

Eurasian security governance: new threats, institutional adaptations

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Halford Mackinder developed the geostrategic formulation recognising that international politics encompasses the globe. His simple formulation, which guided early twentieth-century policy-makers and theorists in North America and continental Europe alike, held that the state that controls the Eurasian heartland controls the periphery, and the state that controls the periphery controls the world.¹ More so than in the first decade of the twentieth century, the European system has ceased to be 'European' – the great powers are no longer solely European in the cultural or geographical sense. The end of the Cold War eradicated the *cordon sanitaire* provided by the Soviet empire that largely protected the prosperous western half of Europe from the dysfunctional social, ideological or religious, political and economic systems of Eurasia. Paradoxically, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the institution that best served the security interests of the West in its competition with the Soviet Union, is now relatively ill-equipped to defend against or resolve the threats emanating from Eurasia to the Atlantic system of security governance, which had emerged over the course of the postwar period and is now facing a difficult transition to the post-Cold War environment.

The changing nature of the security agenda and security dilemmas facing the states of Europe and North America make the transatlantic community increasingly vulnerable to threats originating outside its immediate geographic ambit, a point brought home to the United States on September 11 2001. The openness of the European states to external influences, the free movement of peoples and goods, and domestic political liberalism have made these states soft targets. The international system described by Mackinder remains operative in the still-important military sense: states remain defined by their territoriality and the existential threat posed to them by a direct military attack by another state. At the same time, however, the European states are less concerned about territoriality (and the threat of war) and more

concerned with sustaining the western system of security governance and extending it as far eastward into Eurasia as necessary. The western European states and the United States wish to reproduce in Eurasia their norms of statecraft, particularly the prohibitory norm against the use of weapons of mass destruction, as well as to impose dispute- and conflict-resolution mechanisms of western design. To put it benignly, the Americans and western Europeans hope to manufacture the conditions necessary to project the security community created in the Atlantic area in the postwar period into the eastern periphery of Eurasia.²

A question arises as to whether this system of security governance, which is being progressively extended from western to eastern Europe, can be eventually projected farther into Eurasia. The concern is not simply that the 'Great Game' of diplomacy played out by Great Britain and Tsarist Russia in the nineteenth century will be replicated as a triangular competition between the United States, Russia and China. Central Asia and the Balkans, in particular, have regained a lost geostrategic or geoeconomic significance in the twenty-first century. These areas' importance is linked to their pivotal geographical position as a nexus between the Atlantic security zone and the Middle East and Asia and as potential buffers or transit points between the Islamic Middle East and Christian Europe. Central Asia will play an especially critical role as an alternative source of energy supply for Europe and Northeast Asia, will either help repair or deepen the environmental distress occasioned by climatic change, will serve either as a sanctuary for terrorism against the West or as a staging ground for its eradication, and may become transformed into a region defined by weak state structures and ethnic irredentism or by strong states with democratic institutions.

Perhaps as important, the evolution of Islam in this region – whether it will assume a relatively non-intrusive secular role as in Turkey or a radical variant of Islamic fundamentalism as in the Taliban's Afghanistan – will have important implications for the security of Europe's southern flank, the prospect for deep and secure economic ties between Eurasia and Europe, and the geostrategic relationships between Eurasia's greater and lesser powers. Three important policy-relevant questions with theoretical implications are of interest: what are the nature of the security threats posed to Europe that originate in Eurasia? Can the 'West' incorporate Eurasia into the western system of security governance? Will the future system of security governance be cooperative or will it evolve into a competitive system of balancing and shifting alliances? *Limiting Institutions?* focuses on the security dilemmas facing the states of Eurasia, the sources and kinds of threats posed to the European political space by Eurasia, and the role that international institutions are playing and may play in the creation of a sustainable system of security governance encompassing the Eurasian land mass.

Security governance in Eurasia

Security governance is the policy problem confronting the great Eurasian powers in the contemporary international system. The postwar security system encompassing the Eurasian landmass was governed by the stable crisis produced by the bipolar distribution of power and the alliance system it spawned. Conflicts between the two superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union, were played out in the deadly logic of nuclear deterrence, limited wars along the periphery of Asia, and proxy wars in Africa and Latin America. The ideological Manichaeism and structural rigidity of the postwar period have now yielded to structural fluidity and ill-defined civilisational disputations.

The postwar system of countervailing power created by NATO and the Warsaw Pact unraveled with the latter's dissolution and the progressive transformation of NATO from a military alliance with an Atlantic perspective into a pan-European political organisation with an increasingly residual military role. The challenge of security governance for the West reflects neither the transformation of NATO into a political organisation nor the nascent emergence of a Euro-American security community extending eastward and encompassing the Russian Federation. The challenge is located in the absence of and difficulty of constructing an effective system of governance encompassing the whole of Eurasia.

Security governance has received increasing attention since 1989.³ Its rising conceptual salience is derived in large measure from the challenges presented by the 'new' security agenda. Security governance has been defined as 'an international system of rule, dependent on the acceptance of a majority of states (or at least the major powers) that are affected, which through regulatory mechanisms (both formal and informal), governs activities across a range of security and security-related issue areas'.⁴ This definition of security governance is largely consistent with that of those analysts who insist that: institutions are mechanisms employed by states to further their own goals;⁵ states are the primary actors in international relations and some states are more equal than others;⁶ power relationships are not only material but normative;⁷ and states are constrained by institutions with respect to proscribed and prescribed behaviour.⁸ This broad conceptual definition of security governance allows scholars to investigate the role institutions play from any number of methodological perspectives. As importantly, it allows us to ask if the necessary conditions exist in Eurasia for the successful eastward extension of the Atlantic security community into Eurasia or if the dynamics of the Eurasian state system are incompatible with it. It leaves open the possibility that the system can be extended into Eurasia as well as the prospect that the Eurasian state system will embrace the logic of anarchy and manifest its by-products, the balancing of power and perfidious alliance partners.

