6

Institutional imperatives of system change
The evolving European security architecture

Introduction

The European landscape is changing rapidly, not least owing to a series of
decisions taken in the second half of the 1990s. In June 1996, NATO's foreign
ministers decided to adopt ESDI 'within the Alliance' and to develop the CJTF
concept. In May 1997, NATO and Russia agreed to establish a Joint Permanent
Council. In June 1997, EU leaders reached agreement on the AMT. In July 1997
in Madrid, NATO agreed on the admission of three new members (Poland, Hun-
gary and the Czech Republic), while the Commission published its Opinion on
CEE candidates and presented its Agenda 2000 report on the implications of
enlargement. In 1998 and 1999 the Union began accession negotiations with
twelve countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Malta. In December
1999, the Union also re-affirmed Turkey's candidacy status although no negoti-
ations have begun owing to the long path towards democratisation that Turkey
must embark upon if it is to fulfil the political side of the Copenhagen Criteria.
Economically, in late 2000 and early 2001, Turkey experienced massive financial
crises which means that meeting the economic criteria also has a long way to go.
In December 2000, the Nice European Council meeting formalised rapid devel-
opments in European security and defence, by creating within the CFSP context
an ESDP with new institutional arrangements in Brussels and a planned Euro-
pean Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), which was declared 'operational' at the
Laeken European Council in December 2001. Apart from the Union and NATO,
institutions like the WEU and OSCE also experienced developments, including,
in the case of the WEU, its own demise. This chapter considers the institutional
responses to the geopolitical and geostrategic challenges of system change in the
fields of European foreign policy, security and defence. It looks at the four insti-
tutions which lie at the heart of the debate about European security after the

Cold War: the Union, NATO, the WEU and (to a lesser extent) the OSCE. It examines their development and analyses their interrelationship: what we have learned to call the European 'security architecture'. The final section of the chapter deals with the issue of the Union's role in world politics post-Cold War.

European foreign and security policy

This section presents a detailed analysis of European foreign and security policy as it has emerged after nearly fifty years of efforts by the EC/EU, dating back to the early 1950s with the European Defence Community (EDC) saga, and bringing us up to the Amsterdam and Nice reforms of October 1997 and February 2001, respectively. Attention is given not only to the CFSP itself, but also to its predecessor, EPC, which spanned nearly a quarter of a century (1970–93) before it was replaced by the CFSP with the coming into force of the TEU. One needs to stress a fundamental difference in the efforts at foreign and security policy co-operation before and after the Cold War, as the latter offered (Western) Europe two fundamentally different scenarios, one prior to, and one after, its demise. The dominant view from 1947 until 1989 was one favouring integration in an effort to protect the free Western side of Europe from succumbing to the communist threat of the Soviet empire (accompanied by similar economic and social efforts against the internal threat of communism, especially in France and Italy). This created a 'West versus East' divide that coloured all integration efforts in 'high politics' areas prior to 1989.

After 1989, the security challenge has become one of integrating the East into the existing foreign and security structures of the West and, of course, of adapting them to this new international environment. Whereas the first phase was one of 'exclusion', the second, and current, phase is one of 'inclusion'. The implications are enormous for integration theory and practice as they address totally different requirements. Pre-1989, defence meant that integration efforts were geographically limited to Western Europe and best served in practice by NATO thanks to American leadership and capabilities. Post-1989, we are facing the prospect of a Continent-wide security and defence system that may or may not include the US. That is to say, the European security agenda is now one of creating an overarching architecture that would include all European states and all the many institutions on the Continent dealing with international affairs (the Union, WEU, NATO, OSCE, and the Council of Europe). In practical terms, this means that the future of the CFSP/ESDP is clearly linked to the institutional reforms required to render the Union more efficient as it enlarges. This became visible in recent treaty reforms, where future changes to the number of Commissioners have been made dependent on a reweighting of votes in the Council. Amsterdam, in particular, also extended the scope of QMV in the CFSP, making it clear that treaty reforms would take into consideration not only the 'old' argument about the international interests and duties of the big states, but also the

fact that Germany is now a fully fledged actor in international politics (as it is now reunited, fully sovereign, and its Constitution is being re-interpreted to allow for a more active international role, seeking a seat on the UN Security Council) and that the Union could consist of nearly twenty-seven or so members in the not-too-distant future.

All this has of course impacted on the very definition of what 'Europe' actually means. In other words, where will the borders of the current Union end in the longer term? This question goes beyond the mere geographical definition of the Continent and will undoubtedly have implications for what kind of Union and what international role for the Union will ensue. The nature of the EU political system has been discussed earlier in this book (Chapter 2), whereas the question of what type of actor the Union is in international affairs is covered later. Before dealing with this issue, however, one needs to assess the impact of the initial debate on integration theory and developments in European foreign and security policy, as what is debated today is a continuation of a much longer discussion.

The initial debate

The fundamental question of the first two decades of European integration, that is, up to the mid-1960s, had two main dimensions: federalism versus intergovernmentalism, and big versus small states. This particular debate first occurred in the late 1940s and early 1950s and culminated in the EDC saga of 1950–54.[1] Such a debate was then repeated in the slightly different environment of the 1960s with the Fouchet Plans. The latter period was dominated by Gaullism and was part of a wider malaise which culminated in the first major institutional crisis of the Community in 1965, which was resolved by the Luxembourg Accords of January 1996. The same year, however, also witnessed the French withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command.

The questions of West European economic reconstruction and collective defence had been temporarily settled with the 1947 Marshall Plan (OEEC) and the creation of NATO in 1949. The sheer dominance of the US in both organisations meant that immediate concerns had been dealt with. But foreign and defence co-operation, both in more general terms and with a view to deepening integration, remained largely unanswered all the same. The setting up of the Council of Europe in 1949 had shown the limits of European federalism but the debate carried on with the creation of the ECSC and, more importantly for our purposes, with the EDC, where a clearly federal defence structure had been proposed by the Pléven Plan in 1950. Important to note here is that the EDC project eventually failed in 1954, and with it the prospects for the establishment of a European Political Community. The key feature of the debate at the time was, in our view, the question of sovereignty, which brings in the British stance on the matter but, crucially, adds the issue of how to balance the national interests of big states with those of small(er) ones, preferably within a structured, institutionalised framework. The question of 'efficiency versus accountability',

which reappeared later and has dominated European foreign and security policy since the 1970s, contained then a different dimension to the current debate, which mainly deals with democracy (see below). The older debate amounted to how much power big states should have in the aftermath of the Second World War in general, and before (EDC) and after (the Fouchet Plans) the Suez *débâcle* of 1956 in particular. More recently, however, and in part owing to the relative small size of most applicant states (either engaged in current accession negotiations or future ones), this debate has re-emerged, even if one must note that not only the international context – political and economic – is different, but also the very nature of the Union itself.

All this had normative and descriptive implications for the kind of structure the integration process would allow in the fields of foreign and defence policy, with the federalists offering a supranational entity and the intergovernmentalists adamantly opposing it. The main arguments in favour or against a federal structure have been described at some length elsewhere (see Chapter 1). All that needs to be added here is that the federalists favoured a constitutional solution to all the problems of European foreign policy and defence at a stroke. The federalisation of Western Europe would have automatically created a common foreign and security policy with a common defence (European armed forces). In order to make the whole process politically acceptable, the EDC would have been part of the European Political Community tied to the EDC plan, comprising a common government, Parliament, and so on; that is, a federal political union. At the other end of the spectrum, the intergovernmentalists basically argued that the collective defence of Western Europe had been taken care of by the creation of NATO, and that defence and foreign policy should remain within the exclusive remit of national control and traditional military alliances. In terms of which EC states favoured which alternative in the 1950s and 1960s, a distinction can be made between, on the one hand, the federalists in Italy, (West) Germany, and the Benelux countries, and, on the other, France and Britain (the latter initially as a non-member and then as a potential member), which favoured a more intergovernmentalist approach.

As no compromise could be found between the two extremes, partly because of fundamental differences and partly because Britain refused to join initially and then was prevented from joining by the French in 1963 and 1967, no further progress was achieved in foreign and defence matters within a strictly European framework. As a result, the continuing debate over the desirability and feasibility of such a project was dominated by the French and were linked to developments in their polity. Indeed, domestic changes in Paris altered the overall European landscape when the EDC plan was overturned by an unholy alliance of Gaullists and communists in the *Assemblée Nationale* in 1954, and, once the Fifth Republic had been established in 1958, de Gaulle dominated European politics. As a non-member, Britain was not directly involved in the debate and did not gain much credibility or sympathy by trying to undermine the Community (the creation of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in 1960)

and by signing agreements with the US on military (including nuclear weapons) and intelligence issues. Germany was geographically divided, politically impaired at the international level (Basic Law and later WEU restrictions on arms production and possession), and with a foreign presence on its soil (with both divided Berlin and divided Germany as symbols of limited sovereignty). All this meant a stalemate as far as European foreign and security policy was concerned. Only bilateral intergovernmental efforts succeeded – most notably, the Franco-German Treaty of 1963 – and NATO's predominance remained unchallenged, despite increasing problems with US foreign policy in South-East Asia. However, the economic successes of the Community in general, and those of the Customs Union and the Common Market in particular, meant that there was an impact that extended well beyond the Community's internal borders. Accordingly, efforts to find a way of integrating and co-operating on the political side of economic affairs did not go away, both internally (political union) and externally (foreign affairs). Hence the setting up of EPC in 1970, following the December 1969 Hague Summit.

From EPC to the CFSP and . . . the ESDP

The main foundations of European foreign policy co-operation were laid down by the EPC framework following the 1970 Luxembourg Report, and were developed throughout its history with the 1973 Copenhagen Report, the 1981 London Report, and more recently with Title III of the SEA. We contrast here EPC with the failed attempts of the 1950s and 1960s, and identify the reasons for a different outcome and its implications for integration theory.

The main reason for the successful development of EPC was ironically that the previous failures had shown the limits of supranationalism in 'high politics' areas central to national prerogatives and, ultimately, sovereign statehood. But even successive Gaullist attempts at a more confederal, big-powers, Concert of Europe-type arrangement had their own limitations. Those same failures, however, had also shown the existing resolve of smaller states to push ahead with integration in all domains of policy action.[2] The international environment had also changed, with the consolidation of *détente* and the emergence of new leaders in all key members of the Community and in Britain (Brandt, Pompidou, Heath). All these changes at the domestic, European and international levels led to the setting up of EPC in 1970 and the first enlargement of the Community in 1973. In fact, the new members actively participated in foreign policy discussions even before they formally joined the EC/EPC framework.[3]

The principal reasons for EPC's success can be attributed to its intergovernmentalism, flexibility, pragmatism and its built-in room for adaptation. The EPC arrangements also coincided with a stagnation phase in other areas (especially the economy following the oil crises of 1973 and 1979), and it can be argued that, to paraphrase Taylor, such arrangements 'saved' the overall process of integration by allowing intergovernmentalists to be seen as possible integrationists for the first time.[4] A similar case has been made more recently by

Øhrgaard, arguing that there is clear 'affirmative' evidence that 'integration can occur in an intergovernmental setting'.[5] But where this book parts company from Øhrgaard is on his conclusion that Haas' neofunctionalism must be reassessed in that new light. Instead, we argue that confederal consociation offers a better alternative (see below). Despite its limitations from a classical federalist prism,[6] it was thanks to EPC that foreign policy co-operation was occurring for the first time within an institutionalised framework, albeit distinct from the Community's and more flexible than it (no formal role for the Commission and no jurisdiction for the ECJ). Moreover, one needs to link progress in foreign policy with the enlargement process at the time, which was to include a leading international country, Britain. Finally, while EPC showed that political leadership had been reinstated as a key element in any integrative move (thus presenting a setback for the automatic spillover thesis), it also confirmed that some momentum does take place on its own and that the success of economic integration in the 1950s and 1960s meant that the Community had to develop new ways of co-operation in foreign policy if it did not want to be only 'an economic giant but a political pygmy'.

