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Conclusion

As Henry Kissinger noted in 2001, the contemporary strains in the transatlantic relationship mirrored those experienced throughout the Cold War.¹ As shown in the previous chapters, such an interpretation holds considerable merit. Given the political, economic and social changes witnessed in this era, perhaps scholars should not be surprised that the US–UK relationship was fraught with difficulties. Nevertheless, the traditional interpretation that the Nixon–Heath years were a period of constant acrimony for US–UK relations requires clarification. Nixon’s policies in Vietnam were publicly supported by Heath and, even in the face of stern criticism from other European leaders, Heath remained resolute in his support. Nixon’s détente policies were also publicly supported and US–UK interaction in a number of other areas continued. Intelligence cooperation was a continual feature of the relationship and Heath revitalised US–UK nuclear cooperation. The upgrading of Polaris was a subject that saw continual discussion amongst US–UK policy-makers, and the final decision to upgrade Polaris (in November 1973) confirmed that the US–UK nuclear relationship would continue in spite of the prime minister’s flirtation with the idea of an Anglo-French nuclear deterrent.²

Such information should not lead to a total reversal of our understanding of the Nixon–Heath years. Whatever was stated publicly to the contrary, Heath’s government remained suspicious of Nixon’s détente policies. In particular, there was a constant concern that superpower cooperation could morph into superpower condominium, and the secretive fashion in which the US–PRC rapprochement was conducted only increased London’s suspicions. US–Soviet negotiations concerning SALT were viewed with particular trepidation because Heath’s government believed it could result in the curtailment of US–UK nuclear cooperation. Such concerns had a direct impact on British nuclear policy and Heath’s nuclear overtures to France, and the final decision

to opt for the Chevaline upgrade to Polaris, were driven, in part, by a concern that SALT would limit US–UK nuclear cooperation.³

Other elements of détente, especially the CSCE and MBFR negotiations, were another source of disagreement for US and UK policy-makers. To be sure, the Nixon and Heath governments were in agreement about the undesirability of both projects. Nixon and Kissinger viewed the CSCE with derision, and this was something that British officials largely shared. Nonetheless, there existed a point of clear difference between US and UK policy. Nixon saw the CSCE as a potential avenue for pressuring Soviet foreign policy in other areas deemed more important to US interests. Thus, the CSCE was initially directly linked to reaching a Berlin settlement and, when this was concluded in 1971, the CSCE was linked to progress on SALT and MBFR. Heath's government viewed the CSCE differently. As détente improved East–West relations, it was believed that the CSCE would inevitably be concluded. It was, as Douglas-Home noted, 'unavoidable'.⁴ Accordingly, Heath sought to settle the CSCE as quickly as possible as a way of ensuring that the CSCE would not actually deal with anything deemed to be of extreme importance. This was clearly at variance with US policy and, as such, between 1970 and 1972 this was a continued source of divergence in US and UK policy.

MBFR was an area of deeper concern for both US and UK policy-makers. If not handled correctly, the British government believed MBFR could critically undermine NATO, and Heath wanted the issues surrounding MBFR to be vigorously analysed within NATO. Only once this had been accomplished would NATO undertake serious discussions with the Warsaw Pact. Nixon initially gave little attention to the concept, but by 1971 – due to a mixture of domestic, international and economic motives – the president gave the idea more interest. US policy was designed to press forward with the idea whilst the British continued to debate the merits of the negotiation.

In existing accounts, SALT, MBFR and the CSCE are often depicted as being major sources of antagonism for US–UK relations.⁵ Certainly they were subjects where differences were apparent, but the point that should be remembered is that they were matters to be negotiated. Difference of opinion, in and of itself, does not indicate that US–UK relations were in a crisis. Rather, it merely demonstrates that states have differing interpretations on matters. Indeed, throughout 1969–72 US–UK officials engaged in detailed bilateral discussions on these topics. It was only in 1973–74 when wider US–UK political differences intensified that these differences assumed greater importance. Where US–UK differences on MBFR were once viewed as natural policy divergences that could be negotiated, they were now seen as further proof of a more uncooperative US–UK relationship. Kissinger and Schlesinger viewed British differences as indicative of wider British attempts to undermine US foreign policy. Initially, however, they were viewed as natural points to be debated amongst allies. It is

within this context that US–UK differences on international diplomacy can be properly understood.

