

3

A year of discord 1973–74

No special relations. Correct. They'll [Britain] have the relation with the French.

President Nixon to Henry Kissinger, 9 August 1973¹

A year of discord

At the onset of 1973, the US–UK relationship was entering a new epoch. The East of Suez withdrawal had lessened Britain's global commitments and Britain officially entered the EEC on 1 January 1973. Heath was determined to chart a more Euro-centric British foreign policy, which would involve the creation of common political, foreign, monetary and energy policies within the EEC. The US had also undergone a re-assessment of its global position and the Nixon administration had reconfigured US foreign policy with its détente agenda. The Paris Peace Accords (January 1973) officially ended the US's involvement in Vietnam, and superpower détente had resulted in the opening to the PRC and the establishment of US–Soviet bilateral diplomacy. 1973, therefore, presented new circumstances in which US–UK relations would be conducted, and it was the adaptation to this that created a number of problems for US–UK relations.²

First, Britain's membership of the EEC created procedural difficulties for bilateral interaction, given that the EEC was seeking to produce common policies on a plethora of topics, including monetary, trade and energy cooperation. It also envisaged the establishment of common political and foreign policies. How the US would interact with the expanded EEC was a source of continued difficulty for American and British policy-makers. Aside from procedural problems, Heath was determined to operate as a fully-fledged member of the EEC. This meant that US–UK diplomacy could not be an avenue for solving US–EEC

matters. This was another area which caused much angst in Washington and led to profound consequences for US–UK relations, including the short-term postponement of nuclear and intelligence cooperation.

All of these US–UK difficulties were surrounded by the gradual erosion of President Nixon's authority because of the Watergate scandal.³ Even though Kissinger would dismiss Watergate as a 'school boy prank' and equated it to 'a bunch of dogs snapping at the heels' of the president, the issue would soon dominate Nixon's agenda.⁴ It was, as Kissinger noted, obvious that foreign policy issues were no longer Nixon's top priority, and testament to this is that the annotations and comments the president had always provided on briefing papers were now no longer made. Nixon – who was seriously considering firing Kissinger at the beginning of 1973, and who had promoted James Schlesinger to defense secretary in part to temper Kissinger's dominance of foreign policy – reluctantly accepted that US foreign policy would largely be directed by Henry Kissinger.⁵

Watergate and the impact it had upon the foreign policy decisions taken by the Nixon administration would also have a malign impact upon US–UK relations. For instance, UK policy in a number of areas was informed by the president's domestic problems. One of the most important was the bearing it had upon Heath's decision to upgrade Polaris. Likewise, US foreign policy decisions could hardly be immune from Watergate. US policy-makers believed that Nixon's domestic troubles explained, in part, why Britain refused to embrace the 'Year of Europe'. Such beliefs contributed to the more antagonistic policies undertaken by the US throughout 1973–74.⁶

This chapter is broken into three parts with the 'Year of Europe' comprising the opening third. Following this is an assessment of US–UK relations during the fourth Arab–Israeli war. Finally, the oil crisis which followed, along with the Washington Energy Conference of February 1974, which was convened to solve this, are analysed within the context of US–UK relations. For US–UK relations, the common theme throughout 1973–74 is largely one of acrimony. British policy-makers, including the prime minister, believed Kissinger's 'Year of Europe' was a ploy designed to dominate the nascent common foreign policy of the EEC. For their part, US policy-makers believed that a valuable bilateral relationship with the UK was being replaced by one built upon distrust and competition. The seriousness of such political disputes resulted in the more practical aspects of US–UK cooperation being affected. On two occasions, the US temporarily halted intelligence and nuclear cooperation because of broader political disagreements. This occurred as a form of political punishment, but it was also seen as a policy tool by Kissinger. In sum, Kissinger utilised US–UK bilateral cooperation as a means of encouraging the British to take a less hostile approach to American political initiatives. This was witnessed during the 'Year of Europe' as a means of altering the perceived antagonistic policies of the British

government; in the immediate aftermath of the fourth Arab–Israeli war, in order to prevent the British pursuing a policy which would undermine Kissinger’s ‘shuttle diplomacy’; and throughout the Washington Energy Conference, as a means of ensuring that the British government supported Washington’s energy proposals. This coercive element in Kissinger’s foreign policy is something traditionally associated with his approach in relation to America’s adversaries, but, as shown below, it was applied to America’s British ally as well.⁷

In spite of these political differences, and serious bilateral disputes, US–UK cooperation continued in a number of highly sensitive realms. For instance, Kissinger tasked Thomas Brimelow with drafting the US–USSR Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement.⁸ By November 1973, Heath had decided to upgrade *Polaris*. This required additional US assistance which Nixon approved in January 1974.⁹ Finally, throughout the Washington Energy Conference of February 1974, the Heath government worked closely with the Nixon administration even at the cost of sacrificing EEC cohesiveness. This was largely done in order to protect Britain’s oil interests. Presented below then is a picture which highlights an antagonistic relationship between the two countries, but one which, although strained to near breaking point, survived intact and, indeed, by the time Edward Heath left office in February 1974, had been reinvigorated by the nuclear agreements between the two sides.

‘Year of Europe’: Origins and motives

The ‘Year of Europe’ had its genesis in the autumn of 1972. The creation of superpower *détente* and finding a solution to the Vietnam War had dominated the agenda of the president’s first term, and throughout the administration there was a belief that the US had somewhat neglected their relationship with Europe. As Donald Rumsfeld recollected, the fact that he was appointed as Nixon’s third representative to NATO in February 1973 – following David Kennedy’s resignation some eight months earlier – suggested that the Nixon ‘administration’s interest in [NATO] was at best modest’.¹⁰ More important still was that Nixon believed that relations with Europe were taking on a new competitive form. Certainly, throughout 1969–72, the US–EEC economic relationship had manifested in fierce competition, and political changes that were evolving would present new challenges for US–EEC relations. The most pressing was that the EEC was seeking to formulate an independent voice in international affairs. Clearly, regardless of what form this actually took, it would have some bearing on the future course of US–EEC relations.

With EEC expansion confirmed at the beginning of 1973, Nixon sensed this was an opportune moment to address the situation.¹¹ What then did the recently

re-elected president envisage? Simply, Nixon had the ambitious agenda to re-conceptualise US–EEC relations. In practical terms, this meant that all aspects of US–EEC relations would be dealt with as a whole; discussions pertaining to monetary or trade matters would no longer be conducted in total isolation from those in the military/security realm. This, in British circles, took the moniker of the ‘one ball of wax thesis’.¹² It appeared, more appropriately, as an extension of Nixon’s linkage approach to foreign policy. Linkage, as seen in US foreign policy towards the USSR, would now be more explicitly applied to Europe.

US motives behind the ‘Year of Europe’ created considerable debate, with Henry Kissinger providing his own weighty analysis. Kissinger suggested the initiative was required to revitalise relations with both Europe and NATO. NATO’s conventional force position vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact was steadily worsening and, in an age of nuclear parity, NATO’s nuclear deterrent was deemed to have become less credible. US–EEC economic disputes were also jeopardising the political–military relationship. As such, a Declaration of Principles would be created. This would outline the future basis of US–EEC practices and overhaul NATO’s conventional forces. Finally, it would prevent economic disputes having a detrimental impact on US–European political–military affairs.¹³

A number of authors have largely accepted Kissinger’s argument.¹⁴ Without doubt, one of the motivating factors behind the ‘Year of Europe’ was genuinely to improve NATO’s force posture, given that both Nixon and Kissinger had raised serious concerns about NATO’s capabilities ever since assuming office. Nixon had even opined that NATO was ‘finished’ unless a modernisation programme was undertaken and in February 1973 repeated such concerns.¹⁵ Kissinger largely agreed with Nixon’s view of NATO and had a long history, dating back to his time at Harvard, of suggesting that NATO needed to overhaul both its conventional and nuclear forces. Likewise, as a part-time adviser to the Kennedy administration, he had made similar arguments.¹⁶

Assessments drawn up for Kissinger in the 1970s only endorsed these pessimistic views. Two of Kissinger’s aides, for instance, described NATO as ‘decaying’ and, during one conversation between Kissinger and secretary of defense James Schlesinger, both men agreed that a conventional arms attack by the Warsaw Pact would lead to the collapse of NATO!¹⁷ Attention upon NATO in 1973 was also consistent with earlier policy espousals, given that Kissinger had suggested in 1971 that once SALT and British membership to the EEC had been settled, the issues surrounding NATO would be tackled.¹⁸ Therefore, at one level, the ‘Year of Europe’ can be viewed as an attempt to improve NATO.

Other commentators have interpreted Kissinger’s motives differently, with Robert Dallek suggesting that the ‘Year of Europe’ was designed as a means to focus attention away from Watergate. Others have been more cynical in their interpretation of US motives with the argument being put forth that the

'Year of Europe' was devised to re-establish US 'hegemony' over Europe and to prevent the EEC challenging US leadership of the Atlantic alliance. For Mario Del Pero, Kissinger's policy was even darker. Kissinger employed 'classical realist' traits in seeking to 'divide and rule' the EEC, which would ensure that the EEC's attempts to establish a common foreign policy would not be formed on an independent basis. Rather, it would accord, generally, to the contours of US wishes and, even more importantly, would not be able to challenge US primacy within the Atlantic alliance.¹⁹

Watergate as an explanation for Kissinger's 'Year of Europe' is only part of the story. While domestic factors can have a strong influence upon the course of US foreign policy, and were certainly important during the Nixon administration, the reality is that the 'Year of Europe' had its origins in September 1972, some five months *before* Watergate became a political problem for the president.²⁰ This chapter also rejects the argument that the 'Year of Europe' was a means of ensuring US hegemony over the EEC's emerging common foreign policy. No archival evidence is used to support these claims and there is also little wider evidence provided that convincingly illustrates that the 'Year of Europe' was designed to ensure the US could dominate the EEC.

As Kissinger suggested in his memoirs, the 'Year of Europe' was calculated to re-invigorate NATO and to provide a symbolic gesture of Atlantic solidarity.²¹ This was not, however, the sole intention behind the project. Rather, the president and Kissinger decided that a 'Year of Europe' was necessary in order to encapsulate all aspects of US–EEC relations. This meant that the continuing imbalance between the military contributions of the US and the European powers to the defence of Europe could no longer persist. The expansion of the EEC meant trade and monetary practices which were disadvantageous to the United States could not be negotiated in complete isolation from military-security matters. US policy, therefore, sought to ensure that the EEC could not continue to operate bilaterally in the economic realm, whilst still expecting the US to contribute so considerably to Europe's defence needs. In sum, the Nixon–Kissinger theory of linkage was to be applied to US–EEC relations.²² Kissinger himself best summarised the US objectives in conversation with Nixon:

Eventually we can force them [EEC] into a position where they have to talk to us on these matters [economics], or we will talk separately on our matters. And they can't insist that MBFR, nuclear treaty, and so forth, we cannot operate without consultation ... I would use this, at least – at a minimum, you'll get out of it a better tone in the other discussion.²³

This does not mean, however, that the 'Year of Europe' was designed to enforce US hegemony over Europe. Certainly, Nixon and Kissinger wanted

to ensure that the US remained the dominant partner within NATO. This, however, would not be achieved by dividing and ruling the EEC. Rather, in their assessment, this would occur naturally because of simple power realities. It should be pointed out that documentary evidence does exist that illustrates that the US was seeking to 'divide and rule' the EEC. Nevertheless, this was not the original intention of the 'Year of Europe' project. Rather, it was simply a tactic that was employed once US policy-makers realised that the EEC was not going to cooperate in producing their much-wanted Declaration of Principles. The ultimate objective was not to divide the EEC; it was to reconfigure US–EEC relations that accepted the new economic, military and political realities of the alliance.

Gaining economic advantage from Europe's reliance upon US military guarantees was also a peripheral objective of the 'Year of Europe'. Nixon was not prepared to forfeit the political relationship with Europe solely to achieve economic advantages.²⁴ This was a position Kissinger agreed with. As one of Kissinger's closest advisers reminded him, it was not in the interests of the US to sacrifice the US–European security relationship for 'citrus fruits'.²⁵ For Kissinger, political considerations would predominantly outweigh economic factors. US policy sought to mitigate the economic consequences of EEC expansion, but this would not be achieved at the cost of permanently alienating America's European allies.

Theory and practice

In September 1972, Nixon discussed his intention to refocus upon US–European relations once his re-election had been guaranteed.²⁶ Such thinking was rapidly transmitted to British officials, and was positively met, with Burke Trend informing Kissinger that such an initiative would be welcome.²⁷ With Nixon securing his re-election in November 1972, this re-appraisal began. However, the atmosphere for such an initiative was less than ideal given that the US Christmas bombing campaign of North Vietnam had been roundly condemned by Europe's leaders. This soured Nixon's opinion towards such critics and, indeed, made him re-assess the nature of the entire NATO alliance.²⁸ As Nixon articulated in conversation, NATO 'had been an alliance of interest and friendship'; now it was 'just an alliance of interest'.²⁹ Clearly the president's personal feelings towards European leaders were less than ideal for re-affirming the solidarity of transatlantic relations, but the exception to this was Nixon's attitude towards Edward Heath. Heath's personal relationship with Nixon may have ended in 'mutual contempt' but at the beginning of 1973 Heath was held in high regard by the president. Heath, alone amongst European leaders, had

given his public support for US actions in Vietnam, and such support had not gone unnoticed in the White House.³⁰ British officials observed that Nixon's attitude towards Heath had warmed. Indeed, Lord Cromer suggested Nixon viewed Britain as the 'blue eyed boy'.³¹

Heath's visit to Washington and Camp David in February 1973 presented an opportunity to exploit this favourability. Kissinger termed the visit 'interesting but inconclusive'.³² The minutes of the meetings largely corroborate Kissinger's assessment as decisions pertaining to nuclear cooperation, trade, monetary reform and re-configuring NATO's force posture were all deferred for a future date.³³ It was only on the issue of the CSCE and MBFR that real policy differences were discussed. With SALT achieved, a peace treaty signed in Vietnam and the establishment of triangular diplomacy, Nixon was now determined to settle other matters. In particular, the president wanted progress on SALT II and on MBFR. To support such ambitions, Nixon and Kissinger envisaged some type of linkage between the MBFR and CSCE negotiations.³⁴ They argued that the CSCE should be quickly settled, on the proviso that MBFR negotiations would begin soon after. In anticipation of this, Nixon wanted NATO to agree upon their MBFR objectives, with September 1973 being given as a final date by which this should all be settled by.³⁵

The Nixon–Heath meeting also indicated that the US would no longer tolerate the criticism it had received for trying to settle a number of East–West issues. Kissinger argued that SALT and MBFR were necessary, both for domestic and strategic reasons, and that he would not accept open hostility to them from America's allies. Kissinger warned Heath:

Europe really must stop being so suspicious about the risk of a bilateral deal between the Soviet and United States Governments in this matter. If the Europeans went on pestering Washington on this issue, the United States Government might be driven to the point where they had no alternative but actually to conclude a deal of this kind.³⁶

In April, Kissinger repeated a similar message to Trend.³⁷ This was in general accordance with Kissinger's private complaints about Britain's attitude towards SALT and MBFR. According to Kissinger, the British had a 'desire to be a spokesman in NATO against the US'.³⁸

This shift in emphasis towards the CSCE and MBFR left Heath's government uneasy. Certainly, Heath had sought a swift resolution to the CSCE since 1970, but since then two years had passed and the negotiations had become broader in scope and more complicated in design. For the British, trying to find a common Western negotiating platform in Kissinger's timeframe would be difficult, and even more concerning for British policy-makers was the possibility that a hasty

settlement could result in the West agreeing to terms not properly considered.³⁹ This is a point which Trend and Sykes conveyed to Kissinger in June 1973, but they were unable to convince him of the merits of their argument.⁴⁰ As the year progressed, the CSCE and MBFR discussions became ensnared in wider US–UK difficulties pertaining to the ‘Year of Europe’. What were once seen as ‘natural’ policy differences had now assumed vital significance.

During the Camp David talks, Nixon took the opportunity to explain how the following year would be used to refocus upon the US–European alliance. Nixon revealed his preferred method for implementing such changes: ‘We must try to recreate the wartime habit of getting together for really intimate and deep discussions in a relaxed atmosphere – discussions which range over the whole field of the problems, political, military and economic, which we faced together.’⁴¹ Heath’s response is not recorded in the British memorandum of the conversation, but his subsequent actions indicated his disinclination to react positively to such a proposition because the prime minister told his Cabinet colleagues that Britain should cooperate with the US only after full consultation with Britain’s EEC partners.⁴² Given his determination for Britain to act as a fully-fledged member of the EEC, it would have been contradictory for Heath to have agreed to solve US–EEC matters on a US–UK basis. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that Heath had not ruled out negotiations. Heath simply differed with Nixon on how these would be conducted. Given this, the *Daily Telegraph* newspaper was quite correct to predict that ‘hard bargaining’ between the US and the EEC lay ahead.⁴³

Heath may have been averse to operating bilaterally with the US, but the opposite impression was transmitted to Washington. On 5 March 1973, British officials met with Kissinger and Nixon’s plans for US–EEC relations were discussed. Kissinger suggested private US–UK talks be held to discuss the subject and the British delegation gave their approval. The British record of this meeting does not explicitly state that agreement was given to Kissinger’s proposal but from the memorandum of the meeting this obviously occurred because Trend enquired when this meeting should convene. Secondly, the FCO’s internal history on the ‘Year of Europe’ noted that British agreement to Kissinger’s offer was given during this meeting.⁴⁴

Within the British policy-making bureaucracy there was an element of disagreement (or misunderstanding) over the direction of British policy. Heath was opposed to US–UK bilateralism for solving matters concerning the EEC. Heath’s officials, however, had given the reverse impression to Kissinger, and this is a point which existing scholarship has crucially overlooked. British policy, as articulated to Kissinger, ran contrary to Heath’s wishes, and it was this contradiction in British policy that would contribute to the US–UK diplomatic furore throughout the summer of 1973.

