This chapter examines first how it was that the structure of the ‘traditional’ extended family and its values, often referred to as ‘neo-patriarchy’, was able to adapt in a dynamic way to the challenge of rapid social and economic change. This survival helps to explain why patterns of male domination remained so all-powerful and generalised within Algerian society, so that politically vulnerable post-independence governments preferred not to challenge the status quo on the position and rights of women. This failure to engage in any significant programme of progressive reform is illustrated by reference, firstly, to the inability to transform the conservative laws of personal status, indeed the government went backwards on this issue compared to the French reform of 1959, and secondly, by reference to a one-party state control and stifling of an organised women’s movement.

**Neo-patriarchy: family structure and a blocked society**

Between 1954 and the 1970s Algeria experienced an extraordinary degree of change: the disruption of war was followed after independence by chaos and economic dislocation as a million settlers, who held the key technical, administrative and professional functions, departed. After 1962 the new government, confronted with economic and social disintegration, mass rural–urban flight, high unemployment and a quite staggering population explosion, attempted to resolve the crisis of rural under-development through an agrarian revolution, while oil revenues were invested in a Soviet style industrialisation programme. One classic modernisation theory maintains that the global, long-term progress in the position of women is a result of economic change, leading to education, entry into the work force, change in the balance of ‘traditional’ gender roles within the family, and access to health care and family planning. However, a distinctive feature of Algerian socio-economic development after 1962 is that for at least two decades rapid
modernisation, including an enormous expansion in female education and literacy, had a quite minimal impact on gender roles, equality and overall rights. Kamel Kateb has measured an explosive growth in girls’ education: the percentage of those receiving primary education (age six to fourteen years) increased from 9.5 per cent in 1954 to 71.56 per cent in 1987. However, this dramatic change had, for at least two decades, minimal impact on the position of women and, for example, their level of employment increased from 2 per cent in 1954 to only 2.6 per cent in 1977, one of the lowest in the Muslim world. This apparent contradiction between improved access to education and ongoing exclusion from the labour market can be explained in part by a post-independence model of labour-saving industrialisation that excluded women, and by agricultural reforms that weakened their traditional role in the peasant economy, reducing them to the position of homemakers.

As Kateb and others have pointed out, patriarchy trumped the forces that might have led to social and political emancipation: the Algerian family, faced with the challenge of modernisation, proved to be highly inventive in adapting the ‘traditional’ male-dominated, extended family so that it served as a basis of economic and political strength, rather than as a conservative corset that led towards inevitable social decline. The anthropologist Camille Lacoste-Dujardin and sociologists like Claudine Chaulet and Lahouari Addi have shown how this dynamic restructuring took place, so that kin networks and marriage strategies could adapt to modernisation and facilitate access to new forms of political and economic power. The typical post-1962 household was constituted of three generations in which, because of the desperate crisis in housing, parents shared the same space with married sons, their wives and children, or, if more wealthy, acquired adjacent flats. This extended family group, instead of fissuring into autonomous, nuclear units, continued to function as a collective and adult brothers and elders were able to insure and protect it best by avoiding putting all their eggs in one basket and diversifying the economic base. Typically one son might emigrate and send remittances from France, another to work in the big cities of northern Algeria, while others remained on the family farm cultivating the land, or used it as a base from which to set up small local businesses (as traders, taxi drivers, hauliers) or travelling daily to jobs in local towns or industry (day-labourers, postmen, masons).

This adaptive, dynamic capacity of the ‘traditional’ family provided it with considerable strength in times of massive economic and political dislocation and change but went hand-in-hand with a vigorous...
reinforcement of the patrilineal ideology that maintained women in their ‘natural’ role of mothers and daughters claustrophobic within the home. Lacoste-Dujardin says of this family as ‘refuge’: ‘These new families, fragments of lineage groups dispossessed of so many of their privileges, still jealously guarded, according to the length of time passed since its disruption and the degree of links retained with the parental clan, a consciousness of family honour and still adhered to a patrilineal ideology’. Claudine Chaulet rejects the Eurocentric idea that there exists a necessary link between processes of economic modernisation and the evolution of the nuclear family, and points to a flexible, extended family network in which women as individuals were still subordinated to the masculine-controlled interests of the group, ‘which aimed to prevent any divisions that could be provoked by the spouse’, through arranged, endogamous marriage of young brides who could be easily controlled, and subjected to the strict regulations of gender segregation and seclusion. Kin networks also operated like clientele systems to gain access to political power, for example through relatives in local government who could fix access to jobs, land and favourable planning decisions.

