

Introduction: war economies, peace economies and transformation

Since the end of the Cold War, economic greed and profit-seeking have become a significant motivation for the perpetuation and deepening of conflict in some parts of the developing world. The most acute economic motivation in armed conflict has been the illicit exploitation of lucrative natural resources such as diamonds, timber, gold, oil, precious gems, and minerals like coltan, which have provided both the means and incentive for some warring parties to wage campaigns of violence and human rights abuses. (Government of Canada, 2009)

BLOOD DIAMONDS in Africa, drug cartels in Latin America and the participation of warlords in Afghanistan's illicit opium trade have heightened both public and academic awareness of the problem of war economies – systems in which economic incentives either motivate actors to instigate and participate in political violence or which facilitate ongoing conflict by providing a means of financing violent struggle. Policy statements such as the one presented above, along with explosive media reports, dramatic Hollywood recreations, countless non-governmental organisation (NGO) programmes and masses of academic research reveal an increasing concern over these economies, and have in turn led to a growing interest in and need for policies which limit the degree to which commodities can be used to either finance war, or become a dominant motivation for individuals to take up arms. Seen as a major threat to peace, stability and development, the international community has increased its focus on creating and improving upon policies which can eradicate or transform these 'economies of war' into 'economies of peace'. Unfortunately, success on this front has been largely elusive, with violent economic activities continuing to fuel and feed off war and insecurity in many parts of the world.

While the relationship between economic activities or incentives and instances of political violence have been well documented and analysed from

multiple perspectives, there is a notable lack of a more general reflection on the policies through which these activities are managed or transformed. The processes through which development and security actors, tasked with reconstructing war affected societies into peaceful liberal states, engage with or tackle the problem of war economies remains under-scrutinised. Discussed in greater detail in upcoming chapters, much of the work in this regard looks narrowly at the problem, evaluating specific projects or the trade of a specific commodity. Victories are often measured quantitatively, with overall reductions in the cross-border trade of illicit diamonds, or the number of drug-free provinces defining progress. Assessments of broader approaches tend to be classified as serious failures of ultimately unachievable tasks, as illustrated by analysis of the decades-long American War on Drugs. While there has been some more substantial and nuanced analysis of the dynamics and flaws of specific programmes, for example the Kimberly Process which seeks to prevent diamonds from fuelling political violence, the transformation of war economies into peace economies has rarely been considered holistically. Programmes are analysed separately as opposed to being approached as a broader reform area and studies often fail to combine a concern for the practical policy-related issues with the more substantive conceptual and political dynamics of programming.

Through a critical exploration of the mechanisms and political relationships which are involved in transformations of war economies into peace economies, this book provides a more holistic mode of analysis, offering a multi-layered examination of the processes through which security and development actors attempt to manage war economies in conflict-affected states. As the methods and politics of war economy transformation are assessed, what becomes apparent is that current transformation attempts have become both illustrative of and central to the liberal peacebuilding agenda. This agenda, led by international development and security actors, has the ultimate goal of constructing liberal peaces from the vestiges of what they define as weak, failed and collapsed states. It is in the dominance of the liberal peacebuilding agenda that the broader explanation for the failure of transformation projects across time and place can be found, as the ideological, conceptual and resultant operational practices of this project complicate and create barriers for transformation. As shown through analyses of several reform areas central to war economy transformation, paradoxes and problems found within the liberal peacebuilding project itself hinder the ability to effectively manage the dysfunctional political-economic practices which threaten security. The lack of success seen in this programme area is not merely a function of poor project planning and implementation, but rather indicative of a faltering project of global governance which imperils its own success through its reliance of faulty, narrow conceptions and ideological commitments.

While examining the failure of one particular policy area, war economy transformation, what emerges are wider conclusions applicable to the practices of development aid and peacebuilding more generally. At issue are the fundamental practices and theories of international intervention, which are exposed as operationally flawed, conceptually defective and deeply ideological. Taken as a whole, these interrelated layers of critique offer a significant challenge to the dominance of the current liberal peacebuilding agenda. Through this challenge, however, comes the opportunity to adapt and reformulate the theory and practice of peacebuilding. As actors attempt to build economies of peace, we witness challenges to the dominance of the liberal agenda. Examples of actors utilising their agency and power to challenge dominant processes suggests that security and development actors need not always operate under the limitations of the current liberal peacebuilding consensus and can, through a greater understanding of the problems and politics involved, work towards less destructive and more just forms of political-economic relationships specifically and more just modes of peace generally.