Both Robert O. Keohane and Robert Jervis have addressed the requirements of security governance in the contemporary international system.⁹ Jervis has argued that the western system of security governance produced a security community that was contingent upon five necessary and sufficient conditions. The first two concern beliefs about war and the cost of waging it. The first requires national elites generally to eschew wars of conquest, and war as an instrument of statecraft, at least with one another; the second that the costs of waging such a war outweigh any conceivable benefits, material or other. The second two conditions are the embrace of political and economic liberalism. The first requires national elites to accept that the best path to national prosperity is peaceful economic intercourse rather than conquest or empire, in order to eliminate the rationale for war and economic closure. The second calls for the existence of domestic democratic governance, in order that the domestic practice of compromise, negotiation and rule of law characterises relations between states. The final condition stipulates that states be satisfied with the territorial status quo, a condition that mitigates the security dilemma.¹⁰

All five conditions are met in the Atlantic security community; they are lacking in most of Eurasia. Keohane recognises this problem in his discussion of the barriers to global governance.¹¹ Keohane's expressed scepticism about constructing a system of global governance is instructive in the context of extending the Atlantic system of security governance. He identified three barriers to global governance that can usefully be adapted to the problem of security governance in Eurasia. The first is the cultural, religious and civilisational heterogeneity of Eurasia, which probably prohibits the wholesale adoption of the European norms and principles that animate the existing Atlantic system of security governance. European norms are as likely to be particular as they are universal. The second and related barrier is the absence of a consensus about beliefs and norms, which would make the likelihood of extending the Atlantic system of security governance into Eurasia virtually non-existent.¹² The third barrier to a Eurasian system of security governance is the absence of an institutional fabric that is both thick enough to meet the challenge of governance and consistent with indigenous (rather than European) norms and beliefs about the practice of statecraft and even national governance.

Both Jervis and Keohane expressed concern about the sustainability of the western systems of governance and the prospects for their eventual globalisation. Jervis asked the question, 'What are the implications of the existence of the security community for international politics in the rest of the world?' That query is not the one addressed in this book. Instead, we pose an alternative question, 'What are the implications of an anarchical Eurasia for the Atlantic security community?' The problem facing the states of Eurasia is a simple one: will the efforts to extend or impose western values and institutional forms into Central and East Asia produce a convergence or divergence

of behaviour around the pre-existing European norm, some normative compromise between the Occident and Orient, or a lapse into the corrosive competition inherent to international anarchy? Will a failed effort to extend the western system of security governance into Eurasia delegitimise it? Will the heterogeneity of the states occupying the geopolitical space of 'Eurasia' push all states towards a renewed embrace of the sovereignty norm and the system of alliances it inevitably engenders?

These questions are important because the evolution of international politics in Eurasia is not peripheral to European security and is central to the successful expansion of the Atlantic security community into eastern Europe, including the Russian Federation. The postwar security order sponsored by the United States was a system of security governance suffused by three norms: democratic governance and conformity with the market, collective defence, and multilateralism.¹³ As long as bipolarity characterised the European state system and as long as the requirements of nuclear deterrence and conventional balance dominated the security calculus, there was little debate among elites about the fundamental threat posed to Europe or how to meet that threat. The absorption or participation of the Eurasian states into this institutionalised system of security governance presents an important challenge to continuing systemic stability. The very heterogeneity of this grouping of states – a geopolitical heterogeneity internal to the states of the Atlantic community and a normative heterogeneity between the states of Eurasia and the Atlantic community – raises at least five questions about the institutionalisation of security in Eurasia: why is Eurasia relevant to the security concerns of the Atlantic Community? What are the security dilemmas faced by the states of Eurasia? What relevance does alliance theory have for the evolution of Eurasian security? What are the boundaries of a Eurasian system of security governance and how high are the barriers for assimilating non-European states into a European order? What role can institutions play in creating a Eurasian system of security governance?

Diffusion and the new security agenda

The absence of a Eurasian system of security governance is given special meaning and force owing to the changing nature of the security threats facing the states of prosperous Europe. The long-lived distinctions between the 'high' and 'low' politics of international affairs and between domestic and foreign policy have been increasingly rendered obsolete by the changed context of state action and changing nature of the European state.¹⁴ The 'high' politics of diplomacy and the 'low' politics of commerce had largely obscured the now transparent interdependence between these two fields of action. The line between foreign and domestic policy has become so blurred that the distinction has lost much of its conceptual force. The emergence of

new arenas and sources of conflict – weak state structures, ethnic conflict, environmental threats – and new technologies that render state boundaries increasingly porous – particularly cyberspace and the internationalisation of commerce and capital – have broadened the systemic requirements of security.¹⁵ The new security agenda raises two important questions: why have these new security threats risen to prominence in the post-Cold War period? Do the Eurasian states pose a putative threat to the systemic or milieu goals of the Atlantic states, to the integrity of the central and eastern European states and authority structures, or to the societal integrity of those states individually and collectively? Put differently, can the security threats posed by Eurasia to itself and to Europe be treated as the relatively simple problem of identifying state-to-state threats that unequivocally represent a state-centric security calculus where the state is both the subject and object of analysis? The answers to these questions are central to the chapters in Part II of *Limiting Institutions?*.

The most promising conceptual category of response focuses on the altered structure of the European state system and the changing nature of the European state.¹⁶ The emergence of new security threats in Europe suggests that we can no longer conceive of security in terms of a policy choice restricted to specific dyads of states. Threats can no longer be simply disaggregated into the capabilities and intentions of states; primacy can no longer be attributed to the state as either agent or object.¹⁷ A definition of security restricted to the traditional concern with territorial integrity or the protection of ill-defined but well-understood ‘national interests’ would exclude threats to the social fabric of domestic or international societies or threats emanating from states with imperfect control over their territory, weakened legitimacy, or persistent interethnic conflicts. Moreover, the growing irrelevance of territoriality and the continuing importance of jurisdictional sovereignty have left states vulnerable to these new categories of threat: national responses are no longer adequate, yet the division of political space into states jealously guarding their sovereignty inhibits collective responses to these diffused threats. The sovereignty norm of the Westphalian system, therefore, has placed a barrier to cooperative outcomes – even in the Atlantic security community.

The key characteristic of the Westphalian state is its ‘territoriality’. Described by John H. Herz as a ‘hard shell’ protecting states and societies from the external environment, territoriality is increasingly irrelevant, not only in Europe but in the newly formed states of Eurasia. States no longer enjoy the luxury of a ‘wall of defensibility’ that leaves them relatively immune to external penetration. As noted by Wolfram Hanrieder, even though Herz later changed his mind about the demise of the territorial state, ‘his argument on the changed meaning and importance of territoriality was clearly valid’.¹⁸ It not only forces us to change our conception of power – shifting attention from the military-strategic to the economic – but should

also change our understanding of threat. As the boundaries between the state and the external environment have become increasingly blurred, it leaves open the possibility that the new security threats may operate along channels dissimilar to the traditional threats posed to the territorial state.

The 'interconnectedness' of the post-Westphalian state system, most visible in western Europe, was facilitated and reinforced by the success of the postwar institutions of American design as well as by European economic and political integration.¹⁹ Geography, technological innovations, the convergence around the norms of political and economic openness, and a rising 'dynamic density' of the Atlantic political space have progressively stripped away the prerogatives of sovereignty and eliminated the autonomy once afforded powerful states by territoriality.²⁰ These elements of the contemporary European state system appear to have linked the states of Europe together irrevocably, are spreading outwards into Eurasia, and now facilitate the transformation of domestic and foreign policy disequilibria in the Eurasian states into security threats for the affluent states of Europe.

