory that he can integrate within his own consciousness as a prosthetic memory that can adequately function as a representation of his own family’s suffering. Blum’s self-identification must take a detour through the experience of another’s violence for its own realisation.

And indeed, it is an experience of memory that Blum encounters. Entering the crypt at Nyamata, he writes: ‘my stomach turned. Strangely, I felt relief. The odor exempted us from the need for imagination. It relieved us of the need for understanding.’ Releasing him from the bonds of abstraction that previously obscured his connection to his personal history, Nyamata’s raw, defiant, concrete exposure of mutilation, death and purposeful annihilation is freedom from the burden of this imagination. Situated at the nexus of imagination and understanding, Nyamata allows Blum to recognise the violence of genocide. This is not through the specifics of its Rwandan occurrence, but rather through an experience of its consequences that, paradoxically, soothes through the very terror Blum can sense in this moment. Although the memorial is unflinching in the horror it houses, the sensory experience it represents for Blum triggers a psychological process that provides an absolutionary relief from both the struggle to understand his own history and the guilt resulting from his failure to imagine it. It is, in fact, through the overwhelming sensory assault of the stench and the sight of the corpse that Blum is able to grasp, albeit indirectly, the essence of his own history. Experiencing genocide’s unimaginable and unintelligible consequences allows for the comprehension of its true nature, and, in turn, it strengthens an understanding of his own family’s suffering.

Despite being coined in 2009, four years after Blum’s essay was published, Michael Rothberg’s term ‘multidirectional memory’ represents an exciting turn in memory studies that retroactively defines the process by which Blum utilises his experience of memory to engage with his family history. Multidirectional memory is a form of memory that is ‘subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing’. It is a dynamic form of transhistorical remembrance that allows for the memory of one event to illuminate another. In this model, memories become assimilable to associative
(Re)cognising the corpse

and cross-referential chains of meaning. Crucially, as Rothberg writes, ‘pursuing memory’s multidirectionality encourages us to think of the public sphere as a malleable discursive space in which groups … come into being through their dialogical interactions with others.’ Indeed, Blum’s interaction with the corpse and the sensory assault it produces (a corporeal form of communication, it could be argued) is the means by which his process of self-identification is finally successful.

What, however, are the ethics of utilising one tragedy to come to terms with another, of finding peace with one’s own history by absorbing the pain of another place and another time? Rothberg himself offers a compelling argument in favour of the comparative and juxtaposive form of memory that he champions. In addition to claiming that the intersection of histories ‘has the potential to create new forms of solidarity and new visions of justice,’ Rothberg insists that removing the competitive element of cultural memories that jostle for commemoration in the global consciousness dismantles the ‘hierarchy of suffering’ that is created when events such as the Holocaust are designated as the paradigm of human agony. Propagating multidirectional memory as a form of remembrance that ‘cuts across and binds together diverse spatial, temporal, and cultural sites,’ Rothberg’s hypothesis would see Blum honouring the memory of Rwanda’s genocide through the very self-identification he is able to experience at the sites that testify to it. Rather than acting as a ‘secondary’ genocide through which Blum attains an understanding of the ‘principal’ genocide of the Holocaust, Blum’s successful self-identification at this Rwandan site of catastrophe implies an equivalence of importance and gravity between them that levels the playing field of competitive suffering. Multidirectional memory therefore has special significance for legacies of genocide that extend beyond physical monuments to their occurrence. While it is important to emphasise the uniqueness of distinct historical moments and not encourage conflations of tragedies that possess singular features and aftermaths, creating an intersective and interactive dialogue around genocide and mass violence enables the creation of associate conversations that ensure the remembrance of genocidal violence in all its forms and occurrences. If to speak of one genocide is to open up the possibility of remembering another, millions of deaths have the opportunity to be pulled back from the brink of obscurity and remembered. Corporeal memory in the Rwandan context can be understood to extend beyond itself, contributing to the creation of identifications and a discourse that establishes genocide as a real
consequence of conflict. These sites therefore become places that the world, and not just Rwanda and its tourists, can effectively mourn.