This patriarchal model held true not only for rural and provincial small-town society, but also for large numbers in the big cities, many of whom were refugees or recent migrants from the interior. The traditional Maghrebi house, with its sealed in private spaces (absence of ground-floor windows, inner courtyards) was designed to protect women from the eyes of strangers, a condition of male and familial honour. But the huge population movement into the towns during and after the war created an enormous housing crisis and overcrowding, conditions which made it extremely difficult to maintain the seclusion and privacy of women. The anthropologist Willy Jansen shows how, despite the most adverse conditions, attempts were made to maintain the appearance of segregation. In multi-occupation housing shared by families who were strangers to each other would follow the rule of giving a warning, such as a cough or calling ‘tarîq’ (way) whenever they wished to pass through a communal courtyard in which unrelated women might be present, so that they could hide or cover themselves. What can be seen from this is how the family, despite enormous pressures of uprooting, rural–urban migration, overcrowding and promiscuity clung on to the core values of honour and patriarchy. In a situation in which male immigrants to the city faced deep anxiety about the spatial regulation of segregation, in which women of the household were exposed to the dangers of contact with strangers, men frequently resorted to more draconian female seclusion than was normal in the village, including
imposition of the veil, strict surveillance and refusal to allow women to go unaccompanied by a male into public spaces.\textsuperscript{13}

Some commentators have tended to draw a picture in which the oppression of Algerian women has been ascribed to a ‘battle of the sexes’, an aggressive male subjugation of women. Certainly Hélène Vandevelde-Daillière produced a considerable body of evidence from her survey in 1969–70, to show that many women felt so isolated within the home that they had no means to escape from a life of resignation and ignorance, and were passive and de-politicised. Typical of the statements recorded is the following by a middle-aged woman, ‘No women take part in social life because of customs. Women are made for the house, which basically means they have no life. They rarely go out . . . Put in another way, Arab women are buried alive’.\textsuperscript{14} So radical was female seclusion that a third of rural women had no contact even with neighbours, while their husbands avoided conversation with them and some wives were even ignorant of the nature of their husband’s employment.\textsuperscript{15}

However, as Lacoste-Dujardin has shown, older women as mothers and mothers-in-law could achieve a considerable degree of domestic power and status in so far as they brokered marriages and exercised a strict disciplinary control over their daughters and co-habiting daughters-in-law, thus reproducing the ideology of female submission and serving as ‘agents of masculine domination’.\textsuperscript{16} Numerous reports by French army itinerant social and welfare teams during the war noted that resistance to emancipation of Algerian women came mainly from the dominant older women or adjouzat who blocked any reforming intent and prevented contact between the French and the young women in their households. Patriarchy, far from being solely imposed by force on women by males, was a powerful system of belief and practice that was sustained by both men and women and this explains in part the ability of the ideology to survive post-war changes.\textsuperscript{17} It was also in the rational self-interest of Algerian women to aspire to membership of cohesive and extended family networks since this provided them with the best guarantees of a degree of economic security and respect: for example, the usual escape route for wives who suffered abuse at the hands of husbands or were repudiated was to return to the protection of their family of origin. Willy Jansen shows how the situation of ‘women without men’ was not enviable: they faced extreme poverty and hardship as virtual social outcasts, and the ambition of most widowed or divorced women, as of their male kin or guardians, would be to try and ensure that they remarried as quickly as possible so as to return to the protection and security of the patriarchal collective.
Women and the conservative function of post-independence government

The newly independent state made resounding and high-principled general statements on women’s rights. A sequence of ‘foundation’ declarations such as the Tripoli Programme of 1962, the Constitution of 28 August 1963, and the Algiers Charter of April 1964, as well as Ben Bella and Boumédienne in key speeches, made bold statements on the full equality of women. For example, Article 12 of the 1963 constitution stated, ‘All citizens of both sexes share the same rights and duties’. In later years, as an emerging women’s movement struggled to assert itself against a conservative, male-dominated political regime, these basic constitutional rights would be constantly referred to, but as many commentators have noted, there continued to exist a fatal and contradictory gap between such general statements of high principle and the failure of the FLN one-party state to develop a coherent programme of reform that would translate basic rights into reality.