The other important element of EPC was its impact on national foreign ministries and diplomats. This is known in the literature as the 'co-ordination reflex', in that any national foreign policy position has to cater for any impact it would have on the foreign policies of other members and, by implication, on the overall view of the Community. Whether an arrangement among all members could be found in EPC made all the difference between a clear European line (usually reinforcing the view of one – or more – state) and a diplomatic failure for the Community as a whole. Of course, failure to get EPC support did not mean the end of a national initiative, especially when it was made by a big state, but it did have a negative effect overall and a less than constructive impact on the emerging *acquis politique*, namely, EPC declarations, *communiqués*, and *démarches*. All this was of particular importance to the credibility of EPC in the latter part of its life, when more instruments were added to it, especially the use of economic sanctions to back the rhetoric. Indeed, the lack of a common stance meant a weakening of Europe's position on a given international issue and a return to more nationalistic positions. All this had a detrimental effect on integration, whether implicitly (the so-called 'footnote states' of the 1980s – Greece and Denmark – were not seen as convinced integrationists in other fields either) or explicitly (as was the case in the spring of 1982 when solidarity was seen as greatly damaged by Britain's insistence on obtaining political support in its efforts to regain the Falkland Islands, whereas it did not reciprocate in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) with its obstruction over agricultural prices).[7]

The overall impact of years of intergovernmental foreign policy-making and the careful avoidance of defence matters (although the economic and political aspects of security had been included in EPC as early as 1981) meant that some progress on a European voice in the world was made (especially in the CSCE, the Middle East and Central America), and an institutional structure had

gradually developed, including European correspondents, COREU, emergency procedure and working groups. But somewhat paradoxically, the limits of such an exercise were also exposed: a distinctive structure with parallel foreign ministerial meetings, a limited role for the Commission and the EP, and no defence dimension (see below). All this meant that in the run-up to the TEU, the new arrangements had to go one step beyond the existing mechanism if they were not to be seen as a total failure. But the lessons of the past had also been learned and no supranational/federal jump was seriously envisaged either (as the collapse of such an isolated effort by the Dutch Presidency as late as September 1991 had shown). This is clearly visible not only in the rather limited federalist aspects of the CFSP (the Commission's theoretical right to initiate debate and policies, the possible use of QMV in the Council over the implementation of Joint Actions, the possibility of using the Community budget for operational and administrative expenditure), but also in the limited changes that Amsterdam brought about in 1997 (see below).

In its most ambitious interpretation, the transition from EPC to the CFSP[8] had four main objectives in mind,[9] with the TEU itself largely approximating in the end a 'compromised structure':

- to 'integrate' the various external policies of the Union by weakening considerably, if not totally eliminating, the previously existing legal and *de facto* dichotomy between Community affairs (trade and aid policies) and EPC affairs (foreign policy);
- to facilitate the above by giving more powers to the Commission in what remains, even with Maastricht, mainly an intergovernmental pillar;
- to facilitate the emergence of common EU actions in foreign and security policy, by limiting the use of unanimity and of the national veto in the decision-making process;
- to move towards overcoming at long last the distinction between, on the one hand, the economic and political aspects of European security, and on the other, its military component (defence).

With regard to the dichotomy between Community and EPC affairs, some progress can be found in the 'temple structure' of the TEU, although the dichotomy persists between its supranational (EC) and intergovernmental (CFSP and JHA) pillars. As for the Commission's role in the CFSP, some progress was made by the incorporation for the first time of a Commission right of co-initiative in second-pillar issues, although no exclusive competence was envisaged as is the case in the first pillar. The TEU deals with the third problem, by distinguishing between principles and Common Positions (Art. J2) on the one hand, and Joint Actions (Art. J3) on the other.[10] In the former case, decisions will still be taken by unanimity, but, once such decisions have been reached, their implementation would, if all states agree, come under QMV. Also, Maastricht adds a security–defence dimension to the Union, by allowing military issues to be discussed for the first time, albeit within the second pillar and its

newly declared 'defence arm', namely the WEU. As for the Amsterdam CFSP revisions, there were rather limited overall, as the most important ones have been postponed. There is little change, as the Commission remains a junior partner. The so-called 'Mr CFSP' has now been named, and will be the Secretary General of the Council. To what extent this will help the identification of a visible and clear centre for the CFSP remains unclear, as this development affects the future structure of the Council Presidency, henceforth to consist of the current and next Presidencies, plus the Commission (new troika), with the assistance of 'Mr CFSP'. Early signs since Solana was appointed to the post in November 1999 pointed to increased tension with Patten, the (new) Commissioner for External Relations. Since then, there have been many efforts by all parties involved to try and play down this clash of prerogatives.

Some modifications have also been made regarding CFSP decision-making:

- 'Common Strategies' (a new concept) are to be defined by the European Council.
- Decisions are to be implemented by the Foreign Ministers' Council using QMV if needed (for both Common Positions and Joint Actions which have already been adopted). An 'emergency brake' is provided, allowing any member to oppose the adoption of a decision for important and stated reasons of national policy. In such cases, those members that wish the Union to act could, if they represented a QMV, refer the matter to the European Council for a decision by unanimity.
- 'Constructive abstention' is permitted and institutionalised. This could reduce the risk of deadlock.
- A policy planning and early warning unit led by the High Representative for the CFSP (with personnel drawn from the Council's General Secretariat, the member states, the Commission, and the WEU) is to be established in order to provide policy assessments and more focused input into policy formulation. The tasks of the unit include: monitoring and analysing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP; providing assessments of the Union's foreign and security policy interests and identifying areas on which the CFSP could focus in the future; providing timely assessments and early warning of events or situations which may have significant repercussions for the Union's foreign and security policy, including potential political crises; and producing at the request of either the Council or the Presidency, or its own initiative, argued policy options papers to be presented under the responsibility of the Presidency as a contribution to policy formulation.

There is, however, no real progress on the CFSP budget, which has dogged relations with the EP over recent years.[11] Some observers have argued that, as no 'contamination' has occurred, in the sense of an intergovernmentalisation of existing communitarian practices, this is a success for integration.[12] Such an approach fails to take into account that the *acquis politique*, as is the case with the *acquis communautaire*, is rarely reversed.

In terms of defence matters, the Petersberg tasks of the WEU have been inserted in the AMT and the word 'progressive' has replaced that of 'eventual' in the framing of a common defence policy and common defence. Where there is, however, great progress is after the December 1998 Franco-British Saint-Malo Declaration, which basically lays the foundations for a defence and military dimension within the Union. In practice, it puts an end to the WEU versus NATO debate on European defence, as the debate now is between the Union and NATO. It is important to analyse how the Union managed to move thus far. A number of WEU 'rebirths' in the early 1980s (over the 'euromissiles' and the 'space war' debates), and again in the early 1990s with Maastricht, but also over the 1991 Gulf War and in the mid-1990s in the Adriatic Sea over a naval embargo in the Balkans, had led many to believe that the future looked bright for this organisation. But the WEU became obsolete in November 2000 when it disbanded itself. After Saint-Malo, the Union had made major strides towards a ESDP. The WEU could no longer serve its main purpose as the Union itself had now become an alternative – in the long run – to NATO and national defence policies. However, a number of WEU arrangements remained in force, such as its Art. 5 provision, a shadow secretariat, and its Parliamentary Assembly (which has taken the name of an interim assembly). Other institutions or agencies have become, since 1 January 2002, EU agencies (the satellite centre in Torrejon, or the Institute for Security Studies in Paris). The EU has also created three new bodies to coordinate and develop the ESDP:

● a Political and Security Committee known as COPS (after its French acronym) which consists of senior officials from the fifteen member states based in their respective Permanent Representations. It deals with all aspects of the CFSP including the ESDP;
● a Military Committee which consists of the national Chiefs of Staff or their representatives;
● a Military Staff which provides military expertise and support to the ESDP.

These new structures came into action in an interim force in March 2000 and were confirmed as permanent organs after the December 2000 Nice European Council meeting. In addition, following the June 2000 Santa Maria de Feira European Council meeting and the November 2000 Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels, the foundation of the ERRF have been laid as follows:

Germany: 13,500 troops; 20 ships; 93 planes
Britain: 12,500 troops; 18 ships; 72 planes
France: 12,000 troops; 15 ships; 75 planes; Helios spy-planes
Spain: 6,000 troops; one ship unit including aircraft carrier; 40 planes
Italy: 6,000 troops
The Netherlands: 5,000 troops
Greece: 3,500 troops
Austria: 2,000 troops

Finland: 2,000 troops
Belgium: 1,000 (to 3,000 troops); 9 ships; 25 planes
Sweden: 1,500 troops
Portugal: 1,000 troops
Ireland: 1,000 troops
Luxembourg: 100 troops
Denmark: no contribution owing to the Amsterdam opt-out.

There are many problems one must mention at this stage: the national defence budgets have been falling dramatically in the past few years and it is only since the 11 September 2001 events that there has been some reversal of this trend, especially in the bigger countries. Several weaknesses have been identified with regards to lift capacities and satellite guidance systems. It is, therefore, unclear what impact the ERRF will have in the future. Moreover, the participation of non-EU NATO members has created friction (especially with Turkey) and the key issue will remain what relationship the ERRF will have with NATO (see also below). It is unclear if recent developments will lead to an 'autonomous' EU defence entity as the 'Europeanists' want (France, Belgium, Italy), or will instead reinforce NATO as the 'Atlanticists' (Britain, the Netherlands, Portugal) would prefer. But what is clear is that there are military officers working for the Union in Brussels now, and not only for NATO.

As for any 'lessons' for theory, one should stress the fact that European integration is a multifaceted, multiform process, which marries intergovernmental and federal arguments and processes. This is all the more so in the field of 'high politics'. A more 'sophisticated' approach, that of confederal consociation, might be more relevant here, not least because it is better equipped to offer a better explanation of why so much and no more integration has occurred in Western Europe in general, and in EPC/CFSP matters in particular. It also offers prescriptive views on the future development of an effective decision-making system in EU foreign policy.

Confederal consociation and European foreign policy
The approach in question, as argued in Chapter 2, has been developed since the early 1990s as an alternative to the rather sterile debate between intergovernmentalism and federalism (and all the variations in between). It has the double advantage of describing the process of integration in the past and of suggesting its limits in the future. As Church has summarised the confederal consociation thesis:

> Through the segmentation of the European populations, governance is left in the hands of a cartel of state elites in the Council of Ministers, with states securing their interests via proportionality and mutual veto in bargaining . . . Chryssochoou has built on this idea of Taylor (1993) to suggest that the fact that the EU is a Confederal Consociation is a direct cause of its lack of democracy.[13]

In our view, confederal consociation offers a better explanation of the 'hybridity' of the Union, in that its 'political constitution' comprises federal, confederal

and consociational principles and procedures (see Chapter 2), while bringing in the additional question of democracy and foreign policy. The most important dimension of this approach for the decision-making process in the CFSP is to argue that the continued existence of the national veto and, hence, the need for consensus, reinforces not only the democratic element in the CFSP/ESDP (by respecting the wishes of the component national demoi as expressed through their elected representatives) but is also the best guarantee for the emergence of a truly common European foreign, security and, eventually, defence policy.[14] Such a normative statement differs starkly from the traditional federal view on foreign policy: instead of perceiving QMV as a panacea, confederal consociation takes it as a side-show that can be useful only in lesser issues such as the practical implementation of policies agreed on the basis of unanimity or consensus. The distinction between 'unanimity' and 'consensus' is important because it shows that the use of the national veto can only be a weapon of last resort. Within reasonable limits, the emergence of a true European identity should and must include all views and not exclude any particular position, especially on matters of vital national interest (which is by definition changing as it is largely decided by the government of the day). This will be especially relevant after the next enlargements.

Democracy and accountability in foreign and security policies are not seen as mutually exclusive but rather as prerequisites for the emergence of a European identity in the world. But all this is in the future and will take time. For the time being, the veto will remain for important matters of national sovereignty. EU institutions such as the Commission and the EP will try to accelerate the process towards a European demos, but there is no guarantee of success nor a clear timetable. What it means in terms of practical arrangements in CFSP decision-making is that there will be some advances on federalist means such as QMV in the implementation of Common Positions and Joint Actions, together with vetoes where necessary. 'Constructive abstention' is further evidence of progress in that direction, but the mere fact that abstention by one-third of EU members is acknowledged as a restriction on its use reflects the continued importance of intergovernmental practices. These restrictions fit quite well in the confederal consociation model, and could not therefore be described as evidence of obstinate and obsolete nationalism. It is hoped that the COPS and CFSP planning cells will also be used as the 'oil' necessary for the wheels to work more efficiently, but without undermining the importance of consensus.

In both theoretical and practical terms, there will be more of this multifaceted form of integration which, with or without the new fashionable name of 'flexibility', will produce progress in some areas and problems in others. In the latter category one could mention the eventual merging/absorbing of the WEU into the Union, especially now that 'old' neutrals and neutralists (Ireland and Denmark) have found new allies in the 1995 members (Sweden, Finland and Austria) and are bound to find even more diverging immediate security interests in the next newcomers as defined by the December 2001 Laeken European

Council meeting (all twelve states currently engaged in accession negotiations, except Bulgaria and Romania which have not been listed as joining by 2004, mainly on economic grounds).

To a large extent, the initial debate of 'small versus big states' has now been re-ignited. But as the international context (both world-wide and in Europe) has been dramatically and fundamentally altered, solutions that have been excluded in the past might now become more acceptable such as a European UN Security Council (*de facto* or *de jure*, with or without Russia, with or without the OSCE's blessing) and the Contact Group (which includes France, the UK, Germany and Russia) since the Bosnian phase of the Yugoslav crisis. Thus, good examples of the possible future 'turf wars' already occurred in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September events (see also Chapter 5), first on 19 October 2001 when a tripartite meeting between the French (Chirac/Jospin), the British (Blair) and the Germans (Schröder) took place just prior to the Ghent European Council meeting, and second on 5 November in London when another such meeting (in the form of an informal dinner this time) was 'gate-crashed' as a commentator put it, 'by Berlusconi, Aznar, Solana, Verhofstadt and Kok'. All these issues will be considered first during the European Convention (March 2002–March 2003) and second by the 2004 IGC, which had been announced in Nice in December 2000 to soothe German criticisms and which was confirmed by Laeken a year later. But let us now expand on the OSCE and NATO, whose development has impacted heavily on the construction of the institutional map of the European security and defence area. Discussion of the OSCE is brief and reflects its relatively limited role.