**Conclusion: remembering Rwanda**

The processes and manifestations of identification that Rwanda’s corporeal displays of memory elicit are as multiple as they are complex. However, in light of this chapter’s arguments, are they commemoratively effective? As stated, Guyer is sceptical of the value of corporeal memory in this context. Rwanda’s piles of corpses and rows of bones, she writes, are ‘unable … to distinguish between genocide and death in general … even when bones remain, the demand for an absent testimony also remains’. Cook, insisting that ‘physical remains themselves do not “tell the story”’, echoes Guyer’s dubiousness towards the success of the memorialisation these sites aim to stage. That Rwanda’s corporeal memorials do not necessarily point to specific violence is attested to by Blum’s ability to view these memorials as emblematic of genocidal brutality and incorporate and constitute the corpses within an act of multidirectional memory. Both Cook and Guyer use these criticisms to imply that Rwanda’s sites of corporeal memory are its failure to adequately commemorate those who perished.

However, these writers do not acknowledge – as demonstrated in the opening pages of this chapter – that the Rwandan intent behind displays of corporeal memory is not to commemorate people as individuals; the story of the genocide cannot be narrated through individual lives. Instead, to reflect the logic-defying reality of genocidal violence and the scale of devastation the killings wrought, these memorials are intended to convey a sense of mass destruction, unintelligibility and an unimaginable amount of horror. Furthermore, it is precisely this conveyance of mass that defies Guyer’s claim that Rwanda’s memorials only represent ‘death in general’. While death is indeed a routine and mundane element of existence, the enormity of its volume in the context of mass violence indicates an event that is the antithesis of the ‘general’ – it is, in fact, an exceptional event that connects Rwanda’s history with the history of nations that have shared the pain of genocidal persecution. As a mass crime against a mass of people, Rwanda’s sites of corporeal memory are successful in commemorating the violence precisely because of the failure of non-individual corporeal identifications that its sites of corporeal memory produce. Although this may seem puzzling to Western anthropological notions of individualism – where that individualism
is a prime concern – in Africa, as Jessica Murray comments, ‘a person depends on other people to be a person’.66 This does not mean that African individuals fail to retain a sense of autonomy and this chapter fiercely resists Milena Bubenechik’s suggestion that members of ‘indigenous societies … cannot stand for themselves as solid independent individuals’.67 Rather, Murray’s statement makes clear that a sense of communality is culturally inscribed as an essential and immovable component into an African sense of self that perceives itself as part of a wider social network. In death as in life, then, Rwanda’s memorials to the dead are communal – a reflection of Rwandan society that renders these sites fitting tributes to the dead, their lives previous to their persecution and to the violent history that produced them.

Despite their lack of agency, Rwanda’s corpses provoke numerous, elaborate and ultimately personal processes of identification – or, indeed, of non-relation – that galvanise approaches to memory and conflict commemoration. The Rwandans’ connection to the corpses is not one initiated by their induction into a formalised memorial site. The identifications that take place – or, indeed, that do not materialise – are reverberations of the violence that is commemorated at these locations; the non-identifications perpetuated in the Rwandans’ encounter with the dead are themselves testimony to the devastating cost of a survival dependent on the suspension of recognition and the horror of a conferred anonymity that facilitated the merciless slaughter of close to one million Tutsis. Reflecting the very depersonalisation that marks the violence being commemorated as genocide, the shocking visibility of industrial-scale extermination at Murambi, Nyamata and Nyarubuye emphasises, as a cautionary tale, the consequences of a total failure of intersubjective relation. The corpses are startlingly present reminders of a time almost without ethics. To those who experienced that violence, ethical re-engagement through the corpse as its manifestation is a challenge that is still being undertaken twenty years on.