Kissinger launched the 'Year of Europe' publicly on 23 April 1973 in a speech that had not even been seen by the State Department prior to its announcement.⁴⁵ Perhaps if it had, the speech writers would have worded his statements a little more delicately as the announcement for a 'Year of Europe' caused enormous offence in European capitals. Kissinger proposed that the US and the EEC would issue a Declaration of Principles which would institutionalise US–EEC relations. This would be achieved by interconnecting all aspects of US–EEC interaction in some type of formal document, which would then be signed by the respective leaders later in the year. Kissinger also envisaged that the 'Year of Europe' would encompass an overhaul of NATO's military structure. It is interesting to note that Kissinger's proposals had distinct similarities with earlier arguments he had made prior to obtaining office. Also, a National Security Council study memorandum, composed in July 1970, had many similarities. Kissinger's initiative appears, therefore, to have been the manifestation of his earlier thinking.⁴⁶

Kissinger's speech, however, contained a less than flattering analysis about the role Europe could play on the global stage. In private, Kissinger had described Europe as 'basically irrelevant' in shaping global events. The president and other senior US officials were also expressing similar sentiments.⁴⁷ Kissinger's analysis of Europe in his speech, while not as blunt as those espoused privately, did make it clear that Europe's interests were strictly regional whereas, in contrast, the US had global interests and responsibilities. Such insights, even if accurate, hardly created the ideal atmosphere for re-confirming Atlantic solidarity, or, more importantly, winning support for his proposals. As Kissinger retrospectively acknowledged, 'It may not have been wise to make reality explicit'.⁴⁸ Indeed, it appeared so and, as Raymond Garthoff has pointed out, 'The Europeans were not amused to be assigned a "year" by the Americans'.⁴⁹ This certainly applied to Heath, who was furious with Kissinger. 'For Henry Kissinger to announce a Year of Europe without consulting any of us was rather like my standing between the lions in Trafalgar Square and announcing that we were embarking on a year to save America,' Heath lambasted.⁵⁰ Another unnamed European official equated Kissinger's proposal as akin to an unfaithful husband's declaration of a 'year of the wife'.⁵¹

In spite of Heath's personal intransigence, Kissinger's proposal was given serious attention in British circles. Cromer sent his opinion to London, explaining that Kissinger wanted the declaration to produce substantive conclusions, rather than woolly phraseology. Britain would, thus, have to respond in this spirit and do so in a timely fashion, given that the US was eagerly awaiting the European response. Trend produced a similar analysis for the prime minister. As Trend advised Heath, despite its vague content and other shortcomings, 'it would not be in our interest to rebuff' Kissinger's proposals. As he further

warned the prime minister, the Nixon administration was attaching significant importance to this project, and the British would thus be wise to react accordingly.⁵² Indeed, few could be in any doubt as to the degree of importance Nixon was personally attaching to the 'Year of Europe' as he made it known to the media that he desired the Europeans to respond in the same spirit as that which greeted the Marshall Plan in 1947.⁵³

The president was soon to be disappointed by the European response. 'The speech is clearly an important one with a constructive intent' was the FCO's public reaction.⁵⁴ Privately within the FCO, a rather more cautious attitude was adopted. For the MOD, the proposals were welcome as long as the initiative brought real improvements to NATO. The majority of British scepticism emanated from the Treasury, which feared that an all-encompassing declaration would result in Kissinger exploiting Europe's reliance on US security guarantees to the economic advantage of the US. The Treasury was also nonplussed at the American initiative because it trampled over European efforts to coordinate EEC monetary policy. In April 1973, a European reserve fund had been established that was designed to streamline EEC monetary policy, yet Kissinger's ambition to seek US-EEC monetary reform would clearly challenge this.⁵⁵

The concern that the US would use its military contributions to Europe for economic gain was not unique to the Treasury. Senior policy-makers and officials across various departments, including the prime minister, were sceptical of establishing a single framework in which US-EEC relations should be conducted.⁵⁶ As Paul Lewis, the US editor for the *Financial Times*, perceptively noted:

Dr Kissinger clearly implies a connection between the economic concessions the US wants from the Common Market and its readiness to remain committed to Europe's defence – although this 'linkage' has always been opposed by the Europeans.⁵⁷

Though British officials differed with Kissinger on the substance of a Declaration of Principles, they had not rejected its creation. Instead, they wanted further negotiations on the subject. How this would be done created a problem for the prime minister. Heath wanted to fully consult his EEC partners about wider US-EEC negotiations. The obvious problem of pursuing such a course was that the EEC had no foreign minister who could undertake this task. Kissinger therefore proposed that the declaration could be negotiated bilaterally with individual EEC members, yet when Nixon had suggested such a course earlier in the year Heath had been against it. The prime minister's position appears not to have concerned Burke Trend all that much given that in May 1973 he

again expressed British interest in bilateral discussions. Trend did add some caveats to his support, warning that it would be difficult to persuade France to support Kissinger's ideas. As such, it was preferable for Kissinger alone to convince the French of his plans. Regardless, the fact remained that British officials had again indicated their support for Kissinger's bilateral approach in creating some sort of declaration.⁵⁸

What is curious about all of this is that Heath was being supplied with full briefings of the Trend–Kissinger meetings. Why then did the prime minister never instruct Trend to inform Kissinger of his true thinking regarding the creation of the declaration? Perhaps Heath simply never read the relevant papers. Alternatively, the prime minister could have felt it was a matter that was easily reconcilable. Maybe, however, Heath was happy for Trend to mislead Kissinger in order to avoid any recriminations. Whatever the reason behind this confusion, the point remained that Kissinger believed the UK was willing to operate bilaterally in establishing a declaration. Such evidence undermines arguments that it was the 'obsessive secrecy' of the Nixon administration that created US–UK misunderstandings throughout the 'Year of Europe'.⁵⁹ These arguments have largely accepted the accusations levelled at the Nixon administration by British officials at the time. Not surprisingly, these officials blamed their US counterparts for US–UK antagonism and failed to highlight how their own actions may have contributed to difficulties. On closer inspection of the documentary record, it becomes apparent that the British government's own bureaucratic inertia was just as instrumental in creating the US–UK misunderstanding.

British reversal

This Trend–Kissinger agreement collapsed in the following months and US–UK bilateral discussion on the declaration also came to a halt. Kissinger has suggested that British membership of the EEC explains this. According to Kissinger, the need to appear as a 'good European' resulted in Britain following the French, who had taken an extremely negative attitude towards the idea. US–UK bilateralism was therefore stopped to appease French wishes.⁶⁰ This argument is not without merit as the prime minister was certainly concerned with causing an Anglo–French dispute because of the 'Year of Europe' concept.⁶¹ The French factor was, however, just one determinant behind the British reversal in operating bilaterally with the US. Two fundamentally important reasons were also behind this reversal. First, Heath had never supported the bilateral approach and, secondly, British officials who gave their agreement to operate bilaterally in creating the declaration began to question Kissinger's

motives and decided bilateralism was a dangerous path to pursue. As the year progressed, Kissinger's declaration was no longer seen as an opportunity to reconfigure US–EEC relations, but rather as a device in which Kissinger could, at best, ensure American primacy within the alliance. At worse, it was seen as a US attempt to establish a new framework for US–EEC relations that would allow the US to dominate the nascent common foreign policy of the EEC and extract preferential economic treatment from the EEC.

In May 1973, Heath departed for Paris where he discussed the declaration with the French president, Georges Pompidou. French scepticism towards the project was evident and Pompidou even alleged it was a Kissinger ploy to 'divide and rule' the EEC. Less cynically, Pompidou suggested that it was designed to flatter the ego of President Nixon. Interestingly, Heath rejected this assessment and made a robust defence of the US-inspired 'Year of Europe' and then urged Pompidou to undertake the necessary preparatory measures so the project could seriously progress. Such appeals, however, made little impression upon the French president.⁶²

Subsequently, when Heath returned to London he convened a meeting of the European Unit. Here, the 'Year of Europe', France's attitude, and the likely consequences for British interests were discussed at length. After much deliberation, the prime minister concluded that the British tactic would be to 'lie low'. Only once Pompidou's meeting with Nixon (scheduled for 30 May to 1 June 1973 in Reykjavik) was finished could a firm British response to the 'Year of Europe' proposals be put forward.⁶³ This, then, was the beginning of the British decision to reverse bilateral cooperation with the US over the 'Year of Europe'.

Following the US–Franco summit in Reykjavik, the French foreign minister Michel Jobert publicly rejected Kissinger's desired procedural process for creating a declaration.⁶⁴ For Heath this was troublesome, as he realised that any sort of US–French confrontation over the 'Year of Europe' was likely to force the British to 'take sides' and harm British interests. Heath, therefore, came to the conclusion that the best way to safeguard the British position was to react with a non-reaction. Consequently, London informed Washington that it would take no further action until this US–Franco disagreement had been resolved.⁶⁵ Jobert's public announcement also scuppered the ambitions of Trend and Brimelow. They had accepted the idea that US–UK working groups should be established to work on draft versions of the declaration but following Jobert's *démarche*, this idea was scrapped. Clearly, British policy was being influenced by France and, as Alistair Noble has rightly suggested, the 'British were anxious to demonstrate their European credentials'.⁶⁶

In London, deliberation about the next course of action was the order of the day. Advice provided by Trend and the FCO still suggested that the British should react positively to Kissinger's 'Year of Europe' proposals, and that they

needed to go some way to producing a draft version of the Declaration of Principles. As such, the British should ask Kissinger to provide them with a draft version of the declaration, from which they would then consult with West Germany and produce a response. Once UK–West German consultation had been completed, the two would then present their response to France, and from here tripartite discussions could commence and produce a unified European response to the ‘Year of Europe’.⁶⁷

The prime minister partially accepted this advice and instructed his officials to obtain a draft of the declaration from the US, which would then be discussed with the West Germans. However, Heath added the caveat that Britain should try to create two separate declarations which would specifically separate economic and security matters.⁶⁸ Unfortunately for the British, this plan quickly came unstuck, because the discussion of the draft declaration with the US and West Germans was to remain secret – yet, unbeknownst to the prime minister, the French had learned of these discussions. Thus, a rather embarrassing situation for Heath developed when he met with Jobert on 2 July 1973, and the French foreign minister made it clear that he knew of the UK–US–West German efforts to create a declaration, and that he was unhappy with the situation. Indeed, it appears as if a rather acrimonious discussion took place between Heath and Jobert, leaving the British in no doubt that the French were not prepared to establish a declaration in this fashion, and, moreover, the French even suggested that the creation of any declaration was unnecessary.⁶⁹ In spite of Jobert’s reaction, the British decided that they would seek to win his support for the declaration later that month but they were simply wasting their time as Jobert again rebuffed any talk of creating a declaration. Added to this, the French remained angry with the British for trying to move forward with the ‘Year of Europe’ in a manner that would emphasise US–UK bilateralism. In their assessment, all of the members of the EEC had to act in unison, and would all have to be properly consulted before any progress towards creating a Declaration of Principles could be made.⁷⁰

Heath’s policy was now broken. He had sought to produce two declarations that would explicitly separate economic and security issues but, by attempting to push the process forward by engaging in US–UK and UK–West German bilateralism, he had attracted the scorn of France. With Heath’s policy ruined, he altered course and decided that bilateralism could no longer continue and that the EEC would have to act as a collective. Consequently, Heath outlined to Nixon that US–UK bilateral discussions pertaining to the declaration would be transmitted to all EEC member states. Furthermore, UK–EEC discussion on the declaration would remain private, i.e. out of the purview of the US.⁷¹ Heath had therefore effectively closed down the US–UK path for establishing the declaration.

In part, Heath was driven to this because he wanted to lessen French antagonism towards Britain. Heath also realised it would have been superfluous to have presented a US–UK agreement to France if it was likely to be rejected out of hand. The prime minister was, therefore, attempting to convince the French of the merits of the declaration, and from here a common EEC response to the US initiative could be given.⁷² This does not, however, explain the entire situation. Heath, along with other senior policy-makers and officials, suspected from the outset of 1973 that the US could be tempted to extract preferential economic terms from the EEC by exploiting its continuing security commitments to Europe.⁷³ These deep-rooted anxieties began to come into the open as the year continued.

British policy-makers pointed to a number of actions in Kissinger's behaviour that suggested his policy towards the EEC was less than altruistic, and that his diplomacy was designed to exploit the differences between the EEC member states for the gain of the US. For instance, Kissinger had informed the British that a draft version of the declaration had been made exclusively available to them. Heath was concerned that Kissinger was being less than frank with him and he was right to be suspicious as Kissinger had established backchannel communications with French and West German officials, and in this realm he was also providing them with 'exclusive' draft versions of the declaration.⁷⁴

Kissinger's rivalry with Secretary Rogers further contributed to British suspicions. Rogers contradicted Kissinger's claim that the Americans had not drafted different versions of the declaration, and had informed Douglas-Home that at least four competing versions existed. In contrast, Kissinger was claiming that he had only created one version of the declaration. Given this, it is easy to appreciate why the British reached the opinion that Kissinger was providing competing versions of the declaration to different countries in order to maximise his negotiating position.⁷⁵

This, then, was the background in which Burke Trend was to liaise with Kissinger at the end of July 1973. Trend should have expected that this meeting was likely to be uncomfortable, because four days prior to his arrival Nixon had despatched a scathing letter to Heath. In it Nixon had lamented Heath's decision to cancel US–UK bilateralism for creating the declaration and outlined a number of other areas where US–UK relations were becoming difficult.⁷⁶ In his memoirs, Kissinger described his meeting with Trend as a 'painful session'.⁷⁷ This was somewhat of an understatement because the meeting descended into near acrimony. Nixon had instructed Kissinger to give Trend 'my worst' if he 'was being difficult'.⁷⁸ As the record of the meeting suggests, Trend, in Kissinger's analysis, was presumably 'being difficult'.

In the actual meeting, Trend refused to provide Kissinger with FCO memorandums of UK–EEC discussions about the declaration. 'If old friends treated

the US Government like that, the US would deal with them as they did with Luxembourg,' Kissinger blasted. Kissinger continued with his warnings and explained that there would be 'major consequences' for the US–UK relationship if Heath insisted on making their bilateral conversations known to other EEC members.⁷⁹ This obviously had the desired effect because Trend, on a 'one time basis', handed the requested records to Kissinger.⁸⁰ That evening, Trend contacted Kissinger via telephone, and whilst the conversation was conciliatory in its tone, Kissinger's fundamental point, that US–UK bilateralism should be restored in order to create the declaration, remained. It was obvious now that whatever the intentions behind the 'Year of Europe', it had clearly turned 'into an adversary procedure'.⁸¹

Kissinger's behaviour in this meeting provoked a serious examination in British circles. Richard Sykes, who was present at the Kissinger–Trend encounter, sent his analysis to Thomas Brimelow and suggested that the pressure emanating from the Watergate scandal was forcing President Nixon to seek quick foreign policy successes. The slow British reaction towards the 'Year of Europe' had therefore angered the president and resulted in Kissinger's reaction.⁸² Given the domestic problems engulfing Nixon, this was not an unreasonable conclusion. Nevertheless, this analysis fundamentally missed the point that from Kissinger's perspective the British had agreed to bilaterally discuss and draft the declaration. The British had reneged on this, and this, therefore, was the real source of the US's irritation toward Britain.

One day after the Kissinger–Trend meeting, Kissinger noted the 'Year of Europe' could go into 'low gear'.⁸³ The sincerity of this is betrayed by Kissinger's actions and he was still determined to establish some sort of substantive agreements. Kissinger now altered his tactics and, instead of bemoaning the lack of US–UK cooperation, he enacted a series of measures to ensure a more amenable policy from the British. What should be remembered is that Kissinger's policy of producing a declaration which accepted linkage had not changed. What had altered was Kissinger's tactics in achieving this objective. In conversation with his staff, Kissinger made it clear that 'They [UK] can't milk us for everything in the name of special channel'.⁸⁴ Kissinger explained how he would now attempt to influence British policy. 'We are going to try to bust the Europeans. The French can be useful in this. We hit the British, ignore the French and deal with the Germans and Italians.' As Kissinger concluded, 'We must break up the Europeans'.⁸⁵

Hitting the British

As Nixon wrote in 1980, 'diplomacy can be used either as a sword or as a needle – as a weapon or an instrument of union'.⁸⁶ To influence British policy, the president took the 'sword' approach on this occasion. Similarly, America's other principal European allies were also to face the wrath of the Nixon administration. Kissinger apparently intimated that he would use his influence on Wall Street to 'wreck' the French economy, and threats of withdrawing US troops and curtailing military assistance to West Germany were also made.⁸⁷

How the British would be dealt with became clearer in the following weeks. The area in which the Americans decided to apply pressure concerned the closest area of the US–UK relationship, namely intelligence and nuclear weapons cooperation. The US thus suspended its existing intelligence and nuclear cooperation with the UK. 'I am cutting [Britain] off from intelligence special information they are getting here,' Kissinger informed the president. 'No more special relations,' Nixon agreed.⁸⁸

US–UK nuclear cooperation was the next area to be used by Kissinger as a means of influencing British foreign policy. Suspending nuclear cooperation was perhaps the most powerful tool in the US arsenal, because Britain depended significantly on US assistance with its Polaris force. For example, one report supplied to Heath (November 1970) suggested that, 'The British strategic deterrent is at present entirely dependent upon our continued access to US information and material'.⁸⁹ UK reliance was further exacerbated by the programme to update Polaris, as only the US would be able to provide the necessary technical cooperation for the timely and safe update to Polaris.⁹⁰

Given this obvious area of vulnerability, nuclear cooperation was the next area of US–UK cooperation that American policy-makers sought to utilise to bring about a change in British policy. First, James Schlesinger postponed a meeting with British officials regarding the upgrading of Polaris. Schlesinger cited his inability to review the necessary briefing material as he had only recently been appointed as secretary of defense, but in reality it was a plan concocted with Kissinger to pressure the British into engaging bilaterally over the declaration. At the end of the month, Schlesinger was still refusing to meet with the British about Polaris, and in spite of British officials being 'desperate' to ascertain the American position on whether Poseidon (the latest US Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile nuclear weapons system) would be sold to the UK, he refused to yield.⁹¹

Further to this, Kissinger also instructed US Treasury Secretary George Shultz to stop any special information being given to the British pertaining to ongoing monetary discussions. As he reasoned: 'I want to get your area synchronized with ours so that they [Britain] can't claim a special relationship

in one field and really put it to us in other fields'.⁹² In sum, under Kissinger's direction, US policy had created a coherent and coordinated response towards the UK's unwillingness to cooperate in regard to the 'Year of Europe' proposals. Kissinger had targeted the most sensitive areas of US–UK bilateralism to invoke a policy change in London, and in the following weeks this would come about.