The porousness of national boundaries in the contemporary European state system has made it more likely that 'domestic' disturbances – particularly those that are either economic or environmental in origin – are not easily contained within a single state and are easily diffused throughout the European system. The postulated ease with which domestic disturbances are transmitted across national boundaries and the difficulty of defending against those disturbances underline the strength and vulnerability of the contemporary state system: the openness of these states and societies along an ever expanding spectrum of interaction provides greater levels of collective welfare than would otherwise be possible, yet the very transmission belts facilitating that welfare also serve as diffusion mechanisms hindering the ability of the state to inoculate itself against disturbances within the subsystem. The concept of diffusion is highly suggestive in this context.²¹

The different elements of the new security agenda explored in the chapters that follow are spread by at least four readily identifiable diffusion mechanisms: the growing dynamic density of the Eurasian political space; flawed or underdeveloped civil societies or political institutions of democracy; geographic propinquity; and the ubiquitousness of cyberspace. Cyberspace, for example, has helped erase national boundaries and signified the potential irrelevance of geographic space. It still escapes effective state control and provides the perfect instrument for non-state and societal actors seeking to destabilise any particular state or aspect of a society. Geographic propinquity and the absence of effective interstate barriers to migration mean that domestic disturbances anywhere in the Eurasian political space, be it from ethnic strife, environmental degradation, or the criminalisation of national economies or of state structures, could be externalised and initiate destabilising migratory flows.

It is the growing dynamic density of the Eurasian security space in

conjunction with the established dynamic density of the Atlantic security space that provides the most pervasive and nettlesome mechanisms of diffusion. The dynamic density of the Atlantic security space gives the European state system its distinctive character, particularly the erosion of meaningful national boundaries and the progressive loss of state control over the decisions of individuals, markedly within the sphere of the economy. The very transmission belts of economic prosperity – largely unrestricted capital markets, high levels of trade, and the absence of exchange controls – also provide the mechanisms for facilitating the criminalisation of national economies, for initiating the erosion of the authority and legitimacy of weak states in transition, and for generating exogenous shocks to national economies that states can no longer effectively control, especially as Eurasia becomes integrated into the Atlantic economy. Moreover, the states along the periphery of affluent Europe are plagued by weak civil societies, ineffective or corrupted judiciaries and other democratic structures, and economies that are either criminalised or escape the effective jurisdiction of national authority. Not only are these states hostage to their interdependence with the rest of Europe, but that interdependence has the potential to transform Eurasian disequilibria – domestic or regional – into potential security threats for the states of affluent Europe.

National authorities in the Atlantic area can no longer discharge their responsibilities by simply maintaining territorial integrity and ensuring economic growth. The broadening of the security agenda has increased the tasks and difficulties of governance, while the transformation of the European state has made it increasingly difficult to achieve its security goals. Security threats now require a joint rather than unilateral resolution. Security threats cannot be simply disaggregated into the capabilities and intentions of states; primacy can no longer be attributed to the state as either agent or object. Rather, security threats have acquired a system-wide significance that demands an alternative conceptualisation of the security dilemmas facing states and the institutional responses to them.

The old and new security dilemmas: the Eurasian paradox

Does the traditional security dilemma continue to constrain state choice in the Eurasian context? Yes and no. Unlike the European security space, where there is growing agreement that the dilemma has been resolved and a security community has emerged, the security dilemma continues to plague interstate relations throughout most of Eurasia.²² Robert Jervis located the security dilemma in the unhappy circumstance that ‘many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others’.²³ Many Eurasian states remain fixated with issues of territorial integrity and face acute territorial challenges (e.g., China and the Xinjiang province or Russia and Chechnya). These states also remain relatively unencumbered by

the widespread norm against the use of military force to resolve outstanding territorial disputes among one another (e.g., India and Pakistan); these states remain challenged in many cases by internal threats to legitimacy (e.g., Azerbaijan and Karabagh).

Whereas amity has become the contextual hallmark of interstate relations within a wider Europe, enmity remains the hallmark of a large number of bilateral relationships in Eurasia. This unfavourable external context should therefore lead us to expect significant barriers to cooperation and consequently to the effective institutionalisation of security relations between the Eurasian states. Moreover, the continued (and rational) preoccupation with relative gains calculations by the Eurasian states guarantees that their prime objective will be to ensure that cooperation does not lead to a disadvantageous change in the hierarchy of regional power. These states remain, in Joseph Grieco's felicitous phrase, 'defensively positional' – states are more concerned with their relative power position (however defined) than with assuring the maximum absolute gain derived from cooperation.²⁴ Thus, the context of state action is not particularly supportive of institutionalised security cooperation or the wholesale embrace of the European system of security governance.

At the same time, this security dilemma has become less intense and inverted along Eurasia's western frontier. Within Europe, the postwar security dilemma of military insecurity has been replaced by the post-Cold War security dilemma of ensuring political and economic stability along its borders. The nations of western Europe fear the negative consequences of political and economic insecurity in eastern Europe and beyond. Consequently, any measures taken by the nations along Europe's eastern periphery that enhance national security, defined broadly in its military or economic dimensions, are viewed as a positive contribution to European security rather than as a threat to it. This new security dilemma, derived from the contest over the allocation of scarce national resources between policies that generate domestic plenty and those that generate external stability, also provides an incentive and possibility for the nations of western Europe to cooperate with their eastern neighbours even at the risk of being exploited: security free-riding by these nations poses a lesser threat to the NATO states than does the re-emergence of authoritarian regimes or economic collapse that could disrupt the reconciliation of the two halves of Europe. This change in the perception of threat is illustrated by: the transformation of NATO into a political alliance encompassing both halves of Europe; the creation of the NATO–Russian Council that may be the first step towards full Russian membership in NATO; the Ukrainian application for NATO membership, which, if accepted, will project the alliance in the Eurasian 'heartland'; and NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, which has made critical inroads into ordering civil–military relations and fostering security cooperation along the entire southern Eurasian periphery,

from Albania to Tajikistan. For the founding states of the European Union (EU) and NATO, therefore, the concern is not with its neighbours seeking too much security, but with its neighbours being too insecure.

