5

Geopolitical imperatives of system change
Order and security in post-Cold War Europe

Introduction

This chapter addresses the question of how change at the international system level has produced those political outcomes related to European security and defence design post-Cold War. It is both a description and an evaluation of the way in which Europe's security arena has changed, as well as an attempt to come to terms with the process that led to the 'internalisation' of system change. By 'internalisation' we mean the process – or better, the causal relationship – between system change and policy response. Our argument is that the nature of the post-Cold War systemic reality has been instrumental in sustaining and even increasing actors' faith in co-operative frameworks and in further advancing rule-governing state behaviour and interaction in the European region. The discussion aims at assessing not only the impact of change on the Union *per se*, but also the way change has been translated into policies and strategies that led to the further transformation of the European institutional environment in the field of security and defence. In particular, the argument put forward is that the nature of the new systemic reality in Europe, contrary to realist and neo-realist predictions, can be conducive to the efforts of EU member states to formulate norms and rules which can promote co-operative state behaviour and advance the integration process – slowly and painfully – in foreign and security policy. The analysis deals with the theoretical debate in the field and aims at tracing the defining features of the 'new European order'. Concepts such as globalisation, multipolarity, anarchy, national interests, roles and identities are examined, albeit briefly, in an attempt to understand the structure of the European regional subsystem in relation to state behaviour and interaction.

Although highly unoriginal, there is no other way but to indicate, right from the beginning, that the geopolitical earthquake of 1989–91, which entailed the demise of communism and ignited a process of dissolution of the CEE order,

has also eliminated the basic elements of the postwar global as well as regional structure. History and geography, which tight bipolarity had kept *in limbo* for over forty years, have re-emerged as factors reconstituting Europe's identity. The scope of political change, the rapidity with which events become known at the global scale, and the complexities involved in trying to understand the new security challenges, have been and continue to be discussed. Our traditional conception of the classic factors of power in analysing and explaining the changing security environment is still relevant. The difference today, as Dewitt put it, is 'the reach of impact, the complexity of the causal process, the range and capabilities of actors involved, and the acknowledgement that threat and response are no longer within the sole or even primary purview of the military'.[1]

Against this background, the discussion in the following pages addresses two important dimensions of current international concern. The first is the evolution of the European security system in the new millennium, taking account of the changing properties of world politics since the collapse of bipolarity and attempting to assess the extent to which structure, power and actors have been assigned new meanings under the impact of uncertainty and unpredictability following the tectonic shifts in world affairs. Second is the extent to which the strategic ramifications of the new geopolitical realities and the new security challenges, although lacking a unified concept of threat, can adequately 'provide' rules for state interaction and, crucially, for reinforcing the 'institutionalisation' of security. Moreover, can process and institutions be instrumental in redefining identities and interests towards a less competitive and even non-conflictual European system, especially when – as in the case of the Union – the negative impact of international anarchy is neutralised by the long-term experience of co-operative institutional frameworks of normative interaction? In the context of the latter, the analysis in this and in Chapter 6 is directed towards the examination of (not only) EU institutional response and adaptation to the new structural elements, but also towards assessing the development of strategies, both national and institutional, as well as the formulation of effective policies.

The overall question is one of *rationale* in the context of security elusiveness in a turbulent world. A discussion of key components of national and institutional policy-making and of the key transformation elements that crowd the new European security agenda contributes to this overall understanding. Common themes involve debates about stability and instability; continuity and change; multipolarity and leadership; co-operation and discord; power capabilities and patterns of behaviour.

Rethinking security

The dramatic change of international systemic polarity clearly reflects the development of new structural variables as products of trends aiming at revising

institutional entities and state policies. These trends can be seen as directly linked to problems and challenges of redefining basic tools of analysis: structure and the nature of the system, national interest, state sovereignty and power. In this context, any discussion about the prospects of a new system of collective security in Europe – as they have been expressed through the decisions taken in Maastricht, Amsterdam, Berlin and Madrid – should take account of the constituent elements of change that produced the 'new order'.[2]

With respect to the international system, the term 'structure' refers to the ordering of principles and priorities, as well as to the distribution of capabilities among units that lead to the various forms of polarity. Among the several uncertainties arising from the new structure, there is one persisting 'certainty': the anarchical nature of the international system. Anarchy has been constant throughout the history of the interstate system. At the same time, the range of options available to any state is constrained by the international distribution of power.[3] That a multipolar order has succeeded the bipolar one is clear, and so is the fact that the emerging multipolarity will differ markedly from the multipolarity of previous eras. Whereas the multipolarity of the 1970s and 1980s took on meaning within the broader context of persisting bipolarity, the multipolarity of the 1990s and (possibly) beyond does not do so.[4] During the Cold War, the Union and Japan were great powers when judged by their economic productivity, trade balances and financial surpluses; but they were scarcely such when judged by their continued security dependence on the US. Post-1989, these actors could be great powers not only in the economic sense, but also because the political impact of their economic power will no longer be qualified by a security dependence that imposes substantial constraints on their freedom of action in foreign policy.

The 1991 Gulf War had complicated things, for in the midst of the dust and fire, the rhetoric of American politics turned to talk of a 'new world order'. This phrase has come to symbolise, for many, a set of expectations and hopes, few of them terribly clear or well articulated, and even fewer so far fulfilled. If there is to be a new order, it will have to emerge not simply out of the ashes of the old, but rather in a dynamic tension with the powerful legacy of great-power war and resulting international institution-building during this century. There is, therefore, a critical evaluation problem, which is linked to the need for conceptualising the changing European order. It is of paramount importance to identify the nature of the post-Cold War order in Europe, and at the same time to trace the implications of systemic change both for the order itself – as a structural construction – as well as for the state units that lend legitimacy to that order.

According to Smith, there are essentially four dimensions to this *problématique*. The first has to do with the nature and character of 'order' in general. The second has to do with the concept of change. The third concerns the response(s) to the process and the products of change, and the fourth addresses 'the issue of impact, and the ways in which changes in the order and in the actions of major participants feed into further processes of change', which influence both the

nature of the whole (system) and the behaviour of the parts (state or other units).[5] At an empirical level, the changing nature of the order can be linked to a series of important developments. First and foremost, it is the existence of structural change that produces a rearrangement of European state relationships, especially in the field of world economy. More and more, 'globalisation' enhances the interdependence of national economies and undermines the traditional relationship between state power and the market. Globalising production and global finance transform global economy into a system of 'governance without government'.[6] As noted briefly by Cox:

> there is a transnational process of consensus formation among the official caretakers of the global economy. This process generates consensual guidelines, underpinned by an ideology of globalisation, that are transmitted into the policy-making channels of national governments and big corporations . . . The structural impact on national governments of this global centralisation of influence over policy can be called the internationalising of the state. Its common feature is to convert the state into an agency for adjusting national economic practices and policies to the perceived exigencies of the global economy.[7]

An important implication of Cox's argument is that the state becomes a transmission belt from the global to the national economy, 'where heretofore it had acted as the bulwark defending domestic welfare from external disturbances'.[8] As he points out, 'different forms of state facilitate this tightening of the global/local relationship for countries occupying different positions in the global system'.[9] In this context, Held argues that relations of economic, political and cultural interdependencies across the globe – and more so in Europe – are undermining the sovereignty and autonomy of states in all aspects of their security (and elsewhere).[10] Closely linked with this process is the emergence of new states in Europe, and hence the need to trace the components of the new European system. At the same time, revision of the economic and security status outside Europe has raised questions about the boundaries of the system and the interests of European state actors. More often than in the past, there are new and sometimes unexpected linkages between political, security and economic concerns that increasingly undermine the capacity of states, as foreign policy actors, both to recognise and to respond to new challenges and needs for (collective) action. Finally, there has been a major institutional challenge relating to the adequacy of existing institutions for concerted international action, as well as to the potential for co-ordination between state and non-state forces, transnational or subnational.