The Conference/Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe (C/OSCE)

The evolution of the C/OSCE did not progress as a kind of 'grand design' and was not implemented according to plans for a new security architecture. The transformation of the Helsinki Process was a response to acute needs and requirements, representing a continuous process of institutionalisation and adapting through manageable forms of creative development to the new political and security environment. It is the one forum that brings together all of Europe with the US and Canada, and its potential role is to provide a pan-European security framework. Recognised as a regional organisation under UN Chapter VIII, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) function during the Cold War was ostensibly to bridge the European divide. Although in practice it mirrored the divide instead of overcoming it, the CSCE process did make important contributions to European security-building. The CSCE came into being in 1975, with thirty-five states signing the Helsinki Final Act, which comprised four sections or 'baskets'. The first section concerned security issues; the second, co-operation in economics; the third, humanitarian

co-operation; and the final section included follow-up mechanisms. Although not formally institutionalised, it established a process of diplomatic engagements, conferences and reviews – the objective of the dialogue being to implement the Final Act.[15] The proceedings of the second 'follow-up' Conference that began in Madrid in 1980 were critically affected by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981. The Madrid sessions ended in 1983 with an agreement to convene specific working groups, including one in Stockholm on CSBMs and Disarmament in Europe, known as the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, and another in Ottawa on human rights. The latter failed to reach agreement, but Stockholm committed members to accepting specified notification, observation and verification procedures for military manoeuvres.[16] The third 'follow-up' meeting in Vienna lasted from November 1986 to January 1989. The Vienna talks secured agreement that NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries would commence Conventional Stability Talks (that led to the CFE) within the CSCE framework. The CSCE agreed to take further the Stockholm Document on CSBMs, human rights (the Human Dimension) and procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Negotiations proceeded against the background of a changing European order that was in turn to change the CSCE.[17]

The CSCE Summit in Paris in November 1990 adopted the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. The Charter began the institutionalisation of the CSCE and established five bodies. The CSCE Council was founded, consisting of foreign ministers meeting (at least once) annually, supported by the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO). A CSCE Secretariat was established in Prague, an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw and a Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna. The Charter also called for CSCE summits of heads of state and government every two years. The Charter, together with the conclusion of the CFE Treaty, marked a new stage in European security. The CSCE was developed further in meetings in Valletta, Moscow and Prague before the fourth 'follow-up' meeting in Helsinki in July 1992. At Valletta in February 1991 a 'mechanism' was adopted to settle disputes when the parties concerned were unable to resolve them by negotiation. The mechanism is obligatory, in that it can be requested by a party to a dispute, but its recommendations are not binding and even the initiating phase can be overridden. The 1991 Moscow meeting completed the work of the Conference on the Human Dimension, which commenced in Paris in 1989 and was taken forward at Copenhagen in 1990. The Copenhagen Conference concluded with a declaration guaranteeing the rights of citizens, committing governments to 'pluralistic democracy', the rule of law and the protection of national minorities. Minorities were to have the right to use their own language, observe their own religion and follow an appropriate education. The Moscow Conference went further and agreed that fact-finding teams could be sent to investigate alleged human rights abuses, whether or not the state in question agreed. The Prague Council in 1992 further developed CSCE institutions and procedures. The Warsaw Office for Free Elections was renamed the Office for

Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and was assigned the task of overseeing the Human Dimension. The Prague Council confirmed the Moscow concept of 'consensus minus one'. Prague looked to enhance human rights, democracy and law, and decided that the CSCE could take political and peaceful action without the consent of the state concerned.[18]

The 1992 Helsinki Summit further institutionalised the CSCE, confirming the Prague decisions and widening the role of the CSO. Within the latter, an Economic Forum was created to review commitments under Basket II and with regard to market details. The ODIHR was also enhanced to monitor the Human Dimension and support the newly created High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), which was seen as an institution to act at the earliest possible stage to resolve tensions involving national minority issues that had not developed into conflicts. The Helsinki Summit further created another institution, the Forum for Security Co-operation based in Vienna. It was entrusted with the negotiation of conventional disarmament measures; the promotion of CSBMs; and reducing the risk of conflict. The final innovation of the Summit was its adoption of peacekeeping, defined in accord with the classical UN understanding: a non-enforcement role, strict impartiality, and requiring the consent of all parties involved. CSCE peacekeeping operations would not proceed without an effective cease-fire in place and guarantees for the safety of personnel. Resources and expertise were to be drawn from NATO, the EC, WEU or the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). A more direct linkage to NATO was opposed by France, and the CSCE was to turn to NATO on a case-by-case basis. The Helsinki Document marked the transition of the CSCE from a forum for dialogue to an operational structure. Since 1995, the new OSCE has defined its role in the European security architecture by concentrating on conflict prevention in a broad sense: not only the immediate prevention of violent conflict but also long-term peace-building. Early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management have been identified as the institution's main activities.[19] Its involvement in conflict prevention was closely linked to the Human Dimension and the protection of minority rights. The HCNM has been involved in a number of cases, including the plight of ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia; the Hungarian minority in Slovakia; the Slovak minority in Hungary; the Hungarian minority in Romania; the Albanian minority in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; the Greek minority in Albania; and Ukraine–Crimean relations. Fact-finding missions were dispatched and augmented with CSCE 'good offices' on the ground, which sought, *inter alia*, to facilitate settlements in Moldova and Nagorno Karabakh.

At their Istanbul summit in November 1999, the leaders of the fifty-four OSCE member states signed the Charter for European Security. The Charter originated in the debate on developing a 'Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century' – launched in March 1995, largely to calm Russian concerns about NATO's eastward enlargement. The OSCE Charter for European Security may not be revolutionary in nature but it should not be regarded as a mere empty shell either. It reviews the new risks and challenges to

European security in the post-Cold war strategic environment, reaffirms some basic general principles and provides for the strengthening of the OSCE's operational capacities in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Finally, in the appended Platform for Co-operative Security, the Chapter proposes a set of arrangements for closer ties and co-operation between the OSCE and other international institutions, which, together with the operational guidelines for a more effective OSCE, are directly relevant to NATO's new role in Europe.[20] The Charter also considers the operational capacities of the OSCE from four different angles: field operations, peacekeeping operations, police operations and the Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) concept. The latter is of importance. Originally forged by the US, the REACT concept commits governments to develop at both national and OSCE levels the capacity to set up teams with a wide range of civilian expertise that the OSCE would be able to deploy in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The general assessment to be made here is that we are witnessing an expansion of the operational role and capabilities of the OSCE.

There is no doubt that the OSCE did not, and does not, represent the often-called-for 'grand design' for the European security architecture; nor is it, or will it be in the foreseeable future, the central pillar of the European institutional structure. Perhaps its most important contribution in the new European security environment is the political legitimacy it can bestow on instruments or policies of its own, or of institutions like NATO.[21] By virtue of its membership and decision-making procedures, it can legitimise intervention aimed at ordering the European region. It has also been important in establishing a comprehensive approach to security, which includes human rights, economic and military dimensions at the point when European security has become more complex and multifaceted. Also, the OSCE can be conducive to the management of interregional and transregional relations by providing links to the emerging macro-regions of the world, and thus helping to shape an open regionalism, which may be of utmost importance for the future stability of the international system. However, the OSCE is a long way from becoming a security framework within which other organisations perform subfunctions delegated from above. Its weaknesses are its decision-making procedure and the mobilisation of consensus as well as the absence of an enforcement capability. In the field of the normative consensus, the OSCE has to be regarded, to a very large extent, as a forum of symbolic politics. Indeed, one can rightfully argue that the OSCE is basically not so much a community of values, but a quasi-legal community based on the principles of recognition of the given *status quo* and the commitment to peaceful change.[22]

NATO's rationale in the new European security environment

The evolution of NATO throughout the 1990s is a remarkable tale of survival and development in adverse conditions.[23] This section considers the institutional

and strategic response of the Alliance to the geopolitical and security challenges of system change. Both NATO's origins and Cold War history are well known. What catalysed NATO was a strong desire to link Europe and the US (and Canada) in response to the Soviet threat. NATO mollified European concerns about a German threat; contributed to a greater sense of West European unity and security; and provided a mechanism for the US to participate in European economic and military reconstruction.

Following the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO, the pattern of West European security and co-operation was clarified. With the exception of the crisis surrounding French membership in 1966, the basic rationale of the Alliance was set. The 1967 Harmel Report recommended that NATO co-ordinate a multilateral approach to bridging gaps between East and West, commit the major powers to full consultation with NATO allies on German reunification, overcome the division of Germany and foster European security, and co-ordinate and consult on arms control and mutual and balanced force reductions between East and West. The Report found that the Alliance had two main functions: 'Its first function is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries from aggression should it occur.' The second function is 'to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved.'[24] In May 1989, the Alliance's Comprehensive Concept confirmed the continuing validity of the Harmel Report's objectives.

From 1954 the Alliance looked to nuclear deterrence as the basis of its defence to offset conventional inferiority in Europe. The Soviet acquisition of nuclear forces introduced problems concerning the credibility of American extended deterrence that were to plague NATO throughout the Cold War. By the late 1950s, the ultimate deterrent – i.e., the principle of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which threatened massive retaliation by US nuclear forces in the event of a Soviet attack – was undermined by a fundamental challenge to collective defence. Would the US risk its own security now that the Soviet Union could threaten American soil? With nuclear parity emerging between the two superpowers, the concept of MAD actually increased the potential for a lower-level conventional attack in Europe, were the Soviet Union to test the US resolve to defend Western Europe. Indeed, the turbulent strategic environment tested the credibility of NATO's collective defence function and contributed to France's withdrawal from the integrated military command in 1966. Nevertheless, in the years that followed, the basic rationale of collective defence prevailed in the Atlantic Pact.[25]

The impact of *détente* did not change NATO's original rationale, not least because the emergence of strategic parity between the superpowers did not alter the European order. NATO did commit itself to the pursuit of European *détente*, albeit in addition to its military defence role. Ironically NATO strategy was criticised more as East–West relations deteriorated in the late 1970s. Public protest,

parliamentary attention and the rebirth of the peace movement followed the (abortive) neutron bomb decision and the 1979 decision to deploy Cruise and Pershing II missiles. NATO came under a new public scrutiny in Western Europe. The Alliance had to defend its role and convince public opinion of its rationale. As European doubts and criticisms mounted, Congressional concerns regarding burden sharing were underlined. The INF Treaty of 1987 resolved the immediate issues in dispute but not the wider problems of the European balance of power.[26] The North Atlantic Council (NAC) continued to place its belief in the central importance of nuclear weapons. In its Brussels Declaration of 1988, NAC saw no alternative to a strategy of 'deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces'.[27] To that end, NAC further reasserted the importance of the American commitment to Europe. The Declaration asserted that 'the presence in Europe of the conventional and nuclear forces of the United States provides the essential linkage with the United States strategic deterrent . . . this presence must and will be maintained'. The Council identified the major imbalance of conventional forces in Europe as its central security concern. The Soviet Union and its allies enjoyed a clear advantage in numbers of key offensive systems, including main battle tanks, artillery and armoured troop carriers. NATO welcomed the signs of change in the policies of the Soviet Union following Gorbachev's leadership but 'witnessed no relaxation of the military effort pursued for years by the Soviet Union'. Indeed, in 1989, while NAC recognised the dramatic political changes in Eastern and Central Europe, it continued to stress its strategy of deterrence. Throughout the postwar years, as NATO's membership, organisational structure and list of responsibilities grew, two essential facts remained constant: NATO focused on the Soviet threat, and it performed both military and non-military functions for its members. Athough the degree of threat varied over time, for the Alliance the threat always was present.