Kissinger's actions got the desired effect from London and caused a considerable stir throughout British policy-making circles. Four meetings of the JIC were convened throughout August and September to discuss the American action. Other British officials hypothesised about American behaviour.⁹³ More importantly, the combined actions of Kissinger and Schlesinger had a significant impact on British policy as the British now took the 'lead' in trying to formulate the declaration with the EEC.⁹⁴ This saw the British engaging in active diplomacy with their EEC colleagues, especially France. Indeed, it was mooted as to what concessions Britain could offer to France in return for a more constructive attitude. Such efforts failed to shift French policy and Jobert made it clear that France would not be rushed into producing a draft declaration.⁹⁵

It has to be pointed out that since the outset of the 'Year of Europe' Heath had sought agreement with the US over the declaration and had made multiple attempts to convince the French to go along with the idea. Whilst US action hastened the British into trying to produce the declaration, it had not fundamentally altered what the British wanted to achieve. Most obviously, the British would still not agree that the declaration had to interlink all aspects of US–EEC interaction, and they still sought a declaration that explicitly separated economic and security aspects of the relationship.

Where US pressure on US–UK bilateral cooperation had its greatest success was in reversing Heath's decision to refuse to discuss the declaration bilaterally. Heath's other policy, to provide full records of US–UK discussions on the declaration to the EEC, was also dropped. Indeed, a total reversal of British policy was enacted; but it also went further. The British now briefed the US on their discussions with EEC members about the declaration. This was undertaken by Richard Sykes who met with Helmut Sonnenfeldt and informed him about British intentions towards the upcoming EEC conference in Copenhagen. Sykes articulated that this was being done as Heath wanted to 'maintain a firm bilateral relationship'. Heath had written to Nixon declaring his intention to maintain 'close' bilateral contact, and this was evidently the manifestation of this desire.⁹⁶

By the beginning of September 1973, the EEC was reaching some limited decisions on the contents of the declaration. For example, it was decided to establish a spokesperson for the EEC who would then act as the main representative for US–EEC interaction. However, even this ran afoul of Washington given that, earlier in the year, Kissinger had shown his opposition towards such an idea, and this latest announcement only soured his opinion further.⁹⁷

Nevertheless, some positive progress did also appear to be developing as the EEC announced how the declaration would be completed procedurally and what it would (provisionally) contain. Such was the speed of this that a draft version of the declaration was delivered to the US on 19 September 1973.⁹⁸

Though the EEC had produced this draft in a relatively short space of time, Kissinger was far from pleased with it and, during his meeting with Douglas-Home on 24 September 1973, he made his displeasure known.⁹⁹ During this meeting Kissinger was extremely forthright in bemoaning the conduct of both the EEC and the British throughout the previous months, and complained that 'It was worse than dealing with the Soviets'. Douglas-Home refused to engage in reprisals and instead claimed that the US and UK fundamentally agreed that a declaration needed to be created. Where the two countries differed was in how this would be achieved procedurally.¹⁰⁰ Douglas-Home was being disingenuous, given that a fundamental difference with Kissinger did exist. The UK did not want US–EEC relations to be institutionalised according to the American concept of linkage. Moreover, their enthusiasm for the project had only been reignited following the coercive diplomacy enacted by the US against key British interests.

At the end of Douglas-Home's visit, US officials began to evaluate the contents of the EEC's draft declaration. Sonnenfeldt informed Kissinger that it was 'sound' in places, but in others it was 'ludicrous'.¹⁰¹ The EEC draft explicitly separated economic, political and security issues, which clearly contradicted Kissinger's intention to interconnect such areas. Moreover, it indicated that US bilateral pressure upon the UK and wider EEC had failed to convince them that this should be applied to US–EEC relations.¹⁰² Whilst differences in substance still persisted over the declaration, the EEC had shown itself willing to negotiate and further progress in creating the declaration took place in the latter half of September 1973. Events in the Middle East, however, would come to intercede in the creation of the declaration. The differences which emanated from this would threaten to cause lasting damage to the US–UK relationship.

The nadir for US–UK relations

On 6 October 1973, war broke out between Israel and the axis of Egypt–Syria. US intelligence was largely caught unawares by the outbreak of war. As Ray S. Cline, the director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, opined, US intelligence assessments had been 'brainwashed by the Israelis', who in turn had 'brainwashed themselves' into believing that the Arab states would not launch a pre-emptive strike.¹⁰³ British intelligence was equally poor. One day prior to the war, Sir Philip Adams, UK ambassador to Cairo, reported

that Egyptian military moves were not indicative of preparations for war. As he informed London, 'There has been no, repeat, no, evidence of panic here or offensive intentions.'¹⁰⁴ As subsequent events showed, this assessment was somewhat inaccurate.

On a number of distinct issues US and UK interpretations on how to respond to the conflict clashed. The first area of US–UK debate revolved around the use of British airbases in Cyprus for reconnaissance overflights of the warzone. The second concerned how a ceasefire should be negotiated within the UNSC. The US airlift to Israel was to be the third area of US–UK antagonism. The final point related to the US DEFCON III decision of 25 October 1973.

That US and UK policy differed was perhaps to be expected given that their respective policies towards the Middle East had often clashed since the beginning of the Cold War. With Heath coming to office this only continued, and his ambition of resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict caused further US–UK disagreement. Heath had signalled his intention to find a resolution to the Arab–Israeli conflict soon after assuming office and this solution, as Douglas-Home publicly declared in October 1970 during a speech at Harrogate, would be based on the general contours of UN Resolution 242. Briefly summarised, this meant that Israel would have to surrender the land it had occupied following its victory in the 1967 Six Day War.¹⁰⁵ Given Nixon's 'even-handed' policy towards the Arab–Israeli dispute, there should have been little problem in supporting Heath's approach. Indeed, William Rogers's peace proposals, dubbed the 'Rogers Plan', were largely in line with Heath's own thinking. However, it was soon apparent that Nixon was undermining his secretary of state's ambitions, and in 1971 Nixon authorised a large-scale military shipment for Israel and little pressure was placed upon Israel to reach an agreement with its Arab neighbours. By 1972–73, Nixon had, in real terms, dropped the Rogers Plan and was pursuing a more traditional pro-Israeli policy.¹⁰⁶

When conflict erupted in October 1973, longer-term political differences, coupled with recent US–UK antagonism, were likely to see relations strained.¹⁰⁷ This said, shorter-term problems were, from Kissinger's perspective at least, immaterial and the seriousness of the conflict meant US–UK differences had to be put to one side.¹⁰⁸ Events would show this not to be the case, and US–UK discord was obvious from the outset. This stemmed from longer-term differences towards implementing a lasting political settlement in the region, and shorter-term difficulties contributed to a suspicious atmosphere towards each other's policy objectives. Fundamentally, however, US and UK policies were seeking competing objectives. Heath wished to remain 'neutral' throughout the conflict as this would safeguard British oil supplies, and he wanted to find a lasting political solution that would largely endorse UN Resolution 242. The US, under Kissinger's direction, saw things differently. According to

Kissinger's thinking, the war presented an opportunity for a lasting political settlement that would predominantly exclude the USSR from the region. It was this competing idea then, on how a lasting Arab–Israeli settlement would be created, which really led to severe US–UK animosity.¹⁰⁹

The ceasefire

When fighting broke out in the Middle East, policy-makers in Washington and London expected a swift Israeli victory. Indicative of this is the fact that during a meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), convened on 6 October 1973, all of the advice proffered suggested that Israel would achieve a rapid military victory.¹¹⁰ Thus, for Nixon and Kissinger, the biggest concern was that the USSR would intervene to prevent a military humiliation of its Arab allies. Events soon showed that believing an easy Israeli victory would come about was misplaced. Rather than Israel turning the Syrian front into a 'turkey shoot', it was the Israelis who found they were retreating across the Golan Heights.¹¹¹

The information coming out of the region was unclear and, to better determine the balance of the conflict, the United States Air Force (USAF) wanted to undertake reconnaissance overflights of the warzone. British airbases in Cyprus were ideally situated geographically to launch such overflights, and a request was put to the Heath government to utilise these facilities. The British deliberated this request at length and various ideas were put forward. It was suggested that if the flights could remain secret, or at least plausible deniability could be ensured, then approval should be given. Heath remained reluctant because he suspected that the US would provide the Israelis with the intelligence gathered from these reconnaissance overflights. Of course, this would have undermined his efforts to remain neutral during the conflict and he therefore refused to grant approval for the American request.¹¹²

In spite of this early warning sign that British policy would not be amenable to US requests, Kissinger refused to take heed. Now the US secretary of state sought assistance from the British in the UNSC. Kissinger proposed that the British table a ceasefire resolution in the UNSC, which would call for a ceasefire and a return to the status quo ante bellum.¹¹³ London was less than enthusiastic with Kissinger's idea and, when he had initially suggested this course to Lord Cromer, British reluctance was evident. Indeed, the British ambassador rejected Kissinger's offer because British information indicated that the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, would reject such ceasefire proposals. Kissinger was unwilling to demur, and again he contacted Cromer and attempted to convince him of his ceasefire plan. Kissinger guaranteed that

Egypt would accept a ceasefire resolution if it was tabled by Britain. Cromer relented and suggested that it was 'well worth the effort' if Egypt would agree to such terms.¹¹⁴

Cromer reported his conversations with Kissinger to London.¹¹⁵ Kissinger's argument that Egypt would agree to a ceasefire that insisted on a return to the status quo ante bellum ran in contradiction to the information received from the British ambassador to Cairo, Philip Adams. Accordingly, Douglas-Home ordered Adams to meet with Sadat, in order to learn his real position about ceasefire terms. Adams duly reported on his discussions and confirmed that Sadat would not accept a ceasefire which insisted on a return to the status quo ante bellum.¹¹⁶

On 13 October 1973, Heath convened a meeting at Chequers where the war was discussed in detail. Maintaining Britain's oil supply was clearly at the top of his agenda, and he reasoned that the current tactic of neutrality assured that the British government could not be accused of being pro-Israeli and would hopefully prevent any possible oil embargo by the Arab states being enacted against the British. Coupled with this, it was also apparent that Kissinger's ceasefire proposal was viewed as either some sort of 'trick' or as a means of preserving superpower détente. Again, British anxiety towards Kissinger's real foreign policy intentions surfaced and it was concluded that Britain would not table any ceasefire resolution proposing a return to the status quo ante bellum. In the UNSC, Kissinger's ceasefire proposal had effectively collapsed.¹¹⁷

The airlift to Israel proved to be the third area which witnessed US-UK disagreement. At the onset of hostilities, the Israelis had lobbied the Americans for military aid, but this had been met coolly in Washington. As Schlesinger had warned during the WSAG of 6 October 1973, 'Our shipping any stuff into Israel blows any image we may have as an honest broker.'¹¹⁸ Consequently, Israeli demands for F-4 Phantom II fighter jets and M60 tanks were rebuffed.¹¹⁹ Agreement was given, however, to re-supply Israel with ammunition, but even this was conditioned on the fact that Israel had to provide its own airliners to pick it up. Three days into the fighting, Israel had endured serious military losses, with a total of over 250 tanks and 49 fighter jets being lost. The Israeli ambassador in Washington, Simcha Dinitz, consequently stepped up his lobbying for American assistance and this was partially successful because Nixon agreed to supply five F-4 Phantom IIs. Crucially, the stipulation that Israel had to provide its own transportation remained, thus allowing the Americans to retain the impression that they were not directly re-supplying Israel.¹²⁰

This created a dilemma for Kissinger. His entire response to the conflict was driven by his overarching ambition of excluding the USSR from the region, and designed so that all of the belligerents realised that only the US could establish a lasting political settlement. As such, the ceasefire proposal was built upon the

proviso that Israel would, at the very least, be militarily dominant on the Syrian front, because this would ensure the Arab states would be willing to negotiate. As Kissinger put it: 'Our interests are not identical with Israel's. We want Israel to win so the Arabs will turn to us.'¹²¹ As such, American involvement in re-supplying Israel had to be kept to a minimum so as to present an image to Egypt and Syria that the US was not seeking to advance Israel's position at their expense. This would enable the US to appear as an 'honest broker' and assume the position of kingmaker in any political settlement. Unfortunately for the US secretary of state, military events on the ground would intercede and made such an approach impossible to pursue.¹²²

Events in the war soon led to further Israeli calls for US assistance. An Israeli counter-attack on the Syrian front had ground to a halt because of a lack of equipment, and now they demanded that the US re-supply them directly via airlift. With Israeli calls becoming more vehement for a re-supply, Washington was forced into making a decision.¹²³ Whilst Kissinger remained reluctant, Schlesinger advised Nixon that the US undertake the re-supply with its own transport planes. The US secretary of defense suspected that if the US refused to provide Israel with the needed material it could well be militarily defeated. In turn, this could lead Israel into being tempted to utilise its nuclear arsenal to ensure its security.¹²⁴ Making an Israeli military defeat more likely was the fact that the USSR was re-supplying both Egypt and Syria.¹²⁵ Nixon understood that supplying Israel with any sort of material would attract criticism, so he concluded that the US may as well supply Israel with what it actually required to win the war. As Nixon simply put it: 'You'll get as much blame for three [aircraft] as for twenty-five ... Do what will do the job.'¹²⁶ Thus, the president ordered a full re-supply via airlift for Israel.

The airlift was to act as the catalyst for the third schism in US–UK relations. With the president ordering an open airlift to Israel, the question of how this would be conducted had to be determined. The USAF wanted to use its transport planes from European airfields, because this would both shorten the flight time to the warzone and increase flight safety. This request was to prove problematic for the British as agreeing to it would clearly undermine Heath's policy of neutrality. The likelihood that Britain would agree that US aircraft could re-supply Israel from its airbases, given the earlier refusal to even allow reconnaissance overflights from British bases in Cyprus, was therefore slim. Heath had demonstrated his desire to remain neutral when he had refused to support Kissinger's cease-fire proposal in the UNSC, and had also refused to supply ammunition and spare parts for British-made Israeli Centurion tanks. Walter Annenberg was surely correct then to inform Washington that a US request to use the US airbase at Mildenhall would be rejected. As Kissinger wrote, 'There was never a formal refusal on the airlift because it had been made plain that we should not ask.'¹²⁷

Nuclear alert

The collapsed ceasefire proposal and the refusal of the British to acquiesce in the airlift deeply irritated key policy-makers in Washington.¹²⁸ However irksome this was, it was a matter that need not have resulted in a great US–UK quarrel. Testament to this was the fact that Kissinger dismissed using US–UK nuclear cooperation as a form of leverage in obtaining a more amenable British policy.¹²⁹ At this juncture, Kissinger did not feel that US–UK political disagreement warranted such a stern US reaction. In the following days this was to change because of US–UK differences over the US response to a letter received by the Soviet premier, Leonid Brezhnev. The US decision to move their military, including their nuclear arsenal, to a heightened state of alert, DEFCON III, was to prove deleterious for US–UK relations.