This last issue is of paramount importance for Europe: European transnational forces, combined with fragmenting subnational ones, create ambiguity and fluidity; the Union forms an 'island of peace': a unity of transnational networks and a common retrenchment from a violent periphery. Paradoxically, however, these processes are also reproduced within the single state with national networks, security zones and areas of violence. Transnational forces

and the growth of cosmopolitanism have weakened the nation-state, but this challenge has led to the emergence of nationalist reactions and the legitimation of subnational secessionist forces. As Hassner put it, 'the nation-state is both obsolete and obstinate'.[11] In Western Europe, the challenge to the nation-state comes primarily from the process of integration and globalisation; in the historically imperial Eastern Europe, the challenge comes from a reconstructed national–romantic ethic primordialism, which could lead to the disconnection of the assumed unity of state and nation. As the locus of international security shifts in practice from state to nation, the unchallenged, and uncritical, acceptance of the unity of state and nation has become problematic. The amalgam of state/sovereignty is contested within and across international boundaries, as it is confronted by a competing amalgam: nation/identity. The implication is that, although the state remains a central actor in the international system, it is not the sole actor in the area of security. Ethnonationalism and identity politics also have system-transforming effects in international relations.[12]

In attempting to respond appropriately to the new conceptual and, eventually, policy challenges, we must do more than merely add new issues to the global agenda. Our thinking about the nature and pursuit of security must change. The attempt to understand the new European order and security should take account of its geographical and functional scope, its degree of institutionalisation, its strength and fragility and its ideological and normative elements. While the collapse of the Soviet bloc and accelerating globalisation have fundamentally altered the structure of geopolitics, 'our conceptual frameworks and menu of policy prescriptions are indelibly infused with a Cold War political logic'.[13] The definition of security issues, the way in which they were analysed, and the policies that resulted were the products of the dominant geopolitical and ideological environment. Consequently, security was understood primarily in military terms, and security studies fixated on the problem of achieving and maintaining a stable balance of nuclear and conventional forces between two ideological–political blocs. The militarised conception of security that grounded international relations during the Cold War is being challenged simultaneously both by multifaceted and holistic conceptions.[14]

The collapse of communism, and with it of Soviet hegemony in CEE, removed the immediate military threat. A threat to national security no longer necessarily evokes images of invading armies. The concepts, labels and even norms to which those in the Western security community have grown accustomed over the past fifty years are no longer so clearly applicable. While the military dimension of security is no less important in the post-Cold War environment, there are clear limitations on the application of conventional interstate-level analysis to the examination of international security in general, and European security in particular. Strategic studies are now viewed as focusing on more than the use of military force; security no longer presumes a principal concentration on challenges to a government and country from outside its borders; conflict no longer necessarily means only the violence of armed force;

central governments are no longer viewed as the sole legitimate authorities for the use of coercive means; and defence no longer presumes that military force is either the first or the most appropriate instrument for action.

All this amply proves that Laidi is right in stressing that the 'reconstruction of meaning or purpose' and its linking up with the exercise of (military) power cannot be settled through 'any ideological or teleological deintoxication which the proponents of Popper's *open society* seem to be advocating at times'.[15] For all that, the divergence between meaning and power cannot be reduced to the tension between the integrative logic of the economy and the disintegrative dynamic of identity. It triggers off a 'chain' reaction affecting all the factors related to the exercise of political sovereignty, the most important being the military instrument. Russia provides the best example: while it remains by far the leading military power in Europe, the way we view the collapse of Russian power is governed less by its inherent weaknesses than by the fact that, today, there is no underlying plan to this power. This leads us to the commonplace but nonetheless essential observation that a military power, no matter how large, suffers a considerable loss of meaning the moment it is unable to connect power with a military policy.[16] The divergence between military power and military policy affects not just Russia but also, albeit to a lesser extent, the US and the other European powers.

Moreover, the replacement of the major military threat from the East by multilevel and multidirectional threats, though admittedly of lower tension, has lent great fluidity and instability to the European security system, which was not well equipped, in terms of policies, competences and institutions, to deal with it. The avalanche of change has clearly demonstrated the difficulties in meeting the new problems that have arisen from the debris of the old order. Instability and a perception of insecurity have resulted from the change in the power structure and ideological configuration of the international system caused by the collapse of the entire deterrence regime as previously defined; namely, the encompassing of those norms, rules and procedures, which provided for the system's governance. It may well be true that the end of the Cold War provides an opportunity to raise the strategic threshold and thereby reduce substantially the possibility of a global conflict; and while this may be true for Europe, one should not be too sanguine about the prospects for a 'peace dividend' in many parts of the world, some of them being worryingly close to or even inside the 'European perimeter'.

For all that, the new Europe makes prediction about the course of international politics difficult. Ambiguity and the dynamics of transformation pervade the immense and unique problems posed in the post-Cold War world by the challenge of achieving security. In the 1990s, policy-makers confronted circumstances that were more diffuse, multiple and uncertain than those faced by earlier generations. The ending of the Cold War has loosened the bonds of patron–client politics, thereby giving licence to the rise of micronationalisms, encouragement to narrow sectoral interests, and legitimacy to unilateral efforts

to redraw subnational, national and even international boundaries. The rules are yet to be defined, where the true nature of threats remain shrouded by their multiplicity and complexity, and where it is hard to judge what constitutes winning and losing.[17] In straightforward terms, the end of the Cold War has removed the *ultima ratio* for crude distinctions not only between friends and foes, but also between primary and secondary conflicts. The result has been a structural modification of the international stakes, from a vertical pattern (conflicts are not all of equal importance) to a more horizontal logic (conflicts are too complex and too specific for their settlement to be fungible).[18]

Security challenges become even more complex when one turns to those issues that may not directly challenge the viability of the state in traditional terms, but that may nevertheless undermine its sovereignty, compromise its ability to control the penetrability of its borders, and exacerbate relations, whether between groups within the polity or between states within the regional or global system. Increasingly, it is argued that individual and collective security are dependent on our ability to confront the new challenges. Among the new factors that transcend boundaries and threaten to erode national cohesion, the most perilous are the so-called 'new risks': drug trafficking, transnational organised crime, nuclear smuggling, refugee movements, uncontrolled and illegal immigration, and environmental risks.[19] These are not new sources of potential conflict. They all existed to some extent or another during the Cold War, but were largely subsumed by the threat of military conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact countries.

Responding to these threats, especially to wide environmental degradation in the former communist states, will be an important dimension of preventive defence. The political and economic costs of environmental degradation and mismanagement, such as the high disease rates and safety shortcomings in nuclear plants in the former Soviet Union (FSU), are proving to be formidable challenges to economic development and stability. The simple recognition of such problems, however, has not always elicited effective responses from the international community. Instead, nations have frequently opted to focus their energies on the more manageable manifestations of pending conflicts, such as arms build-ups, that result from disagreements between nations over non-traditional security issues.[20] Because Europeans face so many difficult security challenges, all of which compete for attention and resources, it will be difficult to tackle these kinds of non-traditional threats. Yet, they cannot simply be ignored for long: the environmental threats posed by the aging nuclear infrastructure in CEE and the former Soviet states, inadequate controls over highly enriched uranium and other nuclear materials (including weapons-grade materials) in Russia, and the deterioration of nuclear-powered vessels (some of which literally are rotting in port), could all soon reach crisis proportions.[21] Although these problems have not gone unreported, much more needs to be accomplished if future disasters are to be avoided.

Refugee movements and illegal immigration represent additional layers of non-traditional threat to Europe's security and stability. While the most publicised refugee flows in the past few years have occurred in Central Africa, more than 800,000 Bosnian refugees remain in Germany and other European states, and almost 500,000 Albanians have entered Greece and Italy. Many other refugees have resettled in Europe after fleeing or emigrating from former colonies. The economic and social burdens these refugees place on government services have become substantial. As a result, numerous countries in Europe are beginning to re-examine their immigration policies and enforce more stringent standards. This could have a destabilising effect on the less economically advanced European nations and could threaten interstate relations. It could also lead to domestic unrest if more is not done soon to regulate the flow of refugees and expedite safe repatriation of those not accepted for long-term residence. In the interim, Europe is experiencing an increase in crime rates and hate crimes, any of which could lead to instability and thence to conflict and insecurity.[22]

These factors, probably as much as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (nuclear, chemical and biological), their means of delivery, and human rights abuses, pose profound challenges to the viability of a new global order, as they are more than capable of contributing to violence and other forms of coercion. Contrary to other global challenges (the communications revolution, water shortages, access to energy resources, financial flows), they call directly into question the very authority of the state and are therefore potentially, if not openly, subversive. This multifaceted conception of security entails a multifaceted approach to security itself. While an exclusively state-centred analysis is capable of illuminating some facets of discord and conflict in the 1990s (e.g., proxy wars and irredentism), it is limited by its one-dimensional optic: the distribution and character of military power.[23] This multifaceted/multidimensional security concept means that there is no rigid link between a comprehensive concept for understanding a new situation and the quality of the response. On the contrary, a broad concept allows a flexible, tailored policy in which force is only one of the various means employed.[24] In the final analysis, security is a politically defined concept. It is open to debate whether the widening of security might be a good or a bad political choice, but security is not intrinsically a self-contained concept, nor can it be related to military affairs only. If political priorities change, the nature and means of security will inevitably follow and adapt to the different areas of political action.[25] Security is also multidimensional, in that individual welfare is more central to policy-making than it was fifty years ago. Individual security can no longer be satisfied only through military measures; it needs a multidimensional understanding. As Politi notes, 'individual security and international stability are becoming increasingly interwined and a security threat is anything that hampers any relevant organisation in ensuring individual security'.[26] This means that security is elusive; more than ever, it is embedded in the interaction of localising and globalising forces. The axes of conflict in the shadow of the Cold War will probably

be more complex, not less, and more difficult to manage. Policies begin to blur traditional dividing lines, both between jurisdictions and between concepts that once were discrete.