The Eurasian states face both security dilemmas and a policy paradox: the security dilemma identified by Jervis requires each state to guard against any disadvantageous change in the military status quo while pursuing an advantageous change in its position along the regional hierarchy; and policies redressing the new security dilemma, which is preoccupied with fostering states that are domestically secure and economically prosperous, could produce a disadvantageous change in the regional hierarchy of states. In the absence of a system of security governance, particularly the institutionalisation of the norms and rules of European statecraft, Eurasia will remain a source of instability for the Atlantic security community. Stability in Eurasia – as in eastern and southern Europe – remains dependent upon a stable economic and military environment, but in much less favourable circumstances. Unlike eastern and southern Europe, however, it is likely that the transitions to democracy and the market economy will remain generally intractable owing to unfavourable economic, cultural, ethnic and political factors domestically and a competitive military-strategic calculus internationally. Institutions have none the less made inroads into Eurasia, but will they facilitate the transition to the European-sponsored security community, or simply move Eurasia towards a less conflict-riven international society?

Alliance theory and Eurasia: help or hindrance to understanding?

Alliances are perhaps the most ‘primitive’ form of international institution. They have also been the most important historically. Alliances, as either formal or informal institutions, are regarded as effective mechanisms for regulating disequilibria in the international system.²⁵ A weak system of security governance in Eurasia could be founded upon a system of alliances. An alliance-based system of security governance, however, suffers from one important disability: military alliances are not particularly well-equipped to address the security challenges currently facing these states. The sources, as opposed to the symptoms, of conflicts arising from ethnic irredentism, weak state structures, energy shortages and environmental dislocations, to name a few, are not easily resolved by military means. A reliance upon alliances, both as a policy instrument and as a conceptual device for ordering inter-state relations, could well prove a dangerous choice in the changed Eurasian security environment.

Alliance theory has provided the framework for understanding not only the evolution of the postwar European security order, but that of the European state system since 1648. The contemporary debate has been largely framed by the question of whether states balance power, interests or

threats.²⁶ There are two ancillary questions driving this debate. The first asks whether states, in forming those alliances, balance or bandwagon.²⁷ The second revolves around the appropriate assumption to make about state preferences; viz., do states maximise absolute or relative gains? (While this particular debate over preferences is largely spent, it is clear that a system of security governance along the European model would require an external environment that would allow states to maximise absolute rather than relative gains.)²⁸ The problem of bandwagoning and balancing remains salient in a condition of anarchy. Stephen Walt has provided a relatively uncomplicated and useful definition of both: '*Balancing* is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat; *bandwagoning* refers to alignment with the source of danger . . . balancing is alignment with the weaker side, bandwagoning is with the stronger.'²⁹ However, the relative fluidity of the contemporary international system, the evolution of a security community among the states of democratic Europe and North America, and the changed status of the state, particularly the limitations on state autonomy in meeting many of the new security threats, have made this debate potentially less relevant to the problem of security governance.³⁰

One insight from the alliance debate that continues to have relevance is the problem of buck-passing and chain-gangs, two byproducts of alliance behaviour in a multipolar system.³¹ While contemporary Eurasia cannot be considered multipolar in any meaningful sense, the Eurasian system is more fluid today than at any time since the 1930s. Consequently, the behaviour associated with buck-passing and chain-gangs may remain relevant to the challenges posed by the new security agenda.³² Buck-passing, as a reformulation of the free-rider problem, arises because states 'wish to avoid bearing unnecessary costs or because they expect their relative position to be strengthened by standing aloof from the mutual bloodletting'.³³ In the Eurasian setting, buck-passing occurs at two levels: first, the Americans have made a concerted effort to shift the costs of eliminating the underlying causes of the new security threats to the Europeans; and second, the Europeans (and the Americans) have also made an effort to shift the political and financial costs of redressing the structural disabilities of the states in transition to international and regional institutions, particularly NATO, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU.

Chain-gangs are more problematic, because they can only arise when states experience 'a high degree of security interdependence within an alliance . . . each state feels that its own security is integrally intertwined with the security of its alliance partners. As a result, any state that marches to war inexorably drags its alliance partners with it.'³⁴ Once again, the parallels between this formulation and the Eurasian state system are inexact, but highly suggestive. If geographic propinquity, the ubiquitousness of cyberspace, a growing interaction density, ethnic conflict and weak state structures do function as agents of diffusion, then it would follow that

the security of the Eurasian states is ‘integrally intertwined’. Consequently, if the states of prosperous Europe – the full members of NATO and the EU in particular – wish to control their external environment and minimise the risks posed to the existing system of governance, they cannot allow those states along Europe’s periphery to remain outside or excluded from the EU- and NATO-dominated system of security governance. This requirement raises two additional questions: what are the outer boundaries of the European system of security governance? Can the Eurasian states be assimilated into a system of security governance that reflects European norms, values and identities?

Boundaries and assimilation

Extending the western system of security governance into Eurasia raises the problem of identifying the criteria that will demarcate the outer boundary of the future European system of security governance. Within the context of EU or NATO enlargement, the question has turned on whether Europe is defined as having two tiers of states (the assimilated and the unassimilated) or as having two speeds (assimilated but with differentiated membership in the various institutions of economic and military security).³⁵ Within the context of Eurasia, the question turns on the relevance of the region to the European security order, the precise delination of what geographic space Eurasia occupies, and the limits placed on any institution or group of institutions governing this geopolitical area. NATO has emerged as the key security institution governing and maintaining order in the European geostrategic space; and the EU has emerged as the key economic institution governing and maintaining order in the European geoeconomic space.

Other security institutions explored in *Limiting Institutions?* – the OSCE, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and others – may eventually play a more prominent role than NATO or the EU in governing Eurasian security, but each is handicapped by a potentially debilitating heterogeneity of membership (OSCE), exclusivity by design (CIS), a volatile membership (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova grouping [GUUAM]), disparate interests and expectations for the institution among the member-states (SCO) or a relative lack of legitimacy (BSEC). The overlapping membership of these Eurasian security institutions may contribute to the creation of a single set of norms governing statecraft in the region, but there is no guarantee that those norms will be consistent with those of the Atlantic community. Moreover, the final boundaries of these institutions, including NATO and the EU, remain ill-defined and undetermined. The problem of establishing the appropriate boundaries of each institution (not to mention their appropriate scope and function) complicates the difficult challenge of coping with the ‘politics of inclusion’ and the require-

ment of assimilation if a stable and peaceful security order is to evolve in Eurasia.³⁶ The transition to the politics of inclusion initiated by the end of the Cold War has opened up the European political space and accelerated the growing cultural, political, military-strategic and societal intermingling of Europe and Eurasia. However promising and pleasing this development is from a normative point of view, it does deepen the potential for the externalisation and diffusion of domestic disequilibria and complicates the task of security governance in both Europe and Eurasia.