One of the reasons for this failure lay in the political turmoil and instability that accompanied the transition to independence, as a range of ‘clans’, clientele systems and ideological blocks competed for power. Between early July and early September 1962 Algeria came close to a full-scale civil war as the ‘external’ armed forces headed by Ben Bella moved to crush the ‘internal’ Wilaya commanders during an advance on Algiers that led to several thousand deaths. Ben Bella, during his brief period as president (13 September 1962 to 19 June 1965) was plagued by political insecurity and this absence of stable authority led him to make a number of compromises with religious conservatives that was to have particularly negative consequences for women whose interests were seen as expendable when weighed against the retention of personal power by FLN apparatchiks. In recent years, especially with the surge of radical Islamist movements after 1988, commentators have begun to revise an earlier historiography that exaggerated the more secular, socialist and progressive side of the Algerian regime, by placing a stronger emphasis on the popular Islamist and archaic features of nationalism. The educated intellectuals who, influenced by French laïcité and the Enlightenment, provided a materialist or Marxist analysis of Algerian history and political development, constituted a tiny minority, compared to the masses and the FLN leadership that followed the Messalist tradition which sought to weld the disparate regional, religious and linguistic forces into a cohesive unity and nationalism based on the idealisation of a mythical order that was to be resurrected over and against the hated ‘Christian West’. As Harbi notes: ‘Algeria
advances with its eyes fixed on the past, riveted to its sacred archaïsms because they belong to the body of the community. The nationalist ideology combines a nostalgia for the past and the revolutionary hope of a new world. As has been seen, the defence of an Arabo-Islamic identity was formulated most crucially in terms of women, as mothers and educators, and of the private sphere of the family viewed as a bastion in which core values were transmitted from one generation to the next. In particular FLN propaganda had helped to reinforce the association between French emancipation and counter-insurgency, so that any moves to reform the position of women after 1962 could be aggressively denounced as a dangerous instrument of western neo-colonialist penetration and subversion.

The new political elite that came to power at independence under the leadership of Ben Bella (1962–65) and then Boumédiène (1965–78) recognised perfectly well, in a situation of deep political instability, the profoundly entrenched and unyielding nature of popular Algerian social, cultural and religious tradition. At the core of this lay the patriarchal family, the fundamental building block of the entire social and political order. The political elites quietly turned their backs on the issue of women: there was no reason to meddle in or stir up opposition, in relation to reforms for which there existed little significant pressure or demand. Thus while the FLN elites felt comfortable in utilising the language of ‘socialism’ and secular law in the technocratic and economic sphere (of oil production, planning, industrialisation, land reform), the cultural-religious agenda was basically drawn from the Ulema tradition. The PPA of Messali Hadj (1937–54), and its successor the FLN, both shared a populist and messianic religious nationalism that was shaped by the Ulema, and its leading ideologue, Tawfiq al-Madani, became Minister of Culture and Religious Affairs in the first FLN provisional government and later under Ben Bella. In the post-1962 political struggle between the minority current of socialism and Arabo-Islamic traditionalism, both Ben Bella and Boumédiène discreetly sided with the latter on the question of women, particularly as in a search for political legitimacy they had most to gain from appealing to populist Islam and the austere salafiyya movement which sought a return to the purity of tradition and sharia. An authentic womanhood was to be located more in the restoration of an essence that was defined in relation to an immutable past than through any process of modernisation.

As Mohammed Harbi, a leading oppositional figure within the FLN has argued, the post-1962 governments showed an essential weakness of Algerian nationalism from its very beginning in the 1920s, a form of populism that based unity on a religious and mythical idealisation of a
The post-independence state

past community that obscured elaboration of a clear ideology or political project, so acting to the detriment of universal and individual rights, a process in which women were the greatest losers.26

The dynamics of this failure can be most clearly traced through the post-independence blockage of reform of the marriage and family laws.