For the non-Rwandan or non-witness, visiting these sites of catastrophe is often an attempt to understand what seems incomprehensible, to reassert a sense of ethics by commemorating tragedy as the evil it represents. However, the inability to form identifications with the dead is not necessarily an ethical or commemorative failure: if the highest form of ethical engagement with tragedy is a by-product of true empathy, then the experience of its discomforting intelligibility indicates the site of corporeal memory fulfilling its function. Rather than representing the breakdown of memorial potency, the
corpse’s non-overt signification enables a remembrance of Rwanda’s catastrophe that extends beyond these sites’ physical parameters. Enabling the self-identification of the non-witness and facilitating the juxtapositive consideration of Rwanda’s history within the theoretical model of multidirectional memory, the anonymity retained by Rwanda’s corporeal memorial sites becomes the simultaneous condition of its prolonged legacy. Corporeal memory creates an experience that is, ultimately, highly individualised with respect to both perception and reception. Whether we are Leontius, Cornelius, Gourevitch, Guyer, Cook or Blum, the corpse as memorial spectacle provokes an experience of identification that, in whatever form it takes, cannot fail to promote some engagement with the 1994 tragedy that left an indelible, still-echoing imprint on Rwanda’s history.

Notes

3 Ibid., p. 3.
4 See P. Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families (London: Picador, 2000). This book enjoyed a warm critical reception. Gourevitch was awarded the National Book Critics Circle Award, the George Polk Book Award, the Los Angeles Times Book Award, the Guardian First Book Award and the PEN/Martha Albrand Award for First Nonfiction, among many others. The concern that some Africanists had about the content of Gourevitch’s text is summed up by René Lemarchand’s criticism that Gourevitch ignores the political tensions that motivated the killings and employs a Eurocentric, Holocaust-based frame of reference for his narrative. A full explanation of his grievances can be found in R. Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), p. 87.
5 Notably, Into the Quick of Life received the Prix Culture 2000 and the Prix Pierre Mille.
6 A Time for Machetes was awarded the Prix Femina in 2003 and the Priz Jossef Kessel in 2004.
8 D. LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), p. 96.
Although it is not within the remit of this chapter to discuss the methodologies and psychological processes by which genocide comes into being, the theoretical literature on the topic is fascinating and essential reading in the pursuit to understand perpetrator behaviours. James Waller’s *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) is particularly instructive. Howard Adelman’s chapter entitled ‘Theories of genocide: the case of Rwanda’, in V. M. Esses and R. A. Vernon (eds), *Explaining the Breakdown of Ethnic Relations: Why Neighbours Kill* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), tackles what he perceives as deficiencies in Waller’s theoretical offering when applied to the Rwandan context.


18 Ibid., p. 207.


22 Ibid., p. 8.

23 Ibid., pp. 32–3.


25 Hatzfeld, *Into the Quick of Life*, p. 34.

26 Ibid., p. 104.


28 Hatzfeld, *Into the Quick of Life*, p. 115.


In addition to Rwandan anger at the perceived inaction of the international community, there is a scholarly consensus that Rwanda's genocide could well have been prevented with the help of bodies such as the United Nations. For a particularly convincing report, see H. Adelman, 'Blaming the United Nations', *Journal of International Political Theory*, 4:9 (2008), 9–33; additionally see N. Hitchcott, 'Commemorating genocide in Boubacar Boris Diop's *Murambi*', *Research of African Literatures*, 40:3 (2009), 48–61, 54–5, which demonstrates how Diop singles out France for specific blame with regard to their non-involvement.

44 Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You*, p. 15.
46 Cook, 'The politics of preservation', p. 300.
47 Ibid., p. 303.
49 Ibid., p. 74.
51 Guyer, 'Rwanda's bones', 159.
52 Ibid., 163.
53 Ibid., 163.
54 Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You*, p. 16.
55 Ibid., p. 16.
56 Ibid., p. 196.
57 A. Blum, 'Searching for answers and discovering that there are none', *New York Times*, 1 May 2005. All other quotations from the article are from this source.
59 Ibid., p. 5.
60 Ibid., p. 5.
61 Ibid., p. 9.
62 Ibid., p. 11.
human suffering has negatively affected the ability of Genocide Studies to predict genocides.

64 Guyer, ‘Rwanda’s bones’, 175.

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