

2

Re-assessing foreign policy 1969–72

There could be no special partnership between Britain and the United States, even if Britain wanted it.

Prime Minister Heath to President Pompidou, May 1971¹

The jilted lover

According to Henry Kissinger, Edward Heath rejected a close working partnership with Richard Nixon, which left him feeling akin to that of a ‘jilted lover’.² Kissinger’s analysis has had an incredible impact upon the subsequent scholarly assessments of the US–UK relationship. As Heath’s official biographer Philip Ziegler has claimed, ‘Certainly it was no fault of President Nixon’s if the special relationship languished’.³ As the argument runs, Heath was determined to attain membership of the EEC because this would bolster a stagnant British economy, and promote Britain’s international influence. France, having vetoed British membership on two previous occasions in 1963 and 1967, had to be convinced that Britain could be a ‘European country’. Accordingly, Heath disassociated from the US–UK special relationship in order to prove his European credentials, and thus undermine the perennial French fear that Britain would act as an American Trojan Horse within the EEC.⁴

This interpretation has been challenged by other scholars. Rather than it being London’s enthusiasm for a weakening of the special relationship, the cause of this lay with Washington. The Nixon administration’s secretive foreign policy resulted in Britain being ignored and British policy-makers therefore sought to re-galvanise their influence internationally by entrenching a European foreign policy.⁵ Other commentators have attempted to synthesise

such arguments. The Nixon administration's indifference towards the special relationship coupled with a British foreign policy pursuing a more European path resulted in the special relationship becoming near redundant. It was only once the consequences of the global economic and energy crisis of 1973–74 became apparent that the special relationship became prevalent again.⁶

Central in many of these accounts is the role played by certain individual policy-makers. Henry Kissinger, in particular, is seen to have had a malevolent effect upon US–UK relations.⁷ As one leading scholar of US–UK relations declares, US–UK difficulties 'certainly owed something to Kissinger's ego'.⁸ This line of argument appears especially popular amongst former British officials.⁹ Certainly, as recent scholarship has demonstrated, Kissinger's penchant for presenting himself as the archetypal proponent of *realpolitik* should be challenged, given that his actions could be dictated by anger, jealousy and suspicion of his bureaucratic rivals.¹⁰ Personalities, and especially that of Kissinger, did have an impact, often a detrimental one, upon the course of US–UK relations.¹¹ Nonetheless, such arguments should not be taken too far. US–UK relations are far greater than simply the behaviour of a few men. Indeed, if one is to accept the arguments of some scholars, one would be left with the impression that the entire US–UK relationship was virtually single-handedly controlled by Henry Kissinger. While personal relations in the conduct of international affairs are important, they are not overriding in determining the course of relations between states. Economic, security, political and domestic factors all play an important role in determining the development of events. Accordingly, these areas feature prominently below.¹²

Existing accounts have also tended to focus too heavily upon moments of crisis and acrimony between the two states. US–UK differences concerning the ceasing of the post-World War II Bretton Woods economic consensus, the India–Pakistan War, the 'Year of Europe' and the fourth Arab–Israeli War have all been emphasised. This is not unreasonable given the sometimes serious ramifications which emanated from such disagreements. Yet, as other analysts have highlighted, focusing solely on such events presents a distorted image of this era, and continued military, nuclear and intelligence cooperation between the two countries was hardly symbolic of a relationship that was supposedly 'All at sea'.¹³

Accordingly, it is argued below that certain aspects of the US–UK relationship functioned smoothly throughout this period (1969–72). In contradiction to the typical portrayal of Edward Heath actively shunning close US–UK cooperation, it is shown that in some areas it was actively re-energised.¹⁴ This was most obvious related to the updating of Britain's strategic nuclear weapons system, Polaris. Where US–UK difficulties did arise, these stemmed from differences towards *détente*, EEC entry and the re-ordering of the world's financial system.

For US–UK relations, 1969–72 should be seen as a period of transition, rather than one of crisis. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that many areas of difficulty for US–UK relations were largely ignored by policy-makers during this time. As shown throughout subsequent chapters, these unresolved differences were to create a number of problems for US–UK relations in the following years.

Dramatis personae

Nixon, as with all presidents, brought his own style of conducting foreign affairs to the White House.¹⁵ He was determined to centralise the creation of foreign policy in the White House because he was distrustful of the traditional centres of power in Washington. In Nixon's assessment, his years as vice-president (1953–61) had demonstrated how the Washington bureaucracy was able to manipulate the president into pursuing choices which 'they' wanted. In Nixon's estimation, the CIA was full of 'Ivy League Liberals' who disdained him. Worse yet, Nixon distrusted the work of the CIA and believed that many of its analysts had a tendency to utilise intelligence as a means to support pre-existing conclusions.¹⁶

As one former director of the CIA (DCI) recalls, Nixon 'despised' the agency, not least because he was convinced that it had worked with John F. Kennedy in the 1960 presidential election to undermine his candidacy.¹⁷ As such, the role of the DCI (Richard Helms) was severely curtailed, and all intelligence assessments were instructed to run through the office of Henry Kissinger.¹⁸ Kissinger also made sure that Helms would never meet with the president alone, and that all intelligence estimates that were to reach the president had to be in Kissinger's possession 'at least 48 hours' beforehand.¹⁹ This meant that all of the intelligence assessments that were to reach the president could be vetted by Kissinger and duly influenced according to his design. As national security adviser, therefore, Kissinger effectively functioned as Nixon's 'principal' intelligence officer. It is with authority then that Richard H. Immerman notes, 'Richard Nixon had no use for sources of intelligence other than his own – which meant Henry Kissinger's'.²⁰

The new president's opinion of the State Department was little better. As one prominent journalist recollected, Nixon 'distrusted the state department which he considered both fuzzy minded and a nest of holdover liberal Democrats'.²¹ Nixon's disdain for the State Department is captured well by his comment that it was staffed by 'striped pant faggots'.²² Worse still, the president believed that the existing Washington bureaucracy was actively seeking to undermine his policies. In order to overcome this, Nixon wanted to replace all of the existing bureaucrats with his own appointees.²³ On matters related to foreign policy,

Nixon was determined to centralise its creation and execution from within the White House. Nixon believed that a sort of inertia had enveloped US foreign policy, and it was only through the White House that foreign policy could be properly debated and re-conceptualised. In the subsequent years, the opinions of the CIA, Pentagon and State Department were to be largely ignored. As Arthur Schlesinger noted, Nixon's conduct really did mark the zenith of the 'Imperial Presidency'.²⁴

Nixon was aided in this ambition by employing a very small circle of advisers in which policy choices would be debated and decided. This circle included Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman, Deputy Chief of Staff John Ehrlichman, Treasury Secretary John Connally and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. Haldeman's position within the administration was particularly important given that Nixon wanted all matters of substance to be channelled through him. Such was Haldeman's importance that he was referred to by Nixon as his 'lord high executioner'. In fact, the president made clear in one Cabinet meeting: 'When [Haldeman] talks, it's me talking.' According to a number of White House insiders, nobody, not even Kissinger, could ignore Haldeman.²⁵

Whilst not immune to Haldeman's presence, at least in advising the president on foreign policy matters, Kissinger reigned supreme.²⁶ Kissinger managed to achieve this in a number of ways. First, he had been quick to centralise as much power in his office as possible. Thus, Kissinger – under the direction of Nixon – sought to change the Washington bureaucracy, in order to strip the traditional centres of influence of their power. The State Department was Kissinger's first target and, in spite of meeting resistance, he was successful in diminishing its influence by forcing through a number of changes.²⁷ Kissinger did this by first warning against following Lyndon Johnson's 'Tuesday Lunch' decision-making approach. As Kissinger suggested, this approach meant that the 'discussants are frequently inadequately briefed and often unfamiliar with the nuances of the issues before them'.²⁸ To avoid this in the new administration, Kissinger advised that the National Security Council should return as the principal forum for discussing and deciding US policy. Here, the national security adviser (Kissinger), working under the 'direction of the President', would determine the agenda and lead the discussion.²⁹ This won Nixon's approval and the first National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) issued under him stated that the National Security Council would be the 'principal forum for issues requiring inter-agency decisions and setting basic national objectives'. NSDM Number 2 re-affirmed this.³⁰ Nixon was even more explicit within private communications with Kissinger.³¹ The State Department also lost a number of its advisory roles within the administration. For instance, the collective group meetings between various bodies were taken away from the State Department and placed in the hands of Kissinger.³²

Kissinger's position within the administration as the number one foreign policy adviser was therefore endorsed at the onset of the Nixon administration. Nixon's decision to re-establish the National Security Council as the primary body for debating and deciding US foreign policy enabled Kissinger to enact a tremendous amount of influence upon the course of US policy. However, it should be remembered that Kissinger's position within the bureaucracy was far from supreme. His biggest challenge was that he did not have an institutional base from which to operate in the same fashion that a secretary of state or defense would have. Instead, Kissinger relied solely upon the continued good will of the president himself. Thus, although Nixon gave greater prominence to his national security adviser, it was the president who assumed the dominant role in the Nixon–Kissinger relationship and it was Nixon who established the general outlines of foreign policy. It was Kissinger's job to then turn these general ambitions of the president into reality.³³ One former Nixon White House insider eloquently summarises the relationship thus: 'Many of America's moves in this period originated with Kissinger, but Kissinger was operating within the Nixon framework.'³⁴

On the face of it, it is perhaps curious that a book which deals with US foreign policy has yet to mention the role played by the US secretary of state. William Rogers was appointed as secretary of state in 1969, and had worked with Nixon as a partner within the same New York law firm, had advised him as a senator on the Alger Hiss case and had served as the Attorney General during the Eisenhower administration with him. Given this, one would naturally presume that Rogers would have had a major role to play in US foreign policy-making but in reality he had limited influence upon significant aspects of US foreign policy. The institutional changes to the Washington bureaucracy ensured that the State Department's influence was curtailed, and Nixon's disdain for the department meant he had little time for it anyhow. As such, Rogers' main area of concern was with trying to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict. Even this had only been given to Rogers largely because of Nixon's belief that Kissinger's Jewish background would leave him incapable of pursuing a path which was not profoundly pro-Israeli.³⁵ Thus, Rogers' influence upon US–UK relations was limited and occurred only sporadically.

Melvin Laird, as Nixon's defense secretary, had a much more influential role in US foreign policy which can largely be attributed to his superb bureaucratic in-fighting skills.³⁶ However, on the major issues, Kissinger usually managed to triumph. More importantly, Kissinger had a far more consistent record of supporting Nixon on the most crucial issues. On all of the critical events during the early days of Nixon's first term, be it Cuba, the potential Syria–Jordan war and the escalation of hostilities in Vietnam, Kissinger steadfastly supported the president which, in turn, gave Kissinger more influence with Nixon.³⁷ Laird,

however, was still important for US–UK relations and obvious areas where his influence would be felt included the MBFR negotiations and debates about wider NATO restructuring. Laird's position on the upgrading of Britain's Polaris fleet was also of crucial significance for British interests. Nevertheless, UK policy-makers would predominantly gain access to Nixon via Kissinger.³⁸ Given this, it is the person of Henry Kissinger that features heavily in subsequent chapters.

In comparison to Nixon's distrust of the bureaucracy, Heath worked well with his civil service. Heath leaned heavily on Robert Armstrong – his principal private secretary – especially on matters related to European and domestic policy. Douglas Hurd, who would go on to become foreign and commonwealth secretary during the Thatcher and Major governments (1989–95), and Donald Maitland, who acted as Heath's press secretary, also enjoyed a close professional relationship with the prime minister. Heath also actively sought the advice of Lord Carrington, secretary of state for defence (1970–74), on defence and security issues.³⁹

Burke Trend, the Cabinet secretary, enjoyed a somewhat mixed relationship with Heath. Apparently, his Socratic method in proffering advice irritated Heath and he was also judged to have been too close with the former prime minister, Harold Wilson. However, for US–UK relations, and in matters regarding defence and wider foreign policy, Heath realised that Trend was indispensable, because Trend was, as one author put it, 'Heath's link-man with Nixon'.⁴⁰ Trend achieved this position largely as a result of Nixon's insistence that the usual channels for international communication, i.e. via the State Department, be bypassed. Instead, foreign governments deemed of importance were encouraged to communicate all sensitive and important matters via Henry Kissinger. This backchannel method is usually associated with Kissinger and Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Union's ambassador to Washington (1962–86). However, the British also engaged in backchannel diplomacy with Rowley Cromer (UK ambassador to Washington, 1971–74) first acting as the main liaison, and Trend gradually assuming the role from 1971/2 onwards.⁴¹

Other key individuals for the management of US–UK relations included Rowley Cromer, Denis Greenhill, Thomas Brimelow, Richard Sykes and Charles Powell.⁴² Cromer was the former governor of the Bank of England, and had acted as an unofficial adviser to the Conservative Party during the Labour governments of Harold Wilson (1964–70). Cromer's reward for this was to be appointed as the ambassador to Washington.⁴³ Greenhill and Brimelow were the two officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office who had the most contact with the Nixon administration. Sykes and Powell were both important as they attended many of the meetings between Cromer and key US officials. Once the Kissinger–Trend backchannel was established, they attended these meetings too.⁴⁴

Little has been said so far about foreign and commonwealth secretary Alec Douglas-Home. While he was certainly not marginalised in foreign policy-making, Heath was keen to dominate the areas of foreign policy that he felt were most important. Such aspects included Britain's application to the EEC and the conduct of US–UK relations. Furthermore, whilst Douglas-Home established a cordial relationship with his opposite number William Rogers, and was held in high regard by both Nixon and Kissinger, the reality was that points of importance were communicated and discussed via backchannels. Consequently, communication about matters of substance largely took place through Rowley Cromer and, later, Burke Trend.⁴⁵

Maintaining a presence East of Suez

On assuming office, Heath was faced with a number of associated difficulties regarding the economy. Heath had inherited an economy with an unexpected budget deficit and his economic problems were compounded by the fact that his chancellor of the exchequer, Iain Macleod, passed away soon after taking office. Macleod, who had spent his years in opposition crafting an alternative economic agenda for the country, was replaced by Anthony Barber who, by own admission, was ill-prepared for the job.⁴⁶ In foreign affairs, two immediate points were prevalent: whether to endorse the 1967 decision to withdraw British military forces East of Suez, and how to attain membership of the EEC. Both of these topics had obvious consequences for US–UK relations.⁴⁷

Throughout the 1960s, the US had made several efforts to convince the British to maintain their East of Suez commitments.⁴⁸ This presence included the two sovereign bases in Aden and Singapore, agreements to uphold security in a number of states, and a number of smaller bases located east of the Suez Canal. In total the British committed close to 90,000 troops to upholding this role. Such efforts proved superfluous when Wilson announced in 1967 that Britain would begin a phased withdrawal of its forces East of Suez. By January 1968, Wilson had decided that this process would be accelerated and British forces would be withdrawn by the end of 1971.⁴⁹ Such announcements deeply irritated Washington with Lyndon Johnson giving the impression that a British withdrawal signalled that the US would have to stand alone in the defence of the entire Western bloc.⁵⁰

Once Nixon took office in January 1969, he too attempted to convince Wilson that he should reverse the East of Suez decision. Nixon believed that Britain had a role to play globally and he lamented the decision not to support Britain during the Suez crisis (1956–57) because it resulted in Britain hastening its global retreat, which had only damaged the long-term interests of the