The politics of inclusion is complicated by the absence of a ready-made geographical boundary like the one the United States (and the Soviet Union) faced in 1947. We are reminded that, in an unconstrained environment, geographic space and institutional size will matter. As club theorists like to point out, clubs are viable only so long as the benefits of membership are not outweighed by its costs. In the context of a system of security governance, the enlargement of any of these institutions can lower their value for any individual state. And unlike previous international systems, which could be effectively governed by the powerful few, the contemporary international system can be effectively disrupted by the weak many.

The boundary conditions of the Eurasian and European systems – geopolitical, institutional-legal, transactional and cultural – have likewise changed.³⁷ While there has been a dismantling of the boundary conditions that separated the eastern and western halves of Europe, many of the critical boundary conditions remain in place between Europe and Eurasia, particularly civilisational disputations, divergent geostrategic challenges, and the practice of multilateralism within institutional frameworks. Only the transactional boundary has been lowered. One consequence of this development has been the need to address the problem of Eurasian security governance. Whereas the Cold War's end revealed the false cultural boundary dividing central, eastern and western Europe, the lowering of the transactional boundary within Eurasia has brought into sharp relief the persistent and divisive cultural boundary between Christian Europe and its Islamic periphery. While the changed boundary conditions of the European political space pushed the OSCE, EU and BSEC to practise a 'politics of inclusion', NATO was initially handicapped in this regard since the 'politics of exclusion' was its *raison d'être*. Yet we have the paradoxical outcome that it is NATO that has practised most effectively the 'politics of inclusion' with the institutional innovations of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the Euro-Atlantic Political Cooperation, and the PfP programme, as well as the creation of the NATO–Russian Council in 2002. Security institutions of Eurasian origin, particularly the CIS and SCO, clearly practise the politics of exclusion, but even in the case of the SCO, the Chinese have belatedly recognised that its final membership and agenda should remain open.³⁸ The politics of inclusion initiated by the changed boundary conditions of post-Cold War Europe and Eurasia indicates that the progressive and all-inclusive eastward

extension of the western system of security governance is all but inevitable. Yet the precise form and content of such a development remain undetermined, and the effort may ultimately fail, particularly as that system is based on European values and norms which are not negotiable and treated as universal rather than as particular.

The role of institutions in alleviating conflict and promoting cooperation

What role can international institutions play in mediating conflict and fostering cooperation? Recent scholarship has focused on issues of institutional design and on the roles that international institutions play in managing conflicts of interest in constrained environments, in fostering cooperation by lowering transaction costs or by promoting confidence-building measures, and in facilitating conflict resolution mechanisms that deter war. Much of the scholarship has also focused on the necessary and sufficient conditions required for international institutions to perform that task.³⁹ Two alternative theories of international relations, neo-liberal institutionalism and social constructivism, have generated particularly promising propositions for understanding the role of institutions as facilitators of cooperation and conflict management. One variant of neo-liberal institutionalism focuses on the functions performed by institutions to mitigate conflicts of interest and facilitate cooperation, while another has linked the utility of international institutions to categories of strategic interaction. In either case, international institutions allow states to overcome or mitigate the defensive and uncooperative logic of anarchy.⁴⁰ Social constructivism, which postulates that identity and normative belief systems shape material interests, view institutions as evidence that states are governed by a normative system and that the requirements for collective identity formation are being met.⁴¹

In the past, studies of international institutions have generally investigated the patterns of conflict and cooperation in the transatlantic political system that emerged after World War II. This preoccupation with the western security and economic systems left scholars open to the initial charge that they were only looking where institutions appeared to exert some impact on preference formation – namely in the Atlantic area.⁴² A second and more fundamental problem with the empirical analyses of institutions has been that Europe in particular has proven an ‘easy’ case, because a unique set of historical circumstances, the bloodshed and devastation of the two ‘world’ wars, convinced the Europeans to relax their sovereign prerogatives in the interest of peace and prosperity. More important, the focus on Europe carries with it an inherent European bias with respect to the preference for a multilateralised and institutionalised statecraft as well as the essential content of the norms necessary to govern those states’ behaviour. The security dilemmas facing the arc of Eurasian states that stretches from

the Balkans to China provide a good empirical test of the proposition that formal or informal institutions and the norm of multilateralism are not particular to Euro-Atlantic states, in either a cultural or a geographic sense, and can be successfully and fruitfully extended into the Eurasian landmass.

The discussion so far has focused on the structural and contextual changes in the European political space which have made it necessary to broaden the definition of security. Systemic stability and the prospect for a peaceful and cooperative pan-European security order are largely contingent upon the successful transition to the market and multiparty democracy in Europe and along its periphery. And those transitions, in turn, are contingent upon a stable economic and military environment.⁴³

The precise role of institutions in the post-Cold War security architecture remains contested. This unsettled state of affairs raises the question of institutional choice and design, a matter complicated by the necessity of accommodating an expanded conception of security that extends beyond the traditional concern of assuring territorial integrity and the physical protection of national assets from military threat. The interrelationships between the institutions governing the 'new' and traditional elements of the security calculus, as well as the interaction or interdependencies between them, remain uncharted. Yet it is the management of the institutional interdependence of the EU, NATO, OSCE, BSEC, CIS, GUUAM⁴⁴ and SCO, in particular, which may eventually define the contours of the future Eurasian security order and Eurasia's place in the European and North American definition of interest and calculus of action.

There are good reasons to suspect that these security institutions can and do play a prominent and constructive role in Eurasia. First, the provision of multiple fora to resolve outstanding conflicts of interest or to meet common threats will serve the security interests of the European states, at least from a systemic perspective. A closer relationship to NATO, for example, may provide Eurasian states with a reassuring security guarantee (regardless of whether it is debased or not). Likewise, a closer relationship with the EU could enhance these nations' economic prospects by providing privileged access to the largest market in the world. The evolution of the CIS and the BSEC into viable markets could provide alternative routes to economic prosperity and the eradication of poverty, an underlying source of conflict. The SCO, as an institutional form of Eurasian origin, may provide normative and cultural reassurance for the Eurasian states and thereby facilitate cooperation with Europe, or it may serve as a potential counterweight to NATO so long as Russia is denied full membership. Second, the deeper engagement of these institutions could support the normative and belief system presently suffusing the European system of security governance: the importance of democratic governance domestically, the rejection of war as a mechanism for dispute resolution, the legitimacy of existing dispute- and conflict-resolution mechanisms, and the preference for multilateral solutions to

common security challenges. Finally, these norms and beliefs generate two other important externalities: they create a common frame of reference for identifying and resolving conflicts of interest; and they create a community of interest and values critical to meeting the external conditions necessary for sustained cooperation and diffuse reciprocity. If these norms and beliefs took root in Eurasia, it would facilitate the extension of the western system of security governance or at least engender its onset.