Britain's future role

In the opinion of the Nixon White House, several aspects of Heath's foreign policy were regrettable. Nixon had enthusiastically welcomed Heath's election in June 1970, believing that he would reverse Britain's global decline – a point which he felt had only undermined US interests because 'the United States would by necessity be forced to "go it alone" in the foreign policy leadership of the free world'.⁶ Nixon's hopes for Heath were misplaced as Heath fundamentally endorsed Wilson's East of Suez withdrawal in his much-anticipated defence review of 1970. From Washington's perspective this was an annoyance given that the Nixon Doctrine aspired to reduce America's global commitments, and their attempts to promote burden-sharing and improve NATO's conventional forces were also dealt a further blow. Nonetheless, at this stage, the president accepted the British decision philosophically because he accepted that Britain still contributed, as a proportion of GDP, the most of any European state to NATO. *Polaris* had been kept, intelligence facilities in Cyprus remained and the UK's other global bases, notably in Diego Garcia, were also retained. As Kissinger concluded, Heath's government was 'doing as much as they can'.⁷

Heath's overriding foreign policy priority was to obtain British membership of the EEC but he did not view it as a zero sum game. He had no intention of ending aspects of US–UK bilateralism which remained relevant for promoting British interests. The objective was, as Douglas-Home articulated, to have the 'best of both worlds'.⁸ By the end of 1972, Heath had managed to achieve his main foreign policy objective. Britain, at the third time of trying, had attained membership of the EEC. For the Nixon administration this was perceived as potentially troublesome. The US had traditionally supported British membership of the EEC yet Nixon would come to question this. His economic advisers persistently warned about the economic challenges that EEC expansion would pose for US interests and the international economic policies pursued by the president would only further enflame US–EEC economic competition. In 1971, the implementation of a 10 per cent surcharge on imports and the refusal to convert dollar-gold transactions demonstrated Nixon's determination to safeguard US economic interests. Therefore, the expansion of the EEC was largely seen by the president as an economic competitor, rather than as a potential partner.⁹

For Nixon, however, the political, rather than economic, consequences of British EEC membership were more important. Here, Kissinger provided Nixon with several areas where future problems could arise. An 'independent

Europe could prove to be a competitive power center with the US,' Kissinger warned. Nixon feared that the US was potentially losing a close British ally in which confidential and close matters could be discussed. In its place was an enlarged EEC, built on cooler ties and with no foreign policy machinery to work through.¹⁰ Ultimately, despite these concerns, Nixon endorsed British membership of the EEC and even offered clandestine assistance for aiding the UK–EEC negotiations. As Nixon concluded, the US could do very little to prevent British membership of the EEC and, more importantly, he believed British membership could potentially benefit US interests in the longer term as it could turn the EEC into an 'entity'.¹¹ More simply put, the EEC could become a more equitable partner within the Western alliance which would advance the cause of burden-sharing and promote the Nixon Doctrine's wider aspiration of lessening direct US involvement globally.

The year 1973–74 illustrated how misdirected such thinking was. Predictions from the likes of Kissinger that EEC expansion would mark the onset of a more competitive relationship were proving to be accurate. Kissinger's warnings that the EEC's lack of foreign policy apparatus would prohibit easy bilateral relations were clearly highlighted during his 'Year of Europe'. So too was Kissinger's fear that US–UK bilateral contact would be less easy now that Britain was a member of the EEC. Kissinger's wider concern that the EEC would actually challenge US primacy within the Western alliance was also apparent, as the EEC refused to cede to American demands that a higher degree of linkage between economic and political matters should be implemented. When the EEC sought a separate policy initiative towards the Arab–Israeli conflict which directly contradicted US policy at the end of 1973, it was with some justification that US policy-makers lamented the expansion of the EEC.

It was Kissinger's 'Year of Europe', however, that sparked considerable US–UK disagreement. The 'Year of Europe' initially illustrated procedural problems for US–UK interaction now that Britain was a member of the EEC, especially in regard to how the US would negotiate the Declaration of Principles. Kissinger desired to operate bilaterally with European governments and Heath's government, whilst indicating a willingness to follow this course, soon backtracked. The prime minister wanted the EEC to unify a common position, and, once this was achieved, negotiate with the US as a collective.