War economies, peace economies and transformation

Before engaging with the above debates, it is useful to explore the terminology involved and place the discussion within a wider context of international aid and interventions. War economy transformation is one of the many goals of what is referred to as peacebuilding. Seen as both a way of preventing latent tensions from turning into violent political conflict and of rebuilding societies already affected by such hostilities, peacebuilding programming involves states and local communities being treated with a range of reforms and policy prescriptions. Often led by external actors, but in coordination with national and local actors, peacebuilding acts as an umbrella for a wide range of activities. Local governance reform, including decentralisation, addressing rural poverty, gender empowerment, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants along with a multitude of other programmes are implemented with the aim of preventing future conflict, rebuilding what was destroyed during conflict, and creating new processes and relationships which will prevent a return to violence.

At the centre of this peacebuilding agenda is the need to create modes of economic interaction which facilitate and support peace. Economic reform involves a wide variety of practices, from macro-economic stabilisation programming led by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, to rural poverty reduction led by international NGOs and local community-based organisations (CBOs). In war-affected areas, however, it is increasingly recognised that attention needs to be paid to

the illicit and illegal economic activities which often come to support and feed off violence. Standard economic reforms fail to adequately address these activities, and thus tailored policies are needed to transform them into relationships which no longer pose a threat to peace and security. It is these specific reforms, a subset of peacebuilding and economic reforms, which this book will explore.

These policies, discussed in greater detail in forthcoming chapters, aim to manage or transform what are often colloquially referred to as war economies. Often studied under the rubric of political economies of violence, these forms of economic activity are considered to be antithetical to the creation of peace. They refer to occasions where economic incentives either motivate actors to instigate, participate in or prolong violence or where profits from the trade of resources acts primarily as a source of funding for ongoing political struggles (though these two functions can exist simultaneously or become more and less dominant throughout the course of a conflict). The trade of a commodity or an economic exchange may not be the sole cause of conflict, but does become a fundamental part of the conflict dynamic, impacting the nature and/or trajectory of political violence. In this sense, war economies do not simply refer to the state of an economy in times of conflict, but are defined as the economic relationships and transactions which cause, sustain or prolong periods of physical political violence or instances where actors take advantage of political violence for financial gain.

The most notorious examples of war economies come from the African continent where the illegal diamond trade was seen as fuelling conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola. Such infamous cases have led to an increased focus on the role of natural resources in conflict-affected areas with other conflicts being analysed through the lens of economic opportunities, including Cambodia where the trade in timber was a factor in funding continued insurrection and in Afghanistan where the opium industry is seen as contributing to ongoing instability. The notion of a resource curse is commonly invoked, implying that the abundance of resources has actually hindered, rather than helped, countries' development by fuelling violent conflicts (see Basedau and Lay 2009 for a good review of the literature). War economies involve a wide range of commodities including the sale of both licit (such as timber and coltan) and illicit goods (including arms and drugs) and activities such as human trafficking, organised crime, diasporic funding (either through voluntary contributions or extortion), money laundering, tax evasion, corruption, and even the use and manipulation of foreign aid. Besides a diversity of commodities and activities, war economies are also known to involve a range of actors, from rebel groups and organised criminal gangs to state agencies and democratically elected leaders. In some cases, opposing factions cooperate in order to allow both sides to continue their economic

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endeavours. Private companies in 'peaceful' states also have a position in these commodity chains, with conflict goods such as diamonds, oil and timber being traded through multinational corporations. The consumption of these otherwise licit goods occurs primarily in 'peaceful' developed nations, as does the consumption of illicit goods associated with conflicts, including cocaine and heroin. Private security firms from within the conflict-affected country or from abroad are also known to have become central actors in war economies. For example, the South African firm Executive Outcomes was hired to fight rebels operating in and around the diamond fields in Sierra Leone, while Branch Energy, a UK firm (with contested links to Executive Outcomes), received generous contracts in these newly liberated diamond fields (Francis, 1999; Howe, 1998). The profits from such activities often find their way either legally, or illegally through money laundering, into the world's largest financial institutions and banks, making use of modern banking systems and communications technology. These processes and relationships point to the complex and globally integrated nature of war economies, challenging images of war economies as simply being the direct economic transactions between combatants and traders within a given conflict zone – a complexity that will be further considered throughout this book.