US.⁵¹ Added to this, Nixon wanted a more self-reliant Europe. In practical terms this meant Europe would contribute more fully to its own defence needs. This took the moniker 'burden-sharing'. A whole host of domestic, strategic and economic factors were behind Nixon's desire for burden-sharing. For one, the way in which Lyndon Johnson had financed the Vietnam War had created serious problems for the US economy. Thus, there was an economic imperative for the United States to lessen its spending commitments. The American misadventure in Vietnam had also encouraged calls that the United States could not offer open-ended commitments to foreign powers which would involve huge manpower and monetary resources. Therefore, on the domestic front Nixon was facing Congressional and public opinion pressures to reduce America's global commitments. In such a context, it is not a surprise that Heath's allusion within the 1970 Conservative Party manifesto to reverse the decision to withdraw East of Suez was met with approval in Washington.⁵²

Running alongside this potential change in British defence policies were the efforts of the Nixon administration to share the burden of NATO's conventional forces more equally throughout the alliance. This was driven not only by the aforementioned factors but by the increasingly apparent reality of nuclear parity. NATO had adopted the doctrine of 'flexible response' in 1967 which superseded the previous policy of 'Massive Retaliation', that being that any Soviet military aggression against US allies would be met with a full strategic nuclear response. Flexible response was designed to place a heavier reliance upon conventional forces in a world where rough nuclear parity meant Massive Retaliation was deemed no longer credible. This, so the theory ran, would offer decision-makers greater flexibility during a confrontation with the USSR and prevent a scenario where a president of the United States would be forced to surrender or precipitate a nuclear Armageddon in response to any Soviet military aggression in Europe.⁵³ However, NATO's force levels fell well short of being able to realistically pursue this flexible response strategy. As Nixon's team had been informed prior to taking office, and soon concluded once in office, the Warsaw Pact held an advantage in conventional forces and had also reached parity with the United States in the nuclear realm.⁵⁴ Given this, we can see why Nixon questioned whether NATO's heavy reliance on nuclear weapons was credible under such circumstances. As Nixon bluntly stated, '[the] nuclear umbrella in NATO [was] a lot of crap'.⁵⁵ Less crudely, he informed Heath that the era of 'nuclear standoff' had dawned.⁵⁶ As a result, Nixon concluded that a far greater emphasis had to be given to conventional forces. Only by improving these would a credible deterrence posture be posed towards the USSR.⁵⁷

Kissinger agreed largely with Nixon's assessments on the dangers that nuclear parity posed for Western security. During his time at Harvard, Kissinger

had made similar arguments to those now being pushed by Nixon and in 1970 he repeated such thinking to the president.⁵⁸ As Kissinger noted:

We no longer can count on our nuclear weapons to deter Soviet aggressiveness or threat of using force. With near parity in strategic weapons the Soviets probably assume that we could not credibly threaten their use except when faced with a direct attack on the US itself.⁵⁹

Kissinger was not alone in offering such gloomy advice. The president's other advisers, including Laird and Rogers, were equally pessimistic about the evolving strategic situation.⁶⁰

The Nixon administration therefore assumed a dual strategy towards the British. They first sought to convince both the Wilson and Heath governments to contribute further resources to the NATO alliance. They tried also to persuade the British to reverse their decision to withdraw their forces East of Suez and therefore encouraged Heath to retain as large a commitment as possible.⁶¹ Such an approach proved, ultimately, to be a wasted effort. With respect to NATO, the British government refused to bow to American pressure. With regard to the East of Suez decision, Wilson remained unperturbed and stuck with his original decision. Heath, while wanting to implement a full reversal of Wilson's policy, found that it was not easily reversible. The new prime minister therefore largely endorsed Wilson's East of Suez plans.⁶²

The only discernible difference was that Britain signed a Five Power Pact Treaty with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. It was not, however, a major defence treaty. As Lord Carrington put it, 'There was no question of completely putting the clock back; we accepted much of the situation as we found it'.⁶³ However, it should be remembered that the agreement did ensure that the British retained a symbolic global military role which Wilson's plans would have eliminated. For Nixon, this did provide a small token victory. In relation to Britain's NATO commitments, American efforts were equally pointless. The Heath government made it clear that Britain would not be contributing greater resources to NATO. All that the Heath administration offered was their auspices in trying to convince fellow NATO members to increase their own contributions.⁶⁴

Doing as much as they can

The manner in which the Nixon administration should react to Heath's defence review was vigorously debated in Washington. Melvin Laird, who was ever conscious of Congressional opinion, wanted to send a message to London

that defence cuts were intolerable. In his assessment, Congressional demands for US troop withdrawals globally, and in particular throughout Europe, would become more vehement because of British defence cuts. The US, therefore, should threaten to withdraw its troops from NATO unilaterally. This, Laird hoped, would force the British into retracting their own defence cuts. However, Laird's advice did not attract much support within the administration. His deputy, David Packard, suggested that a public rebuke of Heath's decision should be issued; the approach was endorsed by William Rogers.⁶⁵

Aside from Laird, there appeared little appetite at this stage for a major confrontation with the UK over their defence spending. As other US officials advised, to pursue Laird's course, or even the less bellicose options put forward by Packard and Rogers, would do little to serve US interests. As George Springsteen reasoned, the UK still contributed, as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the most of any European state to NATO.⁶⁶ Therefore, to publicly admonish the Heath administration would be an unproductive course. More important yet, Laird's approach was unlikely to actually change the British decision, meaning a confrontation would actually not serve any meaningful objective.⁶⁷ This line of argument gained the support of Kissinger's advisers. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Kissinger's key aide for European affairs, argued that whilst Britain's defence commitment had not increased, Heath had not agreed to the scale of cutbacks envisaged under Wilson.⁶⁸ This clearly resonated with Kissinger. 'The fact is that the British have probably done about as much as they can,' Kissinger informed the president.⁶⁹ Such advice won the president's backing. Consequently, no public rebuke was issued; nor were any threats of US troop withdrawals from Europe made. Instead, when US officials met with their British counterparts, a sympathetic tone, along the terms outlined by Kissinger, was employed.⁷⁰

The White House took Heath's decision rather philosophically given that it ran contrary to Nixon's policy of burden-sharing. For US-UK relations, Heath's confirmation of Wilson's East of Suez policy had reduced Britain's utility as an ally to the US. This, however, was not an event deemed to be terminal in the eyes of the Nixon White House. Kissinger had argued against the notion of a public rebuke because of the president's desire to establish solid relations with the new Conservative government.⁷¹ Moreover, the five power defence agreement did provide the US with a symbolic partner on the world stage, in that the US could plausibly argue that it was not alone in trying to maintain global stability. Thus, as one author has recently noted, the East of Suez decision did not mean the end of Britain's ability to actually project global power.⁷² Yet, Heath's decision did signify the increasingly Euro-centric nature of British defence and foreign policy. As Lord Carrington wrote, 'Defence had come full circle. It was not only to start but almost to end

at home.⁷³ Furthermore, the British had been perceived by the Nixon administration to have undermined US interests. As shown in subsequent chapters, when US–UK opinion collided, the Nixon administration would not always react in such a subdued manner.

EEC expansion: A future competitor?

As Denis Greenhill argued, for Edward Heath, ‘Europe came first’.⁷⁴ Heath had demonstrated this desire during a series of lectures at Harvard University in 1967 where he noted that Britain should reconfigure its foreign policy priorities away from the ‘Atlantic Community’ and the Commonwealth. Instead, Britain would shape a new Europe, which would act as a genuine third power centre in a world dominated by the superpowers. Thus, as one early biographer of Heath noted, the EEC was a vehicle in which Britain could ensure a world role ‘commensurate with the role that she enjoyed in the past’.⁷⁵

Traditionally, historical accounts have tended to present Heath’s EEC policy as a zero sum affair. For these authors, Heath rejected a close relationship with the US in order to gain EEC membership.⁷⁶ When Heath read a biography of himself in which it was claimed he wanted to abandon the special relationship, he scribbled in the margin ‘No’.⁷⁷ Heath was correct to reject this line of argument. Certainly, Heath brought his own particular brand of realism to the US–UK relationship; he refused to accept that US–UK cooperation was always beneficial to British interests. For instance, soon after assuming office, Heath ordered an assessment of US usage of British bases globally and wanted to know whether it was in the British interest to grant US access to these bases. Both Douglas-Home and Carrington responded that it was in Britain’s interest, arguing that it allowed Britain to continue exploiting US expertise in the nuclear and intelligence realms.⁷⁸

Nevertheless, Heath querying US rights to British bases does not automatically imply that he wished to terminate such cooperation. Rather, Heath wanted to ensure that the US–UK relationship, as it had traditionally been conceived by British policy-making elites, actually continued to promote British interests. Relevant aspects of the relationship, such as nuclear and intelligence sharing would be allowed to continue whereas other elements, such as international summitry, would be allowed to slip.⁷⁹ Europe then was seen by Heath as a way of maintaining Britain’s international position and would, much in Ernest Bevin’s vein of ‘pillars’, act as one pillar for British interests. The other pillar, the US–UK relationship, would be retained and utilised as and when needed.⁸⁰ None of this was seen as particularly controversial (at this stage anyhow)

from Washington's perspective. The Nixon administration wished to pursue its détente agenda in a largely bilateral fashion. British international decline in recent years also undermined notions that it could act as America's global lieutenant. However, as Kissinger explained, the US was not blessed with many close allies and the US 'should not discourage those who feel they have a special friendship for us'.⁸¹

Close US–UK relations had been sought by British policy-makers as a means of upholding British global interests since the end of the Second World War.⁸² Similarly, Harold Macmillan looked towards British membership of the EEC as a mechanism for managing Britain's changing international circumstances. Wilson's government also sought a similar objective. Macmillan and Wilson, however, were both reluctant converts to the European project. They came to the conclusion that British membership of the EEC was essential for maintaining British relevance in a world dominated by the superpowers. They also believed that EEC membership could help to improve Britain's economic fortunes. Heath's Euro-centric policy should not, therefore, be viewed as revolutionary in the field of British foreign policy.⁸³

Heath differed from his predecessors, however, in that he was more passionately committed to the European ideal. For Heath, British membership of the EEC was imperative, not only for ensuring Britain could continue a relevant world role, but also for maintaining European peace and stability. As one commentator noted soon after Heath's accession to office, 'Mr Heath will use all his power' to prove that Britain could win admission into the EEC.⁸⁴ First, Heath's background made him a suitable candidate for trying to obtain membership to a club that had eluded both Macmillan and Wilson as he had been the chief negotiator for UK membership to the EEC under the Macmillan government (1960–63).⁸⁵ Witnessing Charles de Gaulle veto British membership, and his citing of the US–UK special relationship as the reason for his action, provided Heath with first-hand experience of France's suspicion of the US–UK relationship.⁸⁶ As Donald Maitland opined, Heath 'drew the clear lesson from the events of 1962/63 that the French held the key' to EEC membership.⁸⁷ Given this, once in office, Heath would court France and sought to convince French president Georges Pompidou that Britain should be admitted into the EEC.

Why then was Heath determined to enter the EEC? Some have suggested that he was passionately committed to the ideal of European integration as a means of ensuring the continent's future peace, stability and prosperity. Whilst this view is not without merit, Heath's policy was also driven by pragmatism and a desire to ensure that the UK could retain an influential role in world affairs. Heath, however, also wanted to move further and faster towards an integrated political Europe, which would have common foreign and defence

policies. Indeed, it was Heath's intention to utilise the expansion of the EEC as a vehicle for promoting this ambition in 1973. It was this feature of Heath's European policy that marked his fundamentally different approach to that of his predecessors.⁸⁸

Regardless of the actual route taken, the fact remained that British membership of the EEC would have a profound impact upon US–UK relations. Obviously, if the British followed the protectionist trade and monetary policies as practised by the EEC, this would have ramifications for US economic interests. Politically, given the notion that the EEC would create some type of 'common' foreign and political policies, this would at the very least change the nature of US–UK diplomacy.⁸⁹

What then of US policy? Since the creation of the EEC, successive US administrations had encouraged British membership as it was commonly believed this would revitalise the British economy and ensure Europe was driven by a friendly power.⁹⁰ The Nixon administration did not automatically subscribe to such thinking. Certainly, the president reassured both Wilson and Heath on multiple occasions that the US supported British membership.⁹¹ Furthermore, Nixon even offered clandestine US support for Britain's application.⁹² Given that this was the flagship policy of the Heath government, it is perhaps not surprising that the president would make such utterances in a bilateral conversation. If, however, one studies the documentary record of the internal debates in Washington, it becomes clear that considerable anxiety about British membership of the EEC existed.

Soon after coming to power, the Nixon administration undertook a serious review of US policy towards EEC enlargement. Nixon's economic advisers were pushing the president to reconsider US support for EEC expansion and, reiterating the types of argument put forward since the mid-1960s, they suggested that EEC expansion would have a detrimental impact upon US economic interests. Nixon came under further pressure from domestic constituents with the Republican leadership advising that he should be more robust in challenging the protectionist trading practices of the EEC.⁹³ As Sonnenfeldt recalled, some US policy-makers were concerned about the possible development of an economic 'fortress Europe'.⁹⁴

John Connally, the confidant of Nixon and US Treasury Secretary, was especially vocal in emphasising such thinking. In Connally's opinion, EEC enlargement would only have negative consequences for US economic interests because it would increase the number of countries that would adopt protectionist policies.⁹⁵ Connally appears to have been somewhat of a *bête noire* for British policy-making elites. Greenhill noted that Connally 'roughly handled' the British chancellor of the exchequer, Anthony Barber, during meetings. Heath was equally frustrated with Connally and he remarked that they had

'killed the wrong man at Dallas'. Officials tasked with Britain's EEC negotiations even speculated as to whether Connally was advising Nixon against supporting British membership.⁹⁶

Economic arguments, though important in the opinion of Nixon, were not critical in determining US policy towards British membership of the EEC. Nixon accepted that Heath was determined to obtain British membership of the EEC and, as a result, US economic interests were likely to suffer. This, though, would be counterbalanced by the political benefits derived from British membership.⁹⁷ As the president candidly explained, the 'economic guys' should be 'screwing' one another, and 'there ought to be a lot of screwing going on' but fundamentally 'the political aspects of our relations should be overriding for both sides'.⁹⁸ In a less robust fashion, Nixon issued a memorandum in January 1971 that explained US economic policy had to 'maintain close coordination with basic foreign policy objectives'.⁹⁹ In the final assessment, Nixon was not prepared to sacrifice the political–military relationship with Europe for short-term economic gains.¹⁰⁰

As the president made clear, the political aspects of EEC enlargement were what fundamentally mattered. On this topic, Nixon's political advisers presented conflicting advice. Walter Annenberg, the US ambassador to the UK, argued that British membership would advance US interests as it increased the likelihood that Europe would have a more 'outward' looking mentality, implying that Europe would assume a greater role in the global containment of the USSR. It also created the potential that the EEC would assume a greater proportion of the European defence burden.¹⁰¹ Similar advice was provided by the State Department which supported their position by bringing in wider European questions, notably concerns about West Germany. They suggested that British membership was required because it would act as a natural counterweight to West German dominance of the EEC. Perhaps these arguments held particular resonance with the president given his ongoing concerns vis-à-vis West Germany's policy of *Ostpolitik*.¹⁰²