Procedural issues aside, fundamental differences divided US and UK policy throughout the 'Year of Europe'. Most alarming yet, for US–UK relations, was that Heath and his senior advisers suspected Kissinger's 'Year of Europe' had rather more sinister objectives than those claimed, believing it was the intention of the US to divide and rule the nascent common foreign policy of the EEC. While several scholars have accepted this was Kissinger's objective, there is very little evidence to support such an interpretation. Kissinger certainly

wanted more from the 'Year of Europe' than his stated intentions to improve NATO's forces and provide a symbolic gesture of Atlantic solidarity. Indeed, US policy was designed so that direct linkage was made between US–EEC economic and political interaction. More simply, the Nixon–Kissinger theory of linkage, primarily driving US foreign policy vis-à-vis the USSR, was to be applied to US–EEC relations.

It is this crucial point which really created discord amongst US and UK policy-makers. Heath did not want this conceptualised approach applied to US–EEC relations, because he feared that the US would exploit its security guarantees to Europe as a means of extracting more amenable trade and economic agreements with the EEC. Moreover, Heath did not want the US to influence EEC policies which were at a formative stage. Subsequently, Heath's government sought to resist US policy and did this initially when he let it be known that any US–UK discussions pertaining to the Declaration of Principles would be transmitted to Britain's EEC partners. Following French pressure, and further evidence that Kissinger's real motivations were less altruistic than he presented, Heath suspended all US–UK discussion about the declaration. As Heath informed the US, they would simply have to wait until the EEC had formulated a common position before negotiations could proceed further.

Heath's actions were viewed with incredulity in Washington, because his policy was effectively scuppering any hope of a quick foreign policy success – which Nixon personally wanted to distract attention from his Watergate troubles. More substantively, Heath's decision was seen to mark the end of close US–UK diplomacy, and both Nixon and Kissinger talked about the end of the 'special relationship'.¹² However, Kissinger was determined that his declaration be created along the lines he sought, and therefore exerted bilateral pressure upon Britain to achieve this. This took the form of US–UK intelligence and nuclear cooperation being suspended temporarily. Such tactics soon yielded results for Kissinger, and Heath reversed his policy that US–UK discussions on the declaration could not occur. Indeed, such was the pressure put on the British government that Heath not only allowed US–UK discussion on the declaration, but he also provided the US with reports about UK–EEC discussions about the declaration.

By the beginning of October, the EEC had produced a draft declaration, and British officials were also discussing the declaration with their US counterparts. US–UK relations were, at some level then, recovering from their summer of hostility. The outbreak of the fourth Arab–Israeli war was soon to ruin any hopes of relations being quickly repaired. During the war, Heath was foremost concerned with protecting Britain's oil supplies, but he also envisaged an Arab–Israeli settlement that would follow the general outlines of UN Resolution 242. The conflict for Heath presented both difficulties and opportunities but, by adopting

a neutralist stance towards the war, Heath believed he could bolster his chances of producing an Arab–Israeli settlement as well as protect Britain's oil supplies.

Oil, whilst of course not unimportant in the American opinion, was of secondary concern to larger geopolitical factors. The greatest concern for Washington, then, was the likely reaction of the USSR, and the peace settlement that the US sought was designed to largely omit them from the region. US policy was predicated upon the assumption that Israel would be militarily dominant at the end of the war, because this would ensure that the Arab states would negotiate. In turn, because of the severe losses induced by the surprise Egyptian–Syrian assault, Kissinger believed this would make Israel more susceptible to American pressure to negotiate a lasting political settlement with its Arab neighbours. Accordingly, presenting America as the only power able to broker a peace deal would prise Soviet influence away from its Arab allies.¹³

Given these radically different agendas it was always likely that US and UK policy would come into conflict. This quickly manifested when the British refused to table in the UNSC Kissinger's ceasefire proposals that were predicated upon the idea that all belligerents returned to the status quo ante bellum. In effect, the land occupied by Israel in 1967, and now re-captured by Egyptian and Syrian forces, would have to be given back to Israel. Heath believed that supporting this would be perceived as a pro-Israeli act by the Arab states, and his attempts to pursue a neutral course would be undermined. Heath would again infuriate Washington when he refused to allow US reconnaissance aircraft to fly from British bases in Cyprus to survey the warzone. The US airlift to Israel similarly was not allowed to utilise British air bases.