The end of the Cold War and pace of change in the European order was, however, spectacular and it fundamentally challenged NATO's rationale and *raison d'être*. The Alliance responded by attempting to adapt to the new security environment, stressing its political role and reorienting its approach to issues of military doctrine, sufficiency and readiness. The process of change in the Alliance began in 1990. It was a process that would eventually result in significant reductions in funding and force levels for NATO's conventional and nuclear forces. Joint weapons programmes, annual military exercises, readiness, nuclear alert status and training have all been sharply reduced. In May 1990, NATO's Military Committee announced that it no longer considered the Warsaw Pact a threat to the alliance, which instead looked to 'seize the historic opportunities resulting from the profound changes in Europe to help build a new peaceful order in Europe'. The member states declared NATO as one of the principal architects of change in the new Europe and identified the need for adaptation. To that end, intra-Alliance co-operation, political consultation and co-ordination were underlined. The conclusion was that 'although the prevention of war will always

remain (NATO's) fundamental task, the changing European environment now requires . . . a broader approach to security based as much on constructive peace building as on peace-keeping'.[28]

The London Declaration of the NATO Heads of State and Government in July 1990 confirmed that the Alliance 'must and will adapt'.[29] The Declaration stressed the continued institutional task of collective defence, acknowledging, however, that challenges to that mission had been radically transformed: 'security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance.' Member states sought a new relationship with their former adversaries in Eastern Europe, thus inviting the Warsaw Pact powers to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. The Declaration also envisaged changes in NATO's force structure as the CFE Treaty was implemented and Soviet troops left Eastern Europe. Strategy would change with the creation of true multinational units, moving away from the geographically based area defences of the past.[30]

A new Allied military strategy was to be prepared, which would move away from forward defence and modify 'flexible response' to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. In June 1991, NATO began to define its 'Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe'. NATO declared that it did 'not wish to isolate any country, nor to see a new division of the Continent', but to seek 'an architecture for the new Europe that is firmly based on the principles and promises of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris'. The Alliance supported the adoption of democratic reforms and market economies in Central and Eastern Europe. It further identified a set of initiatives to develop its security partnership with its former enemies, including exchange of information and ideas on security policy; military doctrine and arms control; contact between senior military authorities and widening participation in Alliance activities, including scientific and environmental programmes.[31] NATO also began to recognise the emergence of a new European security architecture. NAC accepted that security in the new Europe had various dimensions – economic, political, ecological and defence – and found that the 'Alliance, the EC, the WEU, the CSCE and the Council of Europe are key institutions in this endeavour'. The Council believed that a transformed Alliance was an essential element in the new architecture, for an 'important basis for this transformation is the agreement of all Allies to enhance the role and responsibility of the European members'. The Council welcomed 'efforts further to strengthen the security dimension in the process of European integration and recognise the significance of the progress made by countries of the European Community towards the goal of political union, including the development of a common foreign and security policy'.[32] At the same time, it looked to the development of a European security identity to strengthen the European pillar within the Alliance. For the Council, such a process would 'underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity'. While the Council accepted that institutions such as the

EC, WEU and CSCE have 'roles to play in accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes', the 'extent of its membership and of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position'. Thus, the Alliance asserted its 'particular' role, by identifying four core security functions it would perform in the new Europe:[33]

- to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force;
- to serve, as provided for in Art. 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern;
- to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state;
- to preserve the strategic balance within Europe.

Although the above represents classic *communiqué* language with nothing but platitudes, it meant that NATO was now seeking to anchor its position in the new European order and establish the complementary nature of other security institutions. In the words of Wörner, 'our future European architecture will rest on a system of different organisations, sometimes overlapping, but interlocking and, albeit with a different focus, complementary'. Accordingly, the challenge for NATO was to secure this relationship when, as Wörner recognised, 'all European institutions – the European Community, CSCE, Council of Europe and Western European Union – are equally in a phase of renewal and redefinition'.[34] Decisions taken (especially) in the second half of the 1990s advanced further the pace of change in the European security landscape. In June 1996, NATO's foreign ministers decided to adopt a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) 'within the Alliance' and to develop the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept. In May 1997, NATO and Russia agreed to establish a Joint Permanent Council. In June 1997, the EU completed the IGC and concluded the AMT. In July 1997 in Madrid, NATO agreed on the admission of three new members, and in April 1999, the Alliance adopted its Strategic Concept, while engaging in military action (Kosovo) for the first time in its fifty-year history. Almost at the same time, EU member states embarked upon their most serious attempt to 'Europeanise' security and defence, with a process starting at Saint-Malo and culminating in the decisions at the Nice Summit in December 2000.

The new strategic concept

Against this background, NATO's new Strategic Concept announced in Rome in November 1991 marked another turning point, as did the adoption of its first

new military policy document in almost twenty years, the MC400 document. It was a major step towards the redefinition of the Alliance's role in the new Europe. The Council accepted that the end of the East–West confrontation had greatly reduced the risk of major conflict and that the notion of a 'predominant threat' had given way to 'risks'. The Strategic Concept found that risks to Allied security were less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of NATO members than from 'the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe'. The Concept reaffirmed the four core functions of the Alliance declared in June 1991 and went further in a new broad approach to security. Security was seen to have political, economic, social, environmental, and defence dimensions. Allied security was now to adopt three mutually rein-forcing elements: dialogue, co-operation and the maintenance of a collective defence capability.

In that context, the Concept stressed the new political approach and under-standing of security in Europe. The Alliance recognised that the prevention of war in the post-Cold War European setting 'depends even more than in the past on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and the successful management of crises'. Under the new strategic circumstances, the Alliance planned to resolve crises at an early stage. It was recognised that this required a coherent strategy, which would co-ordinate a variety of conflict management measures. At the same time, it was anticipated that such a strategy would in turn require close control from the Alliance's political authorities. In June 1992, NATO announced it was willing to support, on a case-by-case basis, peacekeeping under the aus-pices of the CSCE, while in December 1992, it pledged to support peacekeeping under UNSC authorisation.

The Strategic Concept finally underlined the importance of collective defence. The Alliance will maintain an adequate military capability and a clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defence. A commitment was made to retain a mixture of nuclear and conventional forces, though at a much reduced level than in the past. NATO forces are, however, to be adapted to their new strategic roles. The overall size and readiness of forces was to be reduced. The maintenance of a linear defence in the Central European region was to be ended. The Strategic Concept stressed flexibility, mobility and an assured capa-bility for augmentation. NATO forces are to be capable of responding to a wide variety of challenges and are to consist of rapid reaction and main defence com-ponents. The key element was that NATO forces should be able to 'respond flex-ibly to a wide range of possible contingencies'. The new strategic environment was seen to facilitate a significant reduction in substrategic nuclear forces, which were seen, however, as an important link with strategic nuclear forces, in par-ticular American ones, which serve as the 'supreme guarantee' of Allied security.

The adoption of the Strategic Concept marked NATO's transition to the new European security environment, by reaffirming its security role and

implementing the new broad approach to strategy. In the immediate post-Cold War era, NATO retained its position as the primary forum for security in the new architecture. The revived WEU complemented NATO's institutional development in this period. As p. 00 shows, WEU served to bridge NATO–EU relations and to resolve for the foreseeable future the tension between a European defence and security identity based upon the EU/WEU and the transatlantic basis that NATO provides. A second feature of the new security architecture was the overlap of security in terms of its broader political interpretation. The broad approach to security adopted by NATO in its New Strategic Concept was reflected in the response of other institutions to the changing European order. Preventive diplomacy, crisis management and peacekeeping are themes shared by NATO, the WEU, the Union and the OSCE. The latter had some recognition as the overarching organisation but was, and still is, a considerable distance from being Europe's security institution *par excellence.* Aspects of the OSCE role can also be seen in the EU's promotion of a European Stability Pact and the work of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC). While the lack of institutional definition within the new architecture was understandable, co-ordination remained imperative, and so was the need for a coherent and cohesive management of responses to crises, by implementing the broader political aspects of strategy in the new Europe. That was a challenge not just for the Alliance itself, but for the role and relationship of the 'interlocking institutions'.

Consolidating adaptation

With a mandate from the Alliance's Heads of State and Government, and in accordance with the terms of reference endorsed by NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers in December 1997, NATO's Policy Co-ordination Group (PCG) started examining the 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept with a view to updating it 'as necessary'. This process ended on 23–24 April 1999, with the approval by the Washington Summit of the new and by now forward-looking Strategic Concept. The latter was clearly the result of the consolidation of the strategic environment of the 1990s, the decisions taken at both national and international levels and the challenges that NATO had to face, mainly in Southeastern Europe throughout the decade. This new Strategic Concept was to guide the Alliance as it pursued this agenda. With this document, NATO stressed its role in consolidating and preserving the changes of the 1990s, and in meeting current and future security challenges. It clearly indicated a demanding agenda, in which NATO had to 'safeguard common security interests in an environment of further, often unpredictable change. It must maintain collective defence and reinforce the transatlantic link and ensure a balance that allows the European Allies to assume greater responsibility. It must deepen its relations with its partners and prepare for the accession of new members. It must, above all, maintain the political will and the military means required by the entire range of its missions.'[35]

   In terms of threat perception, para. 24 represents an expansive list, which is directly linked with the new evolving security paradigm, by taking account of

the post-Cold War global context, and by emphasising that Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including uncontrolled population mass movement, international terrorism, sabotage, international organised crime and the disruption of the flow of vital resources. Moreover, para. 20 indicates that NATO security remains subject to a wide variety of both military as well as non-military risks, which are multidirectional in nature and often difficult to predict. Such risks include uncertainty and instability in an around the Euro-Atlantic area, and the possibility of regional crises at its periphery, which could, para. 20 stresses, evolve rapidly. In short, both the definition of the risks and their geographic scope have been considerably expanded, while there is a growing recognition that most challenges are not likely to involve a direct military threat to NATO territory. Rather, they will involve non-Art. 5 'crisis response' operations.[36] The new Strategic Concept reflected this changed balance between collective defence and crisis response. NATO forces must be able to carry out a full range of missions as well as to contribute to conflict prevention and non-Art. 5 contigencies (para. 41). Thus, it laid the conceptual groundwork for the restructuring of NATO forces with the view to enhancing their power-projection capabilities. Particular emphasis was placed on deployability, mobility, and survivability of forces, together with their ability to operate 'out of area' (paras 53b and 53d). Improvements in these areas have been the main focus of the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), also approved at the Washington Summit, which aims, in addition to enhancing the Alliance's power-projection capability, to increase interoperability.[37]

Another key issue that attracted attention before the Washington Summit was 'the mandate question' – i.e., whether NATO can take military action in non-self-defence situations, without the authorisation of the UN Security Council, as it did over Kosovo. The issue of the appropriate mandate did not arise until October 1998, when NATO threatened to use air power in Kosovo. In Bosnia, NATO entered by invitation. An Art. 5 mission would be covered by Art. 51 of the UN Charter, which provides:

> Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of these rights of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The European views, strongly supported by Russia, were that non-Art. 5 missions must always be authorised by the UN Security Council. The US and the British rejected this view, basing their argument on the evolving principles of humanitarian law and the danger of large-scale humanitarian catastrophe in the case of Kosovo,[38] and more generally on the legal principles in the UN

Charter regarding the maintenance of international peace and security.[39] The practical issue in the minds of US policy-makers has been the risk that a non-Art. 5 action could be vetoed in the UNSC by Russia or China. The view in Washington is that NATO members cannot allow their chosen course of action in a peace-support crisis to be blocked by a non-member. Many of the allies nevertheless do believe that it is necessary for future non-Art. 5 crisis management and peace-support operations to be based on a sound international legal framework.

The solution found at the Washington Summit was more indirect than expected,[40] and confirmed the trend – a result of the Kosovo war – towards seeing certain humanitarian and legal norms inescapably bound up with conceptions of national interest.[41] The Concept very briefly stressed that the UNSC 'has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, as such, plays a crucial role in contributing to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area' (para. 15). The absence of a direct reference to a mandate has been interpreted as a rejection of legally generated or self-imposed political limits. The criteria, thus, are whether there is a 'threat' – though defined very widely – to the Euro-Atlantic area. For many, it was highly problematic that there was no attempt towards formulating more general rules in a possible emerging legality of humanitarian intervention, thus sending a signal to China and Russia that NATO has not given itself the right to attack sovereign nations at whim, even when there is strong moral justification.[42] Apart from the norms and thresholds of intervention, all the above, as well as several other issues addressed in the new Strategic Concept, clearly reveal the dominant trend in NATO: from defence of territory to defence of interests and values. In this context, the issue of roles and distribution of responsibilities within the Alliance acquired greater salience, especially after the renewed effort on the part of the Union to proceed to a more defence- and security-oriented institutional structure.

WEU and ESDI

NATO's evolving role in security management has not only emerged from the necessity of utilising its integrated military command structure, but also as a result of the policy adjustment of its members to the new security paradigm. Since 1991, the Alliance has been adjusting its force structures to acquire higher levels of flexibility and mobility with multinational formations. The product of this process has been the development of ESDI within the Alliance. The aim was to respond to the old/new debate on 'burden-sharing' and distribution of labour, by increasing the capabilities of the European Allies in crisis management operations, where the US may allow the use of NATO assets, but might not wish to be the leader.[43] The ESDI concept means a greater European capacity for autonomous military action, in part thanks to deeper political cohesion.[44] But the ESDI concept is not linked to a single institutional framework. Multiple organisations and efforts are involved, including bilateral initiatives (notably Franco-German and Franco-British co-operative frameworks) and trilateral endeavours (for instance, those involving French, Italian and Spanish forces in

joint exercises and training). EU members engaged in a limited foreign and security policy co-operation from the early 1970s (with the EPC format), and by the late 1980s they were actively considering a more explicit engagement in defence matters, by utilising the WEU framework.[45] Actually, it was the French that launched the idea of an – autonomous from NATO – ESDI back in 1991, by attempting to establish an organic link between the Union and the WEU in the Maastricht Treaty.