The State Department's advice was largely a regurgitation of what it had recommended throughout the Kennedy–Johnson years.¹⁰³ Unsurprisingly, given the growing bureaucratic squabbling between the State Department and Kissinger, such advice was met with little sympathy from him or his aides.¹⁰⁴ In October 1969, after prompting from his subordinates, Kissinger ordered a review of US policy towards EEC enlargement.¹⁰⁵ Kissinger himself was reticent about EEC enlargement, given that his tendency to see international relations through a realist perspective provoked apprehension towards the emergence of another bloc of powers.¹⁰⁶ As Kissinger had written in 1965, 'European unity is not a major cure-all for Atlantic disagreements. In many respects it may magnify rather than reduce differences.'¹⁰⁷ Kissinger articulated similar

arguments when in government, arguing that an 'independent Europe could prove to be a competitive power center with the US'.¹⁰⁸

Such evidence should not be taken as indicative of Kissinger's European policy. It has to be remembered that Kissinger balanced such judgements by arguing, 'Our security and our prosperity are both insolubly linked with the security and prosperity of Western Europe'.¹⁰⁹ For Kissinger, American security could not be divorced from that of Western Europe. Moreover, economics, which was being pushed so heavily as a reason against supporting EEC expansion, was actually of marginal concern to Kissinger. He was notorious for demonstrating a lack of knowledge of, or interest in, economics during his early years in office. As Arthur Burns, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, noted, Kissinger was, self-admittedly, 'ignorant' about economics.¹¹⁰

The report ordered by Kissinger about EEC enlargement was largely supportive of the concept and it noted that it was, in the main, in the interests of the US. As the report reasoned, if Britain failed to gain entry into the EEC, it 'might well leave us saddled with the UK and the pound in a permanent client status'. This would have obvious negative economic consequences, but any hopes of increased military burden-sharing would also be negated.¹¹¹ A month later, another paper on EEC expansion was produced that largely repeated this argument.¹¹² These internal working papers were finally established as a National Security Decision Memorandum which concluded that the US would 'support ... expansion of the membership of the Community'.¹¹³

Nixon thus re-affirmed the earlier policy of the Kennedy–Johnson administrations of supporting British membership of the EEC. This did not, however, cement US policy. Rather, highly influential US officials continued to question the wisdom of pursuing this course. Nixon's economic advisers continued with their onslaught of advice, suggesting a more proactive approach should be taken to defend US economic interests.¹¹⁴ It was clear during the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 that Nixon was following some of this advice. Whilst his economic advisers were far from unanimous in their support for taking a tougher line in trade disputes, the advice from the likes of John Connally won through.¹¹⁵ Accordingly, as Donald Rumsfeld noted, Nixon decided to 'grab the old shotgun and pull the trigger'.¹¹⁶ This took the form of halting dollar–gold convertibility and placing a 10 per cent surcharge on all imports. These decisions were reached in the utmost secrecy and took scant regard for America's allies. By the beginning of 1972, it is right to conclude that, at least in the economic realm, US–European relations had turned into a 'competitive relationship'.¹¹⁷

Kissinger and his staff also remained less than convinced that US interests were best served by encouraging British membership of the EEC. Sonnenfeldt took his concerns to the president, where he complained about the EEC's lack

of leadership and the unwillingness of the European states to contribute more fully to the NATO alliance. Nixon agreed with this assessment, noting that there was a 'vacuum of leadership in Europe which we must fill'. Even Annenberg had tempered his earlier advice, warning: 'Heath is thinking "Britain first" and wants Britain to command respect in the world. As we noted in our last examination of British foreign policy last December this assertive attitude is bound to result in differences between us.' US policy-makers, whilst officially supporting British membership of the EEC, were privately far more reticent.¹¹⁸

Regardless of US policy, it became increasingly obvious that Britain would attain membership of the EEC. Following a long meeting between Heath and Pompidou in May 1971, a fundamental agreement had been struck to allow British entry into the EEC. Following further negotiations, it was confirmed that Britain would enter the EEC on 1 January 1973.¹¹⁹ This clearly signified that the British had, at some level at least, accepted that their future interests would largely be bound to those of the European region. No longer would the UK seek a global role on the scale that it had done previously and it also signalled that the Heath government was determined to operate within the framework of the EEC. This would mean that the UK would be looking to establish not only common economic policies with their EEC partners but *political* ones also.¹²⁰ All of this created the potential for US–UK disagreements in the near future.

Détente and its consequence

Since taking office, Nixon had sought to reconfigure US foreign policy in order to confront the myriad problems facing the US. Amongst the most pressing included the American extrication from Vietnam, along with the worsening economic situation. For Nixon, the US was facing a gradual decline in its global power and this needed to be tackled. Détente was the policy through which these circumstances were managed.¹²¹ The establishment of détente with the USSR, the opening to the PRC, and the subsequent impact this would have upon US foreign policy actions – notably during the India–Pakistan War – had profound ramifications for US–UK relations. Negotiations encouraged by the détente process, notably the CSCE and MBFR, also produced US–UK difference but also considerable diplomatic consultation.

During Nixon and Heath's first meeting, the president insisted he wanted close US–UK consultation which would not only occur during moments of crisis but would rather become a routine activity.¹²² Throughout the ensuing years, this declaration would prove rather hollow. For example, Nixon's opening to the PRC was conducted without any prior consultation with the

British. Likewise, Nixon's major Vietnam policies, including the incursion into Cambodia, the Easter bombings, and the Christmas bombings of 1972, were taken without even a modicum of discussion with their British ally taking place.¹²³ The deepening of US–USSR bilateral diplomacy also largely excluded the British. Ironically, since the governments of Macmillan and Wilson, British policy had sought to achieve superpower détente. Once achieved, it was now viewed as being just as irksome as superpower confrontation!¹²⁴ As Kissinger astutely noted in his memoirs, détente had created a predicament where the Europeans 'dreaded a US–Soviet condominium'.¹²⁵ Or, as he suggested in private conversation, the real reason the Europeans were distrustful of détente was that they 'didn't do it themselves'.¹²⁶ As another commentator stated in 1970, 'for Europeans, contemporary America is doubtless a less certain protector, a less committed partner'.¹²⁷ Certainly, such descriptions applied to many parts of the British policy-making establishment.

Before assuming office, both Nixon and Kissinger had argued that the US had to engineer a rapprochement with the PRC.¹²⁸ Once in the White House, the president set out to accomplish this and by November 1971, following many months of intricate and secretive diplomacy, US efforts paid off. Nixon was invited to the PRC; his visit was set for February 1972.¹²⁹ There should have been very little in Nixon's rapprochement with the PRC to have caused US–UK disagreement. British policy had traditionally been more amenable to Mao's China than that of the US and Britain had officially recognised the PRC in January 1950 (leading to disagreement between London and Washington).¹³⁰ Moreover, when Heath had taken power, he too was seeking to improve relations with the PRC.¹³¹ US–UK problems largely existed due to the manner in which the president established his opening to the PRC, because Nixon demanded that the US–PRC rapprochement be conducted with the utmost of secrecy – only four days prior notification was given to British officials regarding the president's forthcoming visit to the PRC.¹³² This was hardly a sufficient amount of time for Britain to proffer advice on Nixon's endeavours. The limited pre-warning, coupled with the total lack of consultation, contradicted Nixon's earlier espousal of a desire for 'close and continual' US–UK consultation. Heath was also personally piqued by Nixon's actions, because he had kept the US fully informed of his own efforts to improve relations with the PRC. Nixon's conduct stood in stark contrast to this.¹³³

Aside from upsetting Heath personally, the opening to the PRC had other discernible effects upon US–UK relations. The most obvious ramification was the policy pursued by the US during the India–Pakistan War (December 1971), which was governed by wider geopolitical considerations to the neglect of the realities driving the conflict on the ground.¹³⁴ Border disputes between China and India had led to war in 1962 and China had subsequently supported

Pakistan as a counterweight to Indian power (which was in turn supported by the USSR). Indian–Pakistani tensions were running high over the future of East Pakistan (modern-day Bangladesh), and the possibility of an Indian–Chinese confrontation mounted. From the perspective of the Nixon White House, the signing of the Indian–Soviet treaty of August 1971 confirmed their long-held suspicions about Indian ‘neutralism’ in the Cold War and heightened the possibility of an Indian–Soviet conflagration with China–Pakistan.¹³⁵

This context, together with the importance Nixon attached to the PRC opening, resulted in the US ‘tilting’ towards Pakistan during the India–Pakistan war.¹³⁶ With the war barely three days old, Pakistan was faring badly, and the naval losses of two destroyers and a submarine gave naval superiority to Indian forces. Further, the Indian army – if not supreme – was forcing its Pakistan counterpart to retreat from East Pakistan.¹³⁷ The Nixon White House watched the unfolding events with increasing alarm, and therefore sought a ceasefire agreement in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which was designed to halt the fighting and leave the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan.

US policy was designed primarily with a view to supporting Pakistan’s president Yahya Khan, as Pakistan under his rule provided a useful bulwark against what the US perceived was Soviet-backed Indian expansion in the region. Thus, the US ambassador at the United Nations, George H. Bush, labelled the Indians as the aggressor in the war, and called for a ceasefire which would return East Pakistan to Pakistani control.¹³⁸ This turn of events, however, brought US and UK policy into direct conflict. British officials believed that the war had erupted as a result of Pakistani provocation. Moreover, the British did not view the conflict through the Cold War lens that Washington did and concluded that Indian actions were in response to local factors and were not designed as a smokescreen for possible Soviet aggrandisement in the region. For these reasons, Heath rejected the US ceasefire terms.¹³⁹

Following further fighting, East Pakistan was annexed and declared independent by India. US moves to influence the outcome had been largely ineffective. For instance, the despatching of a US naval task force to act as a ‘signal’ to the USSR against interfering was unable to prevent the Pakistani army suffering a military defeat at the hands of Indian forces.¹⁴⁰ In Washington, recrimination was the order of the day. Both Nixon and Kissinger believed that if the British had supported their UNSC Resolution then the war could have been stopped before Pakistan’s defeat.¹⁴¹ Not all shared this assessment, and other US officials had little sympathy with Kissinger’s ‘tantrums’. Nixon’s chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, believed the US response to the war had been ill-conceived and that Kissinger’s actions had created a diplomatic ‘loss’ for the US. In his assessment, blaming the British was solely designed by Kissinger to deflect attention away from this fact.¹⁴²

Whether the British supporting a UN resolution would have made much difference is largely a moot point. What mattered for US–UK relations was the fact that both Nixon and Kissinger believed the British had undermined their policies. Therefore, a president–prime minister summit scheduled to take place in Bermuda in December 1971 was perhaps an impromptu moment for such an event to be held. Nonetheless, as Sonnenfeldt noted, it gave the opportunity for Britain and America to ‘mend fences’.¹⁴³ British diplomats welcomed this American attitude. The FCO was especially keen to exploit the summit; they saw it as an opportunity to repair some of the fallout over both the Bretton Woods collapse and the India–Pakistan war.¹⁴⁴

At the summit, Nixon and Kissinger elaborated on their recent policy initiatives. They explained why they had not been able to communicate their decision over the China opening but promised that, ‘We’d like to keep you informed on a personal basis’ about US policy in the upcoming months. They also explained their policy regarding the India–Pakistan war. Again, Nixon promised to establish firmer US–UK consultations to avoid future misunderstandings of one another’s policies. Nixon also explained why he had adopted his economic policies during the year.¹⁴⁵

In addition, US–UK nuclear cooperation was discussed with the ongoing Polaris Improvement Project, initiated soon after Heath had won office, being of greatest importance, given that it required additional US assistance. The president gave his personal assurance that this cooperation would continue.¹⁴⁶ The discussions appeared to have met the FCO’s ambition of ensuring recent US–UK difficulty did not impinge upon the wider relationship. Moreover, Nixon had announced at the beginning of the conference that the US would abolish the 10 per cent surcharge upon all imports that it had enacted earlier in the year.¹⁴⁷ While not undertaken because of Heath’s diplomacy, the fact remained that the timing of the announcement coincided with the start of the Bermuda talks, thus affording the prime minister the allure of international influence upon US policy decisions.

Theory and reality

The Bermuda Conference gave an impression that recent difficulties in US–UK relations were in the past. As one newspaper reported, the US–UK relationship was embarking upon a ‘new era’, but one in which the Atlantic alliance remained as the ‘cornerstone of the free world’s defence’.¹⁴⁸ Publicly, the president’s press secretary, Ron Ziegler, also gave the impression that Nixon had enjoyed his talks with Heath.¹⁴⁹ When Heath arrived back in London, he conveyed a similar impression that recent US–UK difficulties were now settled.

He informed his colleagues that he had managed to get US agreement for increased diplomatic consultation and that the US would keep his government fully informed about the developing superpower relationship.¹⁵⁰ US officialdom did little to disabuse their British counterparts of such an opinion.¹⁵¹

This new era in US–UK openness was quickly shown to be illusory. Nixon's visit to the PRC (21–28 February 1972) illustrated that the assurances he had given to Heath were little more than words.¹⁵² British officialdom received no more information regarding the US visit than any other European power. Thus, the FCO had to rely upon television coverage to gauge how the visit was progressing. Moreover, such a predicament heightened British suspicions of US motives and about what the US was actually discussing with the PRC.¹⁵³

Lord Cromer was subsequently ordered to 'smoke out' Kissinger to ascertain the US's motives.¹⁵⁴ Cromer, for his part, was clearly more relaxed about the American silence than his colleagues. Whilst Nixon had declared his visit to the PRC as 'the week that changed the world', Cromer believed that the lack of communication could be attributed to American embarrassment at not having reached any substantive agreements with the PRC. This view was also shared by the UK Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).¹⁵⁵ A survey of the memorandums of the conversations which took place between Chairman Mao, Prime Minister Chou En Lai, President Nixon, and Henry Kissinger appear to somewhat undermine such an assessment.¹⁵⁶ The subject of Taiwan, though originally dismissed by Kissinger in his memoirs as having been a peripheral issue and thus mentioned only briefly, was discussed in detail.¹⁵⁷ Obviously, a potential change in America's military and legal commitments to Taiwan would have practical implications for Asia. Moreover, the Shanghai communiqué – coupled with the geopolitical implications of the visit – demonstrated the rising significance of the US–PRC relationship on the global stage.¹⁵⁸

Despite Cromer's personal assessment, he followed his instructions and sought to learn more from Kissinger. The British ambassador was to have little success. Unable to gain an audience with Kissinger, he had to make do with a debriefing from William Rogers. Cromer was under no illusions as to what Rogers would be able to divulge and complained to London: 'I doubt whether we shall learn a great deal from this source.'¹⁵⁹ President Nixon's personal correspondence with Heath also produced little more information. British officials had little unique US information with which to determine the outcome of Nixon's China visit. Instead, their assessments were drawn from the Shanghai communiqué, Secretary Rogers' briefing to NATO, and discussions with minor US officials.¹⁶⁰

Nixon's personal promise to keep Heath informed regarding his thinking on world affairs was not apparent during his visit to the PRC. It should not be forgotten, however, that Heath did actually support Nixon's rapprochement with the

PRC. Indeed, British support of Nixon's PRC policies won him approval. The British had been 'damn good' about the PRC opening, Nixon declared during a private meeting. 'We couldn't have a better ally' was the opinion of William Rogers.¹⁶¹ Evidently the British government had presented an outward impression of warmth to their American colleagues, but the lack of consultation over the PRC opening generated resentment in London. The prime minister wanted to be better informed than he was. Washington, however, was not forthcoming on this occasion.