This level of disagreement was to be dwarfed by the ramifications that emanated from the aftermath of the DEFCON III decision. While Kissinger had informed Cromer of this decision, it was never communicated to the prime minister. Further, Heath believed the US was endangering all of the Western alliance without even consulting those states which would be affected by such a decision. Moving to DEFCON III was also viewed by Heath as a gross overreaction to the situation, and he believed it was largely driven by Nixon's Watergate induced troubles.

Heath's distancing from US policy had serious consequences for British interests when the US once again temporarily suspended its intelligence cooperation with London. This was done as a form of punishment, but Kissinger's ideas for longer-term punishments were never implemented. A series of possible 'pressure points' drawn up for Kissinger all concluded that the cancellation of bilateral security cooperation would only undermine US interests. This Kissinger accepted and, when a British request for additional assistance in upgrading Polaris was made at the beginning of January 1974, this was duly approved.

The Washington Energy Conference was a watershed for US foreign policy towards the enlarged EEC and Britain. It was seen as a lesson in the Nixon White House in how to conduct future diplomacy with its allies. In particular, the US had learned that by utilising a number of tactics, including the temporary cancellation of nuclear and intelligence cooperation, they had managed to ensure that the British would, if forced, operate bilaterally with the US in opposition to Heath's desire to formulate common EEC political and foreign policies. As shown in Chapter 3, US bilateral pressure on British interests could have profound effects upon the direction of British foreign policy. It is the coercive elements in US diplomacy towards its British ally that are currently omitted from existing accounts of the Nixon–Heath years. Yet, as shown above, this was a feature of the relationship, and, more importantly, was an element of US policy that had considerable success at influencing the course of London's policy decisions.

The year 1973–74 was a difficult one for US–UK relations as disagreement, suspicion and recrimination dominated the relationship. Nonetheless, other areas of US–UK interaction indicate that such an analysis must be tempered somewhat. Kissinger tasked Thomas Brimelow with drafting a US–USSR treaty which eventually manifested as the 'Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War' (signed in Washington DC on 22 June 1973). Even though senior British officials enjoyed an often fraught relationship with Kissinger, this did not prevent the continuation of close cooperation. The choice in upgrading Polaris, of course informed by a concern about the future reliability of US nuclear cooperation, did cement US–UK ties.¹⁴ Heath had also illustrated during the Washington Energy Conference his propensity for close US–UK cooperation when he believed that it would better suit UK interests. Indeed, the EEC's disunity at the Washington Energy Conference dealt a blow to Heath's wider aspiration of producing common EEC policies.

Accordingly, a rather more mixed assessment of the Nixon–Heath years than currently exists is required. US–UK relations undoubtedly witnessed severe problems and adapting to British membership of the EEC created numerous difficulties. Détente and the subsequent diplomacy it created – be it the CSCE, MBFR or SALT – continued to be points of US–UK disagreement. Yet in other realms US–UK cooperation remained remarkably close and consistent. Thus, the portrayal of the US–UK relationship in the Nixon–Heath period must be one that emphasises discord, cooperation and diplomatic coercion.

Wilson's return

Wilson's return to office saw renewed efforts to re-establish closer US–UK relations. Both Wilson and Callaghan were much cooler towards the EEC

and, whilst the renegotiation of the terms of EEC entry were mainly a facade generated by Wilson to appease his domestic critics, it did signal Wilson's intention to refocus upon US–UK relations. This, Wilson believed, would allow Britain to influence US policy more directly, whilst accepting that EEC membership would allow Britain to derive a number of economic benefits. Indeed, what Wilson had sought in the 1960s was the basis of his foreign policy throughout the 1970s.

Wilson's defence cutbacks, coupled with Britain's economic troubles, were to undermine his foreign policy ambitions. US–UK relations were blighted by Britain's chronic economic problems and the unwillingness of Wilson to maintain Britain's defence efforts. However, as previous studies have illustrated, Wilson's defence cuts had little effect on the more practical aspects of US–UK defence cooperation.¹⁵ Such arguments are correct but, given what new material from the archives highlights, this analysis requires further qualification. Firstly, US–UK nuclear and intelligence cooperation was utilised by the Ford administration to influence the scope of British defence cuts, and the nature of US–UK cooperation exposed the British to this type of US pressure. This was evident during Wilson's decision to retain Britain's intelligence facilities in Cyprus when he had initially wanted to close them yet, following US opposition, the British prime minister reversed his decision. On other occasions US efforts were rather less successful. Wilson enacted defence cuts even when Kissinger and Schlesinger threatened to permanently suspend nuclear and intelligence assistance. Wilson calculated, correctly, that the US would not terminate this cooperation because it enhanced US interests. In sum, the coercive diplomacy practised by the US at this juncture was rather less successful than its practitioners hoped for. Nevertheless, the fact that this coercive diplomacy existed is telling about the fashion in which the 'special relationship' was viewed by both the Nixon and Ford administrations.