Conceptualising a peace economy and transformation

At this point, it is useful to consider how a war economy can be distinguished from its natural antonym – a peace economy. In the most basic sense, the two can be differentiated on the basis that the former, as defined previously, is either a result of, directly causes, or directly contributes to physical, organised, political violence while peace economies are constituted by economic relationships which neither benefit from nor have a causal relationship with physical, organised political violence. By this criteria, and given the aforementioned interdependence and global scope of economic activities, it is impossible to classify any economic system as a clear example of a peace economy. While geographically detached from the physical violence associated with war economies, or having the appearance of being far removed from the political economy of violence due to their involvement only at a seemingly distant node in a commodity chain, what are often (wrongly) classified as peace economies are in fact clearly connected to political economies of violence. Though an actor's distance in terms of geography and role in the commodity chain does place it nearer to the category of peace economy on the spectrum, one should not dismiss the need to address activities occurring in these areas in transformation projects.

Further, in order to move towards a peace economy, one must also conceive of peace in a much broader sense, one that goes beyond concerns

regarding overt physical violence. If one judges peace also in terms of the prevalence and role of structural violence (Galtung, 1969) at both local and international levels, the task of creating a peace economy becomes a much wider and more substantial project. Eradicating direct or personal violence, the physical acts of violence committed by identifiable actors, is not sufficient as this can at best only facilitate a negative peace – simply an absence of war as opposed to a positive peace which focuses on the eradication of structural forms of violence as well. Manifest forms of structural violence (less tangible forms of inequality and justice) can be considered as a precursor or potential trigger for latent, as of yet unobservable, forms of physical violence. Of course, there are critiques of this simple binary with concerns that such definitions expand understandings of peace to such a degree that the category itself becomes meaningless, analytically useless, that it is far too normative and that violence becomes characterised simply as anything that ‘Galtung doesn’t like’ (Boulding, 1977: 84; Lawler, 2002). However, the distinction between creating positive and negative forms of peace is adopted here to clarify and reinforce Galtung’s largely accepted notion that what is generally defined as peace often entails much injustice, continued suffering and the roots of future conflict.

In order to transform economies of war into economies of peace, both the structural facets (for example global inequalities and power relations which facilitate and encourage illicit economic activity) and physical facets of violence related to war economies (the more observable and tangible processes of economic exchange) must be addressed. This suggests the need for much larger and more diverse projects than we see in current transformation strategies that tend to be based on narrowly conceived policies which attempt to merely prevent resources or a specific economic activity from contributing to physical violence. Such an approach forces us to recognise that the process of capital accumulation and power relations and imbalances in the geopolitical landscape can themselves be seen as forms of structural violence insofar as periphery regions or persons are exploited in order to ensure the status quo for more dominant, powerful actors. For example, the geopolitical relationships involved in the trade of oil cannot be subtracted from the equation in our consideration of violence witnessed around the drilling of oil in Angola and Nigeria. Thus, in order to transform war economies, the structures which permit, encourage and facilitate war economies must also be addressed, meaning one must also consider the wider structural factors which have facilitated, and which perhaps prompt, actors’ participation in political economies of direct violence.

For this reason, it is useful to add a third category of economy to the discussion, that of a ‘positive peace economy’ whereby economic relationships not only have no obvious association with direct/physical violence, but also

are free of structural violence and support a just and sustainable peace. In this regard, it is useful to consider the transformation of war economies not in terms of an either-or dichotomy, but along a scale with various shades of grey. Therefore, when arguing for the transformation of war economies, two stages are envisioned. The first entails transforming economic relationships so that at a minimum, they are no longer attached to or reliant on overt physical violence – a negative peace economy. The second stage, and what this book refers to when calling for transformation, is a more progressive form of positive transformation, whereby physical violence is not only eradicated, but other forms of injustice (such as discrimination, fear, intimidation, or unfair and dangerous labour practices) are also reduced. What is meant by positive transformation or moves towards an economy of peace therefore hinges not only on removing violence from the equation, but also inserting norms of equality, fairness and well-being into political-economic life into our definition of a peace economy. Thus a war economy can be considered transformed along a qualitative line – the first step being to remove overt physical violence from economic life, and the second step involving transforming relationships in such a way as to support a move towards a positive form of peace. Transformation should be seen as an ongoing process, not easily measured in terms of quantitative progress, but in terms of qualitative changes which seek to remove all forms of violence from economic life.