With both superpowers now openly airlifting material to their respective allies, a further round of diplomatic activity was undertaken which saw Kissinger flying to Moscow, Tel Aviv and London for various talks.¹³⁰ A ceasefire agreement was the result of these efforts but, once back in Washington, Kissinger found his brokered ceasefire had already begun to crumble. After a further round of diplomacy, UN Resolution 339 was passed, which insisted a ceasefire be enacted along an unspecified line and for a UN observer force to be despatched to the region.¹³¹

Whilst the diplomacy was being acted out, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) had surrounded the Egyptian Third Army. Sadat realised that his army was on the verge of destruction, and even more worrying was that, if the Third Army collapsed, the road to Cairo was open for the IDF.¹³² Consequently, Sadat despatched a letter to Nixon which called for direct US intervention to implement the ceasefire. Sadat went as far as to suggest: 'I am formally asking you to intervene effectively, even if that necessitates the use of forces, in order to guarantee the full implementation of the ceasefire resolution in accordance with the joint US–USSR agreement.'¹³³ The Egyptian leader was to be disappointed because Nixon's reply made it clear that the US would not despatch military forces to establish the ceasefire.¹³⁴

Kissinger, meanwhile, was concerned that Sadat would reach out to the USSR and offer the same terms as those suggested to the US. As Kissinger lamented to the Israeli ambassador, Simcha Dinitz, 'if the Soviets put some divisions in there then you will have outsmarted yourselves'.¹³⁵ As Kissinger feared, Sadat did just this and asked the USSR to deploy forces into the region to prevent the further destruction of his military. This now led to a series of telegrams between the US and USSR which gradually became more confrontational in their tone.¹³⁶ On 24 October 1973, Brezhnev delivered a letter which requested that a joint US–Soviet force be despatched to the region. As Brezhnev

wrote: 'Let us together, the Soviet Union and the United States, urgently dispatch to Egypt Soviet and American contingents, with their mission the implementation of the decision of the Security Council of August 22 and 23...' ¹³⁷ More vital yet, Brezhnev outlined that: 'I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally.' ¹³⁸

Historians have debated whether or not this letter should have been interpreted as a Soviet threat to deploy forces into the region and much ambiguity still clouds what motivated Brezhnev to send this letter to Nixon. ¹³⁹ Regardless, in Washington at least, Brezhnev's letter was viewed as a Soviet notice to invade the Middle East, with Kissinger explaining to Alexander Haig, now the president's chief of staff, that he had 'just had a letter from Brezhnev asking us to send forces in together or he would send them in alone'. ¹⁴⁰ At the time, other US policy-makers had reached a similarly dark conclusion, with Admiral Thomas Moorer, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, describing Brezhnev's letter a 'real piss-swisher'. ¹⁴¹

A meeting of the WSAG was thus convened to decide the US response. Kissinger chaired the meeting and it was here that it was decided that US forces should be placed onto a heightened state of military alert: DEFCON III. ¹⁴² Along with this, the US moved two of its aircraft carriers closer to the conflict zone, placed on alert its troops in Europe, alerted the 82nd Airborne Division, and recalled a number of its strategic bombers from the Pacific region. ¹⁴³ 'Words were not making our point – we needed action, even the shock of a military alert,' Nixon retrospectively argued. ¹⁴⁴

Given Nixon's domestic problems, the decision to move to DEFCON III can, perhaps, be viewed as an offshoot of this. Kissinger would note in conversation with Alexander Haig that US domestic troubles were having a bearing on the course of US foreign policy. More importantly, Kissinger believed that the actions of the USSR were being driven by Nixon's weakening domestic position. As he remarked, 'You cannot be sure how much of this is due to our domestic crises'. ¹⁴⁵ Aside from this, there was an overarching concern that the USSR would commit troops to the Middle East, and from the outset of the conflict it had been US policy to marginalise the USSR from the Middle East. Agreeing to a joint US–Soviet task force would have contradicted this objective. As Odd Arne Westad has correctly pointed out, *détente* had its limitations vis-à-vis US–Soviet cooperation. ¹⁴⁶ Or, as Anatoly Dobrynin more bluntly noted: 'The rivalry would remain. *Détente* had its limits.' ¹⁴⁷

America's European allies were not informed, much less consulted, on the decision to move US nuclear forces to DEFCON III. As one newspaper exclaimed, the NATO alliance had been 'kept in the dark'. ¹⁴⁸ This has long been believed

to have applied to the UK as well.¹⁴⁹ Whilst the WSAG may not have consulted with the British on moving to DEFCON III, Kissinger did inform Cromer about the decision. Kissinger made a point in showing how privileged Britain was to receive this information, as Cromer was the only European ambassador informed about the contents of the Brezhnev letter that had sparked the DEFCON III alert.¹⁵⁰ Cromer failed, however, to convey this message to London prior to the DEFCON III move having become public knowledge. Quite why this happened is unclear, and the seriousness of this led Heath to order an inquiry into why this had occurred. Whatever the cause, Heath was never informed prior to the US move becoming public knowledge, but this was the result of London's bureaucratic failings.¹⁵¹

Kissinger had, therefore, informed the British of the DEFCON III move, and in doing so he also requested Britain's 'very strong support'.¹⁵² The fact remained, however, that the prime minister believed the American military moves had been undertaken without prior warning, and he therefore publicly rebuked the American action.¹⁵³ This hardly accorded with the 'very strong support' Kissinger had sought. The move was also viewed with trepidation in London, and MPs in the House of Commons went as far as to cast aspersions about the mental stability of President Nixon.¹⁵⁴ While the foreign secretary dismissed these claims, his own ambassador to Washington was filing reports that expressed the very same thing!¹⁵⁵

Events would fortunately see superpower confrontation averted. Moscow picked up the American military moves, and Nixon had also sent a conciliatory note to Brezhnev on 25 October 1973. Together these convinced the Soviet leader that he should retract his statement to despatch Soviet forces to the conflict zone. The UNSC thus agreed that a 'police force' could be sent to the region, but it would not be allowed to consist of any troops from the United States, USSR, UK or France, and with this agreement in place the spectre of an immediate US–Soviet confrontation abated.¹⁵⁶

For US–UK relations, events in the Middle East had led to a number of acrimonious altercations. However, the fact that the British attempted to distance themselves from US policy should hardly have come as a surprise. On the first day of the conflict, Kissinger had been warned that Britain (and other Western European states) would 'dissociate themselves from the US in order to insure access to Arab oil'.¹⁵⁷ Likewise, during the WSAG of 6 October 1973, William Simon, William Colby and James Schlesinger had all suggested that the European states would be hit hardest by an oil embargo and would 'begin to scream' if one were to be enacted.¹⁵⁸ Nonetheless, Kissinger thought that the UK would support US actions, but events proved that this was not to be the case. The UK had not acted in the fashion Kissinger expected and, moreover, he believed he had been personally let down by the course of British policy. In his

estimation, the British were ‘jackals’ who had ruined his UN ceasefire proposals at the beginning of the conflict.¹⁵⁹

The information Kissinger obtained later on only confirmed his negative view of British policy, because he learned that the British ambassador in Cairo, Phillip Adams, had actively scuppered his efforts at introducing a ceasefire over the course of 12–13 October 1973.¹⁶⁰ British opposition to the airlift and nuclear alert had also demonstrated a frustrating degree of opposition to American policy. As a result of this, Kissinger – after prompting from Schlesinger – wanted to ‘reconsider our European policy’.¹⁶¹ For US–UK relations this even touched the ‘most special’ area of the relationship, that of intelligence cooperation. As William Colby stated in the WSAG convened to discuss American Middle East policy, ‘they [UK] can’t have a special relationship with us and do what they are doing’.¹⁶² Kissinger evidently concurred, as he again temporarily ordered a suspension of US–UK intelligence cooperation.¹⁶³

In London, Heath believed that Nixon’s domestic problems had driven the US decision to move to DEFCON III, which, in turn, was seen as a grossly disproportionate reaction to the situation.¹⁶⁴ Perhaps the prime minister was correct to think that domestic politics had played a part in the decision. However, he failed to grasp that US policy was determined to exclude the USSR from the region, and US actions were conditioned in pursuit of this ambition. Regardless, Heath was nonplussed by American actions and was determined to ascertain why the US had employed the tactics they had. He therefore ordered the JIC assessment staff and the FCO to analyse US conduct throughout the war. When both of these reported, they only endorsed the prime minister’s earlier thinking that the American response had been overblown, and was driven by the domestic problems engulfing the president.¹⁶⁵

The allure of oil

As a means of influencing international support against Israel, several of the Arab oil-producing states enacted an oil embargo following the outbreak of the fourth Arab–Israeli war. As one author has noted, the oil embargo ‘threatened the unity and prosperity of the West’.¹⁶⁶ Likewise, the repercussions of the oil embargo threatened to deal a permanent blow to the US–UK relationship. The Washington Energy Conference, convened in February 1974 to solve this oil crisis, was also seen by Washington as an opportunity to confront French leadership of the nascent common foreign policy of the EEC. The UK was seen as useful in achieving such ambitions, and by applying pressure upon British policy-makers – in the guise of threatening a permanent severance in US security commitments to Europe unless support for US-inspired oil plans

were made, and threatening to outbid all competitors for spare oil, thus forcing its price higher – Kissinger believed the British would break with competing French ideas towards the oil conference. As events would demonstrate, this was an astute assessment.

For the Heath government, the severity of the oil embargo and the decisions taken to solve it served as a seminal moment in the foreign policy of his government. As the energy conference illustrated, Heath was able to work intimately with Washington in order to safeguard British security and economic interests. This approach, however, critically undermined his wider foreign policy of operating collectively within the framework of the EEC. Ultimately, therefore, Heath sacrificed his wider European ambitions to secure British interests, thus demonstrating the pragmatism inherent within his approach to foreign policy.

Such an argument, however, must be carefully qualified. US foreign policy at the Washington Energy Conference was not seeking to dominate EEC foreign policy, and such allegations are over-exaggerated and are not actually grounded in documentary evidence.¹⁶⁷ Certainly, Kissinger was in a combative mood towards the European states and was not prepared – as he put it – to ‘keep financing them’ because they continued ‘screwing us in the Middle East’.¹⁶⁸ Nonetheless, this only explains a part of Kissinger’s overarching approach towards the ongoing energy crisis. Rather, US policy was built around the premise that EEC foreign policy could no longer be dominated by French Gaullist ideas, which the Americans believed would take an anti-American agenda. It would also guarantee that Kissinger’s evolving Middle East diplomacy would not be undercut by any Euro–Arab dialogue that had emerged following the outbreak of the October War.¹⁶⁹

Likewise, British policy at the Washington Energy Conference must be carefully explained. Only reluctantly did the Heath government accept US demands for collective consumer action in response to the oil embargo. The break with France at the energy conference was something that Heath only endorsed once it became apparent that they would not agree to collective consumer action, which would, in his estimation, result in the price of oil rising steeply and do untold damage to both the British economy and his political position. Once Heath had decided upon this course (by mid-January 1974), he showed once again that he was quickly able to engage in close US–UK contact in order to secure his objectives.

Heath had long been concerned about the West’s increasing dependency upon Middle East oil, and he rightly suspected that the Arab states would, in the fullness of time, seek to gain control over their oil reserves. Moreover, he believed a future Arab–Israeli war would cause severe disruption to Western oil supplies.¹⁷⁰ Such fears were soon realised once the fourth Arab–Israeli war broke out as, on 16 October 1973, Arab oil-producing states increased

the per barrel price of oil from \$3.01 to \$5.12. At the Kuwait City summit on 17 October 1973, the Arab oil producers announced a reduction in oil production of 5 per cent per month. This would continue until an Arab–Israeli settlement predicated upon UN Resolution 242 was achieved. The Arab oil producers further announced that only ‘friendly’ countries could purchase oil. This status would only be afforded to states that demonstrated their commitment to finding an Arab–Israeli settlement according to UN Resolution 242.¹⁷¹

This created a myriad of problems for Heath as, in comparison to the US, Britain relied much more upon the continued supply of Arab oil. For instance, over 60 per cent of Britain’s petroleum usage was sourced from the Arab states.¹⁷² Escalating oil prices also harmed Britain’s balance of payments position, and not only was this economically deleterious for Britain, but for the prime minister it was also becoming a political liability.¹⁷³ Because of the potential for an oil shortage, Heath asked the British public to curb their energy use. This even involved a plea that British households limit their heating use to one room! Petrol rationing was seriously debated within the Cabinet, and it was eventually decided to implement speed restrictions on British roads as a means to conserve British petroleum reserves. For Heath, then, the oil embargo was as much a domestic as an international issue.¹⁷⁴

On 6 November 1973, the EEC declared that it would seek to find a resolution to the Arab–Israeli conflict according to UN Resolution 242, which Heath fully endorsed. As he argued, it was essential to support this so as to prevent the oil embargo being applied to Britain. On one level, Heath’s decision was a success given that Britain was categorised as a ‘friendly’ nation and thus ensured the right to continue purchasing Arab oil. Further, on 18 November 1973, the Arab oil-producing states met in Vienna where it was announced that, in ‘appreciation’ of the EEC’s position, the 5 per cent cutback in oil production that was supposed to begin at the end of that month would be postponed. Heath’s tactics had ensured Britain retained access to Arab oil, both safeguarding oil access and preventing further damage to the British economy.¹⁷⁵

The prime minister’s actions were not without wider consequences, and for US–UK relations his decisions had a deeply negative impact. British support for the EEC declaration irritated Washington and, retrospectively, Kissinger would describe Heath’s decision as ‘horrible’.¹⁷⁶ Cromer was next to face Kissinger’s wrath, and throughout November Kissinger levelled his dissatisfaction with British policy on at least three occasions.¹⁷⁷ Schlesinger also lent his weight to Kissinger’s complaints and during a meeting of NATO representatives he accused Britain of ‘decayed Gaullism’.¹⁷⁸ Privately, American assessments were even more scathing. In Schlesinger’s estimation, the British

had demonstrated throughout the entire Middle East crisis that they were simply 'incompetent'. For Kissinger, the British had acted like 'shits'.¹⁷⁹

By the end of November, Kissinger was declaring that the 'special relationship' was collapsing. With a touch of flamboyance, Kissinger warned Cromer that if British policy was to be antagonistic towards the US then, 'This was the worst decision since the Greek city states confronted Alexander'.¹⁸⁰ Kissinger also had a policy paper drawn up that analysed various avenues for punishing the British. The paper concluded that long-term punishment was inadvisable because it would only damage US interests. While accepting this, Kissinger decided that a short-term punishment was necessary, and thus decided to once again halt US–UK intelligence cooperation.¹⁸¹

Kissinger's ferocious response can be explained by the fact that British actions appeared to undermine his efforts to find a long-term Arab–Israeli settlement. At this point, the US secretary of state was engaged in his Middle East 'shuttle diplomacy' and was attempting to find an agreement on which Israel would withdraw from the lands it had occupied during the latter stages of the recent war. While this was ongoing, the British – along with their EEC partners – had publicly articulated that UN Resolution 242 should be the basis of any final Arab–Israeli settlement (thus Israel would have to withdraw from the land it had occupied in the Six Day War in 1967). Given this, it was hardly unreasonable for Kissinger to conclude that this public diplomacy was going to undermine his own efforts. Moreover, Kissinger had no intention of finding an agreement according to UN Resolution 242, because in his assessment it was simply impractical to expect Israel to accept such conditions; he privately referred to such demands as a 'joke'.¹⁸² More importantly, Sadat was also making it known to the US secretary of state that this was an unnecessary precondition for Egypt to agree to a lasting political settlement. Given this, in Kissinger's opinion, European efforts – via their 'Euro–Arab' dialogue – to implement UN Resolution 242 only complicated his efforts to establish a ceasefire agreement and find a permanent political solution.¹⁸³

While Kissinger continued to broker an Arab–Israeli agreement, the Arab oil ministers met in Kuwait. Here, they decreed that the 5 per cent cuts which they had cancelled for December 1973 would be re-imposed upon those states which 'don't provide concrete evidence of friendliness such as by showing they are putting pressure on the United States or Israel'.¹⁸⁴ This was a clear signal to the European powers that continued access to oil was conditioned upon their efforts to convince the US secretary of state to seek an Arab–Israeli settlement according to UN Resolution 242. The dilemma facing Heath was therefore clear: if access to Arab oil was to continue, the separate policy initiative towards an Arab–Israeli settlement would have to continue. This, however, would run the risk of infuriating the US further.¹⁸⁵

Even though Britain enjoyed the right to purchase Arab oil, it still had to absorb the price increase – which was particularly unpalatable given the worsening state of Britain's economy. For Heath, the oil embargo could not have struck at a more inopportune moment, given that the ongoing miners' strike was restricting the amount of coal (still Britain's largest source of energy) available at the very moment that Britain's second largest source of energy, oil, was undergoing extreme price increases. This was having a ruinous effect upon Britain's industrial and social well-being, not to mention the negative effect it was having upon Heath's political popularity. These domestic reasons alone meant that from Heath's viewpoint it was imperative to find some sort of solution to the oil embargo.¹⁸⁶

From the perspective of the US, the status quo was also undesirable given that it was faced with a full Arab oil embargo, and that bilateral oil deals were forcing the price of oil that it could purchase even higher. For instance, oil from Nigeria was commanding around \$17 per barrel, and Japan was purchasing oil from Egypt at just over \$10 per barrel. To place this in context, at the outset of October 1973 oil was trading at just over \$3 per barrel. The price of oil had, therefore, at least trebled in less than three months.¹⁸⁷

Given these circumstances, it was no exaggeration when Nixon declared that the US faced an energy crisis in November 1973. To overcome this, Nixon launched 'Project Independence' which would seek to make the US energy self-sufficient by 1980.¹⁸⁸ Such was the seriousness of the situation that US policy-makers even discussed a possible invasion of the Middle East in order to secure the oil fields. Kissinger, for instance, told a group of journalists that the Arab states had better find a way of cooperating with the consumer nations 'if they don't want to go the way of the Greek city states'.¹⁸⁹ James Schlesinger was making similar comments.¹⁹⁰ Yet, in spite of such rhetoric, it appears as if Kissinger and Schlesinger had little intention of actually militarily seizing the oil fields. Indeed, the fact that Kissinger had made his point to a group of journalists indicates that such statements were designed to be made public in order to exert political pressure against the Arab oil states.¹⁹¹

Therefore, both the US and UK had a strong interest in seeking some sort of a solution to the oil embargo. The form it would take, however, was to be a point which would again result in disagreement between the two countries. This stated, the process illustrated several important things regarding Heath's approach to foreign policy. During the lead-up to the conference, Heath engaged in secret bilateral diplomacy with the US. Heath also broke with his ambition to establish common EEC policies, and followed the US's lead for a collective consumer response to the oil embargo. By doing this, Heath revealed his ability to work closely with Washington when he believed that it better promoted British interests.