Callaghan and Ford

Callaghan's first ten months in office were dominated by Britain's economic crisis. Due to Britain's worsening recession, the speculative attacks on sterling and the growing rate of the PSBR, Callaghan had to seek an IMF loan. The greatest concern for the prime minister was to avoid having to accept a loan that insisted on a significant reduction in Britain's PSBR. Callaghan also wanted a safety net loan from the G10 to defend sterling from currency speculation. In order to obtain all of this, Callaghan wanted the Ford administration to pressure the IMF into providing Britain with preferential loan conditions. This, he believed, would be forthcoming because of Britain's military and strategic importance to the US.

This was a fatal misjudgement by Callaghan. His appeals to Ford, Kissinger and Scowcroft ultimately failed to deliver the type of results he wanted. Ford's political advisers did not believe Britain warranted preferential economic treatment. Meanwhile, Ford's economic advisers believed the IMF's demand that Britain significantly reduce its PSBR was a necessity and, moreover, in Britain's long-term interests. Consequently, the Ford administration refused to intercede in the UK–IMF negotiations.

The IMF crisis illustrated a lack of US–UK cooperation in the form that Callaghan wanted. Nevertheless, as other commentators have noted, the more institutionalised aspects of US–UK cooperation continued to function smoothly in this period.¹⁶ Even in spite of this, it is apparent that the courting of the US–UK special relationship – at first by Wilson, and then pursued by Callaghan – had failed to provide the political influence within Washington when London needed it most. The *Daily Telegraph*, in its review of 1976, captured Britain's declined position rather well when it noted: 'Thus 1976 ends in total disarray, and perhaps the only consolation to the bewildered onlooker is that the farce is now rapidly drawing to its close, and a dénouement at hand.'¹⁷ Of course, the British foreign policy-making establishment did not articulate British decline in such a manner. But one FCO briefing memorandum for David Owen, appointed foreign and commonwealth secretary in February 1977, articulated a very similar point about the continuing significance of the US–UK relationship:

During the last administration our relations with the US were generally good, due both to mutual interest and to the close relationship which Mr Callaghan and later Mr Crosland developed with Dr Kissinger ... But even at the height of the good relationship with Dr Kissinger, the relationship was no longer an exclusive one: the FRG now matters as much to the US as does the UK, and even US–French relations are on a firmer setting.¹⁸

Conclusion

This then serves as an interesting episode in which to draw some broader conclusions about the nature of the US–UK relationship. Certainly the idea that the most 'special' aspects of the relationship were immune to the 'transitory' effects of politics is a highly questionable one, given that intelligence and nuclear cooperation were to be affected because of political disputes in this period.¹⁹ However, longer-term consequences were avoided. Despite the level of political dissatisfaction in Washington towards their British ally, the US–UK relationship was still deemed to promote US interests. It is quite clear from this period that the 'functional' aspects of the US–UK relationship triumphed over any short-term political differences.

The other striking feature of this period was the level of coercion that US policy-makers practised in their diplomacy towards their British ally. The vast number of studies on the diplomacy of the Nixon–Kissinger–Ford years usually associates this practice with US foes. However, this study has shown that coercion was part and parcel of US alliance diplomacy also. Studies on US–UK relations during the years under study here omit this element of the relationship altogether.²⁰ Of course, it should be remembered that coercion in US diplomacy was not the dominant theme in US–UK relations. Indeed, quite the opposite was the case, as diplomatic cooperation on a number of issues – along with security cooperation – was far more common than coercive diplomacy was.