The WEU, like NATO, did undergo a major transformation during the 1990s, until the decision by the Union to absorb it at the Cologne European Council in June 1999. During the Cold War, WEU military functions were largely eclipsed by NATO. The development of EPC in the early 1970s also overtook the WEU's political functions. The WEU lost a further role when Britain joined the Community and no longer needed a 'bridge' to the Six. It was not until the mid-1980s that the WEU was reborn, when France and West Germany looked to it to provide a forum for strategic discussion. The context was the launch of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) crisis in Europe. France sought a 'Europeanisation' of security policy without the price of reintegration into the military command structure of NATO and Bonn aimed to increase public support for Europe's role in Western security policy.[46] Arguably, the major cause underlying these developments was Europe's need to have a more unified voice in defence matters in order to overcome the inertia of not being able to contribute to security and defence decisions reached in Washington.[47]

In October 1984 the foreign and defence ministers of the WEU convened an extraordinary session in Rome, underlying their determination to make better use of the WEU framework in order to increase co-operation between the member states in the field of security policy. The belief was that a 'better utilisation of the WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance'.[48] Furthermore, the Rome Declaration led to institutional reform, with the WEU Council henceforth meeting twice a year and the work of the Permanent Council being intensified. Institutional change continued in 1985 with the WEU Bonn agreement to establish three new agencies to study arms control and disarmament, security and defence questions and co-operation in the field of armaments.[49] The potential role of the WEU in European integration was also identified in the 1987 Luxembourg and Hague Council meetings. In The Hague, the commitment 'to build a European Union in accordance with the Single European Act' was recalled, and it was declared that 'the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence'.[50] But the WEU remained committed to NATO, recognising that, under the (then) military balance in Europe, 'the security of the Western European countries can only be ensured in close association with our North American allies'. WEU members looked to a more integrated Europe to further their role in the Atlantic

Alliance and the European pillar, so that a more balanced partnership would emerge with the US.[51]

A further impetus to the development of the WEU was provided by crises in the Persian Gulf in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1987 and 1988 during the Iran–Iraq war, the WEU co-ordinated the member states' responses to the threat posed by mines in the Gulf. While co-operation in the naval clearance operation was not perfect, the WEU established a three-tier co-ordination framework comprising high-level consultation, involving political and military experts from foreign and defence ministries; meetings of officers serving as contact points within admiralties; and regular contacts between task force commanders on the spot.[52] A similar framework was established in 1990 to co-ordinate the WEU member states' implementation of UN Security Council resolutions. The WEU Ministerial Meeting on 21 August 1990 sought the most effective co-ordination in capitals and in the region, including areas of operation, sharing of tasks, logistical support and exchange of intelligence.[53] While NATO proved to be an important forum, its foreign ministers decided on 10 August 1990 not to proceed with military co-ordination under the integrated command structure. Each member of the Alliance was to contribute in its own way to the Gulf operation, although an attack on Turkey would invoke Art. 5. Thus the WEU had a clear field to provide 'out-of-area' co-ordination. Its role pertained largely to the naval embargo, and the US took effective command of fighting the land war.[54]

The Union, in contrast to the WEU, did not prove to be an effective body for the co-ordination of policy towards Iraq. Although it supported UN sanctions, froze Iraqi assets and suspended co-operation with Iraq, divergences in the Union emerged as the likelihood of military action increased. It was against this background and in the context of the emergent new European order that the role of the WEU in general, and particularly its relationship with the Union, emerged as important policy issues in the context of the IGC 1990/91. A number of different national positions regarding security policy were also presented at the IGC. More specifically, France and Germany envisaged a decisive move towards common defence and proposed the integration of the WEU into the Union. The US responded to the Franco-German initiative by insisting that all decisions to commit an ESDI to out-of-area activity involve consultation with Washington. Moreover, the US signalled its strong opposition to the prospect of a WEU integrated command structure duplicating that of NATO, as well as to any 'backdoor' security commitment to Central and Eastern Europe via WEU enlargement that implicitly extended the US commitment to NATO.[55]

In an attempt to reach a compromise, a joint British–Italian declaration proposed that the WEU should act as both the defence component of the Union and the European pillar of NATO. In contrast, the final Franco-German declaration envisaged the WEU as an integral part of the Union and identified a joint military force, which could form the basis of a Euro-Corps. The latter was a clear rebuttal of Anglo-Italian plans for a WEU force to act 'outside of area' and the

NATO Rapid Reaction Corps for Allied Command Europe under British command.[56] The final settlement left defence as a possible area of future development for the Union. Contrary to the desires of France and Germany, the WEU was not brought within the Union but was made an organisation that could be called upon by EU members to act on their behalf. The European Council was accorded ill-defined powers to 'request the Western European Union . . . to elaborate and implement discussions and actions of the Union which have defence implications' (Art. J4.2 TEU). Therefore, the WEU was not subordinated to the Union, but rather saw itself as 'the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance'. At Maastricht, the nine-strong WEU (Spain and Portugal joined in 1990; Greece in 1992; Denmark and Ireland became observers in 1992; and Iceland, Norway and Turkey associate members) identified measures to develop closer relationships with both the Union and NATO. The WEU envisaged harmonisation of meetings and venues with the Union and close co-operation between the decision-making bodies and secretariats of both organisations. With reference to NATO, the WEU pledged to strengthen working links and the role, responsibilities and contributions of its member states within the Atlantic Alliance. This was to be undertaken 'on the basis of the necessary transparency and complementarily between the emerging European Security and Defence Identity and the Alliance'.[57] The WEU moreover committed itself to act in conformity with positions adopted by NATO, while it adopted a series of commitments to enhance its operational identity. A call was made for a planning cell, closer military co-operation, meetings of Chiefs of Staff and military units answerable to the WEU. The WEU Council and Secretariat were transferred from London to Brussels, and other EU members were invited to join.

The outcome of the Maastricht Treaty was an effective compromise giving the WEU a pivotal role in the new European security architecture. At the same time, it reflected the limit to which the British were prepared to go. Europe's newly instituted CFSP declared that the development of a defence policy was to be a clear objective of the Union, yet the wording of the Treaty was left deliberately vague and only stated, courtesy of Art. J4.1 TEU, that this 'might in time lead to a common defence'. The Maastricht outcome was thus an attempt to reconcile the contending perspectives of the major European powers. The WEU was declared to be both the defence arm of the Union and the European pillar of NATO, thus being left equidistant between the two organisations.[58] The WEU Petersberg Declaration in 1992 confirmed its dual role and the important NATO seal of approval was given by its Heads of State and Government in January 1994. The NATO Summit welcomed the Maastricht Treaty and the launch of the European Union. Full support was given to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity. The latter, according to NATO – in language complementary to the WEU's – will 'strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link and will enable European Allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defence'. But the

NATO declaration went further to proclaim that the 'Alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests', while it welcomed both co-operation and consultation with the WEU. Significantly, the Summit agreed to 'make [the] collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy'. With American support, the Alliance envisaged the development of 'separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance Security'.[59] As part of the process, the Summit endorsed the CJTF concept as a means of facilitating contingency operations.

The January 1994 Brussels Summit directly facilitated the development of the WEU's role. During the same year, the latter's preliminary conclusions on a ESDP reflected the new relationship between NATO and the WEU.[60] By then, a common perception had emerged that, both institutionally and substantively, the development of a common European defence policy had to be seen in the wider context of broader European and transatlantic relationships. The envisaged policy was further to lead to 'an increased European contribution to the objectives of collective defence and a new sharing of responsibilities, which should not only be compatible with NATO's defence policy but should also be a means of strengthening and renewing the transatlantic partnership'. Five levels of European interest and responsibility were identified in the field of defence, where it was agreed that WEU governments:

- have a direct responsibility for security and defence of their own peoples and territories;
- have a responsibility to project the security and stability presently enjoyed in the West throughout the whole of Europe;
- have a strong interest, in order to reinforce European security, in fostering stability in the southern Mediterranean countries;
- are ready to take on their share of the responsibility for the promotion of security, stability and the values of democracy in the wider world, including the execution of peacekeeping and other crisis management measures under the authority of the UN Security Council or the CSCE, acting either independently or through the WEU or NATO;
- are ready to address new security challenges such as humanitarian emergencies; proliferation; terrorism; international crime and environmental risks, including those related to disarmament and the destruction of nuclear and chemical weapons.[61]

The WEU Council of Ministers recognised the need for the WEU to strengthen its operational capabilities in order to fulfil its defence roles. Ministers identified several needs: access to more information on emerging and ongoing crises; a more systematic approach to identifying and meeting contingencies for European military deployments; and appropriate mechanisms for political decision-making, as well as military command and control. They also recorded

the need for 'appropriate information and consultation mechanisms and proce-
dures and more support, in particular to enable prompt reactions to crises, *inter
alia* through a politico-military working group in Brussels which can be rein-
forced as necessary according to the specific nature of the contingency'. Finally,
the importance of a European armaments policy to the development of a
common defence policy was identified. In 1996, the WEU was to contribute to
the EU's review conference, but its Council of Ministers had already decided that
'whatever the outcome of the IGC will be, the intrinsic link between a common
European defence policy and NATO will remain'. Given the gradual realisation of
the limits of an ESDI, largely forged by the experience of the Bosnian crisis and
the consistent pressure to achieve reductions in defence expenditure,[62] it was only
natural that the WEU should develop 'in harmony with, not in competition to,
the wider framework of transatlantic defence cooperation in NATO'.[63]

Atlantic dominance: ESDI within the Alliance

Pivotal to most, if not all, of the policy developments in the latter half of the
1990s was the NAC Ministerial Meeting in June 1996 in Berlin. The meeting
marked a watershed in the development of US policy towards a more coherent
European role in the Alliance. It was then that the ESDI was clarified and the
European security architecture seemed to be coming together. 'The [US] Admin-
istration had clearly gone on the record as supporting a stronger European
pillar.'[64] By 1996, NATO had exemplified a transition from the Cold War struc-
tures, and from contained confrontation between the two superpowers to a new
configuration better adapted to the new geostrategic situation in Europe and the
world at large. The crisis in former Yugoslavia gave the Alliance an opportunity
to demonstrate that it can exercise its military prowess provided that it has the
firm political resolve of governments behind it, and that their objectives are
clearly stated. Involvement in former Yugoslavia had a dramatic impact on
NATO. As already mentioned, the new Strategic Concept acknowledged the need
to adapt the Alliance to the new security demands including risks emerging
beyond NATO borders, among other other challenges short of major war fight-
ing contigencies. But it was operations in former Yugoslavia that gave the imme-
diate impetus for NATO's increased emphasis on peacekeeping and 'out-of-area'
operations.[65] The success of missions assigned to the Implementation Force
(IFOR), together with work undertaken within the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
framework, were evidence of the Alliance's ability to deal with present-day
challenges and thus contribute to the political stability of the continent.[66]

In Berlin, the idea was finally accepted of establishing ESDI within NATO,
and the latter's most radical plan, the CJTF concept – first introduced at the Jan-
uary 1994 Brussels Summit – was refined and its development was authorised.[67]
The Berlin outcome was a major turning point in the post-Cold War European
security, for it settled the fundamental issues affecting the transatlantic bargain-
ing: the primacy of NATO; US leadership in security and defence matters; the
contribution of the Europeans, and as a result – the short- and medium-term –

prospects of a self-contained ESDI. The communiqué endorsed the continuing 'internal adaptation' of NATO and defined the CJTF concept as 'central to our approach for assembling forces for (NATO) contigency operations' and 'operations led by the WEU'. Moreover, it stated that the whole adaptation process would be 'consistent with the goal of building [ESDI] within NATO', enabling 'all European Allies to play a larger role in NATO's military and command structures and, as appropriate, in contigency operations undertaken by the Alliance', while it also referred to 'a continued involvement of the North American Allies across the command and force structure', with the clear aim of preserving and reinforcing the transatlantic link.