What does the above discussion mean for the prospects of co-operation in Europe? Contrary to Mearsheimer's predictions, and the ever-heightening complexity and unpredictability of world politics, today's anarchy and multipolarity do not necessarily undermine such prospects, especially in Europe and the Atlantic arena. World politics should not be viewed as a historically frozen realm of power-hungry states, but rather as a dynamic process of interaction among individuals, groups, states and international institutions, all of which are capable of adapting their sense of self-interest in response to new information and changing circumstances. Under the proper conditions and adaptive foreign policy responses, multipolar systems, not bipolar ones, can produce relatively greater stability. This observation does not ignore the fact that the multipolar systems of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were structurally unstable. Far from avoiding war, they used it to preserve the essential variables of the system, primarily the rights of the major powers, in a status of greater or lesser dynamic equilibrium. The latter was subject to much erosion at the edges and uncertainty as to the growth and decline of relative power positions. Europe's security *problématique* has changed too much in the 1990s and possible responses are too different to expect that future security dilemmas will be clones of those that plagued Europe in the past. In the eighteenth, nineteenth and much of the twentieth century, the essential action in the global balance of power had taken place in Europe. Since the end of the Cold War, the European Continent is no longer necessarily the focus of shifting alignments and multilateral security. A balance of power could still be maintained in Europe but disorderly developments in Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere, could negatively affect the stability of the European subsystem. In other words, although a stable Europe may be a necessary condition for world peace, it is by no means a sufficient one.[27] Thus, the connection between multipolarity and European instability is rather simplistic, as it is only when bipolarity is combined with other systemic conditions that European instabilities are exacerbated. In that sense also, it is not polarity but *polarisation* that can lead to conflictual situations. And there is no evidence that such a process will occur in the European subsystem, at least in the foreseeable future.

On the contrary, as the analysis that follows illustrates, the European protagonists (the US included), while still part of an anarchical environment, have not pursued a relatively simple process of behavioural adaptation to post-Cold War systemic realities. Rather, they have embarked upon a more complex process of an *ab intra* redefinition of their identities, roles and, to an extent, interests, mainly by protecting and on many occasions reinforcing the *sui generis* European institutional environment that has proven instrumental in stabilising their expectations. In one sense, the European 'model' represents a fusion between liberal and realist visions of the international system: it retains

states as the basic units, but contains the security dilemma within a non-conflictual, if not co-operative, culture. In this context, the analysis in the following two sections focuses on the changing roles, structures, power capabilities, strategies and patterns of behaviour of the main actors as a response to systemic change.

The issue of leadership: the US in the new Europe

Although security concerns have been fundamentally influenced by changes in the European and international state system and by the reallocation of power on a structural level, security and defence policies will continue to be defined by traditional 'constituent elements': the Atlantic connection (which will remain of fundamental importance to Europe even if the US reduces its involvement); independent national strategies and choices; and a densely institutionalised environment. As a result, the internal distribution of roles will probably remain unclear because of overall systemic uncertainties. The foundations, however, will remain broadly the same, at least in the short and medium run. Perhaps the most important issue is the extent to which American power and behaviour should and could influence the course of events and the shape of European developments.

What might be called 'structural heterogeneity' is one of the main features of the new international system; it refers to the existence of different international structures corresponding to the different kinds of power: military, monetary, trade, industrial, energy, and so on. This formation has given rise to a major academic debate about US power capabilities. It could be argued that the present and likely future distribution of capabilities will take new forms in different spheres. The military sphere is dominated by the US and is expected to be so in the foreseeable future. The economic sphere, on the other hand, is multipolar, with a high degree of transnational interdependence and a profound trend towards power diffusion. This phenomenon has resulted in an even more significant decline of US effectiveness to 'arrange things' according to its own perception of world order. Viewed in historical perspective, the Europe of the Cold War was distinctive not so much because it was stable – Europe had experienced nearly comparable periods of stability before – but because the US was the linchpin of Europe's order. That state of affairs became natural to most Americans actively involved in international affairs, and public opinion polls suggest that it became part of the US foreign policy landscape.[28]

Throughout the history of Atlantic relations, the question of 'leadership and followership' has dogged the steps of policy-makers and has constrained the lines of policy itself. While it might be argued that during the 1950s and 1960s the sheer preponderance of US power rendered such issues redundant, it was by no means clear that structural power could eliminate the diversity of national role conceptions and perceptions of stakes which inevitably underlay the developing EU–US relations. It was apparent by the 1960s that American leadership

was often mercurial and increasingly questioned within the US itself, and that the role of follower was not attractive to some EU members. Perceptions of the costs and benefits arising from adherence to the Atlantic norm were certainly not uniform, as shown by the tangled history of trade and monetary relations. During the 1970s and 1980s, the underlying diversity and contention in this area became increasingly apparent, although it is open to question how far they fundamentally modified the structure of Atlantic relations.

It could be argued that with the decline of the US *vis-à-vis* the Union in non-military matters, vestiges of American hegemony in EU–US relations appeared anachronistic. Politically, the Nixonian definition of the US as an 'ordinary country' during the early 1970s was disingenuous to say the least, but it did express an important perception held by US policy-makers and the attentive public: that Americans were asked to sacrifice their natural interests and instincts for the benefits of their allies (especially those in Europe) who were no longer incapable of fending for themselves. This perception persisted and has strongly influenced the spirit in which the development of the Union and its political presence have been received. Alongside this went the tendency for the US to attempt periodic redefinitions of the Atlantic relationship and thus, by implication, relations with the Union and Western Europe more generally. Perceiving the Union as a predominantly regional economic actor, and the Europeans as 'partial partners', was indicative of the American unease with developments in Europe, leading the US to castigate the Europeans for not acting politically, and then to reprimand them for their more assertive actions through EPC or other channels. For their part, the Europeans found the role of followership increasingly irksome as their collective consciousness progressed; a development fostered, in large measure, by the erratic nature of US leadership itself. As Featherstone and Ginsberg have put it: 'The hegemon tried to hold on to its outdated prerogatives in an increasingly interdependent (as opposed to dependent) world, while the former client did not initiate a new, more rounded relationship with its former patron but instead moved toward greater economic and foreign policy independence from it.'[29]

The developing security relationship between the US and Western Europe also reflected the tensions between structure, stakes and role that have been identified above. One key feature of the 1970s and 1980s was the questioning of the foundations of US security policies – questions which led to wide oscillations around the central adherence to multilateral structures; key amongst them, NATO. Unilateralism and Soviet–American bilateralism cast doubts over the ability of the US leadership to reflect the needs and aspirations of Western Europe, from SALT I to Reykjavik and beyond. At the same time, for the US, the Europeans' self-identification as a 'civilian', if not a 'civilising', power was suggesting the very kind of free-riding behaviour which Americans were increasingly ready to identify. Since the late 1980s, EU–US relations have been very different from any previous period post-1945. In the 1990s, not only did an era pass but also a way of thinking. As noted elsewhere, profound international

events have raised questions at the very heart of our understanding of international politics. America's place in the world is debated and old thinking will not suffice. In 1991, Roberts noted that the specific intellectual agenda within the debate about US foreign policy after the Cold War is defined by three challenges.[30] The first is to evaluate how long-standing policy priorities and instruments carry over into the new era. The second is to identify new foreign policy issues that have emerged in the shadow or wake of the Cold War. The third is to pose the larger, transcendental questions about what the US stands for in the world and what Americans want to accomplish as a nation. Without answers to these questions, the evaluation of priorities and policies is sterile and impractical. Not since the late 1940s has the policy research community faced such an all-encompassing task. The US cannot simply carry forward the strategies, policies and concepts of the past into a quite different future. One clear lesson of the 1990s, though, is that very little concerted international action is indeed possible without American leadership. The reunification of Germany, the liberalisation of world trade arrangements, the Gulf War and strong intervention in the former Yugoslavia – military and otherwise – all required the US to articulate policies, as well as to convince and sometimes pressure others into joining.

The Gulf War and the admittedly impressive US exhibition of 'capacity to go to war' shows that military power is not obsolete. However, the assumption that the military victory of the US in the Gulf implies that the US has become once again 'hegemonic' would be simplistic.[31] In the twentieth century, the US was forced to intervene in Europe in order to rescue a faltering balance of power from aspiring hegemons. The post-Cold War multipolar balance of power, unlike those of the past, cannot rely on war as a cheap means by which the strong restrain those who aspire to join the majors' club. Nuclear and high-technology weapons make even small-scale wars unacceptably costly for developed democracies. And those weapons will be of limited value in deterring and coercing non-state actors who engage themselves in micro-wars within and across state borders.[32] Within the subsystem of the advanced capitalist and ever-globalising, if not already globalised, world, where the Union and the US act and interact without the presence of the communist threat, the significance of military strength is being reduced. Threats or promises concerning force are very difficult to make on issues of trade barriers or macroeconomic policy co-ordination. Estimates of future power will be more than ever based on the power of state-supported trade, finance capital, investments and other non-military aspects of power. The diffusion of effective power resources between the Union and the US (and Japan) has resulted in power becoming multidimensional and difficult to exercise. In that respect, the promise contained in President Bush's concept of a 'new world order' should not be viewed as a new *Pax Americana*, for no such US dominance can either be effective or viable in the long run, without support from international coalitions including West European states. If there is 'order', it will surely not be premised on the primacy of the US alone, save where, as in the Middle East, military power can still be a major arbiter of events with

implications far beyond the region.[33] The concept of a 'new world order' was born at a time when the US had put together an unprecedented coalition of states to act for a common purpose. The coalition's rationale in 'Operation Desertstorm' was not military: the US possessed the necessary capacity of its own, although it welcomed the efforts of key European allies. Instead, it served political purposes: to convince Americans that the US was not acting alone to secure an asset (oil) that was more important to other countries; and to counter Iraq's charges that it was championing the cause of the downtrodden against the 'enemies of Arab people'. Also, the situation in the Soviet Union meant that the ample US forces still in Europe could be withdrawn without fear.