The reason for this was manifold. As outlined above, the Nixon administration had conducted their diplomacy with the PRC in an extremely secretive fashion. The possibility of US–PRC interaction being leaked prior to Nixon officially opening relations was something the president was not prepared to risk. There was, however, a wider structural issue at play, and that was simply that the UK was no longer important or powerful enough to warrant close consultation on all facets of US foreign policy.¹⁶² UK policy-makers certainly would have preferred deep consultative discussions with their US counterparts. Given the importance attached to Hong Kong by the British, perhaps there was a legitimate basis of complaint. Regardless, the Nixon administration appeared none too interested in British sensibilities. As the president summed up in conversation:

Heath – comes here, he loves to talk about, 'Oh, how was your trip to China?' He likes to talk about the Russian arms, what we're going to do about [unclear] of course he does. And what's going to happen in the Mideast, and what can we do. But he knows, as he talks to me, that what the British do doesn't make a damn bit of a difference in the world anymore. It's too bad, but it's true.¹⁶³

SALT and Moscow

Following Nixon's visit to the PRC, he once again shocked onlookers by announcing a visit to the USSR. As with the PRC opening, the strictest secrecy was employed in engineering this summit. Again, the British were only given brief notice about the visit.¹⁶⁴ British officials were deeply concerned about Nixon's latest gambit and the FCO commissioned a paper that would pre-empt any 'fait accomplis' that Britain would have to face as a result of the Moscow summit. A US–USSR summit was seen to hold much greater potential for damaging British interests than the US–PRC rapprochement not least because of the nuclear negotiations that these talks entailed. Of particular concern was the subject of SALT because the Moscow summit would potentially conclude

some agreement which British policy-makers feared would undermine existing US–UK nuclear arrangements.¹⁶⁵

The SALT process had begun during the Johnson administration and, even though US involvement in Vietnam had strained US–USSR relations, by 1968 Lyndon Johnson had decided to visit the USSR where nuclear arms limitation was to be a topic open for serious discussion. Events, however, interceded in such plans and the USSR's invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 made it politically impractical for the US president to visit the USSR, and thus the proposed trip was cancelled. With the visit cancelled, progress on SALT stalled and it was not until the Nixon administration took power in January 1969 that SALT would begin again.¹⁶⁶

For the Nixon administration, SALT was to be taken as one point in the overarching policy of linkage. SALT, therefore, would be linked to advances in other areas of US–USSR interaction. In particular, the US government was determined not to move on SALT until a satisfactory Berlin agreement had been reached with Moscow.¹⁶⁷ SALT was also conducted on a bilateral basis between the two superpowers. As Nixon candidly put it in discussion with the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin:

Let's be realistic. The key to this sort of thing [SALT] is what the two major nuclear powers will do. It is a question of leadership at the top – I don't mean at the top of governments, but at the top of this group of five.¹⁶⁸

Such an attitude was worrying from the British perspective as any SALT agreement could have consequences for British interests. A general concern was that SALT would gradually erode the US nuclear guarantee to NATO. This, of course, was hardly a new phenomenon. Since the origins of NATO, a perennial British concern had been that the US would loosen its nuclear commitments. More specifically was the worry that the US would agree a SALT treaty that would prevent future US–UK nuclear cooperation.¹⁶⁹

It should not be forgotten that Heath's government supported the general concept of SALT because it was deemed to promote long-term British interests as it would halt a needless arms race and encourage a more stable international order.¹⁷⁰ Nonetheless, there were specific points of interest where SALT concerned the British government. These included the possibility of an Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, a 'No Transfer' agreement and a reduction in Forward Base Systems. Perhaps the most worrisome aspect was the possibility that SALT would curtail existing and future US–UK nuclear weapons cooperation. The 'No Transfer' possibility was, therefore, viewed with particular concern. Officials within the MOD had ascertained that the US had agreed with the Soviets to not circumvent a SALT agreement by providing 'significant'

nuclear weapons to a third party. It also suggested that nuclear assistance, i.e. providing other states with nuclear technology, would be limited or entirely outlawed.¹⁷¹

This had obvious ramifications for Britain's Polaris deterrent yet the US had made no mention of this directly to them.¹⁷² Instead, the British government learned this information from Raymond Garthoff, a member of the US SALT negotiating team. However, Garthoff did not represent White House policy because Nixon preferred to negotiate the substance of SALT through Kissinger's backchannel with Anatoly Dobrynin.¹⁷³ This was obviously problematic from the British perspective as they were unaware of the content of these meetings. While the British received briefings on the general thrust of US policy (something Nixon had insisted on, much to the chagrin of his defense secretary, Melvin Laird), the fact remained that British policy-makers felt they were not adequately briefed about US intentions.¹⁷⁴ As such, we can see from British documentation that a general trend can be discerned: as US–USSR détente established itself, British fears of US–UK nuclear cooperation being curtailed increased.¹⁷⁵

Once Nixon's visit to Moscow was under way (May 1972), Heath sought to gather as much information as possible about the trip. Establishing the finer details of the SALT agreement was viewed as fundamentally important. Compared to China, British officials were much more successful. To be sure, the British ambassador in Moscow, John Killick, reported that he had nothing of substance to inform London. 'We seem to be out in the cold' was Solly Zuckerman's appraisal.¹⁷⁶ Heath, however, was not as much 'out in the cold' as such reports would suggest. Unbeknownst to Killick and Zuckerman, Kissinger had agreed to keep Trend privately informed of American negotiations at the summit.¹⁷⁷ Regardless of this channel, British officials continued to suspect that the Americans were not supplying them with the full picture. To compensate for this, Douglas-Home ordered the British Embassy in Washington to try to elicit further information from Kissinger. While gaining more knowledge, the British remained sceptical about US policy.¹⁷⁸

Though British officials may have been nervous about the likely contents of a US–USSR nuclear arms agreement, the ones reached, in particular the interim SALT I agreement and the ABM treaty, were on balance viewed optimistically.¹⁷⁹ The ABM treaty was generally interpreted as being in the British interest because it had prevented the widespread deployment of ABMs. Those tasked with analysing such matters believed that widespread ABM deployment would have led to serious questions about the credibility of Britain's nuclear deterrent. Therefore, the final US–USSR agreement to limit their ABM deployment to only two sites, and for the ABMs to total only 100 interceptors apiece, was seen to have prevented their widespread deployment.¹⁸⁰

The US was not ignorant of potential British and NATO concerns about what SALT meant for future security cooperation. Nixon had sought to reassure Heath that the US government would never enter into an agreement with the Soviet Union that would undermine Britain's nuclear ability.¹⁸¹ The president also publicly sought to reassure his allies and in a joint session of Congress Nixon stated that:

By the same token, we must stand steadfastly with our NATO partners if negotiations leading us to a new *détente* and a mutual reduction of forces in Europe are to be productive. Maintaining the strength, integrity, and steadfastness of our free world alliances is the foundation on which all of our other initiatives for peace and security in the world must rest. As we seek better relations with those who have been our adversaries, we will not let down our friends and allies around the world.¹⁸²

None of these reassurances did much to alleviate suspicions within the FCO or MOD in London. Thus, both departments continued to advise the prime minister that he should seek to bilaterally utilise his relationship with Nixon to gain more information about US policy.¹⁸³

These continued British feelings of marginalisation were reported to Washington, which presented an interesting conundrum for US policy-makers. Since the outset of *détente*, key US officials had feared this could create the 'atmospherics of peace', which in turn could be exploited by the USSR.¹⁸⁴ Superpower *détente* could also easily be perceived as superpower duplicity and British officials made this known to Kissinger and Rogers on numerous occasions.¹⁸⁵ Given Nixon's exploits in China, along with the signing of the SALT and ABM agreements, US policy-makers were especially conscious of such accusations.¹⁸⁶ Consequently, the president attempted to sooth British concerns about a potential superpower condominium. Nixon assured Trend that the US would not 'go off' with the USSR and establish agreements that would negatively infringe upon the allies of the US. Nixon offered 'very private President to Prime Minister talks through the White House Channel' to further explain the content of US–USSR diplomacy.¹⁸⁷

Nixon's offer of bilateral contact did little to quell British suspicions. Reports continued to arrive in Washington about British concerns towards *détente*, superpower summitry and SALT. Kissinger's visit to Moscow in September 1972 was reported by David Kennedy, the US permanent representative to NATO, to have raised particular concern.¹⁸⁸ Such reporting was, however, contradicted by Secretary Rogers. He informed the president that the British were satisfied with the consultation they were receiving over US–USSR bilateral diplomacy with Kissinger's personal briefings being particularly appreciated.¹⁸⁹

In private, British assessments were much more in keeping with the analysis offered by Kennedy. British officialdom remained highly sceptical about the entire direction of the *détente* process. As the highly influential JIC argued, whilst superpower summits were unlikely to fundamentally alter the foreign policy of either superpower, the increased communication between the two superpowers underscored the 'special nature' of their relationship. This would set in motion the opportunity for further exclusive superpower summits which increased the likelihood of a superpower settlement that would undermine British security interests.¹⁹⁰

The US engaging more heavily in bilateral diplomacy with the USSR thus served to increase British concerns about *détente*. Indeed, at the Moscow summit in May 1972 the two superpowers had gone some way to institutionalising their relationship when they signed an agreement of 'basic principles' which would underpin US–USSR conduct of foreign affairs.¹⁹¹ Interestingly, this increased superpower bilateralism appears to have had a direct impact on Britain's European policy as the extension of superpower bilateral diplomacy supported Heath's argument that EEC membership was essential for safeguarding Britain's interests in a world dominated by two superpowers.¹⁹² As one Cabinet briefing paper stated: 'The spectacle of the two superpowers locked in private talks for over a week, with most of the US Government machinery excluded, reinforces the need for progress towards a common European foreign policy.'¹⁹³ The Nixon administration's level of briefings on the PRC and Moscow openings irritated officials in Whitehall. The president did not feel he needed to consult with Britain in order to achieve what he wanted. On the actual substance of the talks, this was clearly the case. The US could consult the British if they desired, but ultimately British opinion was of little weight. US policy, however, was hardly conducive to alliance solidarity.

On the one hand we can appreciate why British officials continued to be sceptical about American policy. The Nixon administration was never really forthcoming in providing the level of detail about their discussions with the USSR which could have perhaps alleviated British fears. Added to this was the fact that the British government was at this stage in the process of analysing whether or not their own strategic nuclear deterrent, *Polaris*, required upgrading and, if it did, then deciding what the preferred method for achieving this was. Obviously, reaching a decision would be dictated in large measure by the American attitude, and the likely American response to any British request for further nuclear assistance would be influenced by the US's own strategic arms programmes and any legal obligations to which they had committed. Even in such a context, British fears that the US would permanently undermine the US–UK nuclear relationship in order to secure a US–USSR nuclear arms agreement were slightly exaggerated. The Nixon

administration did not believe it had to reach any agreement on 'third party' nuclear weapons in order to achieve a SALT agreement. As Nixon and Kissinger had made clear during private conversations with Soviet officials, the US would not enter into negotiations with the USSR about the British nuclear deterrent.¹⁹⁴ Nevertheless, British concerns about the reliability of the United States continued.

CSCE and MBFR

As the US and USSR continued their détente agenda, other areas of international diplomacy continued to be a source of US–UK disagreement. The first of these related to the possibility of a CSCE. The USSR had sought a CSCE since the 1950s, because it saw this as a potential opportunity for ratifying the post-World War II borders of Europe.¹⁹⁵ Regardless of actual Soviet intentions, this was how the Nixon administration viewed Soviet motives.¹⁹⁶ Until the beginning of the 1970s there had been limited progress on the CSCE. Previously, the USSR had insisted that the CSCE should be conducted exclusively between the USSR and European states. This insistence to exclude the US realistically prevented any further development on the CSCE. By 1970, however, the USSR accepted that the US should be present in the CSCE negotiations. The CSCE was now a subject that could no longer be ignored. As Kissinger explained to Nixon, a refusal to engage in the CSCE would give the USSR an easy propaganda victory. More worryingly, US obduracy could result in Western Europe negotiating bilaterally with the USSR, and reaching an agreement which could undermine US interests.¹⁹⁷

For the Nixon administration, such changes were unwelcome. The CSCE was seen by the president and Kissinger as an irritant. One of Kissinger's aides claimed that Kissinger viewed the CSCE with 'disdain'.¹⁹⁸ Certainly, if you go through the US documentation pertaining to the CSCE, you will find numerous examples of both Nixon and Kissinger casting scorn upon the entire CSCE process.¹⁹⁹ This lack of interest in the CSCE has been noted by several writers.²⁰⁰ Nevertheless, all of this misses a broader point. While the Nixon White House had little enthusiasm for the CSCE, it was viewed as another tool in which the US could exert leverage upon the USSR. This meant progress on the CSCE would be linked directly to matters deemed more important, such as Vietnam, SALT and a Berlin settlement. Washington believed that the Soviets were enthusiastic about the CSCE; delaying movement on the CSCE then was seen as having the potential to soften Soviet policy in other areas. Accordingly, US policy directly linked progress on a Berlin settlement with movement on the CSCE.²⁰¹

Senior members of Heath's government were equally disdainful about the idea of a CSCE. Douglas-Home, for instance, told American officials that he would prefer the CSCE to never take place. The CSCE was a 'horrifying prospect', he later told William Rogers.²⁰² Lord Carrington made similar views known. For Carrington, the CSCE would create the impression that the USSR no longer posed a threat to Western security, and would critically undermine efforts to improve NATO's defence commitments.²⁰³ In spite of this, the British understood that given that East–West relations were improving within the broader climate of *détente*, resisting the CSCE would become increasingly difficult. Other states, notably West Germany and France, were looking to the CSCE as a means of significantly improving East–West relations and were actively pursuing a policy that would see one come into being. In a sense, Douglas-Home was correct when he claimed that the CSCE was 'unavoidable'.²⁰⁴

While the Nixon administration was seeking to extrapolate concessions in other areas of US–USSR diplomacy for participating in the CSCE, the Heath administration sought a quick conclusion to the project. For the British, this would ensure that nothing of substance would be dealt with. Furthermore, it would also prevent any type of superpower deal that would trade the CSCE for some larger prize. The British, therefore, sought to be actively engaged in the negotiations in order to craft the CSCE according to their interests. This position was reported to Washington and one telegram noted, the British government believed: 'The West does not stand to gain from a CSCE so the Allies should try to get the Conference over with quickly rather than dawdle unduly over probably fruitless efforts to secure substantive results'. Internal studies in Washington only confirmed that this was actual British policy.²⁰⁵

Clearly, US and UK policy towards the CSCE contradicted one another. The US sought a long, drawn-out negotiation as a means of convincing the USSR to take a softer line in other areas of its foreign policy. The British, meanwhile, wanted a speedy resolution to the project and a CSCE which dealt with little in the form of substance. Nonetheless, it was not until 1972 that these differences began to have a practical effect upon US–UK relations. With the signing of the first protocol on a Berlin settlement in September 1971, Western European enthusiasm for a CSCE grew. This only encouraged the British to find a common Western negotiating position regarding the CSCE. The US, meanwhile, was encouraging its Western allies to delay progress. Nixon, having achieved Soviet movement with regards to Berlin, decided now to delay progress on the CSCE until the Soviets had made substantive moves on MBFR and arms control.²⁰⁶

This policy shift in Washington did not sit well with those in London. As Denis Greenhill complained to his deputy, Thomas Brimelow:

I find the American attitude ... rather disturbing. If they are going to lie low at the Conference it will greatly weaken our defences against a Russian attempt to steam roller an undesirable Declaration of Principles. The Americans may not like the idea of the conference any more than we do and may rightly blame the Europeans for permitting it to come about. But it would be very serious if they abandoned us at this point and let the Russians have a major propaganda victory.²⁰⁷

That there was a tactical conflict in US and UK policy should not have come as a surprise to Washington. Douglas-Home had informed Rogers that trying to stall the CSCE would only provide a propaganda coup for the USSR and as such the West should seek its swift conclusion. Both Nixon and Kissinger were aware of British thinking: 'The British believe that a Conference is an unavoidable evil, should be given short shrift, and closed out as quickly as possible with minimum damage'.²⁰⁸

Being aware of British policy did not mean that the Nixon administration was happy with it and they continued to seek to delay the CSCE. Indeed, it was their stated ambition to avoid any CSCE agreement in 1972.²⁰⁹ However, British negotiators at the CSCE were pushing for a resolution to the project. From the perspective of the US, British policy was clearly undermining their wider foreign policy objectives. Simply put, if the British managed to force through a CSCE agreement then the US would have less leverage in persuading the USSR to adopt a less hostile stance on matters deemed to be of greater importance by Washington, i.e. arms control and MBFR. The president, therefore, took the opportunity during a meeting with Burke Trend to repeat US policy and admonish British behaviour at the CSCE negotiations. As Trend reported to London, Nixon claimed that Britain's CSCE policy had harmed Western interests. The US wanted the negotiations to be dragged out for as long as possible as this would allow the West to enact a degree of influence on other areas of Soviet policy. The line which British policy was pursuing had squandered this political leverage.²¹⁰

While aware of US dissatisfaction, it did little to affect the course of British policy. More broadly, British efforts were all rather moot given the evolution of events. A swift resolution to the CSCE appeared unlikely given that the Multilateral Preparatory Talks, which convened in November 1972, had representatives from over 35 countries. Aside from the simple mass of countries present was the more important problem that little common agreement existed between them. Thus, it was always likely that finding a common agreement would be an arduous process. Events would later prove this to be the case, given that the CSCE would not be concluded until August 1975.