What happened in Berlin was that NATO acquired even more credibility, in matters of security and defence, than any conceivable rival. With an ESDI within NATO, it became possible for the US to reconcile the strategic desire for primacy in Europe and the domestic political pressures for operational and financial burden-sharing. Strong US leadership expressed not only in the Alliance's post-Cold War adaptation drive, but also in the forceful US commitment to the Dayton process and in the subsequent performance of IFOR, made NATO increasingly attractive to almost every participant in the European security debate, including the French,[68] thus repositioning it firmly as the dominant actor in the new European security setting. Indeed, the Bosnian campaign made evident that the Europeans were incapable of any meaningful stabilising military intervention without the US leadership. The fundamental objective was, as always, the development of ESDI within NATO. CJTF would be a vital tool, leading to the 'creation of military coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU'. A CJTF is a multinational, multiservice, task-tailored force consisting of NATO and possibly non-NATO forces; being capable of rapid deployment to conduct limited-duration 'out-of-area' peace operations, it would be under the control of either NATO's integrated command structure or under WEU. The aim is to open up multinational command and control outside the traditional NATO framework. The primary intent of the CJTF concept was to give NATO military forces the mobility and flexibility needed to execute the new security management tasks of the Alliance. Once fully in place, the new capabilities will at last fulfil the 1991 Strategic Concept's call for military authorities to design smaller, more mobile and more flexible forces. CJTF is a purely military concept, a technique long being used by many forces in the conduct of contigency warfare. NATO has been institutionalising the task force concept in order to make it more effective in the conduct of multilateral operations.[69] It is obvious that CJTF has been instrumental in combining ESDI with NATO's capabilities. The purpose was to give the WEU the necessary military capability to conduct Petersberg-type operations. In fact, deploying CJTF was intended to become the primary military doctrine of NATO in peacetime,[70] for it would provide flexibility to respond to new missions in or around Europe, facilitate the dual use of allied command structures for NATO and/or WEU operations and permit PfP countries to integrate into NATO-led

operations.[71] In terms of the utilisation of NATO's integrated command structure for non-Art. 5 operations, it should be noted that within the three NATO Commands of Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), there are also three CJTF nuclei Headquarters (HQs), in place since the late 1990s.[72]

For the US, the realisation of the CJTF concept was always going to be instrumental in ensuring that NATO remains the core security and defence transatlantic, and for that matter European, institution, while refashioning the 'burden-sharing' debate by allowing Europeans to assume greater responsibility. Cornish, in an attempt to 'deconstruct' the CJTF concept, successfully identifies the constituent elements of its nature and political significance.[73] First, Berlin shows clearly that NATO has firm ambitions to be a crisis manager and peacekeeper in its own right, with the appropriate UN or OSCE mandate. CJTF is a means to achieve this goal. To that end, the idea of a division of labour between NATO and the WEU, with the former responsible for collective defence operations (Art. 5) and the latter for lower-scale missions (non-Art. 5). If there is to be such a division of labour it could only be *within* the non-Art. 5 category, with NATO taking 'hard' missions with fighting potential and the WEU dealing with 'soft' humanitarian and rescue tasks. In other words, non-Art. 5 operations were not the exclusive preserve of WEU. Second, CJTF is not simply 'a Euro-friendly afterthought in NATO's restructuring process, but lies at the heart of that process'.[74] It aims at providing an appropriate response capability across the spectrum of possible military tasks, ranging from the admittedly unlikely collective defence to non-Art. 5 needs for action. Third, via the NATO–WEU diplomatic relationship, CJTF is the practical means by which the ESDI within the Alliance was to be given operational expression. In political terms, it meant that CJTF, as a US-approved and NATO-sponsored idea, enabled a US-controlled development and implementation of ESDI. The key arrangement was the decisions for ESDI 'separable but not separate capabilities'. This meant that NATO had full control over the development of WEU-led operations. In the words of Cornish, 'it is most unlikely that a serious rival to NATO could now develop'.[75] This was confirmed in Amsterdam, where the WEU was recognised as 'an integral part of the development of the Union', and shall support the EU 'in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign security policy . . . with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide' (Art. J7.1 TEU). It is obvious, though, that integrationist expectations have been reduced to hollow political rhetoric. The main significance of the WEU has been that it enabled a working compromise to be struck between integration and intergovernmentalism, Atlanticism and Europeanism.[76] What followed with the development of ESDP was made possible only after NATO's dominance seemed assured (especially by the British) and confirmed this compromise by further institutionalising a US-led, transatlantic division of labour.

European security and defence policy and US response

Two things emerged from the Franco-British Saint-Malo initiative. First, the WEU would be absorbed into the Union and placed under the CFSP. Second, the collective defence provision of Article V of the Brussels Treaty would be retained.[77] NATO's Washington Summit acknowledged the continuation of the Berlin decisions, including the implementation of CJTF, the creation of CJTF nuclei HQs, and the role of the Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) in overseeing the use of NATO assets by WEU-led operations. The Summit also acknowledged that the Union might at some point take over the role of the WEU in the existing NATO–WEU framework planning capabilities.

The Union's inability to tackle the build-up of the crisis in Kosovo and the ambivalence and delays in US policy were vital factors in creating a European demand for a new security and defence initiative. In Kosovo it was American plans that came into action, rather than those of NATO. It would not be far from the truth to note that the Kosovo war was a US operation under a NATO flag. That reality has been very uncomfortable both for the US and for NATO's European members.[78] The experience was instrumental in putting enough pressure on the EU members to move the debate radically forward.[79] Operation Allied Force consisted mainly of air operations. While non-US aircraft carried out over 15,000 sorties, about 39 per cent of the total, US aircraft delivered over 80 per cent of the weapons. The June 1999 Cologne European Council indicated the Union's willingness to provide the institutional framework for a future 'autonomous' European military contribution to international security and emphasised the two ways in which the Union could conduct Petersberg-type operations. One, by using NATO means and capabilities, including European command and control. In this case, the decisions taken in Berlin (1996) and Washington (1999) by the NAC are to be carried out. The other, EU-led operations without reliance on NATO assets and force structures could be conducted by European national or multinational means, which are pre-identified (or pre-designated in NATO terms) by the member states. In such cases either the national command structures, which provide for a multinational representation in the HQs or in the existing command structures within the multinational forces would have to be used for an effective conduct of EU-led operations.[80]

The US has welcomed the Union's ESDP initiative, but obviously this project holds implications for Washington. Hardly surprisingly, it requires a close relationship between the Union and NATO. American policy-makers and commentators have viewed the project in an ambivalent fashion. Officials within the Clinton administration were often at pains to offer their support, publicly welcoming the potential of ESDP to take on conflict management tasks the US would prefer to avoid. Yet, as the momentum of ESDP has gathered pace, anxieties in Washington were increasingly aired. Initially, during the Clinton administration, Secretary of State Albright, phrased these in December 1998 as the 'three Ds': the triple dangers of a decoupling (of European and Alliance decision-making), duplication (of defence resources) and discrimination (against

non-EU NATO members). In a sincere attempt to ameliorate the anxieties, the 1999 Washington NAC Summit agreed on the so-called 'Berlin-Plus' compromise. For NAC, 'a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of our Alliance'. In this regard, 'we are determined that the decisions taken in Berlin in 1996, including the concept of using separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations, should be further developed'.[81] American concerns, however, persisted. During the week of the Nice European Council, the outgoing US Secretary of Defense, Cohen, warned that NATO could become 'a relic' if the Union were to develop a military planning capability that duplicated NATO, and if resource commitments to ESDP detracted from force improvements slated under NATO's own DCI. To its credit, the G. W. Bush administration has tried to dispel most of these apprehensions, and it has nearly stopped making disparaging remarks about the credibility of European security and defence efforts, without, however, stopping voicing concern. Rumsfeld, the new Secretary of Defense, noted in February 2001 that he was 'worried' by a ESDP that might undermine NATO owing to a 'confusing duplication' of efforts, although Powell's first comments as Secretary of State were less alarmist. These broadsides against ESDP have galvanised the Union, by adding urgency to the creation of an efficient institutional interface with NATO and to the definition of mechanisms by which European operations will enjoy access to NATO assets.

The capabilities and responsibilities gap

It is clear that the US and the Union have been trying to define the new transatlantic bargain that would balance the latter's desire for a broader and more independent political role with its continued reliance on American and NATO military capabilities. There are quite a few practical steps to be taken in that direction. A crucial one concerns the way in which the Union enhances its military capabilities for projecting and sustaining power that is addressing the defence capabilities gap that divides its members from the US. The defence capabilities gap means that there is a danger of ending up with a two-tier alliance – one in which the US and perhaps a few European allies are able to conduct high-intensity operations, while the rest of the allies focus on the low end of the military spectrum. This would not strengthen NATO, but weaken it. Accordingly, the defence capabilities gap could result in a quite harmful division of labour for the cohesion of the transatlantic community, whereby the Union would take primary responsibility for conflict management and low-intensity peacekeeping, while the US would take the lead in high-intensity warfare.

In the near term, such a development could contribute to overall NATO capabilities if it were accompanied by an increase in European defence capabilities. Moreover, such a division of labour is consistent with the political desire on the part of the Union to take the lead on lower-end peacekeeping and conflict prevention tasks and also accords with US reluctance to get involved in every such contigency. Over the longer term, however, this kind of division of labour and 'mission specialisation' could undermine the cohesion of the

Alliance, for it would result in allies incapable of contributing to the Art. 5 collective defence commitments, or of conducting high-intensity joint operations 'out of area', thus raising questions about the ability of US and European forces to operate together in more demanding environments.

The debate after the Kosovo war as well as during the Afghanistan and the global anti-terrorism US campaign is revealing. The growing capabilities gap and the emerging division of labour inspires acrimonious debates about burden-sharing, and provides a constant source of friction in the transatlantic relationship. Because Europe is such a dwarf in security and defence issues, the US does not treat the European allies as genuine partners in the development and implementation of security and defence policies. As a result Americans and Europeans are growing resentful of each other in ways and at a pace that soon will become difficult to reverse.

Closing the capabilities gap, without undercutting the Alliance, is among the most urgent and difficult challenges NATO faces in the coming years. EU members should invest more on their defence capacity if they want to be able to exercise some control over American unilateralist tendencies especially after 11 September 2001. The interests of both the US and the Union would be served by developing a strong and effective ESDP. A Europe that remains allied to the US because of its own weakness is of limited value in the current turbulent strategic environment, and probably unsustainable politically. To preserve and advance transatlantic co-operation, NATO needs a bargain that shares more equitably the responsibilities of common interests. A stronger and more assertive Union is by far the more attractive partner for the US. In such a situation, the US would be more attentive to European concerns and more multilateralist than at present. American respect for ESDP would increase, making it easier for Washington to compromise for common transatlantic endeavours.[82]

Why NATO endures

The discussion above has been mainly about NATO's response and adaptation to the new European security environment, the development of its strategies towards the new challenges and its success in formulating effective policies. The issues were and still remain particularly salient, given the new strategic landscape. At the heart of the problem lies the pressing need for the Alliance to redefine its rationale, no longer in terms of identifying a unifying threat, but in terms of combining the capabilities of its members in a way that furthers their post-Cold War interests, while consolidating NATO as a device to the making of substantive agreements in world politics by providing rules, norms, principles and procedures that help state actors to realise those interests collectively. The challenge was enormous as the possibility of deterioration and dissolution became real. Alliances deteriorate and dissolve for several reasons, of which the most obvious and important is a change in the identity or nature of the threat that produced the original association. But NATO endured. Its durability and persistence has many sources.

First, there is a leader, the US, strongly committed to preserving the relationship and willing to expend the effort needed to keep its allies from straying. As Chapter 5 suggested, American leadership is not on the wane but has been exercised effectively through credible institutional structures. Second, NATO has become a symbol of credibility and resolve. The US decision to intervene in Bosnia, as well as its more recent resolute military response to the Kosovo crisis, appears to have been motivated by the fear that failure to act would cast doubt on its reliability and, hence, on NATO's future itself. Third, the high level of institutionalisation of NATO has created capabilities that are certainly worth preserving, despite the extensive change in the array of external threats, especially since it costs less to maintain them than it did to establish them in the first place. As Walt has indicated, 'the 1991 Gulf War could not have been fought without NATO assets, and the 1995 intervention in Bosnia relied on a similar base of infrastructure, military assets and joint decision-making procedures'.[83] Third, the high level of institutionalisation within NATO worked most powerfully because it had created capacities that are highly adaptable. As the foregoing discussion shows, NATO's durability increased since its institutional profile was instrumental in amending doctrines and organisational forms in response to external developments, making it easier to adapt to the new post-bipolar conditions. Fourth, ideological solidarity and a commitment to similar basic goals significantly helped to reduce intra-Alliance conflicts and to sustain it long after its original rationale had gone. Also, the fact that NATO has resulted in its members seeing themselves as integral parts of a larger (Atlantic) political community, reflecting or even creating a sense of common identity, means that the Alliance is undeniably appealing and, therefore, extremely robust.

Although neither the history of the past fifty years nor the public statements of contemporary national leaders offer an absolutely reliable guide for the future, the geostrategic developments and institutional dynamics of the 1990s resulted in NATO remaining the landmark of post-Cold War European security. NATO is still preparing to deal with threats in true realist fashion, even though their identities are increasingly in dispute or uncertain. What NATO has done in response – to realist and neo-realist surprise – is to expand its relationship to other international institutions, such as the WEU and the Union, 'as part of an effort to embed itself further into the framework of European, and to a lesser extent trans-Atlantic, relations. In so doing, NATO has demonstrated the flexibility expected of both organisations and international institutions.'[84] One can easily imagine that these factors, which safeguarded NATO's efficient political and institutional adjustment, led to the decisions that were (or were not) taken in Amsterdam. These decisions cast serious doubts as to whether 'the project of a true common European defence is still a real political objective being pursued by all governments of the relevant European countries',[85] and once again fuelled debate about the Union's role in world affairs and its nature as a global actor. The final section below offers a theoretical understanding of this debate.