The coalition's success does not necessarily set a precedent, however. There is, in fact, no other place on earth about which so many countries care so much, because of oil. As Calleo observes: 'the conditions in the Gulf War did provide a near perfect occasion to demonstrate American power . . . Militarily and geopolitically, however, these were not conditions that could be generalised into a new American-dominated world order.'[34] Likewise, Yugoslavia and the 1998 Iraqi mass destruction weapons crisis have shown that, important as it may be for the US to take the lead, it is unlikely that military power alone will be offered as a solution, at least not without 'objections'. Europe after the Cold War has new security problems, with new complex political and economic dimensions for which the US does not seem well prepared nor much disposed to take the lead in addressing. Nor did the major Western European powers seem eager to legitimise a renewed American hegemony, without some share in the power of decision in terms of defining problems, suggesting remedies, creating strategies and assigning roles. The emotional and psychological adjustments that the US faced in the 1990s is not limited either to changes in the agenda or in the tools most likely to be prominent in conferring power and influence. By the end of 1990, the Soviet threat to American and Western European interests had been replaced by less focused fears of economic and political disruption in Eastern Europe. One might have thought, on the basis of either 'balance of power' or 'balance of threat' theory, that European alignments with the US would have weakened more than they did in the 1980s. Signs of tensions in EU–US relations over trade, the international role of the Union, and relations with the East, had begun to mount in the later years of the Reagan administration. Changes in America's relative position in influencing and, to the extent possible, determining great events had affected its hegemonic role.

This prospect caused confusion regarding America's post-Cold War role. The confusion, however, did not express itself with the familiar dichotomy of the 1930s, that is, between imperialism and isolationism. Rather, it reflected the fact that identifying interests, setting goals and choosing instruments in contemporary US foreign policy had become a more formidable task than ever before. Kissinger was quick to point out that the end of the Cold War, in a manner similar to the end of Second World War, has produced a great temptation to recast the international system in America's image.[35] Kissinger, however, rejects the

notion of a 'unipolar' or 'one-superpower' world, as power has become more diffuse and America's ability to shape the rest of the world has actually decreased.[36] This means that the American exceptionalism, which was the basis for a Wilsonian foreign policy, appears less relevant for the coming years. For Kissinger, the nineteenth-century concept of 'balance of power' is the way forward for the US, whose foreign policy-makers have to articulate a notion of the national interest that is served by the maintenance of an equilibrium in Europe and in Asia, as America cannot 'remedy every wrong and stabilise every dislocation'. But at the same time, it cannot afford to 'confine itself to the refinement of its domestic virtues' because that would lead to American security and prosperity being dependent upon decisions made by others, of which the US would progressively lose control.[37] Kissinger's preference for a 'Congress of Vienna'-like framework for American post-Cold War strategy says little about how the US and the rest of the major international players (Europe, Russia, China and Japan) will achieve this kind of interaction in the world arena, when their governments and societies are facing enormous challenges domestically. As Miller has indicated, 'state-to-state balancing is also more complicated when there are no significant adversarial relationships among these five. Such balancing provides no guidance when non-state actors and functional topics crowd agendas.'[38]

Nevertheless, the US has attempted to make its policies compatible with its relative decline in power and the expansion and globalisation of interdependence, but this process of change has been undermined by a lack of strategic vision. Adopting a realist perspective, Krasner argues that US behaviour is constrained by its own capabilities and the distribution of power in the international system.[39] The external environment will inevitably pressure the US to move towards congruity between commitments and capabilities. In short, because the US is the main loser (in relation to its Western European allies) from structural change in world politics, it is bound to adjust its foreign policy behaviour. There has been, therefore, an undercurrent of disorientation in American foreign policy resulting from difficulties in translating the abstract of military might into actual political success. Having claimed credit for winning the Cold War, US policy-makers have been faced with the equally daunting task of managing peace. Building constructive relations among all the emerging great powers has been a challenge exacerbated by the co-existence of military and economic competition. Because both the issues as well as the hierarchy of power are different in each of these spheres, solutions on one level are likely to pose problems on the other and *vice versa.*

Although international policy co-ordination was never more difficult, there is evidence to support the thesis that the US foreign policy-making elites are attempting to craft policy by pursuing a strategy that promotes American power, position and primacy in order to enhance the capacity of the US to exercise influence abroad. The issue here is one of continuity and/or change. American actions in the Gulf (both in the early 1990s and in 1997–98), Somalia, Haiti, the Korean Peninsula and Yugoslavia, although problematic and incoherent,

represented the continuation of Washington's commitment to an active international agenda, even without a geopolitical and ideological rival. A global foreign policy inspired by *Realpolitik* efforts to prevent other states from 'renationalising' their foreign and security policies is a clear manifestation of continuity. This policy framework is based on the conviction that America's prosperity depends on the preservation of an interdependent global political economy, and that the precondition for economic interdependence is the geopolitical stability and reassurance that flows from US security commitments. Policies of renationalisation would destroy this reassurance and stability upon which US interests are presumed to rest. The assumption is that, if Washington cannot or will not solve others' problems for them, the world order strategy will collapse. Compelled to provide for their own security, others would have to emerge as great or regional powers and behave as independent geopolitical actors.[40]

This American globalism, then, is compatible with a set of principles that have come to be associated with world order, stability and, hence, vital US interests. Three principal objectives remained as they had for forty years: to maintain a strong European defence capacity, led by the US; to encourage a process of European integration that remained compatible with a 'US-made' liberal international political economy; and to continue global liberalisation of trade and investment on terms favourable to American interests. To attain all three objectives, the US had to maintain a strong influence in Europe, and either co-operation on economic and security issues had to be mutually reinforcing or, at worst, conflicts in one area (especially economic) had to be prevented from contaminating relations in the other. The fact that the US sought to institutionalise its relationship with the Union almost at the same time as the collapse of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks in 1990 is a case in point. The 1990 Transatlantic Declaration can be interpreted as the institutional recognition of the changing nature of the EU–US relationship, in which the US is coming to terms with its reduced capability to influence EU behaviour within the old and outdated structures of the 'hegemonic era'. The Declaration not only formalised pre-existing linkage processes between the two, but it also confirmed the weakening of US leverage. Growing and intensifying interdependence forced the US to seek to formalise the process of co-operation with the Union, in the face of important changes both within the Union – the completion of the single market programme, the Maastricht process (especially EMU) and further reforms to accommodate prospective enlargements – and in the new Eastern Europe. The Declaration was an important, though modest, step in the direction of 're-fashioning' EU–US political relations.

The ancillary objectives of US foreign policy in Europe also displayed a degree of continuity: to secure European support, where possible, for American actions outside Europe (e.g., in the Gulf), and to avoid increased financial or military obligations on the Continent. Fiscal pressures in the US made the latter objective even more important and reinforced American interest in European initiatives for greater burden-sharing in defence, preserving at the same time the

centrality of NATO with a new command structure, albeit at lower force levels. American attitudes towards increased European defence co-operation had always been ambivalent, with the US willing to see greater co-operation in order to reduce its own burden, but not to the point of undercutting NATO. That is why the American reaction to the Franco-German initiative of reviving the WEU as an exclusively European defence capability was one of concern. However, the policy outcome of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Berlin, which left the WEU subordinate to NATO, the inability of the Union to develop a common position on the Gulf and Yugoslav crises, and the *de facto* effective co-operation of the US, Britain and France in the Gulf War, diminished American concerns about NATO's role, even though it played no official part in out-of-area crises (until 1994 in the former Yugoslavia). The issue here is that the decline of American hegemony does not suggest that American leadership is on the wane. To be sure, the US overall material capabilities and power position have declined significantly since the early postwar years. But the political institutions and structures of relations that were built under American sponsorship after the Second World War still provide channels and routines of co-operation. America will not (and probably cannot) play the leadership role it did a generation ago, but that leadership has been reinvented in the form of a dense set of institutional and transnational linkages among major actors and regions in the world. Conflicts and disputes are as ubiquitous as ever, but they have become more domesticated and contained. Ikenberry summarises this argument most succinctly:

> Those who believe that American leadership is unlikely, if not impossible, look at past cases, particularly the end of World War II and a mythical version of the nineteenth century, to argue that the necessary conditions are missing: the hegemony needs overwhelming power, a clear purpose, and a large reservoir of political will. The error in the reasoning is not in failing to see that these factors are absent, but rather in failing to understand that they are not necessary in the current conditions, which call for a quite different kind of influence that relies on different instruments and that can thrive in the absence of these factors.[41]

While the actual record of US foreign policy in the late 1990s had by no means been a great showcase of global or Western leadership, the habits and institutional foundations of American leadership were still in place. For Ikenberry, the widespread worry about the end of US leadership is partly a result of a misunderstanding of what leadership is and the changing conditions in which it must operate. If leadership means the ability to foster co-operation and commonality of social purpose among states as well as the ability to reinforce institutionalisation at a systemic level, then American leadership and its institutional creations will long outlast the decline of its postwar position of military and economic dominance; and it will outlast the foreign policy stumbling of particular US administrations.[42] In this regard, the far-flung political institutions, rules, norms and relations that the US built during the Cold War are still in place, and these overall macro-structures can be seen to work despite the steady decline in

America's hegemonic position and the failings of its leaders. Indeed, the overall US-shaped system is still in place. It is this macropolitical system, a legacy of American power and its liberal polity, that remains crucial in generating agreement in the post-Cold War international relations.

Brzezinski goes further in arguing that American global power is exercised through a global system of distinctively American design that mirrors the domestic American experience.[43] Although America's international pre-eminence unavoidably evokes similarities with earlier imperial systems, the differences are more essential. They go beyond the question of territorial scope. As the imitation of American ways gradually pervades the world, it creates a more congenial setting for the exercise of the indirect and seemingly consensual American hegemony. And as in the case of the domestic American system, that hegemony involves a complex structure of interlocking institutions and procedures, designed to generate consensus and obscure asymmetries in power and influence. American global supremacy is thus buttressed by an elaborate system of alliances and coalitions that literally span the globe.[44] As Nye and Keohane have commented, American influence in Europe was greater in the 1990s than during the 1980s.[45] During the Cold War, international institutions such as NATO, GATT, and the Union were essential instruments in the implementation of American global strategy. The US successfully sought to prevent further loss of influence by maintaining a congenial political–economic order in Europe. Successful institutions tend to create interests that support them: even if NATO and GATT could not have been formed *ab initio* under the conditions of the 1990s, they were able to persist under these conditions.[46] Although the Bush administration implemented a 25 per cent reduction in the US force structure, including a sharp cutback of American troops in Europe under strong Congressional pressure to cut the defence budget in the spring of 1990, it succeeded in maintaining the centrality of NATO in European defence and was, by and large, able to keep US policy, preferences and interests intact. NATO remained central to the American internationalist strategy post-Cold War, and emphasis on the alliance was consistent with the US position throughout the Cold War years. By adapting NATO doctrine and structure, and by fending off French efforts to replace it as the central focus for the organisation of defence, the US was able to maintain its long-standing interest in NATO as the central focus for European defence, and thus to maintain its own influence as a central participant in the European security debate. Also, continuing US support for greater European integration must be interpreted as a realisation that the Union can act as a stabilising force in Western Europe and a catalyst for smooth democratic transition in the East. It is interesting, as the following section shows, that even the EU member states chose 'institutionalisation' as a response to systemic transformation: Germany sought to use institutions to reassure its neighbours as it regained a central role in Europe, and Britain tried to retain institutions such as NATO that magnified its influence. Washington viewed reliance on a web of international institutions (especially NATO) as the best way to preserve a strong

position in the tactical bargaining with both Russia and West European powers. The process of institutional adaptation which has been the outcome of interstate bargaining is at the heart of the new European security architecture.

The post-11 September 2001 context

Nobody can credibly deny the fact that the terrorist attacks against the US have in effect ushered in a new era in international politics. The priorities of international relations, the nature of regional politics, the shape of political alliances, the driving purpose of US foreign policy, the nature of international cleavages, the evolving role of military forces and the risks of WMD were all affected by the epoch-making events. The terrorist attacks have altered the Western strategic threshold but they have not really challenged the American position in the world, although the impact on the US strategy debate is profound. In terms of international distribution of power, the overall international security paradigm remained reasonably clear-cut. The US occupies a dominant place in the post-Cold War international system, especially in those aspects of the system dealing with national and international security. Again, one clear lesson of the Afghanistan campaign – like Bosnia and Kosovo – is that all major post-Cold War 'strategic projects and challenges' require effective US leadership.

In the campaign against international terorism, the US – once more – took the lead. By exercising its right of self-defence, it built a varied coalition in support of that right and has sought to develop a strategy to defeat terrorism with a global reach. A new strategic era has thus dawned. The US has a newly defined enemy, which is neither the old Soviet Union nor a, potentially, resurgent China, but international terrorism and terrorist sponsored states.[47] The pursuit and defeat of these enemies has become the overarching goal of US President G. W. Bush and his administration. It has, therefore, become a defining feature of international relations today. Countries formerly having difficult relations with the US, ranging from Russia, to Pakistan, to Iran, have an opportunity to develop a new strategic framework for themselves. New relationships, even alliances, will be built on the campaign against global terrorism, and these may endure well into the future. These radical and, in large measure, structural changes in the international political scene will have a considerable impact on the domestic context in which foreign policy is being conducted. Grand strategy, in the difficult circumstances of the ever-globalising information age, has returned to the fore with the US adopting a strategy of large-scale coalition-building.

Indeed, American diplomacy, since 11 September 2001, has been predicated on the need to build a large coalition of sorts, in order to fight the campaign against terrorism on many fronts and by employing a multitude of means. It is a coalition of sorts, because it is essentially one of variable geometry. Britain has been involved from the outset in all elements of the campaign; broad political

support, direct military involvement, military assistance, intelligence sharing, co-operation on financial controls, collaboration in UN Security Council (UNSC) diplomacy, co-ordination of national diplomatic efforts, development of long-term geopolitical strategy (and capacity for co-ordinated action), humanitarian and refugee policy, consultation on macroeconomic dimensions and sundry work. Other countries are involved in a subset of these activities. Moreover, the coalition is not merely led by the US but cannot be much influenced by others precisely because it is of such varied and inconsistent participation. These realities mean that there has been no major change, despite what some have suggested, in the instincts that animate the present US administration of G. W. Bush. Despite the latter's decision to pay United Nations (UN) dues and consult widely, US foreign policy has not embraced multilateral diplomacy in the traditional meaning of the phrase, nor found a new affection for international treaties. Indeed, the anti-terrorist campaign shows that the US has been adapting a more traditionalist view of international politics and taking harsher judgements about the relevance to its own security of actual or proposed international instruments and will be more, rather than less, vigorous in ensuring that it is not constrained by them when it seeks to act in self-defence. This could lead to a zero-sum struggle for power between the US and those that could threaten its territory, allies, friends or interests. According to Daalder, 'this is a view . . . that places military–security issues on the top of the US foreign policy agenda and focuses on threats to security as the main rationale for American engagement abroad'.[48]

At the level of scholarly debate, after the tragedy of 11 September, a stream of analysts were quick to criticise Fukuyama's 'end of history' thesis.[49] Rather emphatically, some went as far as to declare that history has only taken a break or even that that was the end of the end of history! For his part, Fukuyama responded by saying that such an unprecedented attack on thousands of civilian lives constituted in itself a historical event, while pointing out that the way in which he used the word 'History' in 1989 referred to the progress of humankind toward modernity, namely the institutions of liberal democracy and capitalism, in that it was difficult at the time to discern a viable alternative type of civilisation that people wanted to live in after the demise of communism, monarchy, fascism and the like. Such views were opposed by Huntington who, by dismissing the idea of a single global system (or of world-wide progress toward it), pointed out that the world was mired in a 'clash of civilisations', with several major groups, defined in cultural terms, constituting the new fractures of world conflict.[50] In particular, although he admits to the emergence of non-state actors on the global scene, holding however that nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, Huntington argued that conflict will continue to occur within civilisations, but also that the most dangerous conflicts of all will occur on the fault-lines between civilisations. His *The Clash of Civilisations*, however, may well have raised the question of the cultural dimension of security, in that the 'clash' occurs along the lines of religiously inspired militancy against Western liberal

values, but missed the underlying causes of Islamic resurgence itself, as it was obsessed with the cultural symbols or the retrieval of collective historical memories. A related criticism to his work was that, by rewriting Muslim history, he failed to encourage intelligent dialogue between the two opposing cultures, thus fostering fragmentation and prolonging historical stereotypes.