The failure to carry out reform of the personal status law

Some feminists have argued that to centre on legal reform and individual rights is to impose a western model that may obscure, as ‘declension narratives’ claim, the forms of traditional status and community-based power held by Algerian women.27 However, the modernisation of family codes has been one of the key instruments by which independent Muslim nations, since Kemalist Turkey in the 1920s onwards, have through ‘top-down’, and often authoritarian, intervention attempted to end the subjugation of women, and liberate the potential of half the population to play a full role in economic, social and political development. Algeria is no exception and reform of the family code has been the single most crucial issue around which both the Algerian women’s movement and international feminist organisations have, and continue, to campaign.28

As has been shown in chapter 9, the colonial regime faced considerable difficulty in enforcing the new personal status law of 1959, and was confronted by a society in which a widespread culture of non-compliance with the état civil and marriage legislation was deeply entrenched. Unlike Tunisia and Morocco, which seized the opportune moment of independence to introduce new family codes while the newly independent state could benefit from high levels of support, the Algerian government simply passed an act (31 December 1962) to leave French legislation on the statute books. This meant that the French Ordinance on marriage of 1959 was to remain in force until the law of 5 July 1975. But it was to take yet another decade before the family code of 1984 came to fill the vacuum. The Algerian government was prepared to quietly leave the 1959 law in place, although preferring not to speak too much about this tacit tolerance of what had been slated as an ‘anti-Islamic’ measure. Such tolerance was possible precisely to the extent that the law was in practice ignored or flexibly marginalised, both by society and by the courts, and so did not arouse troublesome political opposition from conservative religious forces in society.

The paralysis of government became particularly evident in the long-drawn-out, twenty-two-year failure to legislate a family code to meet the needs of a rapidly changing, post-colonial society. During this period
(1962–84) there were no less than five failed attempts, mainly by secretive committees on which there was no female representation, to draw up draft legislation (1963–64, 1966, 1972, 1979, 1981). Those drafts, which were leaked to the press, showed a general trend through time towards a radical erosion of the 1959 law and the assertion of the core values of traditional Maliki law. The secrecy surrounding the various commissions was in itself an indication of the deep anxiety of the one-party state in relation to the potentially explosive and politically destabilising nature of the issue. Space does not allow a close examination of the detail of the various drafts, but the overall direction of the conservative shift is indicated by the fact that the final 1984 law, in the words of Lucie Pruvost, codified ‘a family of a patriarchal type based on respect for agnatic solidarities and hierarchies under which women were treated as permanent minors’. For example, wives owed strict obedience to their husbands as sovereign head of the family, as well as respect for his lineage (parents and kin); women no matter what their age could only marry through the authority of a male guardian (wali), which in the case of a widow might be her son; polygamy was retained, and repudiation was restored as a unilateral male prerogative.

The twenty-two-year-long vacuum created by the state and the failure to provide a clear legislative lead on a family code meant that judges and the court system which adjudicated on the reality of marriage, divorce and family life were left adrift to follow their own devices. From 1962 until the abrogation of the code in July 1975, many judges, following their personal religious or ideological bias, simply ignored the 1959 Ordinance which was still in force, and based judgements on classic Islamic law. The way the wind was blowing was clearly reflected during a 1968 conference of jurists on the instability of the Algerian family, during which Mohand Issad of the Algiers faculty of law noted that the supreme court had shown preference for the position that ‘the husband held sovereign power to repudiate his wife at will’, even if this was an abusive practice and in breach of the statutes. Issad justified this on the casuistic grounds that the law of 31 December 1962 retained French legislation, including the Ordinance of 1959, only on condition that it was not ‘of colonial inspiration and discriminatory’ or ‘contrary to national sovereignty’. The right of husbands to unilaterally end a marriage, even without cause, was thus argued to be in the national interest, and Issad swept aside the progressive law of 1959 that served to give greater protection to women as both a colonial evil and discriminatory.