Conclusion

It would not be unduly optimistic to claim that institutions could perform limited, but regionally restricted, security governance roles in Eurasia; scepticism must none the less be reserved for any claim that a single set of institutions will coalesce into a Eurasian system of security governance in the near future. There are significant barriers to a lock-step eastward enlargement of the Atlantic system of governance or the emergence of a Eurasian system of governance congruous with the European normative and belief system. One barrier is located in the asymmetrical evolution of the European and Eurasian state, namely the transition from a warfare to a welfare state. Another is the context of international politics in Eurasia, which presently compels states to focus on relative rather than absolute gains in the calculation of state policy. A third is located in the inability to foster a collective identity encompassing the European and Eurasian states, which, in turn, will impair international cooperation and institution building.

The European and Eurasian states are at different stages of evolution: the European state has lost or willingly abandoned sovereign prerogatives in the interest of maximising either national welfare or security. This progressive erosion of national sovereignty is the result of two tendencies: the voluntary transfer of sovereignty to international or supranational institutions to resolve outstanding conflicts between states or manage dilemmas of collective action; and the involuntary loss of sovereignty to the market and the subsequent efforts to recapture that sovereignty via multilateral governance. Within Eurasia, many new states jealously guard their decade-old sovereignty, and their less sophisticated national economies are not integral parts of the international economy. Thus, the perceived need for international institutions is correspondingly lower.

A relatively high level of enmity in interstate relations, sharpened by the externalisation of intra-state ethnic conflicts, provides the second barrier to a unified system of security governance. The context of state action has a major impact on the formulation of national preferences, which are not immutable but are linked quite closely to the external constraints facing a state, particularly the level of amity and enmity in the international system.⁴⁵ Where there are high levels of enmity, cooperative outcomes are unlikely; where there are high levels of amity, cooperative outcomes are

facilitated. An extension of the western system of security governance requires that amity characterise the Eurasian system – the last decade, however, has not pointed in that direction. The barriers to collective identity formation are the most problematic and are derived, in part, from the first two. One solution to the dilemma of collective action – a motor propelling the institutionalised cooperation in the Atlantic community – is located in the process of collective identity formation that has arguably occurred in the Atlantic security system.⁴⁶ There are two distinct aspects of interstate relations that vary positively with collective identity formation and the emergence of a security community more generally: the level of economic interdependence and the extent to which there has been a convergence of domestic values. On the first measure, the relatively low level of economic interdependence within Eurasia and between Eurasia and Europe makes collective identity formation, and the wholesale Eurasian adoption of the western system of security governance, less likely. The convergence of Eurasian domestic values around the European norm is also lacking and unlikely. There has been a progressive convergence of domestic values in the states comprising the Atlantic area: they have embraced the twin virtues of the market economy and multiparty democracy as well as a preference for multilateral rather than unilateral solutions to common problems.⁴⁷ In Eurasia, there is a wide variety of regime types conjoined to ethnic and religious animosities, and multilateralism remains a relatively alien form of statecraft. As compared to Europe, Eurasia is a highly heterogeneous security space and the prospects for a collective identity are correspondingly low. Moreover, there is neither an effective institutional mechanism for enforcing the convergence of domestic values on a pan-regional basis, nor a certainty that the values underpinning the western system of security governance are either universal or compatible with existing indigeneous belief systems and normative values.

The chapters constituting this volume are generally supportive of this sceptical assessment. Yet, there is also evidence that elements of the western system of security governance have mitigated conflict, shaped expectations and engendered security cooperation in Eurasia. The following chapters provide answers to a common set of questions: what are the boundaries of the European security order and what role does Eurasia play in that order? What are the content of the new security agenda, the nature of the security dilemmas facing the Eurasian states, and the opportunities for externalising regional conflicts? What role can European and indigenous institutions be expected to play in mediating conflict and facilitating security cooperation in this region of the world? *Limiting Institutions?* is divided into four parts. Part II investigates the contemporary security challenges facing Eurasia that may also impinge upon the future stability of the existing European security order; Part III investigates the current roles played by institutions seeking a governance role in Eurasia and the success those institutions have had in

fostering security cooperation and mitigating conflict in Eurasia.

Part II examines a broad range of threats to Eurasian stability and the European security order. Douglas Blum, in Chapter 2, investigates the important role played by identity politics in the shaping of the Eurasian security environment. Blum focuses on the potentially combustible mix of contested national identities and weak state structures that have emerged in the successor states of the former Soviet Union. He highlights in particular the negative impact that malformed or contested ethnic and national identities have upon state capacity. His analysis provides three important insights: weak states with contested national identities are unlikely to prove dependable partners within multilateral frameworks; some Eurasian states are unlikely to develop national identities compatible with the western system of security governance; and the delegitimation of already weak state structures could prove to be a fundamental source of instability and conflict in this region largely beyond the reach of the European powers or European-sponsored institutions. Stuart Kaufman, in Chapter 3, looks at the consequences of ethnic conflict for intra-state and interstate war. His investigation of ethnic conflict in Bosnia, Macedonia and Mountainous Karabagh leads to a number of important conclusions for those wishing to extend the reach of western institutions of security governance. First, ethnic conflict is not only a cause of international insecurity, but may also be the result of security competition between states. Second, an important source of ethnic conflict is how vital interests are constructed, particularly the way in which competing ethnic groups make mutually exclusive claims to the same territory. Third, this construction of vital interests is responsible for the persistence of security dilemmas in Eurasia. His contribution is particularly relevant for those claiming that security institutions like NATO or the OSCE can play a constructive and decisive role in this region.

Weak national identities and ethnic conflict have found expression in transnational terrorism. Phil Williams, in Chapter 4, examines a novel dimension of transnational terrorism, namely, the rising role played by transnational criminal organisations, either as domestic sources of instability and delegitimation or as an 'off-shore' source of instability for Europe. Williams, who details the elements of the new security paradigm, argues that sources of the terrorist threat to Europe originate along or beyond the European periphery. His analysis, which documents the links between weak state capacity and the phenomenon of transnational terrorism, focuses upon the success enjoyed by organised crime in rolling back the state and weakening the existing system of security governance.