Fukuyama, on the other hand, sees the end of the Cold War as evidence of the triumph of liberal democracy over any oppressive and/or authoritarian type of regime: liberalism, in short, reigns triumphantly as the only remaining ideology. While Fukuyama admits that certain internal conflicts exist within liberalism, for instance, among classes, he dismisses these conflicts on the grounds that they are manageable. Conflict is central to his view of the future of international politics, its most important sources being ideological. Although he posits two possible ideological challenges to liberalism – religion and nationalism – he dismisses the threat posed by religion by claiming that religion is ill-suited to the realm of politics, suggesting at the same time that the liberal political process may help to resolve nationalistic tensions. In both cases, Fukuyama's faith in liberalism is overly optimistic. Irrespective of whom of the two wins the argument – and it is too early to even speculate on that – it is worth noting that, although they both see religion as threatening either the so-called 'Western civilisation' or for that matter 'liberalism' as its major constitutive feature, each seems to be employing a rather different approach. More specifically, Huntington rejects ideology and focuses on culture, while Fukuyama emphasises ideology. The fact that these apparently different perspectives lead to similar insights is not coincidental, as both theorists find religion as an inherently non-rational, pre-modern phenomenon. Yet, the question persists: is there a distinction to be drawn between, on the one hand, a generalised image of modernity based on an evolutionary model projected by the West to the outside world and, on the other, the way in which the institutions of modernity – formal and informal, political and economic – are sufficiently enough developed or indeed well enough established to be exported (at any rate of success) to non-Western polities? Be that as it may, we claim that such a distinction is of relevance to developing a more penetrating understanding of the form – or, better, forms – Western 'domination' currently takes in global politics, as well as to the very process of theorising, albeit mostly at the normative level, whether or not Western-style liberalism has reached a posthistorical stage. Before we bring this *problématique* to a close, Fukuyama's observations on the endurance of modernity post-11 September 2001, merit our attention:

> We remain at the end of history because there is only one system that will continue to dominate world politics, that of the liberal-democratic West. This does not imply a world free of conflict, nor the disappearance of culture as a distinguishing characteristic of societies . . . But the struggle we face is not the clash of several distinct and equal cultures struggling amongst one another like the great powers of 19th-century Europe. The clash consists of a series of rearguard actions from societies whose traditional existence is indeed threatened by modernisation. The strength of

the backlash reflects the severity of this threat. But time and resources are on the side of modernity, and I see no lack of a will to prevail in the United States today.[51]

European national visions, preferences and strategies

In the framework already described, the process of systemic transformation lends new salience to the factors outlined in this chapter. In the first place, the notions of leadership and followership in EU–US relations, based on the learning of the past fifty years, demand redefinition if not reconstruction. Within Europe, the leadership role in many areas seems at last partly to be falling to the Union, either by default or by design. For example, in 1989 the US and the EU were the major actors in establishing a co-ordinated Western response to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. The Western Economic Summit in Paris in July 1990 agreed on a programme to aid Poland and Hungary, with the Union acting as the chief co-ordinator. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) began operating in 1991, in part to service the programme. The initial subscribed capital of the Bank was ECU 10 billion, borne by thirty-nine nations plus the EU institutions. Just over half the Bank's capital was committed by the twelve EU nations (45 per cent) and the EU institutions (6 per cent) combined. The US contribution was 10 per cent.[52] The programme was later extended to cover Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany (prior to German reunification), (former) Yugoslavia and Romania.

However, the overall picture of the Union's role after the Cold War is much more complex and challenging. The war in the former Yugoslavia revived visions of a Europe racked by discord and ancient rivalries.[53] For the Union, the conflict exposed its lack of unity and will to act as a custodian of European security. The important issue here is the fact that the Balkan conflict has sapped the Union's confidence and undermined its credibility, thus contributing to the crumbling of popular support for the TEU, which was already diminishing as a result of the economic recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The eventual ratification of the Treaty did not repair the image of the Union as incapable of shouldering the responsibility of acting as the principal stabiliser in a meta-communist European context. At the same time, the Union's evolution and search for a role were, and still are, burdened by the reality of a reunified Germany, which threatens the tacit bargain that has been at the heart of European integration: Germany's acceptance of French political leadership in the Union, in return for a preponderant voice on economic affairs. Germany was thus tied to the West through US leadership on security matters within the NATO structure and French leadership on political issues within the Union. In the 1990s, Germany was suddenly transformed from a middle power contained in a variety of constraining structures and institutions into a major player, given its new size, economic might and geostrategic location in the new Europe. As Hoffmann asserts, 'within the EC, the relative equilibrium among the "big three" – France, the Federal Republic, and Britain – has broken in Germany's favor'.[54]

Mearsheimer argues that nationalism, German reunification and the likely reduction of American involvement in Europe will lead to intensified political rivalry and conflict among the major European powers, essentially as a result of the persistence of anarchy and multipolarity.[55] Yet, breaking out of this kind of realist straitjacket, it should be noted that the existence of international institutions shows that anarchy does not necessarily prevent co-operation.[56] In the absence of institutional stabilisers such as the Union and NATO, multipolarity and nationalism could be fatal, as the First World War demonstrated. In a case such as this, expectations play a crucial role. States and leaders will expect conflict and seek to protect themselves through self-help, and by seeking relative gains the potential of conflict will increase. International institutions, however, exist, in large measure, because they facilitate self-interested co-operation by reducing uncertainty and, hence, by stabilising expectations.[57] Post-unification German policies, like those employed post-1945, are closely linked to international institutions. A united Germany did not revert to old-fashioned nation-state manoeuvring. Genscher regarded his 'policy of responsibility' as a practice beyond the traditional balance of power politics.[58] This does not imply that Germany does not pursue what it perceives as its national interests (see the former Yugoslavia), only that it demonstrates a clear preference for co-operation forging multilateral structures like the Union, WEU, NATO or the Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The account of Anderson and Goodman shows that the German post-Cold War strategies reflected the instrumental role of these institutions for a German policy that depended on reassuring both adversaries and allies.[59] As in the half-century since 1945, it is crucial for Germany to remain a reliable partner, ready, willing and able to shoulder responsibilities with its allies. To remain an influential partner Germany must fulfil its international obligations. A strengthened multilateralism in the European security environment is of vital importance for Germany, which not only has more neighbours than any other European nation, but lies on the dividing line between the affluent West and the fledgling democracies in CEE. It was, therefore, in Germany's interest to promote both integration and ever closer co-operation in NATO and the Union, while simultaneously stabilising Central and Eastern Europe. Germany had a vital interest in keeping the US involved in European security affairs through a transformed and reinvigorated NATO, and a WEU organically linked to the former.

For France, the demise of the Cold War order provided a test for the validity of a set of assumptions and attitudes towards European security, which have constituted the French security model for almost three decades.[60] The French reaction has been one of confusion and ambiguity. French policies have been mostly dictated by immediate perceptions and concerns, particularly those dealing with German reunification and its consequences. The most striking feature of these policies has been the French preference for deepening European integration as the best response to new systemic challenges. The implicit motive was that further integration would alleviate the risk of a hegemonic Germany.

But faithful to its Gaullist tradition, French foreign policy has also attempted to preserve a degree of independence. According to Hoffmann, 'it is the difficult combination of anxiety about Germany and worry about French independence which explains the subtleties and contradictions of France's European policy'.[61] While the deepening of integration was seen by French elites as the best way to restrain Germany's 'operational sovereignty', the very same process was seen as potentially leading to a situation in which Germany might dominate the institutions designed for its containment. The dilemma for French policy-makers was over integration and independence. The idea of an 'organic link' between the WEU and the Union as independent from NATO as possible, while allowing space for the preservation of French military independence, proved impossible to realise, and led to unsuccessful initiatives and inconsistent attitudes. It is indicative of the French confusion and inconsistency that while the rhetoric used had a strong federalist colouring, the proposals submitted in the IGCs of 1990/91 and 1996/97 were compatible with intergovernmental premises. French policy thus allowed the US to rally Britain and Germany behind the reform of NATO's force structure, which was endorsed in June 1991. The British plan that prevailed increased the role of the Europeans (minus France) within NATO, especially through the creation of a rapid reaction force integrated in NATO's command structure.[62] While the British position was consistent with the basic principle of keeping the US involved in Europe, what kept Germany from endorsing the French 'vision' over NATO was not only the stabilising role of the Alliance in Europe as well as its attraction to Eastern European governments, but also France's own reluctance to abandon its autonomy for the construction of a truly collective European security system.