Instead of a conclusion: the Union in world affairs

This section tries to identify what the Union is in terms of its international behaviour: an 'international actor', a 'global power', an 'economic power/bloc', a 'civilian power' or a 'superpower in the making'? These terms entail different descriptive and normative implications for European foreign policy. The same applies to what kind of European security superstructure should exist. There is little doubt from the existing literature that the Union (and before it the Community) has now acquired an international role, even if its legal status remains unclear.[86] There is in fact general agreement that all EU institutions have acquired such a role. This is particularly true of the Commission and the EP, but generally speaking this is due to the emergence of the Union as an international actor.[87]

A study undertaken in 1977 by Sjostedt, posing the question 'to what degree the EC is an international actor at a given time',[88] concluded that the Community was 'some sort of half developed international actor'.[89] As for the future, Sjostedt presented a series of possible developments without committing himself to any particular option. He also warned, quite correctly, of the difficulties inherent in any prediction in the social sciences.[90] In his view, an international actor is an acting unit in the international system, which possesses the quality of 'actor capability'. The latter was in turn defined as having a double characteristic: first, that unit 'is discernible from the external environment', in that 'it has a minimum degree of separateness'; second, that 'it has a minimal degree of internal cohesion'.[91] The Union has come some way from the time when Sjostedt could rightly claim that in the mid-1970s the Commission's role in 'high politics' was non-existent and that there was hardly ever '[a] common behaviour in the "high policy" field areas, to which foreign policy belongs *par excellence*'.[92] There is no doubt that the Commission played an important role in EPC, if only by being represented at all EPC meetings.[93] This is all the more so since the coming into force of the TEU, which gave the Commission a right of co-initiative, at least theoretically. Hence the general assessment that the Community/Union has emerged as a distinct entity on the international scene.

According to Kirchner, '[w]hereas in the 1970's there was a belief that the EC was mostly reactive or more affected by international events than vice versa, the Community can now be described as becoming more active in the international field and attractive to other international actors'.[94] Ginsberg has gone even further by arguing that the number of foreign policy 'actions' has increased over the years, claiming that the new logic behind such actions is what he calls 'self-styled' actions as opposed to the previous logics of integration or interdependence.[95] In certain areas, there seems to be a common European stance. De Schoutheete identified nine issue-areas where '*quelques résultats*' could be identified in the EPC framework: the CSCE, East–West relations, Cyprus, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, the US, the Council of Europe and human rights. Januzzi identifies at least seven areas where there has been a common stance:

Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Latin America, South Africa, terrorism and human rights.[96] Similarly, the Union possesses observer status in many international organisations, starting with the UN, and many non-member states have diplomatic relations and representation with it. From the perspective of third countries, they 'so often perceive the Twelve [now Fifteen] in EPC as being more united and stronger than the member states themselves are ready to admit'.[97] The additional requirement of Art. 30.5 SEA that EPC and the Community's external policy must coincide has added to this trend because the external economic relations of the Community, as well as its development and aid policy, have proved extremely important. Such a requirement is repeated both in the TEU and the AMT.[98]

A high degree of 'co-ordination reflex' has also developed among the foreign ministries of all the member states. Regelsberger has pointed out that a flexible frame of mind is more rewarding in understanding the nature of EPC than is any traditional foreign policy theory.[99] Rummel concurs: if '[t]he aggregation of (EPC) positions and activities . . . does not yet constitute the foreign policy *of* the European Community and its member states, it at least represents a foreign policy *for* them.'[100] Thus both of Sjostedt's criteria (minimum degree of separateness and of internal cohesion) seemed to have been satisfied since he first used these terms. Although the CFSP (and EPC before it) has not amounted to a truly common European foreign policy, it would be incorrect to ignore its role in international relations. Even if one takes a minimalist approach, it is possible to identify a 'European' line on most international relations issues.

Moreover, the Union's own perception of being an international actor is evident in the many official statements on its international role. Europe as a distinct entity was also one of the original underpinnings of the integration process after the Second World War, based on a sense of common identity. The setting up of EPC was agreed upon at a time when the Community had 'arrived at a turning point in its history', when there was a need for Europe 'to establish its position in the world as a distinct entity'.[101] Such a position culminated in the Document on European Identity published by the (then) Nine as early as December 1973.[102] A good way of defining Europe's sense of distinctiveness can be summed up as follows: it is not based on the use of force; it both involves the peoples of Europe and implies their backing; it purports to set up a Europe which is not dominated by any one of its constituent parts (no empire-building). In short, the international actions of the Union can be described as those of a 'Civilian Power Europe'. This term was first coined in the 1970s at a time when economic power seemed to be more important in international affairs than traditional military power. In Duchêne's words, a civilian power is 'a civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force'. It is also 'a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards'.[103] Twitchett defines it as 'an international polity as yet possessing no military dimension, but able to exercise influence on states, global and regional organisations, international corporations and other transnational bodies through diplomatic, economic and

legal factors'. This definition must be contrasted with that of a 'superpower' which possesses power and influence, and the means to implement them in the following fields: ideology, politics, economics, finance and the military, especially in nuclear technology. There also exists a sphere of influence where the superpower has almost unlimited control or dominance.

In the existing literature, two kinds of early criticisms have been made: the realists who deny the very existence of the concept itself, in that it amounts to nothing but a 'contradiction in terms'.[104] Ifestos adds that 'the turbulences of the 1970's and first half of the 1980's . . . [have] tended to discredit [the civilian power Europe approach]'.[105] Pijpers went further in the late 1980s: 'EPC has some striking deficiencies in the field of security', stressing the lack of crisis management arrangements and the lack of co-ordination in the field of arms trade policy.[106] A second, more limited, attack came from a left-wing inspired critique of capitalism. Galtung claimed that a civilian power Europe represented only an alternative to American hegemony in his *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making*.[107]

Another relevant approach covers institutional arrangements, with the view to explaining what the Union is or is not in world affairs. There is no point in repeating the CFSP decision-making process at this stage; suffice it to say that whether or not the Union achieves a common stance on international affairs also has an impact on how close this entity is to a federal, confederal or *sui generis* model. This picture is further complicated by 'domestic sources' of foreign policy which tend to affect foreign policy in variable ways according to the issue at hand, the country concerned, and in relation to EU foreign policy developments. This is not the place to develop this point further but simply to say that a clear federalist–intergovernmentalist divide reminiscent of the formative debates can be found.

Despite the above, a more liberal view has tried to use the concept of a civilian power Europe in order to understand what the Union is in world affairs and, by implication, what its internal structure is. Rummel states: 'When compared to the superpowers, Western Europe stresses moral persuasion, the "good example", and unconditional help and de-emphasises ideological warfare, the selections of proxies, and the "projection of power."'[108] Hill identifies several reasons for applying the phrase 'Civilian Power' to Europe: first, because international politics is not exclusively about military power; second, because the use of military force to intervene in third countries 'has a dubious record'; third, because it is true to say that 'the record of civilian power in action is not insubstantial'; fourth, because Duchêne's original preoccupation was with the process of European integration, and particularly the Franco-German reconciliation, which has been 'gloriously' successful; and fifth, because a Civilian Power Europe is more desirable than a superpower Europe.[109] In that respect, Hill agrees with Duchêne's original view that the Community should not become a superpower because that would go against its intrinsic nature.

More recently, Buchan, in a journalistic effort, argued that the Union was a 'strange superpower'.[110] Thus, he views the Union not as a conventional superpower because of its mainly economic power, and he concludes that in the post-Cold War era this is an advantage as 'economic problems [are] back at the top of the international agenda'.[111] But he also stresses the current shortcomings of European integration and contrasts the advances on monetary union with the lack of a coherent foreign and security policy. As for Piening, he concluded that the Union was a 'global power'.[112] He takes a more practical and less normative view to argue that Europe is now a 'global' power of 'a class of its own'.[113] He sees this development as a direct result of internal integration and argues that the major changes have occurred 'at almost breakneck speed'.[114] Buchan and Piening concentrate on the size of the market, the population, and the economy of the Union, rather than on any 'domestic peace'. Whereas the latter falls into the category of intra-democratic peace,[115] these most recent studies focus on economic power within an ever-interdependent and globalising world. They also both show some scepticism about future developments, especially on the impact of enlargements to come and of waning popular support, but neither offers a prescription to that effect, nor considers at length the implications for the future of European integration theory and practice.

Even more recently, and mainly owing to the *de facto* militarisation of the Union, two more opposing views have emerged about the continued usefulness of the concept of a civilian power.[116] Zielonka, Whitman and Smith have called for its demise. They all consider that a civilian power cannot become militarised and use military means without losing its *raison d'être*.[117] A minority view, first applied to Germany after its participation in NATO's bombing of Kosovo and Serbia,[118] considers on the contrary that military power will at long last offer the Union the means to act like a civilian power in the world, that is to say as a force for the projection of democratic and other human rights principles.[119] So, in short, the jury is still out about what kind of an international actor the Union is. Future deepening and widening will make its role in world affairs all the more relevant and important for further analyses.

The debate on the Union's identity and role in international affairs, while focusing on failings and dilemmas and on persistent limitations, does not ignore the progress European unity has made thus far. Bouts of expansion in both geographical and functional scope have marked its history, and periods of pessimism and showdowns have almost never led to regressions. Hoffmann uses the image of Sisyphus only to suggest that the present shape of the Union 'is quite different from the supranational dream of its founders and that each leap forward brings with it problems as well as reminders of constant handicaps'.[120] However, prophecies of lethal break-ups have not been fulfilled. Instead, it seems that Europeans, following Haas' suggestions,[121] try to 'learn' and to 'revalue' themselves by at least safeguarding their laboriously evolving *acquis*. And this process of 'learning' and 're-evaluation' does lead to – painful and slow – institutional adaptation and policy innovation. As for now, the Union is a necessary and, in some respects, a

leading part of the European political and security landscape, as well as a subtle, if often shaky, actor in international geopolitics.

Notes

1 On the EDC, see Edward Furdson, *The European Defence Community: A History*, London: Macmillan, 1980. On the Fouchet Plans, see Susan Bodenheimer, *Political Union: A Microcosm of European Politics 1960–1966*, Leyden: Sitjhoff, 1967.
2 This was also the case during the 'Empty Chair' crisis of 1965.
3 This phenomenon occurred again in the early 1980s, with Spain and Portugal doing the same in general foreign policy matters, but more particularly on Mediterranean and Central American issues.
4 Paul Taylor, *The Limits of European Integration*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
5 Jacob Øhrgaard, '"Less than Supranational, More than Intergovernmental": European Political Co-operation and the Dynamics of Intergovernmental Integration', *Millennium*, 26:1, 1997, pp. 1–29; the quotes are on p. 27 and their order has been reversed.
6 The decision-making machinery was kept separate: the Paris and Rome Treaties (ECSC, EEC, Euratom) and the SEA covered the external economic relations (trade and development policies), whereas EPC was based on a series of Reports and on Title III of the SEA. See Simon Nuttall, *European Political Co-operation*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1992, pp. 51–259.
7 For more on this question, see Stelios Stavridis and Christopher Hill (eds), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: West European Reactions to the Falklands Conflict*, Oxford: Berg, 1996.
8 As we are assessing a relatively short period of time, any such assessment can be only of an interim kind.
9 This draws on Stelios Stavridis, 'The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Why Institutional Arrangements Are Not Enough', in S. Stavridis, E. Mossialos, R. Morgan and H. Machin (eds), *New Challenges to the European Union: Policies and Policy-Making*, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997, pp. 87–122.
10 Old EPC declarations and *communiqués* are replaced by CFSP statements.
11 Jörg Monar, 'The Financial Dimension of the CFSP', in Martin Holland (ed.), *Common Foreign and Security Policy – The Record and Reforms*, London: Pinter, 1997, pp. 34–51.
12 Simon Nuttall, 'The CFSP Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty: An Exercise in Collusive Ambiguity', *CFSP Forum*, 3/97, p. 3.
13 Clive Church, *European Integration Theory in the 1990s*, European Dossier Series, No. 33, University of North London 1996, p. 33.
14 For more details, see Stelios Stavridis, 'The Democratic Control of the EU's Foreign and Security Policy after Amsterdam and Nice', *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*, 10:3, 2001, pp. 289–311.
15 Fergus Carr and Kostas Ifantis, *NATO in the New European Order*, London: Macmillan/St Martin's Press, 1996, p. 65.
16 *Ibid.*, p. 66.
17 *Ibid.*
18 *Ibid.*, p. 67.
19 *Ibid.*, p. 68.
20 See Victor-Yves Ghebali, 'The OSCE's Istanbul Charter for European Security', *NATO Review*, 48, Spring–Summer 2000, p. 23.
21 Carr and Ifantis, *NATO*, p. 69.