In spite of US–UK disagreements over the CSCE, it should not be seen as indicative of a relationship fraught with difficulties.²¹¹ Certainly differences of opinion existed regarding the substance of what a CSCE should contain and the tactical approach each side should take towards it. However, there were no major ramifications for US–UK relations. Differences on the CSCE were not seriously impairing good relations, as both countries were kept informed of one another’s policy intentions. Such differences are better viewed as a natural policy schism between two countries. Furthermore, the CSCE was simply not important enough at this stage to have serious consequences for bilateral relations.

MBFR

The spectre of MBFR was an area of deeper concern for US and UK policy-makers. As Kissinger expressed, if the MBFR was not handled correctly, it had the potential to ‘screw’ the entire NATO alliance.²¹² Likewise, the British government believed MBFR could potentially damage its security interests. British concerns centred on a large reduction in NATO’s conventional forces on a symmetrical basis. This meant that both sides would reduce their forces equally. Internal studies produced by the British Ministry of Defence revealed that NATO’s conventional force position would relatively worsen vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact if such a policy was enacted. Accordingly, NATO would have to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons for occasions when their use would have been deemed inappropriate. As such, a ceiling approach to the negotiations was preferable which meant that an agreement on a set number of forces which each side could possess would be sought.²¹³

Regardless of the actual specifics, Heath’s government wanted the MBFR to be vigorously analysed within NATO. Substantive policy was to be agreed in this forum and only then would serious negotiations with the Warsaw Pact begin. Heath’s government clearly attached great significance to this given that, during the first high-level meeting with the Nixon administration, both Carrington and Douglas-Home made their reservations known about MBFR. Both argued that NATO required force modernisation, and that an MBFR agreement would only undermine efforts to convince NATO members to improve their defence efforts.²¹⁴

When he assumed the presidency, Nixon gave little attention to MBFR and it was only by the middle of 1971 that this position began to alter due to a number of interlocking factors. Economics was clearly one reason behind this change given that the balance of payments difficulties facing the US had become particularly acute by 1971. MBFR was, thus, viewed as an opportunity

to reduce America's military burden and help ease such economic problems.²¹⁵ MBFR was also seen as an attractive way of hedging against unilateral reductions in military forces by NATO members. The thinking ran that NATO members would enact force reductions regardless of any MBFR settlement being reached. Therefore, an MBFR agreement could allow NATO to reduce its forces without having to suffer the strategic consequences of this being done unilaterally.²¹⁶

Domestic politics were also prevalent in altering US policy. Confronting a hostile Congress which demanded troop reductions globally (in 1971 the Democrat Senator George McGovern, who would contest the 1972 presidential election, called for the halving of American forces in Europe), the MBFR offered a way for Nixon to reduce America's commitments while maintaining a rough equivalence with the USSR.²¹⁷ Melvin Laird was especially conscious of the domestic pressures being placed upon the administration. Although initially against NATO troop reductions, Laird advised Nixon that NATO troop reductions were needed to mitigate Congressional demands. In particular, Senator Mike Mansfield was leading a sustained attack against the administration's unwillingness to reduce its global military presence, and its failure to convince its allies to increase their own military efforts. As such, Laird wanted the US to inform NATO that it would have to accept an increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons for its defence, unless greater burden-sharing was enacted.²¹⁸

Kissinger was also feeling the effect of Congressional opinion and the rejection of the Nixon administration's foreign aid budget gave added emphasis to the growing reluctance of the US Congress to continue to fund the US's global defence efforts.²¹⁹ Following further pressure from Mansfield to reduce America's European force levels, Kissinger suggested to Nixon that a 'visible effort to get MBFR underway' was needed to placate Congress.²²⁰ This then serves as a reminder to scholars that domestic political factors can have a profound impact upon the course of foreign policy decisions.²²¹

As a consequence of these factors, US MBFR policy was built upon twin pillars. It would seek to convince NATO to contribute more to the alliance. If this was achieved, then the US could reduce its own commitments without affecting the overall make-up of NATO's conventional forces. If this was unsuccessful, then the US would seriously negotiate with the USSR on an MBFR settlement. Nixon's position, however, was to avoid reaching any hasty settlement. Rather, US policy was designed to give an impression to Congress that the administration was seriously seeking to reduce America's military burdens in Europe.²²² The president had no intention of being forced into finding a quick agreement by US Senators.

Heath's government found this shift in US policy all rather disconcerting. Douglas-Home and Carrington still believed NATO would likely be

disadvantaged by *any* MBFR agreement. While understanding Nixon's need to placate Congressional critics, they remained concerned that even beginning MBFR negotiations could seriously damage British security interests.²²³ British officials communicated these concerns clearly to their American counterparts and Annenberg reported that 'the more the British look at MBFR, the more they dislike it. They see only a very small margin of safety for NATO in such negotiations.'²²⁴ At the highest level, Heath expressed British worries to Nixon and Douglas-Home repeated similar concerns to Rogers.²²⁵

Such complaints were met with little sympathy within the Nixon administration. As one aide informed Kissinger, 'As you know, NATO generally takes a more pessimistic view of the conventional balance in Europe than our own inter-agency analysis has shown'.²²⁶ However, the US was keen to placate their British ally and so Nixon informed Heath that MBFR was only being countenanced as it was a necessary 'holding action' against his domestic critics and offered further 'consultation and discussion'. Despite Nixon's efforts, reports continued to arrive in Washington outlining British concerns towards MBFR.²²⁷

Like the CSCE negotiations, the long drawn out process of establishing an MBFR settlement was to be a continual source of disagreement between British and American officials. This, however, must be viewed in its proper context. The differences over MBFR were not seen as a point of major difficulty at this stage. Rather, it was a subject which both US and UK officials discussed at considerable length amongst themselves. Indeed, such a state of affairs should be deemed a natural part of diplomacy between states. Disagreement on matters as intricate and detailed as MBFR are always likely to occur between two countries which varied so much in what each would deem to be their vital national interests. The fact that such disagreements were discussed often and at length between US and UK officials is perhaps indicative of a close, though not harmonious, relationship between the two countries' policy-makers.

Conclusion

In opposition to existing accounts that tend to paint an overly dark assessment of US–UK relations during 1969–72, many aspects of US–UK cooperation functioned remarkably smoothly.²²⁸ Public and private support for Nixon's policies in Vietnam was provided by the prime minister. Likewise, Heath would articulate public support for Nixon's détente project more generally.²²⁹ In a similar fashion, Heath received the public backing from the president with regard to British membership of the EEC. Moreover, US–UK interaction was maintained and reinvigorated in this period. This was clearly demonstrated

in the intelligence realm where the 'JIC Net' continued. In keeping with other eras, the station chief of the CIA was also invited to attend the meetings of the JIC. The National Security Agency (NSA), and its British counterpart, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), continued their intelligence relationship. On the nuclear side, US–UK working groups, which had been put on hiatus in the Wilson era, were once again resurrected to discuss potential avenues for upgrading Polaris.²³⁰

Nevertheless, one should not paint an overly optimistic picture of US–UK relations at this time. Many of the key foreign policy objectives of each state were causing deep concern in their respective capitals. British policy towards the EEC was met with deep scepticism in Washington. The policies emanating from détente created resentment and distrust in London. As one British newspaper had correctly predicted following Nixon's inauguration, the spectre of superpower negotiation would create 'anxieties' in London.²³¹ These anxieties were predicated upon the belief that superpower discussion would lead to superpower condominium, and, in turn, see vital Western security interests being sacrificed. Few predicated, however, that superpower détente would have larger ramifications for US–UK relations. This was seen throughout Nixon's efforts to court the PRC and the impact this had upon US policy throughout the India–Pakistan war. Nixon's international economic policies, most obviously in halting dollar to gold convertibility, again resulted in problems between the two countries. It also led to calls in London for closer US–EEC interaction. Most importantly, several unresolved points of difference (namely, Britain's role within the EEC) would have severe ramifications for US–UK bilateral relations throughout 1973–74. It is to this that we now turn.

Notes

- 1 Edward Heath, *The Course of My Life: The Autobiography of Edward Heath* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1998), p. 370.
- 2 Kissinger, *WHY*, pp. 932–3.
- 3 Ziegler, *Heath*, p. 374.
- 4 For an overview of Kissinger's influence in the subsequent writing of Cold War history see: Robert Kagan, 'The Revisionist: How Henry Kissinger Won the Cold War, or So He Thinks', *The New Republic*, 220:25 (1999), 38–48. Also see: Andrew Roth, *Heath and the Heathmen* (London: Routledge, 1972), pp. 227–8; Fredrick Samuel Northedge, *Descent From Power: British Foreign Policy 1945–1973* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974), p. 354; Robert M. Hathaway, *Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations Since World War II* (Boston: Twayne, 1990), pp. 97–8; Robin Renwick, *Fighting With Allies: America and Britain in Peace and War* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 206–11; John Baylis, *Anglo-American Relations Since 1939*:

- The Enduring Alliance* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 168; Sean Greenwood, *Britain and the Cold War 1945–91* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 177–8.
- 5 Hill and Lord, 'The Foreign Policy of the Heath Government', pp. 285–6; Hamilton, 'Britain, France and America's Year of Europe'; Scott, *Allies Apart*.
 - 6 Hynes, *The Year*; Rossbach, *Rebirth*.
 - 7 Spelling, 'Edward Heath and Anglo-American Relations', 640–58.
 - 8 Burk, *Old World*, p. 625.
 - 9 John Killick, British Diplomatic Oral History Project, Churchill College, Cambridge University (hereafter: BDOHP), p. 30.
 - 10 Barbara Keys, 'Henry Kissinger: The Emotional Statesman', *Diplomatic History*, 35:4 (2011), 587–609.
 - 11 One only has to survey the despatches sent from the UK Ambassador in Washington, Lord Cromer, to realise that Kissinger's operational methods, and often prickly personality, were not that well received in British circles. See for example TNA: FCO 82/177 Lord Cromer to Denis Greenhill, 27 April 1972; TNA: FCO 82/183 Lord Cromer to Denis Greenhill, 27 November 1972; TNA: FCO 82/178 Lord Cromer to Denis Greenhill, 15 December 1972.
 - 12 The impression is given within Hynes, *The Year*; Rossbach, *Rebirth*. On the point in the text see: Philip Pomper, 'Historians and Individual Agency', *History and Theory*, 35:3 (1996), 281–308; John Young, *Twentieth Century Diplomacy: A Case Study of British Practice, 1963–1976* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 4–6.
 - 13 David Dumbleby and David Reynolds termed the period 1973–1980 'All at sea'. Dumbleby and Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart*, pp. 307–22. Also: John Baylis, *Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939–1984: The Special Relationship* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 99–115; Michael Chichester and John Wilkinson, *The Uncertain Ally: British Defence Policy 1960–1980* (Aldershot: Gower, 1982), pp. 43–56.
 - 14 For accounts that downplay cooperation see: Hynes, *The Year*; Rossbach, *Rebirth*; Scott, *Allies Apart*.
 - 15 For a good overview on how the political system operates in Washington see: John P. Burke, *The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Paul R. Viotti, *American Foreign Policy and National Security: A Documentary Record* (New Jersey: Pearson, 2005), pp. 320–45.
 - 16 Roger Morris, *Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Quartet Books, 1978), p. 63; Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (London: HarperCollins, 1996), pp. 350–96. For an example of Nixon's complaints about the CIA see: Memorandum from [Name not declassified] of the Central Intelligence Agency to Director of Central Intelligence Helms, 18 June 1969, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Organization and Management*, Vol. II, Doc. 191, pp. 388–9.
 - 17 Stansfield Turner, *Burn Before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors and Secret Intelligence* (New York: Hyperion, 2005), pp. 122–37; Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, pp. 350–1.
 - 18 Richard Helms and William Hood, *A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency* (New York: Random House, 2003), pp. 382–3.

- 19 Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* (London: Penguin, 2007), pp. 342–3; Memorandum from Frank Chaplin of the National Security Council Staff to the Director of Central Intelligence Helms, 23 January 1969, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Organization and Management*, Vol. II, Doc. 182, p. 370.
- 20 Richard H. Immerman, 'Intelligence and Strategy: Historicizing Psychology, Politics, and Policy', *Diplomatic History*, 32:1 (2008), 16; David Robarge, 'Leadership in an Intelligence Organization: The Directors of Central Intelligence and the CIA', in Loch Johnson (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 495.
- 21 C. L. Sulzberger, *The World and Richard Nixon* (New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1987), p. 168.
- 22 Iwan Morgan, *Nixon* (London: Arnold, 2002), p. 132; Memorandum of Conversation, 6 June 1974, File: June 6, 1974, Nixon, Schlesinger, NSAMC, Box 4, GFL.
- 23 Haldeman, *Haldeman Diaries*, p. 309; Jurek Martin, 'Nixon Still Has 200 Senior Posts to Fill', *Financial Times*, 24 January 1974, p. 5.
- 24 Rodman, *Presidential Command*, pp. 36–56; Immerman, 'Intelligence and Strategy', p. 16; Arthur Schlesinger, *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).
- 25 Haldeman, *The Ends of Power*, pp. 51–3; Haldeman, *Haldeman Diaries*, pp. 51–3; 309, 311; Dean, *Blind Ambition*, p. 65; Ehrlichman, *Witness to Power*, pp. 78–80.
- 26 On the role of the National Security Adviser see: John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush* (New York: Random House, 1994).
- 27 U. Alexis Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1984), pp. 513–14; Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs-Designate [Kissinger] to President-Elect Nixon, 7 January 1969 in *FRUS 1969–1976: Organization and Management*, Vol. II, Doc. 3, pp. 11–14.
- 28 Johnson had held a weekly lunch where his principal advisers met to discuss and create policy. See Kissinger's critique of this here: Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs-Designate [Kissinger] to President-Elect Nixon, 27 December 1968, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Organization and Management*, Vol. II, Doc. 2, pp. 2–3. Quote at p. 3.
- 29 *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- 30 For the quote see: National Security Decision Memorandum 1, 20 January 1969, NSCIHF, Policy Papers, National Security Council Decision Memorandum (hereafter: NSCDM), Box H-209, NPMP. Also see: National Security Decision Memorandum 2, 20 January 1969, NSCIHF, Policy Papers, NSCDM, Box H-209, NPMP. For a good overview of Kissinger's NSC see: Gerry Argyris Andrianopoulos, *Kissinger and Brzezinski: The NSC and the Struggle for Control of US National Security Policy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991).
- 31 Memorandum for the President-Elect from Henry A. Kissinger, 7 January 1969, NSCIHF, Policy Papers, NSCDM, Box H-209, NPMP; Memorandum for Henry Kissinger from RN [Nixon], 13 January 1969, NSCIHF, Policy Papers, NSCDM, Box H-209, NPMP.
- 32 Editorial Note, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Organization and Management*, Vol. II, Doc. 2, pp. 10–11.