For Britain, the most important objective in the post-Wall period has been to preserve its 'special relationship' with the US. The view has been that NATO is the best vehicle for the preservation of the US commitment to Europe, which was viewed as essential to European security. Moreover, the continuation of US involvement was seen by London as the best way to neutralise the threat that German reunification presented to the European balance of power and, hence, to Britain's position. Britain perceived NATO as the *conditio sine qua non* of the post-Cold War settlement. Britain insisted throughout the '2 plus 4' negotiations that a unified Germany would have to be a NATO member and that NATO should remain the linchpin of European security. Throughout the Cold War, British defence policy had become so integrated with NATO policy that it was difficult to separate the two.[63] In the mid-1990s, the British view started shifting towards supporting moves to strengthen a European pillar in security and defence. However, this did not signal a fundamental change in British attitudes. For Britain:

> NATO must remain the bedrock of Europe's security and its capabilities should not be duplicated. However, we also need a stronger WEU so that European countries can take on their proper share of the burden and act effectively in situations in which the US may not wish to be involved . . . We need to take high-level decisions

of policy and military action involving Western European countries at summit level. That would keep co-operation on an intergovernmental basis, and not on the basis of Community competence.[64]

This seemingly new British approach has been the result of US reluctance to become involved in issues that do not constitute vital American interests, and of the need to work out ways that foreign policy decisions by the Fifteen can be translated into defence action by the WEU. For Britain, this will not mean a European army or for that matter duplication of NATO. As Douglas Hurd has observed, 'some things will not change. Defence against invasion – defence of our vital interests: these are NATO's essential tasks. But Europeans can and must respond to other demands in Europe and beyond: peace keeping, crisis management, humanitarian operations, sanctions enforcement.'[65]

The foregoing discussion shows that European national responses to the end of the Cold War were conditioned by the highly institutionalised European environment. Not only that, but European governments promoted 'institutionalisation', albeit in different forms (adaptation, reform, consolidation, etc.). This, however, does not mean that institutions have dictated policies. Rather, they have been used to accommodate national interests and to promote national power and policy preferences in well-known co-operative frameworks. It should not escape our attention that national positions and policies reflect deeper antitheses, which relate to fragile balances, national visions and external orientations and interests, both within and outside the EU system. These antitheses derive from the lack of homogeneity of geopolitical perspectives, differing concepts or evaluations of external threat and differing national strategies. The result has been a divergence among fundamental interests and, consequently, the development of divergent national strategic orientations and foreign policy preferences and approaches.

Entering into the security realm is not uncontroversial considering that the Union for a long time professed to be a 'civilian power', lacking military might and ambitions in the military sphere. The European political system on the 'high politics' level is still fragmented into nation-state units, which, throughout its history, either used intergovernmental co-operation with participation in the Atlantic Alliance or developed bilateral co-operation, like France and Germany. This means that the European countries have almost always had the will to integrate trade and economic policies, but not to abandon their authority and autonomy in the vital areas of security and defence, which allow them to behave as independently as possible in the international system. The European defence system was built – at both collective and national levels – on the basis of an 'Atlantic' rather than a 'European' logic. The presence of the US in Europe 'undermined' the need for excessive defence armaments, thus eliminating the systemic causes of past European conflicts. The historical significance of the US presence lies in the fact that it contained the traditional competitive and conflictual tendencies in Europe as well as a developed network of Euro-American

institutions and processes, within which defence and security policies were internationalised. What should be clear is that American involvement and the Soviet threat led to 'Atlanticism' rather than the 'Europeanisation' of defence. The reactions of the major European powers to the tidal changes of the 1990s are testament to this thesis. The calls for a more autonomous European defence system that could be subject to supranational processes should not ignore national strategies and preferences. Successful implementation of the CFSP, as well as of a common defence policy, will continue to depend, as the Amsterdam outcome clearly showed, less on legal obligations and more on favourable political and strategic variables and factors in the European regional and global arenas.

In that context, implementation of the decisions made at Maastricht and Amsterdam could not only be painful but may actually dampen European foreign policy activism and threaten the whole *acquis communautaire*. Joint security policies backed by military options are likely to be possible only when all the member states' interests are under threat. Alternatively, they might refuse to comply with the agreed guidelines. Amsterdam revealed that a modern European strategy document is not easy to write, given the very different foreign policy traditions of the different EU members and the uncertainty of the contemporary world. What treaty reforms have done in the 1990s is to identify defence as essential to EU construction. In such a context, a common security organisation becomes a means to a compelling political end. Given this, imperative practical issues such as military planning, command structures, effectiveness and efficiency are in danger of becoming subordinate considerations. This is against all historical experience. The history of international relations since the Greek–Persian Wars has showed that states band together to meet perceived security threats; they do not forge defence structures to achieve a preconceived political federation. The implementation of Amsterdam stands this logic on its head. The accelerated move to create a more than intergovernmental defence regime as an (implicit) precondition for eventual political union seems to ignore the fact that no functional equivalent to US strategic leadership exists in Europe, nor is one likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. Moreover, regimes should not be viewed as progenitors of regional security communities that supplant national governments. This outcome is highly improbable and might in the end prove to be dangerous. If states perceive that regimes are being constructed around and under them, they are apt to withdraw their co-operation, with adverse consequences for peace and stability in Europe. Instead, the regime-building process should draw from states their common interests in redefining the terms of an interstate security community in Europe, recognising non-state actors as critical supports for the process.

Moreover, successful regime-building requires identification and definition of the threat. NATO experience has shown that there is a linear relationship between the internal cohesion of an alliance and the way in which members perceive external threats and challenges. The nature of European interstate relations post-1989 has changed to such an extent that the definition of a specific

and identifiable threat is very difficult. The Soviet threat has been replaced by a complex of fluid and 'secondary' dangers: local or regional instability, civil and identity-based conflicts, revisionist tendencies in the regional subsystems, nuclear proliferation, and even potential resurrection of past dangers such as nationalist groups and parties in Russia. Failure of EU members to define the nature and character of post-Cold War threats could not only undermine attempts to transform the CFSP into 'defence policy', but could endanger the integration process in other fields. The evolution of the European security institutional map in the 1990s confirmed that the compelling task was not to create structures that derive from member states' compulsions to assuage anxieties about the future, which will erode further the EU's credibility in defence and foreign policy by ignoring the heterogeneity of the European system, but to renovate the transatlantic security arrangements by shifting from a US-led system to a multilateral and more EU-involved one. It should be noted once more that 'institutionalisation' was chosen as *the* principled European security policy: the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), the Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) agreements, the Paris Charter, the creation of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), the strengthening of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)/OSCE's conflict prevention and peacekeeping machinery, NATO's 'Partnership for Peace' (PfP) initiative, together with the decisions taken in Berlin for a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), and in Madrid for NATO's enlargement, have already laid the foundations of a new co-operative security order in place. It is to these developments that we now turn, in an attempt to yield some further insights into the institutional and political evolution of European foreign, security and defence policy.

Notes

1   David B. Dewitt, 'Introduction: The New Global Order and the Challenges of International Security', in David Dewitt, David Haglund and John Kirton (eds), *Building a New Global Order: Emerging Trends in International Security*, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 1.

2   By the term 'order' we mean a formal or informal sum of relations which produces regular and expected patterns of behaviour and in which commonly accepted views on issues of hierarchy, legitimacy and normative interaction prevail. See, for example, Robert Cox, *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, especially Chapter 6. For a historico-sociological approach, see John A. Hall, *International Orders*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, especially Chapter 1.

3   Stephen D. Krasner, 'Power, Polarity and the Challenge of Disintegration', in Helga Hoftendorn and Christian Tuschhoff (eds), *America and Europe in an Era of Change*, Boulder: Westview, 1993, p. 22.

4   R. W. Tucker, '1989 and All That', *Foreign Affairs*, 69:4, Autumn 1990, pp. 96–7.

5   Michael Smith, 'Beyond the Stable State? Foreign Policy Challenges and Opportunities in the New Europe', in Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith (eds), *European Foreign Policy:*

The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe, London: Sage, 1994, p. 24. Smith attempts to approach the problems of foreign policy analysis in the framework of change in Europe. He discusses the implications of change for the 'European state' by looking for the linkages between the tools of foreign policy analysis and state theory. In this exercise, the primary sources are those provided by John Ikenberry and his work on 'The State and Strategies of International Adjustment', *World Politics*, 39:1, 1986, and Robert Cox and his work on 'States, Social Forces and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory', in Robert Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, as well as 'Multilateralism and World Order', *Review of International Studies*, 18:2, 1992.

6 On this notion, see James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds), *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; Susan Strange, *Casino Capitalism*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.

7 Robert Cox, 'Global Restructuring: Making Sense of the Changing International Political Economy', in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (eds), *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, London: Macmillan, 1994, p. 49.

8 *Ibid.*

9 *Ibid.* 'At one time, the military–bureaucratic form of state seemed to be optimum in countries of peripheral capitalism for the enforcement of monetary discipline. Now, International Monetary Fund-inspired "structural adjustment" is pursued by elected presidential regimes (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru) that manage to retain a degree of insulation from popular pressures. India, formerly following a more autocentric or self-reliant path, has moved closer and closer toward integration into the global economy. Neo-conservative ideology has sustained the transformation of the state in Britain, the United States, Canada, and Australasia in the direction of globalisation. Socialist party governments in France and in Spain have adjusted their policies to the new orthodoxy. The states of the former Soviet empire, insofar as their present governments have any real authority, seem to have been swept up into the globalising trend.'

10 According to Held, 'states, including new states, operate in a complex international system which both limits their autonomy and infringes even more upon their sovereignty. Any conception of sovereignty which interprets it as an unlimited form of public power is undermined. Sovereignty itself has to be conceived today as already divided among a number of agencies, national, international and transnational, and limited by the very nature of this plurality.' See David Held, *Modern State and Political Theory*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992, p. 16.