Further to this, when coercion was utilised by the US it had quite mixed results. It was most successful during the ‘Year of Europe’ period when US pressure was able to reverse Heath’s policy course. Likewise, US pressure later on in the year was to have a profound influence upon Heath’s wider European ambitions, when he chose to side with the US at the Washington Energy Conference. Given such success, then, it was only ever likely that US policy-makers would seek to utilise coercive diplomacy in future political disputes with the UK. Yet the government of Harold Wilson proved itself far more resilient to US pressure. In fact, Wilson had a far more accurate understanding of the dimensions of power in the US–UK relationship. Whilst aware that the US could retract its intelligence and nuclear cooperation, he correctly concluded that the US would never do this because it actually promoted US interests. Wilson, far more so than Heath, understood the functional aspects of the US–UK relationship.

Whilst the US–UK relationship declined in importance during this period, in both the international arena and as an aspect of bilateral relations between the two states, it did not mark a terminal decline for the US–UK relationship either. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), the onset of more belligerent US–Soviet relations, the coup in Iran by Islamic fundamentalists (1979) and the steadily worsening US economy, US–UK interaction and cooperation increased.²¹ As John Dumbrell points out, the US–UK relationship was forged in war, and is at its most ‘special’ during such moments.²² As readers will note, the US–UK ‘special relationship’, for better or worse, continues to function within the contemporary world of international relations.

Détente, therefore, was a curious phenomenon in which the US–UK relationship was to operate. Throughout, there was – as a former British ambassador to the US noted of the entire US–UK relationship – a level of ‘mutual assured schizophrenia’ which permeated the relationship in this period.²³ Even so, US–UK cooperation remained remarkably consistent despite numerous policy clashes and differences throughout 1969–77. Perhaps Kissinger sums up the

relationship best: ‘Nobody ever said that the special relationship precluded disagreements’ but ‘we had a degree of confidence in British leaders that we did not have in leaders of any other country’.²⁴

Notes

- 1 Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p. 33.
- 2 On the possibility of Anglo–French nuclear weapons co-operation see: Kristan Stoddart, ‘Nuclear Weapons in Britain’s Policy towards France, 1960–1974’, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 18:4 (2007), 719–44.
- 3 This theme is pressed keenly within Baylis, ‘Moscow Criterion’.
- 4 TNA: FCO 82/197 Record of Conversation, 14 September 1972.
- 5 Hynes, *The Year*; Rossbach, *Rebirth*.
- 6 Nixon, *Memoirs*, p. 179.
- 7 Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, 3 November 1970, NSCIHF, National Security Decision Memorandums, Box H-219, NPMP.
- 8 TNA: PREM 15/2089 Douglas-Home to Prime Minister, 17 October 1973.
- 9 Matusow, *Nixon’s Economy*, pp. 130–3.
- 10 Discussion of United States Policy Toward Europe: NSC Meeting, 28 January 1970, NSCIHF, Meeting Files, National Security Council Meetings, Box H-026, NPMP.
- 11 Memorandum of Conversation, 17 December 1970, NSCIHF, Presidential-HAK Memcons, Box 1024, NPMP.
- 12 Telcon: The President–Kissinger, 13 August 1973, HAKTELCONS; Telcon: The President–Kissinger, 14 August 1973, HAKTELCONS.
- 13 Suri, *Kissinger*, pp. 257–65.
- 14 Twigge, ‘Operation Hullabaloo’, 689–701.
- 15 Baylis, *Defence Relations*, pp. 109–15.
- 16 *Ibid.*
- 17 Paul Johnson, ‘Democracy – at Pistol Point!’, *Daily Telegraph*, 31 December 1976.
- 18 TNA: FCO 82/687 G. N. Smith to Mr Edmonds, 16 February 1977.
- 19 Keith Jeffery, *MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 1909–1949* (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), p. 721; Richard J. Aldrich, ‘British Intelligence and the Anglo-American “Special Relationship”’, *Review of International Studies*, 24:1 (1998), 337.
- 20 Hynes, *The Year*; Rossbach, *Rebirth*; Scott, *Allies Apart*.
- 21 David Owen, *Time to Declare* (London: Michael Joseph, 1991), pp. 283–5, 307–18; Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), pp. 256–83.
- 22 Dumbrell, *Anglo–American Relations From the Cold War to Iraq*, pp. 1–10.
- 23 Christopher Meyer, *DC Confidential: The Controversial Memoirs of Britain’s Ambassador to the US at the Time of 9/11 and the Iraq War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), p. 173.
- 24 Ziegler, *Heath*, p. 378.