22 Gerhard Kummel, 'From Yesterday to Tomorrow – CSCE/OSCE at Twenty: Achievements of the Past and Challenges of the Future', *OSCE ODIHR Bulletin*, 4:1, Winter 1995/96, p. 13.

23 Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terrif and Mark Webber, 'NATO's Triple Challenge', *International Affairs,* 76:3, July 2000, p. 495.

24 See NATO, *NATO Facts and Figures,* Brussels, NATO Information Office, 1989, pp. 402–4.

25 See R. Hunter, *Security in Europe,* London: Elek Books, 1969. Also, J. Wyllie, *European Security in the Nuclear Age,* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.

26 Carr and Ifantis, *NATO,* p. 61.

27 NATO, 'Declaration of the Heads of States and Governments Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels', Brussels, NATO Information Service, 1988.

28 North Atlantic Council, 'Ministerial Meeting at Turnberry, 1990', *NATO Review*, 38:3, 1990.

29 NATO, 'The London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance', Brussels, NATO Information Service, 1990.

30 'NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces. These forces will be highly mobile and versatile so that Allied leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis. It will rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units. NATO will scale back the readiness of its active units, reducing training requirements and the number of exercises. NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up larger forces if and when they might be needed.' See *ibid.*

31 North Atlantic Council, 'Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe', NATO Press Communiqué, M-1(91)44, 1991.

32 North Atlantic Council, 'Ministerial Meeting, Denmark', *NATO Review,* 39:3, 1991.

33 *Ibid.*

34 Manfred Wörner, 'The Atlantic Alliance in the New Era', *NATO Review*, 39:1, 1991.

35 NATO, 'The Alliance's Strategic Concept', Press Release NAC-S(99)65, 24 April 1999, para. 4.

36 Ian Lesser, Jerrold Green, F. Stephen Larrabee and Michele Zanini, *The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Evolution and Next Steps,* Santa Monica: RAND, 2000, pp. 20–1.

37 *Ibid.*

38 See Adam Roberts, 'NATO's "Humanitarian War" over Kosovo', *Survival,* 41:3, Autumn 1999, pp. 102–23.

39 Andrew J. Pierre, *NATO at Fifty: New Challenges, Future Uncertainties,* United States Institute for Peace (USIP) Special Report, 22 March 1999, p. 7.

40 Ole Waever and Barry Buzan, 'An Inter-Regional Analysis: NATO's New Strategic Concept and the Theory of Security Complexes', in Sven Behrendt and Christian-Peter Hanelt (eds), *Bound to Cooperate: Europe and the Middle East,* Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 2000, pp. 92–3.

41 Roberts, 'NATO's "Humanitarian War"', p. 120.

42 Waever and Buzan, 'An Inter-Regional Analysis', p. 93

43 Gulnur Aybet, *NATO's Developing Role in Collective Security,* SAM Papers No. 4/99, Ankara: Center for Strategic Research, 1999, pp. 45–6.

44 David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security,* Washington, DC: United Institute for Peace, 1998, p. 77.

45 *Ibid.*

46 Carr and Ifantis, *NATO,* pp. 76–7.

47 Aybet, *NATO's Developing Role,* p. 47.

48 WEU, The *Reactivation of the WEU, Statements and Communiqués, 1984 to 1987,* WEU Press and Information Service, 1988.

49   *Ibid.*
50   Carr and Ifantis, *NATO*, p. 70.
51   WEU, *Platform on European Security Interests*, The Hague, 1987, in WEU, *The Reactivation of the WEU*.
52   W. V. Eekelen, 'WEU and the Gulf Crisis', *Survival,* 32:6, 1990, p. 524.
53   *Ibid.*, p. 525.
54   Carr and Ifantis, *NATO*, p. 71.
55   Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security,* Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, p. 126.
56   Carr and Ifantis, *NATO*, p. 71.
57   WEU, *Related Texts Adopted at the EC Summit Maastricht,* WEU Press and Information Service, 1991.
58   G. Wyn Rees, 'Constructing a European Defence Identity: The Perspectives of Britain, France and Germany', *European Foreign Affairs Review,* 1:2, November 1996, p. 236.
59   North Atlantic Council, *Declaration of Heads of State and Government January 1994,* NATO Press Communiqué, M-1(94)3, 1994.
60   WEU, *Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy,* WEU Press and Information Service, 1994.
61   *Ibid.*
62   Rees, 'Constructing a European Defence Identity', p. 146.
63   *Ibid.*
64   Stanley R. Sloan, *The United States and European Defense*, Chaillot Papers, 39, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, Paris, April 2000, p. 13.
65   Gregory L. Schulte, 'Former Yugoslavia and the New NATO', *Survival,* 39:1, Spring 1997, p. 27.
66   Assembly of WEU, *The Future Role of WEU*, Draft Report, A/WEU/POL(96)25, Paris, 11 November 1996.
67   North Atlantic Council, 'Berlin Communiqué', Berlin, 3 June 1996, *NATO Review,* 44:4, July 1996. A lengthy document, the Berlin Communiqué touched upon all the main issues facing NATO: the situation in former Yugoslavia and the conduct of IFOR; the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction; outreach through NACC and PfP, and the enlargement timetable; relations with Russia and Ukraine; the role of the OSCE; the Middle East peace process; and disarmament and arms control.
68   France's so-called *rapprochement* with NATO is an important explanation for the Berlin outcome. In February 1991, France announced its decision to take part in NATO's Strategy Review Group. Four years later, in December 1995, following NATO's decision to send 60,000-strong force to Bosnia–Herzegovina to replace UNPROFOR and the Anglo-French Rapid Reaction Force, France initiated its return to the alliance. French chiefs of staff would take part in NATO's Military Committee, would improve their relations with NATO's military staff and would work more closely with NATO's European command structure at SHAPE.
69   See Charles L. Barry, 'NATO's CJTF Concept and the WEU's Role in Crisis Response', paper presented at the WEU Athens Seminar, 1–3 May 1997.
70   Barry, 'NATO's CJTF Concept'.
71   Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security,* p. 133.
72   This arrangement meant that in a time of crisis if an operation was to be headed by the WEU, the double hatted staff who serve as NATO HQ staff and the CJTF nuclei HQ staff would form the core of the CJTF HQ for that operation, augmented by experts and staff from NATO and WEU and other countries. The actual execution of such an operation was envisaged to fall on the Deputy SACEUR, who is usually a British officer. He would oversee the transformation of a CJTF nuclei HQ into deployable HQ under the WEU to

be strengthened by commanders of the forces assigned by NATO and WEU member states for that mission. With this arrangement, the Deputy SACEUR has formed the key point of contact between NATO and WEU. A key role also falls on the Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS), which consists of joint staff working for both SACEUR and SACLANT, therefore covering all the land- and sea-based CJTF HQs. The CJPS was formed as the planning body responsible for the implementation of the CJTF concept. Now it is also the obvious planning source of European-led non-Art. 5 contingencies. See Aybet, *NATO's Developing Role,* p. 51.

73 Paul Cornish, 'European Security: The End of Architecture and the New NATO', *International Affairs*, 72:4, October 1996, pp. 762–4.

74 According to Wörner, the concept is 'the next logical step in the adaptation of our force structures'. Quoted in Cornish, 'European Security', p. 763.

75 *Ibid.*, p. 764.

76 *Ibid.*, p. 768.

77 Aybet, *NATO's Developing Role*, pp. 52–3.

78 Stuart Croft, 'Guaranteeing Europe's Security? Enlarging NATO Again', *International Affairs,* 78:1, January 2002, p. 108.

79 See Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, 'Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: the Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture', *International Affairs,* 77:3, July 2001, p. 588.

80 See Declaration of the European Council on 'Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defense', Cologne European Council, 3–4 June 1999.

81 North Atlantic Council, 'Washington Summit Communiqué: An Alliance for the 21st Century', NAC-S(99)64, 24 April 1999, para. 9.

82 Kori Schake, Amaya Bloch-Laine and Charles Grant, 'Building a European Defense Capability', *Survival*, 41:1, Spring 1999, pp. 21–2.

83 Stephen M. Walt, 'Why Alliances Endure or Collapse', *Survival*, 39:1, Spring 1997, p. 167.

84 Robert B. McCalla, 'NATO's Persistence After the Cold War', *International Organisation*, 50:3, Summer 1996, p. 470.

85 Assembly of the WEU, *WEU After Amsterdam: The European Security and Defence Identity and the Application of Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty – Reply to the Annual Report of the Council*, Draft Report, A/WE/POL(97)10, Paris, 4 November 1997, p. 20.

86 See the AMT of October 1997.

87 What follows draws on Stelios Stavridis, 'Foreign Policy and Democratic Principles: The Case of European Political Cooperation', unpublished PhD thesis, London: LSE, 1991, pp. 22–7. There is, however, a vast literature on the subject. See, for instance, David Allen *et al.* (eds), *European Political Cooperation*, London: Butterworths, 1982; Christopher Hill (ed.), *National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983; and Christopher Hill (ed.), *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*, London: Routledge, 1996.

88 Gunnar Sjostedt, *The External Role of the European Community*, Farnborough: Saxon House 1977, p. 6.

89 *Ibid.*, p. 112.

90 *Ibid.*, see Part II, especially pp. 133–6.

91 *Ibid.*, p. 13.

92 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

93 For details, see Simon Nuttall, 'Where the European Commission Comes In', in Alfred Pijpers *et al.* (eds), *European Political Cooperation in the 1980's: A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe?*, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988, pp. 104–17.

94 Emil Kirchner, 'Has the Single European Act Opened the Door for a European Security Policy?', *Journal of European Integration*, 13:1, Autumn 1989, p. 11. See also Corinne Covillers, *Y-a-t-il une politique extérieure des Communautés Européennes?*, Paris: PUF, 1987, pp. 47–86; Panayiotis Ifestos, *European Political Cooperation: Towards a Frame-*

work of Supranational Diplomacy?*, Aldershot: Gower, 1987, pp. 584–5; and Christopher Hill, 'European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian Power – or Flop?', in Reinhart Rummel (ed.), *The Evolution of an International Actor: Western Europe's New Assertiveness*, Boulder: Westview, 1990, p. 35.

 95 Roy Ginsberg, *Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community – The Politics of Scale*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989.

 96 See, respectively, Philippe De Schoutheete, *La Coopération politique européenne*, 2nd edn, Brussels: Labor, 1986, pp. 67–8; Gianni Januzzi, 'European Political Cooperation and the Single European Act', in Panos Tsakaloyannis (ed.), *Western European Security in a Changing World: From the Reactivation of the WEU to the Single European Act*, Maastricht: EIPA, 1988, p. 106.

 97 Reinhart Rummel, 'Speaking with One Voice – and Beyond', in A. Pijpers (ed.), *European Political Cooperation in the 1980s: A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?*, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988, p. 140.

 98 Art. C in both the Maastricht Treaty and the AMT.

 99 Elfriede Regelsberger, 'EPC in the 1980s: Reaching another Plateau?', in Pijpers (ed.), *European Political Cooperation*, p. 37.

100 Rummel, 'Speaking with One Voice', p. 129.

101 The Hague Communiqué, point 3, December 1969, and the July 1973 Copenhagen Report, Part 1, in *European Political Co-operation*, Bonn: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 5th edition, 1988, pp. 22, 36.

102 *European Political Co-operation*, Bonn: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 1982, p. 58.

103 See Hedley Bull, 'Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms', in Loukas Tsoukalis (ed.), *The European Community: Past, Present and Future*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 149.

104 Hedley Bull's verdict in the early 1980s, *ibid.*, pp. 149–64.

105 Ifestos, *European Political Cooperation*, p. 68.

106 Alfred Pijpers, 'The Twelve Out-of-Area: A Civilian Power in an Uncivil World?', in Pijpers (ed.), *European Political Cooperation*, p. 157.

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108 Rummel, 'Speaking with One Voice', p. 130.

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110 David Buchan, *Europe: The Strange Superpower*, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993.

111 *Ibid.*, p. 7.

112 Christopher Piening, *Global Europe – The European Union in World Affairs*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997. Piening uses a regional approach first taken by Geoffrey Edwards and Elfriede Regelsberger (eds), *Europe's Global Links: The European Community and Inter-regional Co-operation*, London: Pinter, 1990.

113 Piening, *Global Europe*, p. 196.

114 *Ibid.*, p. 197.

115 See Nils Petter Gleditsch and Thomas Risse-Kappen (eds), 'Democracy and Peace', *European Journal of International Relations*, Special Edition, 1:4, December 1995.

116 For more see Stelios Stavridis, 'The Militarizing of the EU and the Concept of a "Civilian Power Europe" Revisited', *The International Spectator*, 36:4, 2001, pp. 43–50.

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