11 Pierre Hassner, 'Obstinate and Obsolete: Non-Territorial Transnational Forces versus the European Territorial State', in Ola Tunander, Pavel Baev and Victoria Ingrid Einagel (eds), *Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe: Security, Territory and Identity*, London: Sage/Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1997, p. 58.

12 Kenneth D. Bush and E. Fuat Keyman, 'Identity-Based Conflict: Rethinking Security in a Post-Cold War World', *Global Governance*, 3:3, September–December 1997, p. 314.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 311.

14 See, for example, Kenneth Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', *Review of International Studies*, 17, 1991, pp. 313–26; Helga Hoftendorn, 'The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Disciple-Building in International Security', *International Studies Quarterly*, 35, 1991, pp. 3–17; Edward Kolodziej, 'Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!', *International Studies Quarterly*, 36, 1992, pp. 421–38; Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991; and Michael Klare and Daniel Thomas (eds), *World Security: Challenges for a New Century*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1994.

15 Zaki Laidi, 'Introduction: Imagining the Post-Cold War Era', in Zaki Laidi (ed.), *Power and Purpose After the Cold War*, Oxford: Berg, 1994, p. 2.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 3.

17 James N. Rosenau, 'New Dimensions of Security: The Interaction of Globalising and Localising Dynamics', *Security Dialogue*, 25:3, September 1994, p. 255.

18 See Zaki Laidi, 'Power and Purpose in the International System', in Laidi (ed.), *Power and Purpose*, p. 11.

19 WEU, *European Security: A Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries*, WEU Council of Ministers, Madrid, 14 November 1995, pp. 8–14.

20 The most prominent recent reminder of the need to take such threats seriously has been the Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster in Ukraine. The Ukrainian government today still allocates nearly 15 per cent of its national budget to managing the environmental after-effects. The total economic and social costs incurred across Europe, including increased health care expenditures and declining life expectancies, will probably never be accurately determined. However, the threat of future Chernobyls is real. The problem of environmental degradation in Eastern Europe is not limited to unsafe nuclear plants, however. It already extends to polluted rivers, toxic dumping, unproductive farm lands, non-existent emission controls and a myriad of other threats to life. Like Chernobyl, these threats must be addressed because their consequences are far-reaching and unacceptable, not only to the populations of the independent Central, Eastern European and newly independent states, but to the whole of Europe. See Ralph A. Hallenbeck, Thomas Molino and Kevin Roller, *Preventive Defence: A New Framework for US–European Security Cooperation?*, Wilton Park: The Center for Global Security and Cooperation, July 1997, p. 40.

21 For several years the US has been attempting to address these problems through the Co-operative Threat Reduction Programme (CTRP). Through the CTRP, the US has helped to destroy ballistic missiles and silos, and has even purchased some highly enriched uranium from the former Soviet Republics and assisted in setting up improved nuclear safety, security and safeguard procedures. To date, however, the CTRP has not eliminated the problems posed by nuclear materials. Indeed, many experts believe that too much attention has been paid to dismantling missiles and silos, and far too little has gone to safeguarding nuclear weapons, military and civilian reactors and loose materials. This comment appears to have substantial merit. If preventive defence policies are to be taken seriously as a framework for addressing these kinds of non-traditional threat to European security, US, Russian and European governments must do more. See *ibid.*, p. 41.

22 WEU, *European Security*, p. 13.

23 The best example is John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, 15:1, Summer 1990, pp. 5–56. He argues that the demise of the Cold War order is likely to increase the chances that war and major crises will occur in Europe: 'The next decades in a Europe without superpowers would probably not be as violent as the first 45 years of this century, but would probably be substantially more prone to violence than the past 45 years. This pessimistic conclusion rests on the argument that the distribution and character of military power are the root causes of war and peace' (p. 6).

24 According to Politi, 'only in short-term lobbying battles is an alternative between prevention and repression seen'. See Alessandro Politi, *European Security: The New Transnational Risks*, Chaillot Papers, 29, WEU Institute for Security Studies, October 1997, p. 13.

25 *Ibid.*, p. 14. See also Barry Buzan, 'Rethinking Security After the Cold War', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 32:1, 1997, pp. 5–28.

26 Politi, *European Security*, p. 16.

27 Fergus Carr and Kostas Ifantis, *NATO in the New European Order*, London: Macmillan/St Martin's Press, 1996, pp. 44–5.

28 Gregory F. Treverton, 'America's Stakes and Choices in Europe', *Survival*, 34:3, Autumn 1992, p. 119.

29 Kevin Featherstone and Roy H. Ginsberg, *The United States and the European Community in the 1990s: Partners in Transition*, London: Macmillan/St Martin's Press, 1993, p. 14.

30 Brad Roberts, 'Introduction', in Brad Roberts (ed.), *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992, p. vii.

31 Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, 'The Diplomacy of Structural Change: Multilateral Institutions and State Strategies', in Hoftendorn and Tuschhoff (eds), *America and Europe*, pp. 44–5.

32 Stephen J. Cimbala, *US Military Strategy and the Cold War Endgame*, London: Frank Cass, 1995, p. 127.

33 Robert E. Hunter, 'Starting at Zero: US Foreign Policy for the 1990s', in Roberts (ed.), *US Foreign Policy*, p. 15.

34 David P. Calleo, 'America's Federal Nation State: A Crisis of Post-imperial Viability', *Political Studies*, 42, 1994, pp. 26–7.

35 Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994, p. 805.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 809.

37 *Ibid.*, p. 833.

38 Linda B. Miller, 'The Clinton Years: Reinventing US Foreign Policy?', *International Affairs*, 70:4, October 1994, p. 624.

39 Krasner, 'Power, Polarity', p. 29.

40 C. Layne and B. Schwartz, 'American Hegemony – Without an Enemy', *Foreign Policy*, 92, Autumn 1993, p. 15.

41 G. John Ikenberry, 'The Future of International Leadership', in Demetrios James Caraley and Bonnie B. Hartman (eds), *American Leadership, Ethnic Conflict, and the New World Politics*, New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1997, p. 2.

42 *Ibid.*

43 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York: Basic Books, 1997, p. 24.

44 According to Brzezinski, 'American supremacy has thus produced a new international order that not only replicates but institutionalises abroad many features of the American system itself. Its basic features include: a collective security system, including integrated command and forces, e.g., NATO; regional economic co-operation and specialised co-operative institutions; procedures that emphasise consensual decision making, even if dominated by the US; a preference for democratic membership within key alliances; a rudimentary global constitutional and judicial structure.' See *ibid.*, pp. 28–9.

45 Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane, 'The United States and International Institutions in Europe After the Cold War', in R. O. Keohane, J. S. Nye and S. Hoffmann (eds), *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993, p. 105.

46 *Ibid.*

47 See the remarks by John Chipman, Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'The Military Balance Press Conference', 18 October 2001.

48 Ivo H. Daalder, 'Are the United States and Europe Heading for Divorce?', *International Affairs*, 77:3, July 2001, p. 559.

49 See F. Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', *National Interest*, 1:3, 1989, pp. 3–18; and his *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Free Press, 1992.

50 See S. P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs* 72:3, 1993, pp. 22–49; and his *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, London: Touchstone, 1996.

51 See F. Fukuyama, 'History is Still Going Our Way: Liberal Democracy will Inevitably Prevail', *Wall Street Journal*, 5 October 2001.

52 Featherstone and Ginsberg, *The United States and the European Community*, p. 106.

53 Michael J. Brenner, 'EC: Confidence Lost', *Foreign Policy*, 91, Summer 1993, p. 24.

54 Stanley Hoffmann, 'America and Europe in an Era of Revolutionary Change', in Hoften-dorn and Tuschhoff (eds), *America and Europe*, p. 63.
55 Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future'.
56 See Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, especially Chapter 6.
57 Robert O. Keohane, 'The Diplomacy of Structural Change', p. 52.
58 R. G. Livingston, 'United Germany: Bigger and Better', *Foreign Policy*, 87, Summer 1992, pp. 165–6.
59 Jeffrey J. Anderson and John B. Goodman, 'Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold War Europe', in Keohane, Nye and Hoffmann (eds), *After the Cold War*.
60 Frederic Bozo, 'French Security Policy and the New European Order', in Colin McInnes (ed.), *Security and Strategy in the New Europe*, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 197.
61 Stanley Hoffmann, 'French Dilemmas and Strategies in the New Europe', in Keohane, Nye and Hoffmann (eds), *After the Cold War*, p. 138.
62 *Ibid.*, p. 131.
63 Luise Richardson, 'British State Strategies After the Cold War', in Keohane, Nye and Hoffmann (eds), *After the Cold War*, pp. 158–9.
64 Speech by John Major, House of Commons, 1 March 1995.
65 Speech by Douglas Hurd to the German Society for Foreign Affairs, Berlin, 28 February 1995.