Part II concludes with two chapters investigating two specific security threats, one drawn from the 'new' and the other from the traditional security agenda. Stuart Horsman, in Chapter 5, investigates the prospect for interstate violence arising from environmental conflict, specifically the allocation of riverine water in Central Asia. His chapter underscores the historical

importance of water allocation as a source of conflict and war, and argues that water allocation conflicts in the twenty-first century are likely to function as an indirect or contributory cause of regional instability. Horsman provides a sceptical assessment of both the existing institutional solutions to water allocation conflicts amongst the Central Asian states and the potential for conflict between those states and China. Jaewoo Choo then addresses the importance of Caspian Sea oil and natural gas reserves outside the familiar concern with the creation of an integrated transport network augmenting the energy security requirements of western Europe. Instead, he places Caspian Sea oil reserves into the more volatile geopolitical context of Sino-American competition in the region. Choo argues that the Chinese and American competition for Central Asian energy reserves has important implications not only for the energy security of the Occident and Orient, but also for the geopolitical evolution of the Asia-Pacific. He details the interaction of the American response in Central Asia to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the intertwined issues of development, exploitation and transport networks for Caspian Sea oil, and China's desire to reverse the growing American influence in its own backyard.

Part III identifies and examines the key regional institutional actors that have an established security governance role in Eurasia. These chapters address a set of specific questions: what role has each institution sought for itself in the region? How well has each institution achieved its objectives there? What are the limits and relevance of each institution to regional security governance? Sean Kay, in Chapter 7, investigates the traditional preoccupation with security dilemmas, the protection of territorial integrity, alliance formation and the pursuit of geostrategic advantage. He identifies the problems attending alliance formation in the region and the patterns of balancing and bandwagoning that are likely to emerge. Kay's chapter focuses on the confluence of national interests that led to the creation of the CIS, GUUAM and SCO, and concludes that these institutions have largely failed to cultivate cooperative multilateralism or abate the security dilemmas that function as barriers to it.

P. Terrence Hopmann and Joshua B. Spero, in Chapters 8 and 9, investigate the roles played by arguably the two most important regional security organisations, the OSCE and NATO, respectively. The OSCE and NATO's PfP programme assumed the important role of institutionalising western norms on a pan-European basis during the 1990s. Hopmann and Spero question whether the OSCE and NATO will be capable of playing a similar role in Eurasia. Hopmann details the evolving role assumed by the OSCE in Eurasia, the regional institution with the most inclusive membership. The OSCE has been charged with the important task of conflict prevention in Europe and Eurasia. Hopmann assesses the OSCE's performance in the last decade and concludes that the OSCE's record in the region is difficult to ascertain precisely because the institution's success is measured by the immeasurable

'dogs that don't bark'. Spero, who was directly involved in the creation of the PfP programme, details its institutional and political evolution. He places the demand by Eurasian states for membership in PfP within the framework of alliance theory, focuses on how the western model of civil–military relations was institutionalised in this region, suggests that the expansion of PfP into this region has strengthened the NATO-based security order, and demonstrates that it has alleviated the security dilemmas these states would face in its absence.

John Willerton and Geoffrey Cockerham, in Chapter 10, explore the CIS, one of the two quasi-constitutional actors in the region. The CIS, which remains an underdeveloped institution, has the potential to reintegrate the arc of states along the southern border of the Russian Federation into a not unimportant economic actor for Europe. Willerton and Cockerham focus particularly on the CIS's unrealised potential as an institution central to the tasks of security provision, economic integration and political stability in Eurasia. They address three important questions: will the efforts of the Russian Federation to bind these states into a single institutional framework harm or benefit the security interests of the West? Is the CIS something more (or less) than the institutionalisation of a renewed Russian bid for Eurasian hegemony? Will the CIS evolve into something more than a paper confederation? Panagiota Manoli, in Chapter 11, appraises the potential role of the BSEC as an effective regional security institution. Turkey's sponsorship of the BSEC served the largely unrealised Turkish strategy of 'cooperative hegemony' in the Black Sea region. It was designed as a mechanism that would institutionalise a leadership role for Turkey in the region, enhance Turkey's importance for Europe, and foster cooperation along Europe's southern periphery. Manoli investigates whether the BSEC has performed any or all of these functions. She finds that it has neither provided a regional security umbrella nor constituted an economic bloc. Instead, the institution's continuing *raison d'être* has been the creation and strengthening of a 'diplomatic community' that provides the basis for regional conflict resolution and cooperation across an increasing number of issue areas.

Simon Serfaty, in Chapter 12, looks at the security governance role of the EU, the second quasi-constitutional actor in Eurasia. He charts the evolution of the EU as a prominent facilitator of the transition process in central and eastern Europe as well as the successor states of the former Soviet Union, and addresses the security ramifications of the EU's projected enlargement, which will, *inter alia*, leave the EU abutting the western boundary of Eurasia. Serfaty raises three important questions: what role can the EU reasonably be expected to play in Eurasian security governance? Will the process of enlargement and the difficulties of security governance along the immediate southern and eastern peripheries of Europe preclude an important role for the EU? How will the process of deepening affect the EU's security and foreign policy ambitions and capabilities? He reaches the pessimistic conclusion that

the EU will be a severely constrained actor in Eurasian security governance owing to the immediate challenges of deepening and the eastern enlargement.

In Part IV, David P. Calleo concludes *Limiting Institutions?* with a sweeping overview of the geostrategic developments in Eurasia since 1989 and the consequences of those developments for the evolution of the Atlantic and Pacific systems of security governance. Calleo poses and answers the fundamental question: how should these states arrange their power relationships to guarantee stability and order best in the twenty-first century? He argues for the deliberate construction of a 'self-consciously plural system' that would strike a balanced relationship between the United States, Europe, Russia and China. Yet the establishment of a global Westphalian order, Calleo's preferred solution to the challenge of global peace and stability, faces the significant barrier posed by the unilateralist impulses and unipolar fantasies of American diplomacy.