What emerges through the forthcoming analysis of current practice, however, is that there is little if any movement towards positive transformation. Instead, what we witness is a focus on the creation of a very narrowly conceived (negative) peace economy, which prioritises stability and an absence of immediate physical violence, and that even in this regard, there has been limited success. Such an approach is indicative of the liberal peace-building project which appears either unwilling or unable to consider or attempt to resolve instances of injustice, both local and international, which would need to be addressed to move towards either negative or positive peace




Figure 1.1 Towards positive transformation

economies. It is important to highlight that the call for positive transformation does not envisage any particular predefined endpoint. It does not suggest replacing liberalism with anything in particular and what are deemed progressive policy decisions in case study material should not be taken as a new set of blueprints. Instead, what is progressive and what will further the goals of positive transformation are the lessons related to challenging the liberal system and negotiating in non-hegemonic ways with a variety of stakeholders in each context. These negotiations should not privilege security and economic growth above social, political and economic justice (which should be at the forefront of creating sustainable and just transformations). This may sound a difficult task, but examples of the opportunities for engaging in and supporting such processes can be found throughout this book.

Transforming war economies: the role of the development-security industry (DSI)

The responsibility for the transformation of war economies called for above rests with an assortment of actors who are simultaneously tasked with resolving global issues related to peace and development more broadly. In tracing the ways in which these actors operate and interact, one witnesses the emergence of a diverse but structured network of actors which create and implement the peacebuilding programming of which war economy transformation is now a part. In terms of these actors' theoretical and conceptual underpinnings and beliefs, as well as their *modus operandi*, development and security actors have become so entwined that it is possible to speak of a development-security industry (DSI). The DSI encompasses a broad range of actors who engage collectively in activities which aim to simultaneously promote peace, security and development. This industry can be likened to what Duffield refers to as strategic complexes, whereby we can identify 'growing strategic networks, linking development and security actors – academics, military establishments, NGOs, private security companies and so on' (2001: 36). Like strategic complexes, the DSI consists of numerous actors including donor states, bilateral and multilateral organisations, militaries and military alliances, local and international NGOs and private companies.

While Duffield is quite specific regarding the role each of these actors has to play in the global governance project (Duffield, 2001: 53–73), the DSI can usefully be divided into two broad categories – guiding actors and operational actors. Guiding actors can be seen as the most powerful institutions within the network, actors who have the power to shape and guide political and economic policy at a broad, systemic level. They are not only central in influencing the nature of interventions, but also remain largely in control of the funding for development-security endeavours. Guiding actors include donor

governments and their militaries, powerful multi-lateral actors (such as the EU and the UN Security Council) as well as powerful international financial institutions (IFIs) and multinational corporations (MNCs). Alternatively, operational actors can be defined as actors and institutions responsible for carrying out the directives and implementing the aims of the guiding actors. These actors include NGOs, specialised UN agencies (such as the UNHCR or UNICEF) and small private companies. These institutions and the individuals working within them can be seen as responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the DSI at the meso and micro levels. Of course, the division is not always so clear – actors may engage in both guiding and operating activities. NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch can be seen as both attempting to alter policy at a macro level while engaging and implementing policy at the micro level.

The separation between those with high levels of diplomatic and policy-making power as opposed to those whose mandates are limited to implementation at the micro level is lent support by Duffield's assessment of strategic complexes, where he determines that through their interaction and relationships with other actors in the network, 'governments are acquiring the ability to project power' (2001: 72). Tracing the division of labour within the DSI by separating the industry in such a way will prove a useful tool in disaggregating and more clearly defining some of the issues and problems related to development-security programming. As will become clear in forthcoming chapters, such a distinction will contribute to a more nuanced reflection on the role of various actors and move us away from a rather unhelpful perception of a homogenous 'international community'. Nonetheless, it must also be taken into account that despite the DSI appearing to be made up of multiple connected but independent actors, it is an industry still very much led by dominant global institutions – states and the large international institutions whose agendas they control. Because of this high degree of control, it is possible to argue that the DSI's activities remain guided by the dominant liberal peacebuilding consensus which will be described in greater detail in forthcoming sections.