Prior to a meeting of NATO representatives, Cromer suggested that some type of gesture to affirm US–UK solidarity should be made to placate US anger.¹⁹² The prime minister was in no mood to be offering such gestures. From the record available, Heath's thinking on this matter appears to be most peculiar. In an official 'Note for the Record', it is recorded that Heath did not believe US–UK relations were confronted with any particular problems.¹⁹³ Perhaps this can be explained as a secretarial error? However, if this was Heath's thinking then he may have been suffering from a short-term memory lapse given that recent political differences had seen the suspension of US–UK intelligence and nuclear cooperation. Nor does it equate with how Heath was acting in other fields relating to US–UK relations. For example, the British decision to opt for the Super Antelope upgrade to Polaris was not relayed to the US at this moment. The reason for the delay was because of wider US–UK political differences. Heath was also deeply angered by the behaviour of senior US policy-makers and complained to the Italian prime minister about Henry Kissinger's 'schizophrenic' approach towards Europe.¹⁹⁴

It was thus left to Douglas-Home to mollify the US. Privately, Douglas-Home agreed with the prime minister that Kissinger's approach during the 'Year of Europe' was the reason for all of the US–UK acrimony, but he followed Cromer's advice and despatched a conciliatory letter to the US secretary of state.¹⁹⁵ In it, Douglas-Home explained that Britain viewed the US as the 'lynchpin' of its foreign and defence policies, and wanted to reassure Kissinger that it was not the intention of the British government to deliberately take contrary policies to those pursued by the US.¹⁹⁶ Such efforts failed to calm Kissinger and the British found that he was in a pugnacious mood at the NATO conference. Complaints, akin to those he had been making to Cromer in Washington, were repeated in this arena.¹⁹⁷ Interestingly, other US officials were less rambunctious than Kissinger, and Schlesinger, who had been scathing about recent British actions, had reportedly been attempting to 'mend fences'. Even Kissinger's anger appeared to be directed more at the European powers than Britain.¹⁹⁸

Kissinger in London

As the oil embargo continued, Western states sought bilateral agreements with producer states to maintain their oil supplies. Heath's government was no exception to this and quickly secured an agreement with Iran in November 1973. Kissinger watched this with increasing dissatisfaction and reasoned that such action would only push the price of oil upwards and be self-defeating in the long term. For the US secretary of state, the continuation of such policies was simply 'suicidal'.¹⁹⁹ Kissinger, therefore, proposed that a collaborative

consumer response to the oil embargo be found, and during his trip to London (12 December 1973) he took the opportunity to publicly articulate such thinking. Here it was suggested that a small group of senior officials should convene to formulate a collective energy policy which would prevent 'beggar thy neighbour' bilateral oil deals; i.e. the decrease in supply would be mitigated by lowering demand through the implementation of oil-sharing programmes and making collective bids to other oil producers.²⁰⁰

Publicly, Heath gave his strong support to Kissinger's proposals, which naturally won his approval, and a rather sycophantic letter was subsequently delivered to the prime minister. Under the surface, US-UK differences were more apparent, and Heath scrawled 'Pompous ass' on the top of Kissinger's letter.²⁰¹ Others, meanwhile, were rather more suspicious of Kissinger's motives, and Julian Amery, a Conservative MP and adviser to Douglas-Home, suggested Kissinger's goal was to ensure US dominance of the oil industry.²⁰² While British officials scrutinised Kissinger's proposals, the US secretary of state began to gauge support for an energy conference, and, following further oil price increases, Kissinger announced his intention to form an Energy Action Group which would assemble in the near future, find common agreement, and seek to break the oil embargo.²⁰³

At this stage, Heath wanted some form of collective consumer approach and Kissinger had, at the very least, provided one alternative with his Energy Action Group, but this also presented a number of interlinked difficulties. The first of these surrounded what Kissinger's intentions actually were. Throughout the entire 'Year of Europe' process, Heath had been concerned with allowing the US too much influence over the formulation of EEC policies. Kissinger's proposed Energy Action Group, regardless of the actual form it took, would have some consequences for ongoing EEC discussions on energy cooperation, and potentially it could limit EEC cooperation in this area. Heath, therefore, did not want to accept Kissinger's idea if it destroyed his wider EEC ambitions of collective political/economic cooperation. Some of Kissinger's other ideas on what the Energy Action Group would seek, especially the notion of actively driving down the price of oil, were simply deemed to be unrealisable objectives. This stated, Heath thought Kissinger's idea was not without merit and he agreed with the basic premise that a collective consumer approach had to be found. Where Heath differed was with the substance, rather than with the fundamental idea, of an Energy Action Group.²⁰⁴

Nevertheless, Heath was still confronted with a problem in relation to the EEC as the French had made their opposition to Kissinger's latest plans abundantly clear. Instead, France suggested that bilateral oil deals should continue until a collective EEC energy policy was formulated, and only once this had been achieved could EEC members engage with other powers about energy

matters. For Heath this appealed little, for he well knew that creating a collective energy policy within the EEC would take some time. Moreover, continuing with bilateral oil deals would only drive the price of oil higher, damaging the British economy further by increasing the cost of consumer goods and thus importing inflation into the economy. Such a set of circumstances was hardly designed to help a prime minister who was already struggling to maintain his political popularity.²⁰⁵

As the British debated what the preferred course of action was, the US took the initiative in trying to alleviate the damage caused by the oil embargo. Nixon had agreed to Kissinger's idea to hold an energy conference amongst the principal consumer states, and thus invited Britain to attend this energy conference in Washington. The following day this invitation was reiterated publicly during a press conference held jointly by Kissinger and the US 'Energy Czar' William Simon, where the world's principal consumer nations of oil were invited to meet in Washington in February 1974. Following this, Nixon delivered a formal letter of invitation.²⁰⁶

As Kissinger realised, a public invitation would force the British to make a decision: they would either support his proposals or they would continue to engage in bilateral oil deals.²⁰⁷ Either way, the US would have confirmation of British intentions and could react accordingly. Heath had to decide whether Britain would attend the conference and then how Britain would actually be represented (either as an individual state or as a member of the EEC). It also forced the British to decide on their course of action, and in essence they had two real choices. They could follow the US lead and agree to collective action, but this would mean forsaking bilateral oil deals and risking a confrontation with France. Alternatively, Heath could support the French line: find an EEC common energy policy, and continue with bilateral oil deals in the interim. Heath soon showed that he would back Kissinger's plan and did so because, in the final assessment, it was far preferable to the one being proposed by the French.

In Brussels, little common agreement existed on how best to react to the US invitation but French hostility to the entire Kissinger-inspired scheme was evident. Nevertheless, on 15 January, Nixon's invitation was discussed at the EEC Council of Ministers and an agreement was reached that the EEC would be represented at the conference by the president of the Council of Ministers. As this was a rotating position, individual member states were free to send their own representatives, and Heath therefore accepted Nixon's invitation.²⁰⁸

Interestingly, Heath had decided to attend the energy conference regardless of the position of the EEC.²⁰⁹ Heath was not going to jeopardise Britain's oil supplies because the EEC could not formulate an agreed position and he was fully aware that Britain had to ensure it had access to affordable oil. The

most obvious concern was that Heath's political authority in the UK was being undermined by continuing industrial relations problems, which, in turn, were being exacerbated by the oil crisis. The rising price of oil was also having severe inflationary effects upon Britain's economy, resulting in a sharp increase in the price of food and energy. The economic and social problems which were magnified by the oil embargo were encouraging Heath's opponents within the Conservative Party to seek his removal. It is not too much of an overstatement to claim that the oil embargo was threatening the political life of the prime minister.²¹⁰ Attending the energy conference would thus afford Heath the opportunity to tackle these problems. If the conference could formulate some collective consumer response to the oil embargo then it would have the benefit of stabilising the price of oil because it would rule out competitive bidding and prevent price escalation. Heath, therefore, was set on attending the conference, regardless of what the EEC's Council of Ministers decided.²¹¹

In relation to foreign policy, Heath had demonstrated his ability to work closely with the Nixon administration when he decided it suited his and British interests to do so. The prime minister resorted to US–UK bilateralism to ensure the energy conference would be successful, and was quite prepared to undermine EEC unity in order to achieve this. First, Heath sent Sir John Hunt, the British Cabinet secretary, to the US to speak confidentially with Kissinger.²¹² This visit was designed to be kept secret from Britain's EEC partners. Kissinger, however, was rather less circumspect in keeping this meeting confidential, as he informed Dan Rather, the CBS journalist, of the clandestine British visit. Heath also sent Jack Rampton, the permanent under-secretary at the Department of Energy, to liaise with the Nixon administration, and knowledge of this meeting was also to be withheld from the wider EEC. For Heath, the seriousness of the oil crisis, coupled with the EEC's inability to reach a workable solution to combat it, meant that he was prepared to seek solutions with the US.²¹³

Following US–UK discussions, the US delivered an aide memoire which outlined the finer details of the upcoming energy conference. This suggested that the energy conference would seek to reverse the price increase in oil, create a new institution that would complete follow-up work from the conference, and would also look to intensify 'economic and monetary policy cooperation to deal with the consequences of the present situation'.²¹⁴ Such suggestions caused concern within the British policy-making elite, because throughout the 'Year of Europe' initiative Heath had wanted to avoid interlinking US–EEC economic cooperation. Now it appeared as if Kissinger was once again proposing such a course.

On 5 February 1974, another European Council Meeting convened and it was here that a mandate which laid down a series of 'ground rules' for the upcoming energy conference was created.²¹⁵ The French were of the opinion

that this mandate meant that all members of the EEC agreed that pre-existing institutions, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, would undertake the follow-up work resulting from the conference. The French thought that the EEC had agreed that it would not accept the American proposal to create a new institution to deal with any follow-up work. As Jobert bluntly told one British official, 'no follow up – full stop'.²¹⁶

Heath's government deliberately interpreted the mandate differently, and certain officials went as far as to suggest that the mandate did not forbid agreement to follow-up machinery being created. Hugh Overton, of the North American Department, suggested Britain should sign up to Kissinger's Energy Action Group. Other officials were less direct but articulated much the same opinion. Indeed, Douglas-Home concluded that the EEC mandate would not prohibit a positive outcome from the conference. As Douglas-Home was fully aware, the US regarded a positive outcome as one where the conference agreed to create a new institution to deal with the follow-up work. It appears then as if the Heath government was countenancing the possibility that the British should break with the EEC and support the American plans, in order to secure Britain's oil interests.²¹⁷

For Kissinger, this played directly into his wider objectives in relation to Europe. In particular, Kissinger was trying to prevent French domination of the EEC's policy agenda, which he believed would result in a common foreign policy premised on an anti-American agenda. As Kissinger candidly put it in one conversation, 'We must break up the Europeans.'²¹⁸ Kissinger, therefore, was actively seeking to exploit the differences between EEC members, so as to cause friction and discord between the various states, and in turn prevent the other states of the EEC from simply acquiescing in French decisions. As such, the EEC would less likely follow the more independent and, as perceived in Washington, belligerent policies that France pursued in its bilateral dealings with the United States.

Nevertheless, the prime minister remained ambivalent towards many aspects of Kissinger's energy plans, and US statements to attempt to roll back oil prices were met with particular incredulity. US ideas of coordinating US-EEC monetary and trade practices were met with equal disdain. Heath, however, accepted the need for an energy conference and was also prepared to countenance the creation of a new institution to solve the oil crisis. British support existed behind the fundamental idea of international energy cooperation and it was only the details of this which now divided US and UK policy-makers.²¹⁹

Bandaid on a cancer

In Washington, France remained the *bête noire* for US policy-makers and, when Jobert again made it clear to Kissinger that France would not be supporting any common consumer solutions to the oil crisis, it only annoyed opinion further.²²⁰ As James Schlesinger would recollect, at this point relations with France were experiencing a 'rather irritating period'.²²¹ At the time, he was rather more candid. The 'worst bastards' was Schlesinger's appraisal of French policy. 'Unadulterated bastards' was Kissinger's even more abrasive assessment.²²² Such comments were evidently not restricted to private audiences, as one British newspaper reported that Kissinger had described the EEC as 'jackals'.²²³

In spite of this, Kissinger was determined that his plans for the energy conference would not be scuppered by France. To ensure success, Kissinger explained that it was his intention to isolate France within the EEC and he would achieve this by winning British and West German support for his energy proposals by being as 'brutal' as necessary.²²⁴ In practical terms this involved a twofold approach. First, this required Kissinger articulating that if a collective consumer response to the oil embargo could not be agreed then the US would outbid all of the competition in order to secure oil. Given the economic power of the US, this was a threat which the US could see through. The second phase involved linking the continuation of US military-security guarantees to Europe directly to support for his energy plans. Nixon queried whether this was a sensible stratagem, and Kissinger himself accepted that his tactics were akin to that of putting a 'bandaid on a cancer'. Nevertheless, the US secretary of state's argument won through.²²⁵

Interestingly, Kissinger never suggested that US–UK nuclear or intelligence cooperation would be revoked if support for his energy conference was not forthcoming. In fact, Kissinger recommended to Nixon that additional support for Britain's Polaris fleet should be given in January 1974, which Nixon accepted.²²⁶ Such actions may at first appear contradictory to Kissinger's broader policy agenda. However, Kissinger decided that linking US–UK nuclear and intelligence cooperation to finding an energy agreement was not required at this point. Rather, he emphasised in conversation with British officials that if a common consumer response could not be found then the US would respond by simply outbidding all other consumer states.²²⁷ Clearly such utterances demonstrated just how much importance the US attached to finding an agreement at the upcoming energy conference. Further to this, Kissinger and other US officials were making it known publicly that they viewed the energy conference as a 'crucial – perhaps even a final – test of Western political cooperation'.²²⁸ This dual tactic had the desired effect upon British

policy-making elites. As such, Lord Carrington – now serving as the British secretary of state for energy – informed Walter Annenberg that Britain would support the US ‘100 per cent’ at the upcoming energy conference.²²⁹

The conference opened on 11 February 1974. Kissinger tabled his plans for overcoming the oil embargo, and outlined that the Western consumer nations should establish a coordinating group. This would establish a coordinated consumer response to the oil embargo and, once an agreed upon position had been established, a foreign ministers’ conference between the consumer and producer states would convene to find a settlement to the oil embargo.²³⁰ As Kissinger had expected, Jobert opposed his proposals.²³¹ This, however, was not really all that problematic from Kissinger’s perspective, because US policy-makers had understood prior to the conference that there was little possibility of obtaining an agreement between all of the parties present. Rather, the US objective was to obtain approval for Kissinger’s plans from as many of the other delegates as possible. As events unfolded, the US came to see that this approach would be successful. In Douglas-Home’s plenary speech he accepted Kissinger’s proposal that some sort of follow-up machinery should be established and representatives from other EEC nations, notably the West Germans and Dutch, made statements along similar lines. Jobert was therefore alone in opposing the follow-up machinery. With Douglas-Home then confirming that Britain would support the creation of a new institution to deal with global energy matters, the image of a united EEC was completely erased.²³²

As the first day of the energy conference drew to a close, Kissinger assessed the situation for Alexander Haig. ‘So far so good,’ the US secretary of state reported.²³³ For Kissinger, things were indeed looking favourable given that Douglas-Home had given British agreement for establishing follow-up machinery and the West German and Japanese delegations had also lent their support.²³⁴ In sum then, the world’s largest consumers of oil had agreed to work collectively with the United States. More significant still was the fact that all the EEC members, except France, had agreed that they would approve Kissinger’s proposals as national governments if common EEC agreement could not be found.²³⁵ ‘It’s not us against Europe, it’s France against us,’ Kissinger explained to Nixon.²³⁶ Indeed, Jobert’s refusal to agree to follow-up machinery had left him isolated, and Kissinger’s adroit diplomacy at this stage had gone some way to engineering this situation.

The decision by the other EEC members to operate as single representatives had isolated France, and importantly it averted a confrontation between the US and the EEC. Instead, the situation resulted in France being outside of the consensus opinion of the conference, and French officials could only publicly bemoan the behaviour of the other EEC states and accuse the US of ‘seeking to impose a Pax Americana on her would-be satellites in the West’.²³⁷ This

outcome delighted Kissinger, who boasted to his deputy Brent Scowcroft that: 'We have broken the Community, just as I always thought I wanted to ... I think its [sic] going to be a good lesson to the French not to monkey around with us.'²³⁸

The British position was rather less jubilant than this, given it had been Douglas-Home's intention at the beginning of the conference to obtain collective agreement. This now appeared unlikely and his last-minute efforts to obtain French agreement were futile.²³⁹ Regardless of French opposition, a communiqué was issued in which it was agreed that an emergency oil-sharing programme would be established for dealing with the 'next crisis'. An International Energy Agency was also created which would oversee this emergency oil-sharing programme, and which would also create a means of 'harmonizing and making parallel the energy policies of the Western countries'.²⁴⁰ The communiqué also explicitly made the linkage between energy, trade and monetary matters, as it stated:

General Conclusion. They [the states who signed the communiqué] affirmed, that, in the pursuit of national policies, whether in the trade, monetary or energy fields, effort should be made to harmonize the interests of each country on the one hand and the maintenance of the world economic system on the other.²⁴¹

This is an important point often overlooked by commentators when assessing the 'Year of Europe'. Throughout the year, Heath had fought against American efforts to apply linkage to US-EEC relations; yet at the Washington Energy Conference, Heath, to some degree, accepted this. Kissinger had also demonstrated at the conference that US leadership of the Atlantic alliance had been assured and, as viewed in Washington, the French challenge to American primacy in the Western alliance had been overcome.