Notes

- 1 See Halford Mackinder, 'The Geographical Pivot of History', *Geographical Journal*, 23:4 (1904), pp. 421–44.
- 2 See Karl W. Deutsch *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organizations in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953). A good introduction to the current debate is found in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds), *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
- 3 See James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds), *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); James N. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic–Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Oran R. Young, *Governance in World Affairs* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Robert O. Keohane, 'Governance in a Partially Globalized World', *American Political Science Review*, 95:1 (2001), pp. 1–13; and Mark Webber, 'Security Governance and the "Excluded" States of Central and Eastern Europe', in Andrew Cottey and Derek Averre (eds), *Ten Years after 1989: New Security Challenges in Central and Eastern Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), pp. 43–67.
- 4 Cited in Webber, 'Security Governance'.
- 5 This assumption is central to rational choice theorists. See Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, 'The Rational Design of International Institutions', *International Organization*, 55:4 (2001), pp. 761–99.
- 6 This assumption is central to realist accounts of international politics. See, *inter alia*, Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1978); and Robert Gilpin *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
- 7 This assumption is central to social constructivist accounts of international politics. See Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations

- Theory', *World Politics*, 50:2 (1998), pp. 324–48, esp. pp. 325–6; and Ted Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', *International Security*, 23:1 (1998), pp. 171–200.
- 8 This assumption is central to institutionalist accounts of international politics. See Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, 'Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions', *International Organization*, 52:4 (1998), pp. 729–57; and James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders', *International Organization*, 52:4 (1998), pp. 943–69.
 - 9 Keohane, 'Governance'; and Robert Jervis, 'Theories of War in an Era of Leading Power Peace', *American Political Science Review*, 96:1 (2002), pp. 1–14.
 - 10 Jervis, 'Theories of War', p. 8. On the last condition, see Randall L. Schweller, 'Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?', *Security Studies*, 5:3 (1996), pp. 90–121; and Mark W. Zacher, 'The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force', *International Organization*, 55:2 (2001), pp. 215–50.
 - 11 Keohane, 'Governance'.
 - 12 *Ibid.*, p. 7.
 - 13 See James Sperling and Emil Kirchner, 'The Security Architectures and Institutional Features of Post-1989 Europe', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 42:2 (1997), pp. 155–70.
 - 14 For a statement of this perspective, see Stanley Hoffmann, *World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), pp. 110–16.
 - 15 See Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998); and James Sperling and Emil Kirchner, 'Economic Security and the Problem of Cooperation in Post Cold War Europe', *Review of International Studies*, 24:2 (1998), pp. 221–37.
 - 16 For an early statement of this argument, see Wolfram F. Hanrieder, 'Dissolving International Politics: Reflections on the Nation-State', *American Political Science Review*, 72:4 (1978), pp. 1276–87.
 - 17 See Glenn H. Snyder, 'Alliances, Balance, and Stability', *International Organization*, 45:1 (1991), pp. 121–42, esp. 126–7.
 - 18 John H. Herz, 'The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State', *World Politics*, 9:4 (1957), pp. 473–93; and Hanrieder, 'Dissolving International Politics', pp. 1280–1.
 - 19 On the transition to a post-Westphalian state in Europe, see March and Olsen, 'Institutional Dynamics', pp. 944–7.
 - 20 Dynamic density is defined as the 'quantity, velocity, and diversity of transactions' by John Gerard Ruggie in 'Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neo-Realist Synthesis', in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 148.
 - 21 On diffusion, see Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, 'Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War', *American Political Science Review*, 74:4 (1980), pp. 932–46; Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr, 'Opportunity, Willingness, and the Diffusion of War', *American Political Science Review*, 84:1 (March 1990), pp. 47–67; and Gary Goertz, *Contexts of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 75–81.

- 22 See Jervis, 'Theories of War'; and John Duffield, 'Transatlantic Relations after the Cold War: Theory, Evidence, and the Future', *International Studies Perspectives*, 2:1 (2001), pp. 93–115.
- 23 Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, 30:2 (1978), pp. 167–214.
- 24 Cited in Duncan Snidal, 'Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation', *American Political Science Review*, 85:3 (September 1991), p. 722.
- 25 See Gilpin, *War and Change*; and Richard Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963).
- 26 See respectively, Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; Stephen Walt, *Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Randall L. Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
- 27 For a summary of this set of arguments, see chapter 7 by Sean Kay in this volume.
- 28 The debate over preferences, which began with the publication of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, was (perhaps) resolved by Robert Powell in his 'Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory', *American Political Science Review*, 85:4 (1991), pp. 1303–20. This debate, whether resolved or not, leaves open the more important question of where preferences come from.
- 29 Walt, *Origins of Alliances*, pp. 17, 21.
- 30 For the original formulation, see Deutsch *et al.*, *Political Community*. For overviews of the recent scholarship, see Mary N. Hampton, 'NATO, Germany, and the United States: Creating Positive Identity in Trans-Atlantia', *Security Studies*, 8:2 (1998/99), pp. 235–69; and Jervis, 'Theories of War', pp. 1–14.
- 31 Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, 'Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity', *International Organization*, 44:2 (1990), pp. 137–69.
- 32 *Ibid.*, pp. 144–7.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p. 141.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 140.
- 35 This specific question is addressed in James Sperling (ed.), *Two Tiers or Two Speeds? The European Security Order and the Enlargement of the European Union and NATO* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).
- 36 On the 'politics of inclusion', see Michael Smith, 'The European Union and a Changing Europe: Establishing the Boundaries of Order', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 34:1 (1996), pp. 5–27; and on the systemic requirement of assimilation, see Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648–1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
- 37 These boundary conditions are identified in Smith, 'European Union'.
- 38 The institutional beginning of the SCO was the Shanghai Five. When a sixth member was added, it was decided to re-name the organisation the SCO and to keep open its future membership and purpose.
- 39 For a brief but comprehensive overview of the roles of institutions in global governance generally, see Keohane, 'Governance'; on the importance of institutional design, see Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal (eds), *The Rational Design of International Institutions*, special issue of *International Organization*, 55:4 (2001).
- 40 A strictly functionalist approach to institutions is found in Robert O. Keohane,

- After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), while two representative game-theoretic approaches are found in Arthur Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), and Lisa Martin, 'Interests, Power and Multilateralism', *International Organization*, 46:4 (1992), pp. 765–92.
- 41 Representative are Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Peter Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', *International Organization*, 52:4 (1998), pp. 887–917.
- 42 See Susan Strange, 'Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis', *International Organization*, 36:2 (1982), pp. 479–96.
- 43 This argument is made in James Sperling, 'Two Tiers or Two Speeds? Constructing a Stable European Security Order', in Sperling, *Two Tiers or Two Speeds?*, pp. 181–98.
- 44 Uzbekistan formally gave notice in June 2002 of its intention to suspend its membership in GUUAM. Uzbekistan joined the organisation in 1999, two years after it was formed by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova in 1997. We have retained GUUAM in the text since the narratives cover the period during which Uzbekistan was a member, although in certain contexts it will also read GUAM.
- 45 Powell, 'Absolute and Relative Gains'; see also Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962).
- 46 Alexander Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', *American Political Science Review*, 88:2 (1994), pp. 384–96, esp. p. 386. This criterion is central to the cooperative form of security governance defined in Webber, 'Security Governance', p. 45; Jervis, 'Theories of War', p. 8; and Keohane, 'Governance', p. 7.
- 47 On the fragility of collective identity formation, see Mary N. Hampton and James Sperling, 'Positive/Negative Identity: Germany and the Euro-Atlantic Communities', *Journal of European Integration*, 24:4 (2002), pp. 281–302.