- 33 Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 23–8.
- 34 Price, *With Nixon*, p. 305.
- 35 Hanhimäki, *Flawed*, p. 28.
- 36 Kissinger, *WHY*, pp. 32–33. Laird's skill as a bureaucratic fighter was acknowledged by Nixon when he commented that 'he was the most devious man in Washington'. Given Nixon's own political skills, this was quite the compliment. For the quote see Cynthia Helms, *An Intriguing Life: A Memoir of War, Washington and Marriage to an American Spymaster* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), pp. 110–11.
- 37 Hanhimäki, *Flawed*, pp. 92–3.
- 38 Rodman, *Presidential Command*, pp. 36–56.
- 39 Peter Hennessy, *The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders Since 1945* (London: Penguin, 2000), pp. 337–45; Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon, *The Powers Behind the Prime Minister: The Hidden Influence of Number Ten* (London: HarperCollins, 1999), pp. 77–8.
- 40 Peter Hennessy, *Whitehall* (London: Pimlico, 2001, revised edition), p. 215.
- 41 *Ibid.*
- 42 Cromer served as the British Ambassador to Washington, 1971–74. Greenhill was the Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS) at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 1969–73. Brimelow was the Deputy PUS at the FCO, 1969–73, before assuming the position as PUS, 1973–75. Sykes was the Minister at the Washington Embassy, 1970–74. Powell was Cromer's Private Secretary, 1971–74.
- 43 An award that Cromer would soon come to regret being granted! See Thorpe, *Alec Douglas-Home*, pp. 411–12; Alexander Spelling, 'Lord Cromer, 1971–74', in Michael Hopkins, Saul Kelly and John Young (eds.), *The Washington Embassy: British Ambassadors to the United States, 1939–77* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 189–208.
- 44 Denis Greenhill, *More by Accident* (York: Wilton, 1992), pp. 130–50; Denis Greenhill, BDOHP, pp. 1–10; Charles Powell, BDOHP, p. 8.
- 45 Ziegler, *Heath*, pp. 388–9; Spelling, 'Lord Cromer', in Hopkins et al., *The Washington Embassy*, pp. 189–208.
- 46 Heath, *The Course*, pp. 325–53; Robert Shepherd, *Iain Macleod: A Biography* (London: Hutchinson, 1994), pp. 529–36.
- 47 Ongoing commercial disputes were causing US–UK difficulties. See Raj Roy, 'The Politics of Planes and Engines: Anglo-American Relations During the Rolls-Royce–Lockheed Crisis, 1970–1971' in Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz (eds.), *The Strained Alliance: U.S.–European Relations from Nixon to Carter* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 172–5.
- 48 John Dumbrell, 'The Johnson Administration and the British Labour Government: Vietnam, the Pound and East of Suez', *Journal of American Studies*, 30:2 (1996), 211–31; Saki Dockrill, *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice Between Europe and the World?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
- 49 David M. McCourt, 'What was Britain's "East of Suez" Role? Reassessing the Withdrawal, 1964–1968', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 20:3 (2009), 454–5; Philip Ziegler, *Wilson: The Authorised Life* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993), pp. 329–31.

- 50 Lyndon Johnson to Harold Wilson, 11 January 1968, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, United Kingdom, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas, USA (hereafter: LBJ Library). Thanks to Dr David Gill for bringing this document to my attention.
- 51 Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, (London: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 179.
- 52 On the domestic pressures facing the Nixon administration see: Dominic Sandbrook, 'Salesmanship and Substance: The Influence of Domestic Policy and Watergate', in Logevall and Preston, *Nixon in the World*, pp. 85–106; Jussi Hanhimäki, 'Global Visions and Parochial Politics'; Thomas Alan Schwartz, "'Winning an Election is Terribly Important'"; Thomas Alan Schwartz, 'Henry Kissinger: Realism, Domestic Politics, and the Struggle against Exceptionalism in American Foreign Policy', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 22:1 (2011), 121–41. For the other points mentioned see: Nixon, *Memoirs*, pp. 370–5; Kissinger, *WHY*, pp. 73–81. For the Conservative Party 1970 manifesto see: 'A Better Tomorrow', 1970 Conservative Party Election Manifesto, available at: www.conservative-party.net/manifestos/1970/1970-conservative-manifesto.shtml (Accessed 12 January 2012).
- 53 Francis Gavin, 'The Myth of Flexible Response: US Strategy in Europe During the 1960s', *International History Review*, 23:4 (2001), 847–75.
- 54 V. A. Walters to Dr Kissinger, 31 December 1968, National Security Council Files, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administrative & Staff Files – Transition, Box 1, NPMP; Memorandum for the President's File from Henry A. Kissinger, 20 December 1971, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 87, NPMP.
- 55 Marc Trachtenberg, 'The Structure of Great Power Politics, 1963–1975', in Leffler and Westad (eds.), *Crises and Détente*, p. 491.
- 56 William Burr (ed.), *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks With Beijing and Moscow* (New York: The New Press, 1998), p. 10.
- 57 William Burr, 'The Nixon Administration, the "Horror Strategy," and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1972', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7:3 (2005), 34–78.
- 58 Henry Kissinger, 'Introduction', in Henry Kissinger (ed.), *Problems of National Strategy: A Book of Readings* (London: Praeger, 1965), p. 5.
- 59 Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, undated (circa October 1970), NSCIHF, Meeting Files: National Security Council Meetings, Box H-029, NPMP.
- 60 Memorandum for the President's Office Files from Henry Kissinger, 18 August 1970, President Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 82, NPMP; Memorandum for the President from William P. Rogers, 22 September 1970, NSCIHF, National Security Decision Memorandums (hereafter: NSDM), Box H-221, NPMP.
- 61 Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, undated (circa October 1970), NSCIHF, Meeting Files: National Security Council Meetings, Box H-029, NPMP; Memorandum for the President from Henry Kissinger, 14 October 1970, President Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 82, NPMP; Memorandum of Conversation, 23 September 1970, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric Files, 1970–73, Political & Defense, Box 2650, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland, USA (hereafter: NAI); Memorandum of Conversation, 3 October 1970, *ibid*.

- 62 Lord Peter Carrington, *Reflect on Things Past* (London: HarperCollins, 1988), pp. 218–20.
- 63 *Ibid.*, p. 218.
- 64 Memorandum of Conversation, 23 September 1970, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric Files, 1970–73, Political & Defense, Box 2650, NAI.
- 65 This can all be followed within: Dale Van Atta, *With Honor: Melvin Laird in War, Peace and Politics* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), pp. 285–90; Memorandum for the President from Melvin Laird, 14 October 1970, NSCIHF, Study Memorandums, National Security Study Memorandums, Box H-167, NPMP; Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs [Kissinger] from David Packard, 12 November 1970, NSCIHF, NSDM, Box H-219, NPMP; Memorandum for Mr Kissinger from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 30 October 1970, *ibid.*
- 66 George Springsteen was a career diplomat within the State Department. In 1973, he was appointed as special assistant to Kissinger.
- 67 George S. Springsteen to the Under-Secretary of State [Irwin], 20 November 1970, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric Files 1970–73, Political & Defense, Box 2848, NAI.
- 68 Memorandum for Mr Kissinger from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 30 October 1970, NSCIHF, NSDM, Box H-219, NPMP.
- 69 Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, 3 November 1970, *ibid.* Interestingly, Edward Heath was arguing much the same point to Cyrus Sulzberger, the lead foreign correspondent for the *New York Times*. See: C. L. Sulzberger, *An Age of Mediocrity, Memoirs and Diaries: 1963–1972* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 693–4.
- 70 Johnson to Ambassador in London Embassy, Tel. 193761, 24 November 1970, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric Files 1970–73, Political & Defense, Box 2848, NAI.
- 71 Memorandum for Mr Kissinger from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 30 October 1970, NSCIHF, NSDM, Box H-219, NPMP; Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, 3 November 1970, NSCIHF, NSDM, Box H-219, NPMP.
- 72 McCourt, ‘Britain’s “East of Suez” Role’, pp. 468–9.
- 73 Carrington, *Reflect*, p. 219.
- 74 Greenhill, *More by Accident*, pp. 147, 167. On Heath’s diplomacy to gain British membership of the EEC see: Sir Con O’Neill, *Britain’s Entry into the European Community: Report on the Negotiations of 1970–72* (London: Routledge, 2000).
- 75 These points were delivered in the Godkin Lecture of 1967 at Harvard University. They were re-printed in: Edward Heath, *Old World, New Horizons: Britain, the Common Market and the Atlantic Alliance* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970). For the quote see: George Hutchinson, *Edward Heath: A Personal and Political Biography* (London: Longman, 1970), pp. 101–2. Also see: Margaret Laing, *Edward Heath: Prime Minister* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1972), pp. 124–47; John Campbell, *Edward Heath: A Biography* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993), pp. 108–38.
- 76 Gottfried Niedhart, ‘U.S. Détente and West German Ostpolitik: Parallels and Frictions’, in Schultz and Schwartz (eds.), *Strained Alliance*, p. 35; C. J. Bartlett, *The ‘Special*

- Relationship': A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945* (London: Longman, 1992), p. 130.
- 77 Ziegler, Heath, p. 374.
- 78 TNA: PREM 15/2077 Heath to Douglas-Home, 8 September 1970; TNA: PREM 15/2077 Douglas-Home to the Prime Minister, 18 September 1970.
- 79 John Young, *The Labour Governments 1964–70: International Policy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), pp. 142–65.
- 80 Bevin served as British Foreign Secretary, 1945–51. On his espousal of the 'pillars' strategy see Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 115–16. For a different interpretation see: Niklas Roszbach, 'Edward Heath's Vision and the Year of Europe', in Morten Rasmussen and Ann-Christina Lauring Knudsen (eds.), *The Road to a United Europe: Interpretations of the Process of European Integration* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2009), pp. 69–84.
- 81 Kissinger, *WHY*, p. 91.
- 82 Reynolds, *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance*, pp. 284–5; Klaus Larres, *Churchill's Cold War: The Politics of Personal Diplomacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. xiv–xv.
- 83 Michael Stewart, 'Britain, Europe and the Alliance', *Foreign Affairs*, 48:4 (1970), 655; Ashton, 'Harold Macmillan and the "Golden Days" of Anglo-American Relations', pp. 691–724; James Ellison, *The United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis: Rising to the Gaullist Challenge, 1963–68* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 139–63.
- 84 M. H. Fisher, 'A Marked Continuity', *Financial Times*, 20 June 1970, p. 13.
- 85 Denis MacShane, *Heath* (London: Haus Publishing, 2006), pp. 46–7.
- 86 Robert Gibson, *Best of Enemies: Anglo-French Relations Since the Norman Conquest* (London: Sinclair Stevenson, 1995), pp. 303–13; Erin Mahan, *Kennedy, de Gaulle and Western Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 136–42; Heath, *Course*, pp. 201–40.
- 87 Donald Maitland, BDOHP, p. 20.
- 88 Ilaria Poggiolini, 'How the Heath Government Revised the European Lesson: British Transition to EC Membership, 1972', in Antonio Varsori (ed.), *Inside the European Community: Actors and Policies in European Integration From the Rome Treaty to the Creation of the Snake* (Brussels: Bruylant, 2006), pp. 313–46.
- 89 Stephen George, *Britain and European Integration Since 1945* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), pp. 49–51; Roszbach, *Rebirth*, p. 3; David Sanders, *Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy since 1945* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 146–7.
- 90 Lundestad, 'Empire' by Integration, pp. 13–28; Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, pp. 114–25.
- 91 Memorandum of Conversation, 1 May 1969, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1969–1974: Foreign Economic Policy; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2001), Vol. III, Doc. 122, p. 319; TNA: FCO 46/591 Note of a Meeting held in the Oval Office, 27 January 1970; Memorandum of Conversation, 27 January 1970, NSCIHF, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1023, NPMP; Memorandum of Conversation, 17 December 1970, NSCIHF, Presidential-HAK Memcons, Box 1024, NPMP; Memorandum for the

- President's File from Henry A. Kissinger, 20 December 1971, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 87, NPMP.
- 92 Kissinger, *WHY*, pp. 937–8.
- 93 Memorandum for the President's Office Files from Patrick J. Buchanan, 17 November 1970, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 83, NPMP; Paper prepared by Consultants, undated, *FRUS 1969–1976; Foreign Economic Policy*, Vol. III, Doc. 26, p. 69; Klaus Larres, 'Assertive Supremacy and Enlightened Self-Interest: The United States and the "Unity of Europe"', *AICGS Transatlantic Perspectives*, December 2009, pp. 3–6, from: www.aicgs.org/publication/assertive-supremacy-and-enlightened-self-interest-the-united-states-and-the-%E2%80%9CUnity-of-europe%E2%80%9D/ (Accessed 27 March 2011).
- 94 Helmut Sonnenfeldt interview, *The Foreign affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training*, from: http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mfdir:6:./temp/~ammem_XnbX_ (Accessed 11 July 2009).
- 95 Connally, *In History's Shadow*, pp. 244–5; Rossbach, *Rebirth*, pp. 56–68.
- 96 Connally had been riding in the same car as President John F. Kennedy when he was assassinated. For the alleged comment see: Roth, *Heath and the Heathmen*, p. 224. For the other quote see: Greenhill, *More by Accident*, p. 166. Interestingly, Barber only refers to Connally in a positive fashion throughout his memoirs. See: Anthony Barber, *Taking the Tide* (London: Michael Russell, 1996), pp. 113–14. The archival record undermines this positive portrayal however. For instance: TNA: PREM 15/361 Tickell to Con O'Neill, 15 October 1971; TNA: PREM 15/361 Tickell to Moon, 18 October 1971.
- 97 Memorandum for Henry Kissinger from C. Fred Bergsten, 6 May 1970, NSCIHF, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-042, NPMP; Memorandum for the President's Office Files from Patrick J. Buchanan, 17 November 1970, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 83, NPMP; Memorandum of Conversation, 17 December 1970, NSCIHF, Presidential-HAK Memcons, Box 1024, NPMP.
- 98 Memorandum for the President's File from Peter Flanigan, 11 September 1972, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 89, NPMP.
- 99 Memorandum by President Nixon, 18 January 1971, *FRUS 1969–1976, Organization and Management*, Vol. II, Doc. 374, pp. 811–12.
- 100 Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs [Kissinger] to President Nixon, 28 January 1969, *FRUS 1969–1976; Foreign Economic Policy*, Vol. III, Doc. 4, pp. 6–7; Action Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs [Kissinger] to President Nixon, 25 June 1969, *ibid.*, Doc. 131, p. 345–7; Memorandum from C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs [Kissinger] 21 April 1971, *ibid.*, Doc. 64, p. 156; Memorandum of Conversation, 25 July 1972, *ibid.*, Doc. 236, pp. 642–3.
- 101 Walter Annenberg to William P. Rogers, 12 February 1971, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry 1613, Box, 961, NAI.
- 102 All of this policy advice can be followed throughout: Memorandum for the President from Henry Kissinger, 17 June 1970, NSCIHF, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-042, NPMP; Information Memorandum from Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs

- [Kissinger], 10 May 1971, *FRUS 1969–1976; Foreign Economic Policy*, Vol. III, Doc. 154, pp. 431–2; State Department Summary: Enlargement of the European Community: Implications for the US and Policy Options, undated (circa June 1970), NSCIHF, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-042, NPMP. On Nixon's concerns about *Ostpolitik* see: Gottfried Niedhart, 'U.S. Détente and West German Ostpolitik: Parallels and Frictions', in Schulz and Schwartz (eds.), *The Strained Alliance*, pp. 23–44; Bernd Schaefer, 'The Nixon Administration and West German Ostpolitik', in *ibid.*, pp. 45–64.
- 103 Lundestad, 'Empire' by Integration, pp. 13–28; Oliver Bange, *The EEC Crisis of 1963: Kennedy, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer in Conflict* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 37–49.
- 104 Memorandum for Dr Kissinger from C. Fred Bergsten and Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 7 November, 1969, NSCIHF, Study Memorandums, National Security Study Memorandums, Box H-164, NPMP.
- 105 Memorandum for Dr Kissinger from C. Fred Bergsten and Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 7 October 1969, *ibid.*, Henry Kissinger to the Secretary of State et al., 13 October 1969, *ibid.*
- 106 As noted by one former US official. See J. Robert Schaetzel, *The Unhinged Alliance: America and the European Community* (London: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 51–2.
- 107 Kissinger, *Troubled Partnership*, p. 232.
- 108 Discussion of United States Policy Toward Europe: NSC Meeting, 28 January 1970, NSCIHF, Meeting Files, National Security Council Meetings, Box H-026; NPMP; Memorandum from the Deputy under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs [Samuels] to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs [Kissinger] 20 August 1970, *FRUS 1969–1976; Foreign Economic Policy*, Vol. III, Doc. 43, p. 110.
- 109 Discussion of United States Policy toward Europe: Part 1 – Alternative Structure, attached to Memorandum for the Vice President et al. from Henry A. Kissinger, 26 January 1970, NSCIHF, Meeting Files, National Security Council Meetings, Box H-026, NPMP.
- 110 Ferrell (ed.), *The Secret Diary of Arthur Burns*, p. 66. One example that demonstrates Kissinger's thinking about global economic matters is contained within: Action Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs [Kissinger] to President Nixon, 25 June 1969, *FRUS 1969–1976; Foreign Economic Policy*, Vol. III, Doc. 131, p. 345. As global monetary issues became a keener part of international diplomacy, Kissinger's knowledge of economics would improve. See: Rodman, *Presidential Command*, pp. 106–7.
- 111 All quotes within: NSSM 79 and 91: Enlargement of the European Community: Implications for the US and Policy Options, attached to Martin J. Hillenbrand to Henry Kissinger, 23 April 1970, NSCIHF, Study Memorandums, National Security Study Memorandums, Box H-164, NPMP.
- 112 National Security Decision Memorandum: US Policy toward the European Community, 30 May 1970, attached to Henry Kissinger to Deputy under-Secretary of State Samuels et al., 30 May 1970, NSCIHF, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-042, NPMP.
- 113 National Security Decision Memorandum 68, 3 July 1970, NSCIHF, Policy Papers, National Security Decision Memorandums, Box H-217, NPMP.

- 114 Report by the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs [Flanigan] 20 June 1972, *FRUS 1969–1976; Foreign Economic Policy*, Vol. III, Doc. 91, p. 223; Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Irwin to President Nixon, 20 October 1972, *ibid.*, Doc. 105, pp. 275–9; Paper prepared in the State Department, Undated, *ibid.*, Doc. 108, p. 287; Report by the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs [Flanigan] 20 June 1972, *ibid.*, Doc. 91, p. 227.
- 115 Connally managed to override the objections of Arthur Burns. In his opinion, closing the 'gold window' was 'a tragedy for mankind'. See: Ferrell (ed.), *The Secret Diary of Arthur Burns*, pp. 49–50; Connally, *In History's Shadow*, pp. 240–5.
- 116 At this stage of his career, Rumsfeld served in the Nixon White House as Counsellor to the President, a role that was predominantly focused upon domestic and economic matters. He would go on to serve in the Ford White House, as Chief of Staff (1974–75) and then as Secretary of Defense (1975–77). Rumsfeld would then return to the White House as Secretary of Defense under President George W. Bush (2001–06). For the quote see: Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown: A Memoir* (London: Sentinel, 2011), p. 139.
- 117 William C. Cromwell, *The United States and the European Pillar: The Strained Alliance* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 72–3; Matusow, 'Richard Nixon and the Failed War against the Trading World', 767–72; Hubert Zimmermann, 'Western Europe and the American Challenge: Conflict and Cooperation in Technology and Monetary Policy, 1965–1973', in Marc Trachtenberg (ed.), *Between Empire and Alliance: America and Europe During the Cold War* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 127–55; Francis J. Gavin, *Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958–1971* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004); William Glenn Gray, 'Floating the System: Germany, the United States, and the Breakdown of Bretton Woods, 1969–1973', *Diplomatic History*, 31:2 (2007), 295–323. For the quote see: Allen Matusow, *Nixon's Economy: Boom, Busts, Dollars and Votes* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 130–3.
- 118 For Kissinger's apprehension see: Memorandum for the Record: Conversation with Dr Kissinger and Mr Lucet, 8 November 1971, National Security Council Files, Box 678, NPMP. For the Nixon quote see: Memorandum for Helmut Sonnenfeldt from Al Haig, 3 September 1970, NSCIHF, Meeting Files, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-047, NPMP. For Annenberg's quote see: Walter Annenberg to William P. Rogers, 12 February 1971, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry 1613, Box, 961, NAIL.
- 119 The British record of these discussions can be followed within TNA: PREM 15/2241. See: Pompidou's statement to the press following his talks in: Jussi Hanhimäki and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 339. Also see: Philip Bell, *France and Britain 1940–1994: The Long Separation* (London: Longman, 1997), pp. 218–26.
- 120 Ziegler, *Heath*, pp. 292–7.
- 121 John Lewis Gaddis, 'Grand Strategies in the Cold War', in Leffler and Westad (eds.), *Crises and Détente*, pp. 14–16; Marc Trachtenberg, 'The Structure of Great Power Politics, 1963–1975', in *ibid.*, pp. 492–9; Jeremi Suri, 'Henry Kissinger and American Grand Strategy', in Logevall and Preston (eds.), *Nixon in the World*, pp. 67–84.
- 122 TNA: FCO 7/1815 Record of a Meeting between the Prime Minister and President Nixon at Chequers, 3 October 1970.

- 123 For the rather candid assessment that the British knew very little about the president's Vietnam intentions see: TNA: FCO 82/178 Lord Cromer to Denis Greenhill, 15 December 1972. Providing solace was the fact that the British government was just as poorly informed as the US State Department and CIA. In Cromer's estimation, only Kissinger and his deputy, Alexander Haig, were abreast of Nixon's thinking.
- 124 Geraint Hughes, *Harold Wilson's Cold War: The Labour Government and East-West Politics, 1964–1970* (Rochester: The Boydell Press, 2009), pp. 112–38.
- 125 Kissinger, *WHY*, p. 94.
- 126 Kenneth Weisbrode, *The Atlantic Century: Four Generations of Extraordinary Diplomats Who Forged America's Vital Alliance With Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2009), p. 213.
- 127 Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'America and Europe', *Foreign Affairs*, 49:1 (1970), 11–30.
- 128 Richard Nixon, 'Asia After Viet Nam', pp. 111–25; Jeremi Suri, 'Henry Kissinger and the Geopolitics of Globalisation', in Niall Ferguson, Charles Maier, Erez Manela, Daniel Sargent (eds.), *The Shock the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 183.
- 129 Amongst the highlights of the US–PRC rapprochement was Kissinger's secret visit to China in July 1971. This involved Kissinger feigning illness during a visit to Pakistan thus allowing him to secretly fly to China. See: Nixon, *Memoirs*, pp. 544–59; Kissinger, *WHY*, pp. 163–94, 684–787. For an entire monograph devoted to the US–PRC rapprochement see: Margaret Macmillan, *Seize the Hour: When Nixon Met Mao* (London: John Murray, 2006). On the diplomacy leading to the opening of relations with the PRC see: Morris, *Uncertain Greatness*, pp. 203–8; Margaret Macmillan, 'Nixon, Kissinger, and the Opening to China', in Logevall and Preston (eds.), *Nixon in the World*, p. 108.
- 130 Lanxin Xiang, 'The Recognition Controversy: Anglo-American Relations in China, 1949', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 27:2 (1992), 319–43.
- 131 Keith Hamilton, 'A "Week that Changed the World": Britain and Nixon's China Visit of 21–28 Feb 1972', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 15:1 (2004), 117–35.
- 132 TNA: PREM 15/1988 Lord Cromer to FCO, 25 November 1971.
- 133 For the quote see: TNA: FCO 7/1815 Record of a Meeting between the Prime Minister and President Nixon at Chequers, 3 October 1970. On the points raised see: Macmillan, *When Nixon Met Mao*, p. 199; Roth, *Heath and the Heathmen*, p. 224; Hamilton, 'A "Week that Changed the World"', 118–21.
- 134 J. R. Saigal, *Pakistan Splits: The Birth of Bangladesh* (Washington: Manas, 2000); Robert J. McMahon, 'The Danger of Geopolitical Fantasies: Nixon, Kissinger and the South Asia Crisis of 1971', in Logevall and Preston (eds.), *Nixon in the World*, pp. 249–68; Luke A. Nichter and Richard A. Moss, 'Superpower Relations, Backchannels and the Subcontinent', *Pakistaniaat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies*, 2:3 (2010), 47–75.
- 135 Kissinger, *WHY*, pp. 866–9; Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 160–70.
- 136 Richard Thornton, *The Nixon–Kissinger Years: The Reshaping of American Foreign Policy* (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2001 2nd edition), pp. 113–22; Nichter and Moss, 'Superpower Relations', 46–9.
- 137 'Naval Victory Claim by India', *Daily Telegraph*, 6 December, 1971, p. 1.

- 138 Bush would go on to become president of the United States (1989–93). Tom Wicker, *One of Us: Richard Nixon and the American Dream* (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 665–7.
- 139 Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries*, pp. 380–2; TNA: PREM 15/715 Edward Heath to President Nixon, 13 December 1971.
- 140 Elmo R. Zumwalt, *On Watch: A Memoir* (Arlington: Zumwalt & Associates, 1976), p. 367.
- 141 Telcon: Kissinger–The President, 17 December 1971, HAKTELCONS.
- 142 Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries*, p. 381.
- 143 TNA: FCO 82/63 Burke Trend to Lord Cromer, 29 November, 1971.
- 144 TNA: FCO 82/63 H. T. A. Overton to Mr Hankey and Thomas Brimelow, 24 November 1971; TNA: FCO 82/67 Steering Brief, Fourth draft, Undated.
- 145 Memorandum for the President's File by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs [Kissinger], 20 December 1971, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1969–1976: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2003), Vol. I, , Doc. 102, p. 353.
- 146 Memorandum for the President's File from Henry A. Kissinger, 20 December 1971, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 87, NPMP.
- 147 John Graham, 'Nixon: Surcharge is Ended', *Financial Times*, 21 December 1971, p. 1.
- 148 'Heath and Nixon Hail New Era', *Daily Telegraph*, 22 December 1971, p. 1.
- 149 'Nixon Very Pleased', *Daily Telegraph*, 21 December, 1971, p. 20.
- 150 TNA: FCO 82/183 H. T. A. Overton to Mr Hankey, 7 January 1972.
- 151 Memorandum of Conversation, 23 December 1971, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric Files, 1970–73, Box 2649, NAI.
- 152 A good overview on the significance of this summit is contained within David Reynolds, *Summits: Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth Century* (London: Allen Lane, 2007), pp. 207–61.
- 153 TNA: FCO 21/982 H. T. A. Overton to T. A. K. Elliott, 22 February 1972; TNA: FCO 21/983 Denis Greenhill to Lord Cromer, 23 March 1972.
- 154 TNA: FCO 21/983 H. T. A. Overton to T. A. K. Elliot, 24 March 1972.
- 155 TNA: FCO 21/983 Lord Cromer to Denis Greenhill, 16 March 1972; TNA: PREM 15/1988 JIC(A)(72)(SA) 41, 28 February 1972.
- 156 Memorandum of Conversation, 21 February 1972, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 87, NPMP; Memorandum of Conversation, 22 February 1972, *ibid*.
- 157 Kissinger, *WHY*, p. 1062. This was a point Kissinger rectified within: Henry Kissinger, *On China* (London: Allen Lane, 2011), pp. 236–74.
- 158 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, 'Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China', *The Journal of American History*, 92:1 (2005), 109–35; Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, *Mao: The Unknown Story* (London: Vintage, 2007), pp. 706–8; Macmillan, *Seize the Hour*, pp. 225–65.
- 159 TNA: PREM 15/1988 Lord Cromer to FCO, 2 March 1972.
- 160 TNA: PREM 15/1988 Richard Nixon to Edward Heath, 6 July 1972; TNA: FCO 21/983 R. M. Evans to Mr Wilford, 16 May 1972.
- 161 Conversation Among President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Affairs [Kissinger], White House Chief of Staff [Haldeman], and Secretary of State Rogers,

- 11 May 1972, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1969–1976, Soviet Union October 1971–May 1972* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2006), Vol. XIV, Doc. 217, p. 813.
- 162 As noted within Sonnenfeldt Note, October 1970, National Security Council Files, President's Trip Files, Box 466, NPMP.
- 163 Conversation Among President Nixon, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors [Burns], the Director of the Office of Management and Budget [Ash], the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers [Stein], Secretary of the Treasury Shultz, and the under-Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs [Volcker], 3 March 1973, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1969–1976: Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2009), Vol. XXXI, Doc. 16, p. 68.
- 164 Robert D. Schulzinger, 'Détente in the Nixon-Ford years, 1969–1976', in Leffler and Westad (eds.), *Crises and Détente*, pp. 378–82.
- 165 Or, at least, this was the opinion of some British officials. See: TNA: FCO 28/2027 H. T. A. Overton to Mr Rose, 24 February 1972.
- 166 Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963–1969* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972), pp. 489–99; Gerard Smith, *DoubleTalk: The Story of SALT I* (New York: Doubleday, 1980), pp. 15–21.
- 167 Memorandum for Mr Kissinger from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 22 June 1970, National Security Council Files: SALT, Box 878, NPMP.
- 168 Memorandum for the President's Files, 15 June 1971, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 85, NPMP.
- 169 TNA: CAB 164/936 Mac [Victor Macklen] to P. J. Hudson, 30 July 1970; TNA: FCO 45/595 SALT: The Defence Department, attached to Denis Greenhill to the Private Secretary, 1970; Trachtenberg, *Constructed Peace*, pp. 283–351.
- 170 Edoardo Sorvillo, 'Caught in the Middle of the Transatlantic Security Dilemma. Great Britain, the United States and Western European Security, 1970–1973', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 8:1 (2010), 70.
- 171 Lawrence Freedman, *Britain and Nuclear Weapons* (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 40–5.
- 172 TNA: CAB 164/936 P. J. Hudson to Burke Trend, 1 March 1971; TNA: CAB 164/937 C. M. Rose to Edward Peck, 21 June 1971; TNA: CAB 133/408 Brief by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 22 June 1971; TNA: PREM 15/1272 Brief No. 4, attached to Burke Trend to the Prime Minister, 23 June 1971; TNA: CAB 164/937 MD Butler to C. M. Rose, 28 June 1971.
- 173 This dual approach to negotiating SALT did not sit well with the US lead negotiator, Gerard Smith. The title of his memoir reveals the bitterness he still felt about this approach. See: Smith, *DoubleTalk*, pp. 200–79. Also see Paul Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Centre of Decision* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989), pp. 308–10; Raymond Garthoff, *A Journey Through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence* (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 2001), pp. 243–76.
- 174 Laird feared that NATO members would leak US policy to the USSR and therefore undermine their diplomacy. See: Memorandum for Mr Kissinger from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 27 April 1970, National Security Council Files, SALT, Box 877, NPMP; Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Henry A. Kissinger, 4 May 1970,