Lessons for the future

Publicly, the Nixon White House gave an impression of satisfaction with the results of the Washington Energy Conference. Privately, however, Nixon's thinking was rather more mixed. The conference had failed to achieve the spectacular results which the president believed could have dissipated some of his domestic critics.²⁴² In spite of this, Nixon and Kissinger believed the Washington Energy Conference had achieved important political aims vis-à-vis the EEC. As Nixon articulated, 'The point is the European Community instead of having that silly unanimity rule, learned they can't gang up against

us and we can use it now, we can use it on trade, security, with everything else'.²⁴³ Kissinger was equally elated by the results and in conversation with the president explained: 'Last week, Mr President, the Community took a decision and today they split apart on it eight to one. It is a lesson to everybody.'²⁴⁴ As Kissinger noted to Brent Scowcroft, 'It taught us an important lesson, if we really throw our weight around we can have our own way'.²⁴⁵

The Washington Energy Conference was, then, an important event from the standpoint of the Nixon White House, because it provided a valuable lesson in how to operate towards the EEC. It would not be unfair to suggest it was somewhat of a watershed for the Nixon administration's foreign policy towards the EEC. Nixon and Kissinger had questioned the wisdom of supporting EEC expansion and British membership of the EEC, and by 1973 both had concluded that this was no longer always in the American interest. As Nixon told one former US ambassador to West Germany, 'I share your concerns with European unity. It is no longer necessarily desirable'.²⁴⁶ As Nixon had feared, the EEC would act in unison in opposition to American interests, and this fear had become a reality throughout the 'Year of Europe'. The British had shown that they were quite prepared to stand in opposition to American policy throughout the year, and it was membership of the EEC that was believed to have caused this new, uncooperative attitude in London. As such, for Schlesinger, 'It was a mistake getting Great Britain into the Common Market'. In Kissinger's opinion, 'It was a tragic mistake'.²⁴⁷

US policy-makers may have lamented this changed international dynamic, but it also provided them with an opportunity to alter the trajectory of events. Or, as one scholar has neatly noted, it afforded US policy-makers the chance to rescue 'choice from circumstance'. In essence, although the likes of Kissinger were restrained by the structure in which they operated, they still had to make decisions which could affect the course of events positively or negatively for US interests.²⁴⁸ The decisions which were undertaken in the lead-up to the Washington Energy Conference, and the effects these had upon the policies pursued by London, demonstrated that Washington could garner the necessary support for its policies if it was willing to be forceful enough. As Kissinger had promised Nixon earlier in the year, 'the Europeans will be on their knees by the end of this year'.²⁴⁹ By the end of the Washington Energy Conference, the US secretary of state had certainly delivered on this promise.

British officials fully understood that the energy conference would have profound political ramifications for the future course of British foreign policy. Denis Greenhill has suggested that it demonstrated the primacy of the US in the transatlantic relationship and, accordingly, those in Whitehall who had argued for a more Euro-centric British foreign policy were severely undermined.²⁵⁰ The Paris correspondent of the *Financial*

Times perhaps best captured the wider ramification for Britain's European policy, when he wrote:

The Washington Oil conference has at least one salutary result which has nothing to do with energy policies. It has shown up the absurdity of the so-called joint European positions based on texts which accommodate the conflicting positions of all the nine partners and has demonstrated to France that it cannot hope to impose its views on the other Common Market member countries indefinitely.²⁵¹

Other British officials were rather more concerned that the EEC's inability to formulate a common position would actively encourage the US to 'divide and rule' the Community. Or, as another put it, the results of the energy conference would only encourage Kissinger to 'impose his will' upon Europe.²⁵² For the prime minister, however, this was something which he was willing to risk. As he was well aware, obtaining agreement with the US was imperative if bilateral oil deals were not to spiral out of control.²⁵³ The fear that bilateralism would result in a 'beggar thy neighbour' approach – which would devastate Britain's economy, and perhaps end Heath's political career – convinced him that the UK had to lend its support to US energy proposals, even at the cost of sacrificing EEC unity.

Conclusion

When assessing this difficult period for US–UK relations, scholars should not forget that close cooperation between the two states continued. The intelligence and nuclear cooperation between the two countries continued throughout the year and, moreover, in January 1974, the US–UK nuclear relationship was re-energised when the British requested additional US assistance for their update of Polaris. Likewise, US–UK diplomatic cooperation was quite unique in that Thomas Brimelow was given the responsibility by Henry Kissinger to help draft a US–USSR agreement on the prevention of nuclear war.²⁵⁴

Even recognising this, the level of diplomatic and political acrimony between the two countries had led to the temporary suspension of this cooperation on more than one occasion. More important yet was that the events of the year clearly highlighted the disparity in power within the US–UK relationship. The US had re-asserted its authority and demonstrated that if the UK was to pursue a policy path which Washington deemed would damage its vital interests, then this would not go unanswered. The practical demonstration of what this meant had been given when the US had halted intelligence and nuclear cooperation in

response to political decisions taken by the Heath government throughout the year. This coercive diplomacy had the desired impact upon the course of British foreign policy. Whilst Heath's decision-making at the Washington oil conference was not solely dictated by American pressure, the US government believed that it could ensure its interests were better protected if it decided to 'throw its weight around'. Given this, it should not be a surprise that in the following chapters we will see that this was exactly the approach that the Nixon and Ford administrations would take when dealing with their British ally.

Notes

- 1 Telcon: The President–HAK, 9 August 1973, HAKTELCONS.
- 2 Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy*, pp. 381–4.
- 3 For a good overview see: Fred Emery, *Watergate: The Corruption and Fall of Richard Nixon* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1994).
- 4 Stanley Kutler, *Abuse of Power: The New Nixon Tapes* (New York: The Free Press, 1997), p. 458; Haig, *Inner Circles*, pp. 321–408.
- 5 On Nixon considering firing Kissinger see: Anthony Summers, *The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon* (London: Victor Gollancz, 2000), pp. 451–2; Chuck Colson, *Born Again* (New York: Crossings Classics, 1976), pp. 73–5. During this conversation with Schlesinger, Nixon reveals that he intended for Schlesinger to balance Kissinger's domination of US foreign policy. See: Memorandum of Conversation, 6 June 1974, File: June 6, 1974, Nixon, Schlesinger, NSAMC, 1973–1977, Box 4, GFL.
- 6 Thomas Robb, 'Antelope, Poseidon or a Hybrid: The Upgrading of the British Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, 1970–1974', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 33:6 (2010), 811–13; Telcon: President-HAK, 23 September 1973, HAKTELCONS.
- 7 A point completely overlooked in existing accounts of the US–UK relationship. See for example: Hynes, *The Year*; Rossbach, *Rebirth*; Scott, *Allies Apart*.
- 8 This was termed Operation Hullabaloo. See: Stephen R. Twigge, 'Operation Hullabaloo: Henry Kissinger, British Diplomacy, and the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War', in *Diplomatic History*, 33:4 (2009), 689–701.
- 9 TNA: PREM 15/2038 The President to the Prime Minister, undated, January 1974.
- 10 Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, p. 149.
- 11 Memorandum of Conversation, 10 September 1972, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 24, NPMP.
- 12 Alistair Noble, 'Kissinger's Year of Europe, Britain's Year of Choice', in Schulz and Schwartz (eds.), *The Strained Alliance*, p. 223.
- 13 Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Company, 1982) (hereafter: *YOU*), pp. 128–38.
- 14 Sulzberger, *The World and Richard Nixon*, pp. 208–9; Alastair Horne, *Kissinger: 1973, The Crucial Year* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), p. 110; Hanhimäki, *Flawed*, p. 275; Möckli, *European Foreign Policy*, pp. 143–5; Daniel Möckli, 'Asserting Europe's

- Distinct Identity: The EC Nine and Kissinger's Year of Europe', in Schulz and Schwartz (eds.), *The Strained Alliance*, pp. 195–6; Silvia Pietrantonio, 'The Year That Never Was: 1973 and the Crisis Between the United States and the European Community', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 8:2 (2010), 158–77.
- 15 Conversation between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs [Kissinger], 19 April 1972, *FRUS 1969–1976, Soviet Union*, Vol. XIV, Doc. 126, p. 445; Memorandum for the President's File from Ronald L. Ziegler, 15 February 1973, President Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 91, NPMP.
 - 16 Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957); Henry A. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership*; Memorandum for Mr Bundy from Henry A. Kissinger, 3 October 1961, File: Kissinger Series, 36 Confidential, Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Kissinger Series, Box 463A, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts, USA.
 - 17 Memorandum for Dr Kissinger from Phil Odeen and Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 28 June 1972, NSCIHF, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-064, NPMP; Memorandum of Conversation, 2 July 1973: File: July 2, 1973, Kissinger-Schlesinger-Moorer, NSAMC, Box 2, GFL.
 - 18 NSSM-123: US–UK Nuclear Relations, Analytical Summary, attached to Memorandum for under-Secretary John Irwin et al. from Jeanne W. Davies, 2 July 1971, NSCIHF, Study Memorandums, Box H-182, NPMP.
 - 19 Dallek, *Partners in Power*, pp. 473–6; Rossbach, *Rebirth*, pp. 155–60; Youri Devuyt, 'American Attitudes on European Political Integration – The Nixon–Kissinger Legacy', *IES Working Paper*, 2:1 (2007), 19; Mario Del Pero, *The Eccentric Realist: Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), pp. 93–9.
 - 20 Fredrik Logevall, 'A Critique of Containment,' *Diplomatic History*, 28:4 (2004), 473–99; Robert McMahon, 'Diplomatic History and Policy History: Finding Common Ground', *Journal of Policy History*, 17:1 (2005), 94; Schwartz, 'Partisan Politics in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations', 173–90; Sandbrook, 'The Influence of Domestic Policy and Watergate', in Logevall and Preston (eds.), *Nixon in the World*, pp. 85–103; Julian F. Zelizer, 'Détente and Domestic Politics', *Diplomatic History*, 33:4 (2009), 653–70.
 - 21 Kissinger, *YOU*, pp. 128–38.
 - 22 Marc Trachtenberg, 'The French Factor in US Foreign Policy during the Nixon-Pompidou period, 1969–74', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 13:1 (2011), 4–59. For evidence of this as the cornerstone of US objectives see: Memorandum for the President's Office File from David N. Parker, 25 May 1973, President Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 91, NPMP; Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs [Kissinger], and Secretary of the Treasury, Shultz, 3 March 1973, *FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy*, Vol. XXXI, Doc. 17, pp. 72–91.
 - 23 Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs [Kissinger], and Secretary of the Treasury, Shultz, 3 March 1973, *FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy*, Vol. XXXI, Doc. 17, pp. 84–5.
 - 24 Memorandum for the President's File from Peter Flanigan, 11 September 1972, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 89, NPMP.

- 25 Memorandum for Mr Kissinger from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 30 January 1973, NSCIHF, Senior Review Group Meetings, Box H-066, NPMP.
- 26 Memorandum of Conversation, 10 September 1972, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 24, NPMP.
- 27 TNA: PREM 15/1273 Record of a Discussion with Dr Kissinger, 14 September 1972; TNA: FCO 82/177 Charles Powell Minute, J. A. N. Graham to A. A. Acland, 24 November 1972; TNA: FCO 82/193 Secretary of the Cabinet's Meeting with Dr Kissinger, 20 October 1972.
- 28 On the bombing see Stephen E. Ambrose, 'The Christmas Bombing', in Robert Cowley, *The Cold War: A Military History* (New York: Random House, 2006), pp. 397–418. On the wider points made see Memorandum for the President's Office Files from B/Gen Brent Scowcroft, 15 February 1973, President Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 91, NPMP; Memorandum for the President's Files from Henry A. Kissinger, 10 April 1973, President Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 91, NPMP; Conversation Among President Nixon, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors [Burns], the Director of the Office of Management and Budget [Ash], the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers [Stein], Secretary of the Treasury Shultz, and the under-Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs [Volcker], 3 March 1973, *FRUS 1969–1976, Foreign Economic Policy*, Vol. XXXI, Doc. 16, p. 68.
- 29 Memorandum for the President's Office Files from B/Gen Brent Scowcroft, 15 February 1973, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 91, NPMP.
- 30 Raymond Seitz, *Over Here* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998), pp. 316–17; Memorandum for the President's Office Files from B/Gen Brent Scowcroft, 15 February 1973, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 91, NPMP; Memorandum for the President's Files from Henry A. Kissinger, 10 April 1973, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 91, NPMP.
- 31 TNA: FCO 59/931 Prime Minister's Meeting with President Nixon, 1–2 February H. T. A. Overton Minute, 12 February 1973; TNA: FCO 82/294 Lord Cromer to Denis Greenhill, 17 January 1973.
- 32 Kissinger, *YOU*, p. 142.
- 33 TNA: FCO 82/303 Record of a Discussion at Camp David, 2 February 1973.
- 34 This direct linkage only materialised in 1974. This was something that Kissinger would later regret. See: Memorandum of Conversation, 26 May 1975, File: May 26, 1975 Ford–Kissinger, NSAMC, Box 12, GFL.
- 35 TNA: FCO 82/303 Record of Discussion at Camp David, 2 February 1973.
- 36 *Ibid.*
- 37 TNA: FCO 82/311 Record of a Discussion at the British Embassy, Washington DC, 19 April 1973.
- 38 Memorandum of Conversation, 5 March 1973, *FRUS 1969–1976, European Security*, Vol. XXXIX, Doc. 131, p. 402, Note 3.
- 39 The British were concerned with the pace of American decision making. For instance, they were critical of the Basic Principles agreement signed during the Moscow Summit in May 1972. In the British assessment, the US had signed this agreement without fully understanding all of the consequences. A repetition of this was something the British were keen to avoid. See Reynolds, *Summits*, p. 251.

- 40 TNA: CAB 164/1233 Record of a Meeting held in the British Embassy, Washington DC, 4 June 1973.
- 41 TNA: FCO 82/303 Record of Discussion at Camp David, 2 February 1973.
- 42 TNA: CAB 130/671 GEN 161 (73) 21 March 1973; TNA: CAB 130/671 GEN 161 (73) 1, 30 March 1973.
- 43 'Atlantic Cross-Currents', *Daily Telegraph*, 25 April 1973, p. 18.
- 44 TNA: FCO 73/135 Record of a Conversation at the British Embassy, Washington DC, 5 March 1973; TNA: PREM 15/2089 The Year of Europe: The Impact on Transatlantic and Anglo-American Relations: An Analytical Account, February–July 1973.
- 45 Stephen E. Ambrose, *Nixon: Ruin and Recovery 1973–1990* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), p. 168.
- 46 James Mayall and Cornelia Navari (eds.), *The End of the Post-War Era: Documents on Great-Power Relations, 1968–1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 360–7; Suri, 'Geopolitics of Globalisation' in Logevall and Preston (eds.), *Nixon in the World*, p. 178; National Security Decision Memorandum 68, 3 July 1970, NSCIHF, NSDM, Box H-217, NPMP.
- 47 For the quote see Dallek, *Partners in Power*, p. 466. Other examples include: Conversation Among President Nixon, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors [Burns], the Director of the Office of Management and Budget [Ash], the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers [Stein], Secretary of the Treasury Shultz, and the under-Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs [Volcker], 3 March 1973, *FRUS: 1973–1976, Foreign Economic Policy*, Vol. XXXI, Doc. 16, p. 68.
- 48 Kissinger, *YOU*, p. 161.
- 49 Garthoff, *A Journey Through the Cold War*, p. 288.
- 50 Heath, *The Course*, p. 493.
- 51 John Stoessinger, *Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), p. 219.
- 52 TNA: PREM 15/1362 Rowley Cromer to the Prime Minister, 23 April 1973; TNA: PREM 15/1362 Burke Trend to the Prime Minister, 24 April 1973; Trend to Heath, 2 May 1973, in *Documents on British Policy Overseas* (hereafter: *DBPO*), series III, vol. IV, Doc. 81, A04075 (CD-ROM).
- 53 Peter Jenkins, 'US Eagerly Awaits Europe's Response to New Atlantic Charter', *Manchester Guardian*, 25 April 1973, p. 2.
- 54 John Bourne, 'Whitehall Welcomes Kissinger's "Charter" Call', *Financial Times*, 25 April 1973, p. 15.
- 55 TNA: T 355/80 F. R. Barratt to Mr I. P. Wilson, 19 June 1973; TNA: T355/80, I. P. Wilson to Mr Bailey, 20 June 1973. Also see: Lord Carrington's Meeting with acting secretary Johnson to ambassador in London Embassy [Annenberg], Tel. 193761, 24 November 1970, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric Files 1970–73, Political & Defense, Box 2848, NAIH. Also see: Lord Carrington, *Reflect*, pp. 228–33; Hynes, *The Year*, pp. 106–8.
- 56 Hynes, *The Year*, pp. 138–42; Noble, 'Kissinger's Year of Europe', p. 223.
- 57 Paul Lewis, 'Importance of Atlantic Charter Call Stressed', *Financial Times*, 25 April 1973, p. 5.
- 58 TNA: PREM 15/1984 Burke Trend to Lord Bridges, 11 May 1973.

- 59 Spelling, 'Edward Heath', pp. 650–1; Hynes, *The Year*, pp. 196–222; Burk, *Old World*, p. 625.
- 60 Kissinger, *YOU*, pp. 162–3. On French policy during the 'Year of Europe' see: Aurélie Gfeller, *Building a European Identity: France, the United States, and the Oil Shock, 1973–1974* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012).
- 61 TNA: CAB 164/1232 Burke Trend to the Prime Minister, 19 March 1973.
- 62 TNA: PREM 15/1541 Record of a Conversation between the Prime Minister and the President of the French Republic, 21 May 1973.
- 63 TNA: CAB 134/3625 European Unit: Minutes of a Meeting Held in Conference Room E, Cabinet Office, 23 May 1973.
- 64 Kissinger wanted a meeting of deputy foreign ministers to convene where the details of the Declaration of Principles would be negotiated and agreed. This would be followed by a foreign ministers' conference where the final Declaration of Principles would be signed. Jobert flatly rejected this publicly and he refused to put forward a competing *modus operandi*. See: Möckli, *European Foreign Policy*, pp. 156–8; Claudia Hiepel, 'Kissinger's Year of Europe: A Challenge for the EC and the Franco-German Relationship', in Jan van der Harst, *Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community's Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969–75* (Brussels: Bruylant, 2007), p. 284. On the US–French discussions see: Memoranda for the President's File, 27 May 1973, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 91, NPMP.
- 65 TNA: CAB 164/1233 Burke Trend to Lord Cromer, 8 June 1973.
- 66 TNA: CAB 164/1233 Record of a Meeting Held in the British Embassy, Washington DC, 4 June 1973. For the quote see Noble, 'Kissinger's Year of Europe', p. 221.
- 67 TNA: CAB 164/1234 Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the Prime Minister, 18 June 1973; TNA: CAB 164/1234 Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 19 June 1973.
- 68 TNA: CAB 130/671 GEN 161 (73) 20 June 1973.
- 69 Hynes, *The Year*, pp. 160–1.
- 70 TNA: CAB 164/1234 Denis Greenhill to Burke Trend, 6 July 1973; TNA: CAB 164/1235 Michael Palliser to J. O. Wright, 24 July 1973; TNA: CAB 134/3625 European Unit: Minutes of a Meeting Held in Conference Room E, Cabinet Office, 27 June 1973.
- 71 Kissinger, *YOU*, p. 189.
- 72 Hynes, *The Year*, pp. 158–61.
- 73 TNA: FCO 59/931 Rowley Cromer to Denis Greenhill, 19 January 1973; TNA: FCO 59/930 Draft Brief, attached to Private Secretary to Lord Bridges, undated (circa January 1973); Greenhill, *More by Accident*, p. 147.
- 74 Möckli, *European Foreign Policy*, pp. 146–7.
- 75 TNA: CAB 164/1234 Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the Prime Minister, 18 June 1973.
- 76 TNA: PREM 15/1981 Richard Nixon to Edward Heath, 26 July 1973.
- 77 Kissinger, *YOU*, pp. 191–2.
- 78 Telcon: President–Kissinger, 30 July 1973, HAKTELCONS.
- 79 TNA: FCO 82/311 Record of a Meeting, 30 July 1973.
- 80 Telcon: The President–HAK, 9 August 1973, HAKTELCONS; TNA: FCO 82/311 Record of a Meeting, 30 July 1973.