It is essential to clarify the justification for placing this network at the centre of analyses of war economy transformation. From a pragmatic point of view, grouping development and security actors together as the key actor is essential as actors on both sides of the dichotomy have prominent roles in the creation and implementation of these political-economic programmes. The responsibility for policies which seek to transform war economies is now given both to traditional security actors such as law enforcement agencies and the military, as well as to more developmental actors, such as NGOs, civil society groups and various legal actors. As development and security actors are now often required to work together in solving this facet of modern conflict it is

useful to consider them as a solitary actor, despite differences between them. Beyond this, the increasing merger between these actors and the blending of the security and development agendas has proved to be one of the greatest legitimising forces in terms of justifying the broad and intensive modes of intervention that the liberal peacebuilding paradigm requires generally, and that in turn facilitates the strong and invasive forms of intervention required to transform war economies specifically. Liberal peacebuilding (discussed in greater detail in [Chapter 3](#)) now requires the transformation of entire societies – intervention in the political, economic and social realms, which requires a linking of security actors in theory and in practice.

The history and nature of the development-security nexus

The rebuilding of Europe and Japan following the world wars reveals a historical merging of international security and development goals which cautions against treating the merger of development and security, and therefore its role in liberal peacebuilding, as an entirely new or innovative phenomenon (Duffield, 2001; 2005). However, despite there being substantial historical record of the blending of these two agendas and discourses, it is argued that since the end of the Cold War there has been a broadening and strengthening of the relationship between development and security actors. The two fields have become increasingly and overtly linked in ways not seen in previous decades. As Neclâ Tschirgi notes, 'Only some 15 years ago it was unusual for policy makers to talk of development and security policies in the same breath. Today the reverse is true' (2006: 39).

This increasingly strong merger has several roots. The end of the Cold War is seen as having a strong impact. No longer constrained by the divisions and limitations resulting from the struggle between East and West, development and security actors have found themselves freer to intervene, creating increased political space for both sets of actors and thus more opportunity for simultaneous engagement. This freedom has since been transformed into a right to intervene (Allen and Styan, 2000) and finally into an idea of a responsibility to intervene (Shaw, 2003), whereby the DSI is *expected* to engage with conflict-affected areas or insecure environments in order to protect individuals from the negative effects of violence. The end of the Cold War also signalled a relative end to the ideological battle with liberal institutionalism emerging as the dominant guiding principle of international development and security apparatus. Key principles within liberal international relations theory and neo-liberal economics have fused the areas of security and development by suggesting that there is a positive relationship between economic and social development on the one hand and stability and peace on the other. This relationship is based on two complementary assumptions, the first being that

peace brings development, and conflict brings underdevelopment (Fitzgerald, 2001). The second assumption simply reverses the above axiom, concluding that development brings peace and underdevelopment brings conflict. War and poverty are perceived to be in a 'dynamic and mutually reinforcing relationship' (Luckham et al., 2001: 3). Though highly debated on empirical and theoretical grounds, the democratic peace hypothesis, another key tenet of liberal theory which suggests that democracies do not fight other democracies and are also less likely to suffer from civil wars, has also aided in the fusing of development and security agendas with the former promoting it as a mode of political development and the latter supporting it for reasons of security.

The adoption of liberal political and economic approaches by both development and security actors over the past several decades has led to a common agenda and legitimising discourse – economically developed and democratic societies have emerged as the recipe for a peaceful and prosperous international arena. Of course, normative liberal ideals do not fully define international relations. Realist concerns still exist, but even these concerns now support similar liberal-based interventions, 'based on a pervasive fear that impoverished people will threaten institutions of neo liberal global governance' (Wilkin, 2002: 634). Thus, both liberals and realists have merged concerning the solution to global instability – the former for normative idealistic reasons, the latter for reasons of self preservation. This coming together of development and security actors from both realist and liberal camps has resulted in a specific and ideologically driven mode of intervention known as liberal peacebuilding. Under this model, actors operate under a distinctly liberal framework which favours liberal democratic governance systems, free and open markets and individual human rights. This model is now seen as the primary, if not the only, model for rebuilding states after conflict, with actors as diverse as local NGOs and powerful international institutions coming to accept what some have termed a 'peacebuilding consensus' (Richmond, 2007). The details and impacts of this ideologically driven foundation of the DSI on war economy transformation will be further discussed in several of the forthcoming chapters as they are fundamental to understanding both the practices and failings of transformation.