- ibid.*; Memorandum for the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from Melvin Laird, 27 April 1970, *ibid.* On British concerns see: TNA: CAB 164/936 Douglas-Home to Washington, Tel. 2476, 2 November 1970; TNA: CAB 164/937 M. D. Butler to R. M. Tesh, 10 June 1971; TNA: CAB 164/937 M. D. Butler to R. M. Tesh, 16 June 1971.
- 175 TNA: PREM 15/1359 Solly Zuckerman to the Prime Minister, 17 July 1970; TNA: FCO 146/4649 Meeting between the Defence Secretary and H.M. Ambassador, Paris, 2 March 1971; TNA: PREM 15/299 Burke Trend to the Prime Minister, 4 March 1971; TNA: CAB 133/408 Brief by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 22 June 1971; TNA: PREM 15/1272 Brief No. 4, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 23 June 1971; TNA: PREM 15/1359 Annex A, attached to Robert Armstrong to Robert Andrew, 15 April 1972; TNA: FCO 41/987 Prime Minister's Meeting with President Nixon, Brief No. 3, T. L. A. Daunt to B. M. Norbury, 1 December, 1972.
- 176 TNA: FCO 28/2027 Killick to FCO, 16 May 1972; TNA: FCO 28/2027 Killick to FCO, 24 May 1972; TNA: PREM 15/775 S. Zuckerman to the Prime Minister, 17 May 1972.
- 177 TNA: FCO 28/2027 Denis Greenhill to Thomas Brimelow, 8 March 1972.
- 178 TNA: FCO 28/2028 Douglas-Home to Washington, 13 June 1972; TNA: FCO 28/2028 H. T. A. Overton to T. A. K. Elliott, 9 June 1972.
- 179 On the details of both agreements see: Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003 3rd edition), pp. 391–7.
- 180 Memorandum of Conversation, 15 February 1972, *FRUS 1969–1976, Soviet Union*, Vol. XIV, Doc. 51, pp. 179–80; Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs [Kissinger], 5 April 1972, *ibid.*, Doc. 83, pp. 260–1, notes 2, 3, 4.
- 181 TNA: FCO 82/205 President [Nixon] to the Prime Minister, 8 June 1972.
- 182 Address to a Joint Session of the Congress on Return from Austria, the Soviet Union, Iran, and Poland, 1 June 1972, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1972* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1974), Doc. 188, p. 664.
- 183 TNA: FCO 41/987 Prime Minister's Meeting with President Nixon, Brief No. 3, attached to T. L. A. Daunt to B. M. Norbury, 1 December, 1972.
- 184 Rodman, *Presidential Command*, pp. 106–7.
- 185 TNA: CAB 133/408 Note of a Meeting held in Sir Denis Greenhill's Office, 25 June 1971. Also see: Douglas-Home's comments in: Sir A. Douglas-Home to Sir D. Wilson, 1 December 1970, G. Bennett and K. A. Hamilton, *Documents on British Policy Overseas: Britain and the Soviet Union 1968–1972* (London: The Stationery Office, 1997), Vol. I, Doc. 57, pp. 287–9; Ambassador in London to Secretary of State, Tel. London 402, 16 January 1970, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric Files 1970–73, Political & Defense, Box 2848, NAIL.
- 186 US Mission NATO [Kennedy] to the Secretary of State [Rogers], June 1972, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry 1613, Box 2703, NAIL.
- 187 Memorandum from the President's File from Henry A. Kissinger, 28 July 1972, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 89, NPMP.
- 188 For the Secretary [Rogers] from Ambassador Kennedy, Tel. USNATO 3570, September 1972, National Security Council Files, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 24, NPMP.

- 189 Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of State, 23 September 1972, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric Files, 1970–73, Box 2649, NAI.
- 190 TNA: FCO 28/2029 JIC(A)(72)(CIG)191, 5 June 1972.
- 191 For British concerns see: TNA: FCO 82/197 P. Craddock to Burke Trend, 18 September 1972.
- 192 Scott, *Allies Apart*, pp. 15–16.
- 193 TNA: FCO 28/2028 President Nixon's visit to Moscow: Brief for Cabinet, 6 June 1972.
- 194 Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs [Kissinger] to President Nixon, 24 December, 1969, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1969–1976: Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2006), Vol. XII, Doc. 110, p. 338; Memorandum of Conversation, 22 April 1972, *FRUS 1969–1976, Soviet Union*, Vol. XIV, Doc. 139, p. 532. This memorandum in *FRUS* differs from the one available in the US archive. See: Memorandum of Conversation 22 April 1972, National Security Council Files, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Country Files–Europe–USSR, Box 72, NPMP.
- 195 Svetlana Savranskaya, 'Unintended Consequences: Soviet Interests, Expectations and Reactions to the Helsinki Final Act', in Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart (eds.), *Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), pp. 175–8.
- 196 Memorandum for the President from Henry Kissinger: NSC Consideration of NATO Issues, Mutual Force Reductions, European Security Conference, undated (circa October 1971), NSCIHF, National Security Council Meetings, Box H-032, NPMP.
- 197 NSC Consideration of NATO Issues, Mutual Force Reductions, European Security Conference, Memorandum for the President from Henry Kissinger, undated (circa October 1971), NSCIHF, National Security Council Meetings, Box H-032, NPMP. There is a burgeoning literature about the CSCE. For a good overview see: Angela Romano, *From Détente in Europe to European Détente: How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE* (London: Peter Lang, 2009).
- 198 William G. Hyland, *Mortal Rivals: Superpower Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 114.
- 199 Editorial Note, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1969–1976, European Security* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), Vol. XXXIX, Doc. 108, p. 327; Memorandum of Conversation, 22 March 1974, *ibid.*, Doc. 192, p. 573; Memorandum of Conversation, 28 August 1974, *ibid.*, Doc. 245, p. 717; Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meeting, 5 December, 1974, *ibid.*, Doc. 262, pp. 763–7; Memorandum of Conversation, 30 January 1975, *ibid.*, Doc. 269, p. 786; Memorandum of Conversation, 16 February 1975, *ibid.*, Doc. 270, p. 792; Memorandum of Conversation, 15 August 1974, *ibid.*, Doc. 243, p. 713.
- 200 Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, p. 532; Angela Romano, 'Détente, Entente, or Linkage? The Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in U.S. Relations with the Soviet Union', *Diplomatic History*, 33:4 (2009), 703–22.
- 201 Jussi Hanhimäki, '"They Can Write it in Swahili": Kissinger, the Soviets, and the Helsinki Accords, 1973–1975', *The Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 1:1 (2003), 37–58; Michael Cotey Morgan, 'The United States and the Making of the Helsinki Final Act' in Lovevall and Preston (eds.), *Nixon in the World*, p. 178. On Kissinger's espousal of such

- thinking see: European Security Issues, Background Paper, Part 1, President's Trip Files, National Security Council Files, Box 667, NPMP; NSC Consideration of NATO Issues, Mutual Force Reductions, European Security Conference, Memorandum for the President from Henry Kissinger, undated (circa October 1971), NSCIHF, National Security Council Meetings, Box H-032, NPMP.
- 202 Memorandum of Conversation, 3 October 1970, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric Files, 1970–73, Political and Defense, Box 2650, NAI; TNA: FCO 30/1744 Record of Conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the United States Secretary of State, 1 February 1973.
- 203 TNA: FCO 7/1814 Record of a Meeting held at Chequers, 3 October 1970.
- 204 TNA: FCO 82/197 Record of Conversation, 14 September 1972; TNA: PREM 15/1273 Record of Conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Dr Henry Kissinger, 14 September 1972. On broader European developments towards the CSCE see: Bange and Niedhart (eds.), *Helsinki 1975*; Romano, *From Détente in Europe*; Richard Davy, 'Helsinki Myths: Setting the Record Straight on the Final Act of the CSCE, 1975', *Cold War History*, 9:1 (2009), 1–22; Romano, 'Détente, Entente, or Linkage?'; Douglas E. Selvage, 'Transforming the Soviet Sphere of Influence? U.S.-Soviet Détente and Eastern Europe, 1969–1976', *Diplomatic History*, 33:4 (2009), 671–88.
- 205 For British thinking see: Record of the Seventh Meeting of the Conference of HM representatives in Eastern Europe, 8 May 1970, in G. Bennett and K. A. Hamilton, *Documents on British Policy Overseas: Détente in Europe, 1972–1976* (London: The Stationery Office, 2001), Vol. III, Doc. 46, p. 19; Minute from Mr Tickell to Mr Wiggins, 6 March 1972, *ibid.*, Doc. 2, pp. 16–18; Record of the Seventh Meeting of the Conference of HM representatives in Eastern Europe, 8 May 1970, in G. Bennett and K. A. Hamilton, *Documents on British Policy Overseas: Britain and the Soviet Union 1968–1972* (London: The Stationery Office, 1997), Vol. I, Doc. 46, p. 235. For the quote see: Ambassador in Bonn Embassy to Secretary of State, Tel. Bonn 1299, January 1972, NSCIHF, Study Memorandums, NSCSM, Box H-171, NPMP. Also see: Ambassador in London Embassy to Secretary of State, Tel. London 9567, October 1971, NSCIHF, Study Memorandums, National Security Study Memorandums, Box H-187, NPMP; CSCE Interagency Task Force: Interim Report, 3 March 1972, NSCIHF, Meeting Files, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-061, NPMP.
- 206 Romano, *From Détente in Europe*, pp. 85–9.
- 207 TNA: FCO 82/193 Denis Greenhill to Thomas Brimelow, 2 October 1972.
- 208 For quote see: Analytical Summary: MBFR and CSCE, attached to Memorandum for Dr Kissinger from Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Phil Odeen, 24 March 1972, NSCIHF, Meeting Files, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-061, NPMP. Also see: CSCE Interagency Task Force: Interim Report, 3 March 1972, NSCIHF, Meeting Files, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-061, NPMP; TNA: FCO 44/533 Record of a Conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Mr William Rogers, 20 December 1971.
- 209 NSDM 162: Presidential Guidance on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction and a European Conference, 2 December 1971, NSCIHF, National Security Council Files, Box H-032, NPMP.
- 210 TNA: PREM 15/1272 Record of Discussion with Dr Kissinger, 28 July 1972.

- 211 In opposition to the assessments of: Hynes, *The Year*; Rossbach, *Rebirth*.
- 212 Discussion between John McCloy and Henry Kissinger, 11 November 1971, White House Tapes, Tape 014–062a, from: <http://nixontapes.org> (Accessed 11 September 2009).
- 213 TNA: DEFE 48/513 DOAE Project 147: Analysis of US MBFR Proposals, Dr D. P. Dare et al., September 1971, Table V.
- 214 TNA: FCO 7/1814 Record of a Meeting held at Chequers, 3 October 1970; TNA: PREM 15/1272 Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 23 June 1971, Brief No. 1.
- 215 Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, undated, NSCIHF, Meeting Files, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-061, NPMP.
- 216 Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, undated, NSCIHF, Meeting Files, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-061, NPMP.
- 217 Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance* (Westport: Praeger, 2004), pp. 51–4; Hubert Zimmermann, 'The Improbable Permanence of a Commitment: America's Troop Presence in Europe During the Cold War', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 11:1 (2009), 19–26.
- 218 Van Atta, *Melvin Laird*, pp. 288–9.
- 219 Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, undated, NSCIHF, Meeting Files, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-061, NPMP; Guy de Jonquières, 'Urgent Moves in the U.S. to Save Some of Aid Programme', *Financial Times*, 1 November 1971, p. 1.
- 220 Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, undated, NSCIHF, Meeting Files, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-061, NPMP.
- 221 A number of works have focused more keenly upon the interplay between domestic politics and their influence on the course of US foreign policy. For the best overviews see: Melvin Small, *Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789–1994* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Julian E. Zelizer, *Arsenals of Democracy: The Politics of National Security – From World War II to the War on Terrorism* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).
- 222 Zimmermann, 'The Improbable Permanence', 23.
- 223 TNA: DEFE 13/880 C [Lord Carrington] to CDS [Admiral Peter Hill-Norton], 17 May 1971; TNA: DEFE 13/880 C [Lord Carrington] to CDS [Admiral Peter Hill-Norton], 16 August 1971.
- 224 From Ambassador in London Embassy to the Secretary of State, Tel. London 6728, July 1971, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric Files, 1970–73, Political & Defense, Box 2658, NAI. Also see: Memorandum for Henry Kissinger from John Irwin, 17 September 1971, NSCIHF, Study Memorandums, National Security Study Memorandums, Box H-171, NPMP.
- 225 TNA: PREM 15/1272 Brief No. 1, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 23 June 1971; TNA: FCO 82/71 Record of a Conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Mr William Rogers, 20 December, 1971.
- 226 Memorandum for Dr Kissinger from K. Wayne Smith, 16 February 1971, NSCIHF, Study Memorandums, NSCSM, Box H-167, NPMP.
- 227 For the quote see: TNA: FCO 82/71 Record of Plenary Session between the UK and US Delegation, 21 December 1971. Further British complaints are within: Annual Assessment for the United Kingdom, From the Ambassador in London to the Secretary

- of State, 14 February 1972, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric Files, 1970–73, Political & Defense, Box 2658, NAI; Memorandum for Dr Kissinger from Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Phil Odeen, 24 March 1972, NSCIHF, Meeting Files, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-061, NPMP.
- 228 Such examples include: Hynes, *The Year*; Rossbach, *Rebirth*.
- 229 See Heath's public speech to this effect contained within TNA: FCO 7/1837 Freeman to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 23 December, 1970. For Heath articulating his support for Nixon's Vietnam policies see TNA: FCO 7/1815 Record of a Meeting between the Prime Minister and President Nixon at Chequers, 3 October 1970.
- 230 TNA: FCO 82/1884 P. R. H. Wright to D. E. Murray, 14 July 1972; John Dickie, *How British Foreign Policy Works* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), pp. 105–7; Richard J. Aldrich, *GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency* (London: HarperPress, 2010), pp. 277–366; Baylis, 'Moscow Criterion'.
- 231 'Nixon's Appeal', *Daily Telegraph*, 21 January 1969, p. 16.