- 81 Telcon: Mr Kissinger–Sir Burke Trend, 30 July 1973, HAKTELCONS. Quote in: Sulzberger, *The World and Richard Nixon*, p. 218.
- 82 TNA: FCO 82/311 R. A. Sykes to Thomas Brimelow, 13 August 1973.
- 83 Telcon: Secretary Rush–Kissinger, 31 July 1973, HAKTELCONS.
- 84 Memorandum of Conversation, 7 August 1973, *FRUS 1969–1976, European Security*, Vol. XXXIX, Doc. 342, p. 999. Similar comments were made to the US Treasury Secretary George Shultz. See: Telcon: Kissinger–Shultz, 15 August 1973, HAKTELCONS.
- 85 Memorandum of Conversation, 17 August 1973: File: August 17, 1973, Kissinger–Schlesinger–John S. Foster, NSAMC, Box 2, GFL.
- 86 Richard Nixon, *The Real War* (New York: Warner Books, 1980), p. 269.
- 87 Horne, *Kissinger*, p. 120; Fabian Hilfrich, ‘West Germany’s Long Year of Europe: Bonn between Europe and the United States’, in Schulz and Schwartz (eds.), *The Strained Alliance*, pp. 242–7.
- 88 Telcon: The President–HAK, 9 August 1973, HAKTELCONS. Quite what areas were shut down is not clear from the existing source material. However, UK documentation does suggest that some aspect of the intelligence relationship was shut down at this point. See: TNA: FCO 82/311 Richard Sykes to Thomas Brimelow, 13 August 1973. The 1973 intelligence cancellation is also referred to by James Callaghan, then foreign and commonwealth secretary, in 1975. See: TNA: PREM 16/733 James Callaghan to the Prime Minister, 22 July 1975.
- 89 TNA: PREM 15/299 Anglo-French Nuclear Cooperation in the Defence Field: Paper prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, attached to Solly Zuckerman to the Prime Minister, 5 November 1970. In 1971, both Lord Cromer and Lord Carrington repeated such arguments. See: TNA: PREM 15/787 Cromer to the FCO, 17 April 1971; TNA: CAB 130/506 GEN 25 (71) 1st, 5 March 1971.
- 90 TNA: PREM 15/1359 Appendix 1 to Annex B, attached to Robert Armstrong to Robert Andrew, 15 April 1972; TNA: CAB 164/1232 United States–United Kingdom Discussions on European Security: Analysis of Objectives, attached to Howard Smith to Burke Trend, 2 March 1973.
- 91 Schlesinger was appointed US secretary of defense in July 1973. For Schlesinger’s discussion with Kissinger about this see: Memorandum of Conversation, 9 August 1973: File: August 9, 1973 Kissinger–Schlesinger, NSAMC, Box 2, GFL. On the other points made see Telcon: James Schlesinger–Henry A. Kissinger, 28 August 1973, HAKTELCONS. British officials were under orders from the Prime Minister to establish the American position in relation to selling Poseidon to the UK. See: TNA: PREM 15/1360 Tel 1277, Douglas-Home to Washington, 15 June 1973; TNA: PREM 15/1360 Tel 1276, Douglas-Home to Washington, 15 June 1973; TNA: PREM 15/1360 Burke Trend to the Prime Minister, 31 August 1973.
- 92 Telcon: Kissinger–Shultz, 15 August 1973, HAKTELCONS.
- 93 Aldrich, *GCHQ*, p. 289; TNA: 82/311 R. A. Sykes to Thomas Brimelow, 13 August 1973.
- 94 Möckli, *European Foreign Policy*, pp. 170–6.
- 95 Hamilton, ‘Year of Europe’, 882; TNA: CAB 164/1235 Record of Conversation between Sir Thomas Brimelow and the French Foreign Minister, 29 August 1973; TNA: CAB 164/1235 AW to Burke Trend, 22 August 1973.

- 96 Memorandum of Conversation, 7 September 1973, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric Files, 1970–73, Box 2649, NAI; TNA: FCO 82/321 Message from the Prime Minister to the President, Tom Bridges to M. Alexander, 4 September 1973.
- 97 Memorandum for Mr Kissinger from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 11 September 1973, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric Files, 1970–73, Box 2649, NAI.
- 98 Hamilton, 'Year of Europe', 882.
- 99 On 22 September 1973, Kissinger had been sworn in as the 56th US secretary of state. Kissinger retained his role as National Security Adviser.
- 100 TNA: FCO 82/310 Record of Conversation, 24 September 1973.
- 101 Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 3 October 1973, National Security Council Files, Country Files–Europe, Box 679, NPMP.
- 102 Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From 'Empire' by Integration to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 182–3.
- 103 Minutes of the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting, 23 October 1973, in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1969–1976: Arab–Israeli Crisis and War, 1973* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2011), Vol. XXV, Doc. 250, p. 699. On the failure of US intelligence see: U. Joseph-Bar, *The Watchmen Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2005); Robert Litwak, *Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969–1976* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 158.
- 104 TNA: FCO 93/254 Adams to FCO, Tel. 742, 6 October 1973. On British intelligence failures see Geraint Hughes, 'Britain, The Transatlantic Alliance, and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 10:2 (2008), 17–18.
- 105 Alec Douglas-Home, *The Way the Wind Blows* (London: Collins, 1978), Appendix B, pp. 296–301.
- 106 Salim Yaqub, 'The Politics of Stalemate: The Nixon Administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969–73', in Nigel Ashton (ed.), *The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1969–73* (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 35–7. For the best recent overview of the origins of the fourth Arab–Israeli war see: Craig Daigle, *Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1969–1973* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012).
- 107 Since Heath had taken office the British had continued to press Washington that the basis of an Arab–Israeli settlement would involve Israel returning to its pre-1967 borders. See for example: Memorandum of Conversation, 3 July 1973, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Arab–Israeli Crisis and War*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 78, pp. 241–2; Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the Department of State [Eliot] to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs [Kissinger], 24 July 1973, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Arab-Israeli Crisis and War*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 80, p. 246.
- 108 Henry Kissinger, *Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), p. 58.
- 109 Matthew Ferraro, *Tough Going: Anglo-American Relations and the Yom Kippur War* (London: iUniverse, 2007), pp. 1–16; Suri, *Kissinger*, pp. 256–67.
- 110 On the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) see: Asaf Siniver, *Nixon, Kissinger, and U.S. Foreign Policy Making* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

- 111 Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, 6 October 1973, in *FRUS: Arab–Israeli Crisis and War*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 112, pp. 324–37; William Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 2001 revised edition), pp. 106–9; Telcon: Nixon–Kissinger, 7.08 pm, 8 October 1973, HAKTELCONS.
- 112 Hughes, 'Britain, The Transatlantic Alliance', pp. 21–2.
- 113 TNA: FCO 93/254 Cromer to FCO, Tel. 3117, 6 October 1973. On Kissinger's motivations see: Telcon: Nixon–Kissinger, 7.08 pm, 8 October 1973; HAKTELCONS; Telcon: Nixon–Kissinger, 8.38 am, 12 October 1973, *ibid.*
- 114 Kissinger, *Crisis*, pp. 204–5. Cromer had evidently received word from London about Egyptian reluctance given that the prime minister had on 12 October 1973 been told that Egypt would not agree to a ceasefire. See: TNA: PREM 15/1765 Lord Bridges to Prime Minister, Message 6 No. 10 to Blackpool, 12 October 1973. Kissinger's source appears to have been the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin. Kissinger, *Crisis*, pp. 192–3, 204–5.
- 115 TNA: PREM 15/1765 Cromer to FCO, Tel. 0340, 13 October 1973.
- 116 TNA: PREM 15/1765 Douglas-Home to Cairo, Tel. 2305, 12 October 1973; TNA: PREM 15/1765 Adams to FCO, Tel. 0432, 13 October 1973. Douglas-Home rang Kissinger and informed him of this latest information. See: Telcon: Kissinger–Douglas-Home, 2.38 pm, 13 October 1973, HAKTELCONS.
- 117 TNA: PREM 15/1765 Record of a Meeting at Chequers, 13 October 1973; Donald Maitland, *Diverse Times, Sundry Places* (London: Alpha Press, 1996), pp. 197–8.
- 118 Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, 6 October 1973, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Arab–Israeli Crisis and War*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 112, p. 333.
- 119 *Ibid.*, pp. 324–37; Memorandum from William B. Quandt and Donald Stukel of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, in *ibid.*, Doc. 129, pp. 377–9.
- 120 Nixon, *Memoirs*, p. 922.
- 121 Memorandum of Conversation, 13 October 1973, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Arab–Israeli Crisis and War*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 173, p. 485; Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger, 12 October 1976, in *ibid.*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 159, p. 446.
- 122 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 222.
- 123 Kissinger, *Crisis*, pp. 211–12.
- 124 Seymour Hersh, *The Sampson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 230.
- 125 Victor Israelyan, *Inside the Kremlin During the Yom Kippur War* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), pp. 58–60.
- 126 Sulzberger, *The World and Richard Nixon*, p. 185.
- 127 Ziegler, *Heath*, p. 386; Annenberg to SecState, 16 October 1973, Tel. 1755, National Security Council Files, Box 1174, NPMP. For the quote see: Kissinger, *YOU*, p. 709.
- 128 Telcon: Schlesinger–Kissinger, 4.15 pm, 13 October 1973, HAKTELCONS; Telcon: Kissinger–Cromer, 4.35 pm, 13 October 1973, *ibid.*; Telcon: Nixon–Kissinger, 9.04 am, 14 October 1973, *ibid.*
- 129 Telcon: Schlesinger–Kissinger, 4.15 pm, 13 October 1973, *ibid.*

- 130 Memorandum of Conversation, 21 October 1973, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Arab–Israeli Crisis and War*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 221, pp. 633–40; Memorandum of Conversation, 22 October 1973, *ibid.*, Doc. 229, pp. 650–4; Memorandum of Conversation, 22 October 1973, *ibid.*, Doc. 230, pp. 654–60; Memorandum of Conversation, 22 October 1973, *ibid.*, Doc. 232, pp. 662–6.
- 131 John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (London: Allen Lane, 2007), pp. 43–4; Horne, *Kissinger*, p. 294.
- 132 Chaim Herzog, *The War of Atonement: The Inside Story of the Yom Kippur War* (London: Greenhill, 2003), pp. 244–9.
- 133 Backchannel Message from Egyptian President Sadat to President Nixon, 23 October 1973, within: Hotline Message from Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon, 23 October 1973, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Arab–Israeli Crisis and War*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 248, p. 687.
- 134 Backchannel Message from President Nixon to Egyptian President Sadat, 23 October 1973, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Arab–Israeli Crisis and War*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 252, p. 702.
- 135 Secretary Kissinger–Ambassador Dinitz, Telcon, 24 October 1973, HAKTELCONS.
- 136 Hotline Message from Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon, 23 October 1973, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Arab–Israeli Crisis and War*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 246, pp. 684–5; Hotline Message from Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon, 23 October 1973, in *ibid.*, Doc. 247, p. 686; Brezhnev’s letter to Nixon was read by Anatoly Dobrynin to Kissinger. See: Transcript of Telephone Conversation between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin), 24 October 1973, in *ibid.*, Doc. 258, pp. 709–10. The actual message arrived later that afternoon in Washington: Message from Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon, 24 October 1973, in *ibid.*, Doc. 262, pp. 727–8.
- 137 Message from Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon, undated (24 October 1973), in *FRUS 1969–1976: Arab–Israeli Crisis and War*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 267, pp. 734–5.
- 138 *Ibid.* p. 735.
- 139 Hanhimäki, *Flawed*, pp. 315–17; Horne, *Kissinger*, pp. 298–308; Israelyan, *Inside the Kremlin*, pp. 154–64.
- 140 Telcon: Secretary Kissinger–Al Haig, 9.50 pm, 24 October 1973, HAKTELCONS.
- 141 Telcon: Secretary Kissinger–Al Haig, 10.20 pm, 24 October 1973, HAKTELCONS; Memorandum for the Record, 24/25 October 1973, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Arab–Israeli Crisis and War*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 269, pp. 737–42, quote at p. 737.
- 142 Siniver, *US Foreign Policy Making*, pp. 210–20. Why Nixon was not present has led to accusations that the president, troubled by domestic concerns, had resorted to heavy drinking and was thus incapacitated throughout the evening. Nixon was certainly asleep when the message from Moscow arrived. When Kissinger asked whether he should ‘wake up the president’ on learning of Brezhnev’s letter, he was given an immediate response of ‘No’ from Alexander Haig. This conversation began at 9.50 pm. See: Telcon: Secretary Kissinger–Al Haig, 9.50 pm, 24 October 1973, HAKTELCONS. The context to Nixon’s trouble surrounds the resignation of Vice President Spiro Agnew, who had resigned from office on 10 October 1973 as a quid pro quo for being allowed to plead a no contest to criminal charges of corruption during his tenure as Governor of Maryland. On 20 October, President Nixon fired the special prosecutor

- into Watergate, Archibald Cox. This led to the Attorney General, Elliot Richardson, and his deputy, William Ruckelshaus, resigning in protest. This was dubbed by the media as the 'Saturday Night Massacre'. Such was the seriousness of this that Alexander Haig notified Kissinger prior to his arrival back in Washington that he would be returning to 'an environment of major national crisis'. See: Telegram from the White House Chief of Staff [Haig] to Secretary of State Kissinger in Tel Aviv, 22 October 1973, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Arab-Israeli Crisis and War*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 234, p. 668. Also see: Spiro T. Agnew, *Go Quietly or Else* (London: William Morrow, 1980), pp. 15–17; Nixon, *Memoirs*, pp. 912–44. For a good overview see: Horne, *Kissinger*, pp. 301–3.
- 143 Memorandum for the Record, 24/25 October 1973, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Arab-Israeli Crisis and War*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 269, p. 741.
- 144 Nixon, *Memoirs*, p. 938.
- 145 Telcon: Secretary Kissinger–Al Haig, 10.20 pm, 24 October 1973, HAKTELCONS.
- 146 Westad, *Global Cold War*, pp. 199–200.
- 147 Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Times Books, 1996), p. 306.
- 148 'NATO Chiefs Kept in Dark', *Daily Telegraph*, 26 October 1973, p. 1.
- 149 Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations*, pp. 142–3; Dickie, *Special No More*, pp. 148–50.
- 150 Telcon: Lord Cromer–Secretary Kissinger, 25 October 1973, 1.03 am, HAKTELCONS; TNA: PREM 15/1766 Lord Cromer to FCO, 25 October 1973; TNA: PREM 15/1766 Larry Woodman to Lord Bridges, 25 October 1973.
- 151 Aldrich, *GCHQ*, pp. 293–4.
- 152 Telcon: Lord Cromer–Secretary Kissinger, 25 October 1973, 1.03 am, HAKTELCONS.
- 153 Hynes, *The Year*, p. 194.
- 154 'Anxious MPs Hit Out at Nixon's Orders', *The Sun*, 26 October 1973, p. 1.
- 155 TNA: PREM 15/1766 Lord Cromer to Secretary of State [Douglas-Home], 20 October 1973.
- 156 Message from President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev, 25 October 1973, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Arab-Israeli Crisis and War*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 274, pp. 747–8; Israelyan, *Inside the Kremlin*, pp. 178–84; 'Russia Retreats from the Brink', *Daily Telegraph*, 26 October 1973, p. 1.
- 157 WSAG Meeting: Middle East, Quandt and Stukel to Secretary Kissinger, 6 October 1973, NSC Files, Box H-094, NPMP.
- 158 Simon was serving at this juncture as the Deputy Treasury Secretary and would head up the Federal Energy Administration that was created to tackle the oil embargo. Colby was the Director of the CIA. See Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, 6 October 1973, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Arab-Israeli Crisis and War*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 112, pp. 334–5.
- 159 Memorandum of Conversation, 24 October 1973, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Arab-Israeli Crisis and War*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 261, p. 724.
- 160 Memorandum of Conversation, 29 October 1973, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Arab-Israeli Crisis and War*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 298, pp. 787–8; Memorandum of Conversation, 29 November, 1973, in *ibid.*, Doc. 363, pp. 1002–3.
- 161 Memorandum of Conversation, 24 October 1973, in *ibid.*, Doc. 261, p. 724.
- 162 *Ibid.*