Exploring the role of the DSI in the building of peace economies: book structure

Through an examination of this industry's ideological, conceptual and operational underpinnings, a clearer understanding of the processes, successes and failures of war economy transformation is gained. The nature of the DSI and its impact on the transformation of war economies is further explored throughout the remainder of this book. [Chapter 2](#) provides a detailed review

and assessment of the policies which the DSI has utilised as it seeks to transform these economies into peaceful post-conflict economies, offering some insight into the reasons for failure in specific policy areas. [Chapter 3](#) offers an in-depth discussion of the development-security industry, detailing the nature and characteristics of the industry and the complex network of actors on which it depends. In this chapter, the problem of war economies which the DSI confronts is explored in greater detail, with a discussion of the ideological foundations of this industry and the competing conceptualisations and standpoints from which these modes of economic activity can be analysed. [Chapter 4](#) will illustrate the above discussions and debates via an examination of the war economy in Kosovo, where the problems of organised crime and smuggling are seen as contributing to a distinct form of economy which both fuelled and fed off the regional conflict and continues to present problems for post-conflict peacebuilding.

[Chapters 5 to 7](#) provide detailed analysis based on empirical research of attempts by the DSI in Kosovo to create a peace economy. Each of these chapters points to trends both in the micro and macro politics of liberal peacebuilding, suggesting that the failure to build peace economies is not simply a matter of poor project planning and implementation but rather a problem related to faulty conceptualisations of the political-economic aspects of war and the much broader issue of ideological bias in the current peacebuilding agenda. An analysis of rule of law reform ([Chapter 5](#)), thought to be an effective way of managing the criminal elements of war economies, considers whether at the ideological level, the rhetoric of liberal notions of law and statehood are used as justification for the imposition of politically motivated reform and how this might result in short-term political goals hindering the creation of sustainable and accountable legal and security mechanisms. This analysis is related to the conceptual issues whereby the political-economic relationships in question are classified as wholly criminal as opposed to political in nature. In this chapter, operational barriers which limit the effectiveness of rule of law reform to potentially play a positive role in transformation are also considered.

[Chapter 6](#) analyses the use of privatisation as a tool of transformation. Seen as a way of ensuring that commodities and other lucrative economic opportunities cannot be captured or manipulated by political actors and warring parties, privatisation is considered central to political-economic transformation generally and dealing with the associated problems of war economies more specifically. Analysis reveals that this programme had a unique impact on transformation. While this reform project is meant to act as a cure for destructive political-economic relationships, such as corruption and organised crime, privatisation also creates new arenas in which actors can continue or reformulate such relationships. The DSI's firm ideological

commitment to privatisation appears to have blinded it to these impacts. Conceptually, liberal peacebuilding's tendency to view this body of reform as an economic and technocratic process also creates new and deepens old political tensions. Again, not unlike the previous areas of reform, the likelihood that these ideological and conceptual problems will be replicated and entrenched is increased by operational issues, primarily related to the staffing and capacity of institutions.

Chapter 7 considers the importance of customs reform. Seen as central in dealing with the smuggling and illegal side of a war economy, customs agencies also serve as a way of regularising trade and collecting revenue for the state. Analysis of this reform area in Kosovo reveals interesting contradictions in the DSI's behaviour, challenging some of the assumptions and findings from previous chapters regarding the ways in which the liberal peacebuilding agenda operates. While the reform of the customs service can be fundamental in creating (or confirming) a conflict-affected country's status as a 'strong state' via the creation or control of international borders, at a conceptual level, some customs reform processes have been more effective in recognising the social, economic and political motivations and interests which affect transformation processes. This conceptual difference, along with observations of several operational differences, partially refutes conclusions made regarding the liberal peace and the DSI in previous chapters. When these differences (along with occasional variations from the norm that are raised in previous chapters) are taken as a whole, conclusions regarding the nature of the DSI begin to take form.

The concluding chapter considers the findings from each of the case study chapters leading to the creation of a comprehensive framework for analysing the DSI as it engages in attempts to build liberal peace economies in conflict-affected states. The dominance of a liberal ideology is found to be problematic in and of itself but also to have serious consequences for the ways in which the problem of post-conflict transformation is conceived, and the operationalisation of solutions. However, given the heterogeneity of processes considered throughout the book, this chapter presents a more nuanced and reflexive analytical framework which takes into account the diversity of this industry as well as the opportunity for actors within it to operate with agency. While finding that there has been limited success in current modes of liberal peacebuilding in transforming war economies, this chapter concludes with suggestions for future research and policy directions.