- 163 Hynes, *The Year*, p. 210.
- 164 TNA: PREM 15/1382 Heath to Lord Bridges, 28 October 1973.
- 165 TNA: CAB 185/13 JIC(A)(73) 43rd Conclusions, 26 October 1973; TNA: PREM 15/1382 Note by Cabinet Office Assessment Staff: The US Alert of 25th October, 29 October 1973.
- 166 Daniel J. Sargent, 'The United States and Globalization in the 1970s', in Ferguson et al. (eds.), *The Shock of the Global*, p. 49.
- 167 Devuyt, 'American Attitudes on European Political Integration', p. 19.
- 168 Minutes of Washington Special Action Groups Meeting, 19 October 1973, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Arab–Israeli Crisis and War*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 208, p. 607.
- 169 On the Euro–Arab dialogue see: Möckli, *European Foreign Policy*, pp. 198–208, 280–6; Gfeller, *Building a European Identity*, pp. 142–161.
- 170 Giuliano Garavini, 'Completing Decolonization: The 1973 "Oil Shock" and the Struggle for Economic Rights', *International History Review*, 33:3 (2011), 473–87; TNA: PREM 15/1981 Edward Heath to Richard Nixon, 15 June 1973; Willy Brandt, *People and Politics: The Years 1960–1975* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), pp. 466–7.
- 171 Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power* (New York: Pocket Books, 1991), pp. 606–7; David Reynolds, *One World Divisible: A Global History Since 1945* (London: Penguin, 2000), pp. 383–5.
- 172 Reynolds, *One World Divisible*, p. 383; Fiona Venn, 'International Co-operation versus National Self-interest: The United States and Europe during the 1973–1974 Oil Crisis', in Kathleen Burk and Melvyn Stoakes (eds.), *The United States and the European Alliance since 1945* (Oxford: Berg, 1999), pp. 74–5.
- 173 All of this was summarised for Kissinger by the US Ambassador to London, Walter Annenberg. See: From AmEmbassy London to SecState Washington DC, 15 October 1973, Document Number: 1973LONDON11901, from: <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=85557&dt=1573&dl=823> (Accessed 11 June 2009).
- 174 David Frum, *How We Got Here* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), p. 319; *Hansard*, Fifth Series, Vol. 866, col. 649. In the Cabinet it was agreed that contingency plans had to be drawn up to deal with the probable oil embargo. See: TNA: CAB 128/53 CM(73) 47th Conclusions, Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet, 16 October 1973; TNA: PREM 15/1765 Lord Bridges to the Prime Minister, 11 October 1973.
- 175 TNA: CAB 128/53 CM(73) 52nd Conclusions, Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet, 1 November 1973; Yergin, *The Prize*, pp. 606–8; Heath, *The Course*, p. 501.
- 176 Kenneth O. Morgan, *Callaghan: A Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 403.
- 177 TNA: FCO 73/135 Rowley Cromer to Denis Greenhill, 1 November 1973; TNA: PREM 15/2089 A. A. Acland to Thomas Brimelow, 7 November 1973; TNA: FCO 82/308 Lord Cromer to FCO, 30 November 1973; TNA: FCO 82/308 Lord Cromer to FCO, 1 December 1973.
- 178 Noble, 'Kissinger's Year of Europe', 232.
- 179 Memorandum of Conversation, 29 November 1973, in *FRUS 1969–1976: Arab–Israeli Crisis and War*, Vol. XXV, Doc. 363, pp. 1002–3.
- 180 TNA: PREM 15/2232 Lord Cromer to Secretary of State [Douglas-Home] 24 November 1973.

- 181 Possible Pressure Points on the UK–Dissatisfaction with the UK as an Ally, George S. Springsteen to the Secretary [Kissinger], October 1973, Subject Numerical Files, 1970–73, Pol UK–US, NAI; Aldrich, *GCHQ*, pp. 296–8.
- 182 Patrick Tyler, *A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East – From the Cold War to the War on Terror* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2009), p. 164.
- 183 Suri, *Kissinger*, pp. 266–72.
- 184 Kissinger, *YOU*, p. 883.
- 185 Möckli, *European Foreign Policy*, pp. 198–208, 280–6.
- 186 Douglas Hurd, *An End to Promises: A Sketch of Government 1970–74* (London: Collins, 1979), pp. 114–15; TNA: PREM 15/2178 Douglas-Home to Washington, Tel. 2504, 20 December 1973.
- 187 ‘Japan Buying Egyptian Oil’, *Financial Times*, 8 February 1974, p. 7; Yergin, *The Prize*, p. 615.
- 188 Memorandum for the President’s File: Energy Meeting with State and Local elected Officials, 7 November 1973, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 93, NPMP.
- 189 Tyler, *A World of Trouble*, p. 174.
- 190 TNA: PREM 15/1768 JIC(A)(73)34 Middle East: Possible Use of Force by the United States, undated (circa December 1973).
- 191 Hughes, ‘Britain, the Transatlantic Alliance’, 33–4. Such rhetoric did, however, provoke serious analysis in British circles. The Joint Intelligence Committee compiled a lengthy assessment about US intentions. See: TNA PREM 15/1768 JIC(A)(73)34 Middle East: Possible Use of Force by the United States, undated (circa December 1973). Also see Kissinger’s conversation with the British Cabinet Secretary Sir John Hunt. TNA: PREM 15/2178 Record of a Conversation between the Secretary of the Cabinet and the American Secretary of State held at the White House, 30 January 1974.
- 192 TNA: PREM 15/2232 Lord Cromer to Secretary of State [Douglas-Home], 24 November 1973.
- 193 TNA: FCO 82/308 Note for the Record, 29 November 1973.
- 194 TNA: PREM 15/2038 John Hunt to the Prime Minister, 6 November 1973; TNA: PREM 15/2038 John Hunt to the Prime Minister, 4 December 1973; TNA: PREM 15/2089 Extract from Record of Conversation between the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of Italy, 9 December 1973.
- 195 TNA: FCO 30/1685 Mr Alexander to Mr Butler, 26 October 1973.
- 196 TNA: PREM 15/2089 Douglas-Home to Washington, 28 November 1973.
- 197 TNA: PREM 15/2232 Record of Conversation between French, German, UK and US Foreign Ministers, 9 December 1973.
- 198 TNA: PREM 15/2232 John Hunt to Lord Bridges, 11 December 1973; TNA: PREM 15/2232 Edward Peck to FCO, 11 December 1973.
- 199 Sargent, ‘The United States and Globalization’ in Ferguson et al. (eds.), *The Shock of the Global*, p. 50.
- 200 William P. Bundy, *A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), p. 458; TNA: PREM 15/2232 Record of a Conversation between the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Secretary Henry Kissinger, 12 December 1973.

- 201 For the letter see TNA: PREM 15/2178 Earl Sohm to Alec Douglas-Home, 14 December 1973. For the quote see Ziegler, *Heath*, p. 384.
- 202 TNA: FCO 55/1102 Julian Amery to Secretary of State, 18 December 1973.
- 203 Kissinger, *YOU*, p. 885.
- 204 Readers should follow the material contained within TNA: PREM 15/2178; TNA: FCO 59/1155 and TNA: FCO 59/1156.
- 205 Hamilton, 'Year of Europe', 887–9.
- 206 TNA: PREM 15/2178 Richard Nixon to the Prime Minister, attached to Earl D. Sohm to the Prime Minister, 9 January 1974; William E. Simon, *A Time for Reflection* (London: Regnery, 2003), p. 88; Letter to Heads of Government of Major Oil-Consuming Nations Inviting their Participation in a Meeting on International Energy Problems, 10 January 1974, in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard Nixon, 1974*, pp. 9–10.
- 207 Telcon: Helmut Sonnenfeldt–Secretary Kissinger, 2 January 1974, HAKTELCONS; Kissinger, *YOU*, p. 891.
- 208 TNA: PREM 15/2178 Palliser to FCO, Tel. 168, 11 January 1974; TNA: PREM 15/2178 Tomkins to FCO, Tel. 40, 11 January 1974; TNA: PREM 15/2178 Tomkins to FCO, Tel. 44, 12 January 1974; TNA: PREM 15/2178 Douglas-Home to Washington, Tel. 120, 17 January 1974; TNA: PREM 15/2178 Douglas-Home to Washington, Tel. 121, 17 January 1974; Reginald Dale, 'EEC Accepts Invitation to U.S. Oil Conference', *Financial Times*, 16 January 1974.
- 209 TNA: PREM 15/2178 Douglas-Home to Bonn, Tel. 19, 10 January 1974; TNA: PREM 15/2178 Record of a Conversation between the Prime Minister and the Japanese Minister for International Trade and Industry, 11 January 1974; TNA: PREM 15/2178 Douglas-Home to Bonn, Tel. 19, 10 January 1974; TNA: PREM 15/2178 J. L. Taylor to Mr Egerton, 10 January 1974.
- 210 Ziegler, *Heath*, pp. 401–27; Alan Clark, *The Tories: Conservatives and the Nation State, 1922–1997* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998), pp. 350–3.
- 211 TNA: FCO 59/1155 N. M. Fenn to Mr Taylor, 29 January 1974; TNA: FCO 59/1155 Brief 1: Washington Energy Meeting, February 1974; TNA: FCO 59/1155 M. D. Butler to Mr Fenn, 28 January 1974.
- 212 Hunt had replaced the recently retired Burke Trend as Cabinet Secretary.
- 213 On the Hunt visit see TNA: PREM 15/2178 Douglas-Home to Washington, Tel. 192, 25 January 1974; TNA: PREM 15/2178 Record of a Conversation between the Secretary of the Cabinet and the American Secretary of State held at the White House, 30 January 1974. On Kissinger's indiscretion see Telcon: Secretary Kissinger–Dan Rather, 28 January 1974, HAKTELCONS. On the Rampton visit see TNA: PREM 15/2178 From the White House to the Cabinet Office, undated (circa 3 February 1974); TNA: PREM 15/2235 Message from the Prime Minister to President Nixon, undated (circa 5 February 1974).
- 214 TNA: FCO 59/1155 Aide Memoire, attached to S. L. Egerton to G. Campbell, 1 February 1974.
- 215 Hamilton, 'Year of Europe', 889. The mandate is contained within: TNA: FCO 59/1155 Palliser to FCO, Tel. 691, 5 February 1974.
- 216 Jobert made this explicit in his speech on 6 February 1974. See: TNA: FCO 59/1155 Ewart-Biggs to FCO, Tel 162, 6 February 1974; TNA: FCO 59/1155 N. M. Fenn to Mr

- Taylor, 6 February 1974; TNA: FCO 59/1155 Palliser to FCO, Tel. 692, 5 February 1974.
- 217 TNA: FCO 59/1155 H. T. A. Overton to Mr Fenn, 7 February 1974; TNA: FCO 9/1155 N. M. Fenn to Mr Taylor, 6 February 1974; TNA: FCO 59/1155 From FCO to Immediate Certain Missions Tel. Guidance 21, 8 February 1974; TNA: PREM 15/2179 Sykes to FCO, Tel. 516, 9 February 1974.
- 218 For the quote see: Memorandum of Conversation, 17 August 1973; File: August 17, 1973 Kissinger–Schlesinger–John S. Foster, NSAMC, Box 2, GFL. Also see: Memorandum of Conversation, 7 August 1973, *FRUS 1969–1976, European Security*, Vol. XXXIX, Doc. 342, p. 999; Telcon: Kissinger–Shultz, 15 August 1973, HAKTELCONS; Telcon: Secretary Kissinger–Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 10 January 1974, *ibid.*; Telcon: Secretary Kissinger–Dan Rather, 28 January 1974, *ibid.*; Telcon: Secretary Kissinger–Mr McCloy, 8 February 1974, 11.10 am, *ibid.*; Telcon: Secretary Kissinger–Mr McCloy, 8 February 1974, 9.40 pm, *ibid.*
- 219 TNA: PREM 15/2178 Record of a Conversation between the Prime Minister and the German Minister of Finance, 29 January 1974; TNA: FCO 59/1155 The Kissinger Initiative: Draft Steering Brief for the Meeting in Washington on 11 February 1974, attached to G. G. Campbell to J. Taylor, 21 January 1974; TNA: PREM 15/2178 Douglas-Home to Washington, Tel 269, 3 February 1974; TNA: PREM 15/2178 Personal for Sykes from Sir Jack Rampton, undated (circa 3 February 1974); FCO 59/1155 S. J. G. Cambridge to Mr Marshall, 7 February 1974; TNA: FCO 59/1155 P. H. R. Marshall to Mr Butler, 4 February 1974; TNA: FCO 59/1155 S. J. G. Cambridge to Mr Marshall, 7 February 1974; TNA: FCO 59/1156 Steering Brief: Washington Energy Conference 11 February 1974, provided by Department of Energy, 7 February 1974.
- 220 Telcon: Secretary Kissinger–Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 10 January 1974, HAKTELCONS; Telcon: Secretary Kissinger–Dan Rather, 28 January 1974, *ibid*; Kissinger, *YOU*, pp. 897–906.
- 221 James Schlesinger, *America at Century's End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 55.
- 222 Memorandum of Conversation, 8 January 1974, File: January 8, 1974, Kissinger–Schlesinger, NSAMC, Box 3, GFL.
- 223 *Sunday Telegraph*, 9 February 1974.
- 224 Telcon: Secretary Kissinger–Mr McCloy, 8 February 1974, 11.10 am, HAKTELCONS; Telcon: Secretary Kissinger–Mr McCloy, 8 February 1974, 9.40 pm, *ibid*; Telcon: Secretary Kissinger–Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 8 February 1974, *ibid*.
- 225 Memorandum of Conversation, 9 February 1974, File: February 9, 1974, Nixon, Kissinger, George Schultz, William Simon, NSAMC, Box 3, GFL.
- 226 Memorandum for the President from Kenneth Rush, 17 December 1973, NSCIHF, Study Memorandums, Box H-182, NPMP; Memorandum of Conversation, 8 January 1974, File: January 8, 1974, Kissinger–Schlesinger, NSAMC Box 3, GFL.
- 227 TNA: PREM 15/2178 Record of a Conversation between the Secretary of the Cabinet and the American Secretary of State held at the White House, 30 January 1974; TNA: PREM 15/2179 Sykes to FCO, Tel. 516, 9 February 1974.
- 228 Paul Lewis, 'Nixon Seeks Code for Oil Deals', *Financial Times*, 11 February 1974, p. 1.
- 229 From AmEmbassy London to SecState Washington DC, 7 February 1974, Document

- Number: 1974LONDON01769, from: <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=15773&dt=1572&dl=823> (Accessed 11 July 2009).
- 230 Hamilton, 'Year of Europe', 889.
- 231 Kissinger, *YOU*, pp. 913–14.
- 232 All of which was reported to Nixon. See: Telcon: Secretary Kissinger–President Nixon, 11 February 1974, HAKTELCONS. A British report on events is within TNA: FCO 59/1155 Sykes to FCO, Tel. 533, 11 February 1974. For quote see: Cromwell, *The United States and the European Pillar*, p. 90.
- 233 Telcon: Secretary Kissinger–Al Haig, 11 February 1974, HAKTELCONS.
- 234 Telcon: Secretary Kissinger–President Nixon, 11 February 1974, HAKTELCONS.
- 235 *Ibid.*
- 236 Telcon: President Nixon–Secretary Kissinger, 12 February 1974, HAKTELCONS.
- 237 Rupert Cornwell, 'Pompidou Turns a Knife in the European Wound', *Financial Times*, 15 February 1974, p. 6.
- 238 Telcon: General Scowcroft–Secretary Kissinger, 12 February 1974, HAKTELCONS.
- 239 TNA: FCO 59/1155 Sykes to FCO, Tel. 562, 13 February 1974.
- 240 Yergin, *The Prize*, p. 630; TNA: FCO 59/1156 Text: Communiqué of 13 Nation Energy Conference, 14 February 1974. All of the details of the communiqué and what it meant in practical terms were spelt out by Jack Rampton for the Cabinet Secretary. See: TNA: FCO 96/54 Jack Rampton to John Hunt, 15 February 1974.
- 241 TNA: FCO 59/1156 Text: Communiqué of 13 Nation Energy Conference, 14 February 1974.
- 242 Bundy, *Tangled Web*, p. 459; Statement at the Conclusion of the Washington Energy Conference, 13 February 1974, in *Public Papers of the Presidents, Richard Nixon, 1974*, p. 165.
- 243 Telcon: Secretary Kissinger–The President, 14 February 1974, HAKTELCONS.
- 244 Telcon: Secretary Kissinger–The President, 13 February 1974, *ibid.*
- 245 Telcon: General Scowcroft–Secretary Kissinger, 14 February 1974, *ibid.*
- 246 Memorandum for the President's Files: Meeting with John McCloy, 13 March 1973, NSCIHF, Presidential HAK Memcons, Box 1025, NPMP.
- 247 Memorandum of Conversation, 11 March 1974, File: March 11, 1974, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Joint Chiefs, NSAMC, Box 3, GFL.
- 248 John Lewis Gaddis, 'Rescuing Choice from Circumstance: The Statecraft of Henry Kissinger', in Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim (eds.), *The Diplomats, 1939–1979* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 564–92.
- 249 Telcon: The President–HAK, 9 August 1973, HAKTELCONS, Box 24, NPMP.
- 250 Greenhill, *More by Accident*, p. 158.
- 251 Robert Mauthner, 'Almost Like the Good Old Days', *Financial Times*, 26 February 1974, p. 6.
- 252 TNA: FCO 59/1156 Sykes to FCO, Tel. 612, 16 February 1974; TNA: FCO 73/151 Record of Conversation between Mr Wright, Fenn and Cuviller, 15 February 1974. Quote in TNA: FCO 59/1155 M. D. Butler to Mr Wright, 4 February 1974.
- 253 TNA: PREM 15/2232 Record of a Conversation between the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Secretary Henry Kissinger, 12 December 1973.
- 254 A point articulated within Twigge, 'Operation Hullabaloo', 689–701.