However, Issad was expressing his individual opinion as a jurist rather than a strict reading of statute law, and this was typical of a situation in
which judges were relatively free to follow their own agendas, a situation that created a mass of confusion and contradictory practices in the legal process. In many ways this juridical anarchy facilitated and, at the same time, legitimated the deep conservative currents in Algerian society that had frustrated or ignored the 1959 law from its inception. In 1968 even the official FLN newspaper El Moudjahid was able to offer a fatwa that condoned a strictly illegal disregard for the law. In reply to a question posed by a woman who had been married by a fatiba ceremony to a man who later turned out to be already married with two children, it suggested that she could contest this before a judge, but the fatiba marriage was, ‘from the point of view of Muslim law pure’, and if she was to contest this in the courts, ‘if you are pious you will always have something on your conscience . . . also in Muslim law polygamy is licit’.34 Lahouari Addi has gone so far as to suggest that Algeria in failing to establish a culture of individual rights was not a Rechtsstaat and was prepared to surrender the monopoly of justice in relation to domestic space and women to the religious-moral order of the community and the man in the street. For example, the authorities appear to have tolerated or turned a blind eye to the widespread use of male violence towards women who they felt had, by appearing alone or ‘improperly’ dressed in the street, impugned the moral order.35

The conservative turn in marriage and family law after 1962 did not mean that Algerian women were lacking in agency and that they were the passive objects of repressive male agendas. Just as civil society had been able to escape the implementation of the 1959 law, so that there was a large gap between the statute book and the social reality of marriage arrangements, so court documents of legal procedure also reveal the kinds of strategies that women deployed to defend their own interests in court.36 Although historians have explored this issue for the colonial period, little if any work has been carried out for the post-Independence era.37 However, some of the published court adjudications provide a tantalising glimpse of how women attempted to utilise the law to their own benefit and, rather significantly, did so by appealing to the colonial Ordinance of 1959. For example, Khedidja Ait Idir brought a court action against her husband Tahar Nabti in July 1965 because he had repudiated her, but acted illegally by failing to get the marriage registered by the état civil. However, the great majority of women were illiterate and too poor to be able to make use of legal process, and if they did so it was in most instances where, having returned to their parents home after repudiation, court action was brought by male relatives on their behalf.38 But ultimately, the overall conservative direction which marriage law took after independence in 1962 severely narrowed the
already restricted room for manoeuvre that women had to defend their interests before a judge.

Women’s organisations such as the official Union nationale des femmes algériennes (UNFA), as well as individual feminists such as Fadéla M’Rabet, voiced with growing concern the failure of the courts to implement current laws inherited from the French. This became particularly clear in the two key areas of enforced marriage and unilateral repudiation. A growing number of religious leaders and cadis openly expressed the right of jebr by which a marriage partner was chosen by the father or male guardian (walli), since, it was argued, women lacked the experience, information or inherent intelligence of men to make such an important decision. The consent of the woman, who they argued must be absent from the marriage ceremony, should always be given by the walli. It was precisely this system that the 1959 law had tried to end by insisting that women must be present at the registration before a state official who would verify her assent, as well as her legal age.

From 1962 onwards, however, a mass of evidence points to forced marriage, often of under-age minors, in spite of the Khemisti law of 1963 which extended the age of marriage for girls from fifteen to sixteen years.39 In the Constantinois region even the official census of 1966 recorded 5 per cent of all girls aged twelve to fifteen years as married (2,774 individuals), undoubtedly the tip of the iceberg since most illegal marriages would have escaped the état civil altogether. Vandevélè-Daillelière’s extensive survey of 1968–72 found that 42 per cent of husbands were imposed on women in urban society, and 65 per cent in rural zones.40 M’Rabet, after publicising evidence of widespread and increasing psychiatric problems, including 175 attempted suicides in Algiers in 1964 among young women forced into marriage, had her weekly radio programme for women closed down.41 In addition there was a growing wave of repudiation or divorce in which women and children were abandoned, frequently without any form of support, and in 1963 there was an estimated 10,000 repudiations and abandoned families in greater Algiers alone.42

The conservative attack on the colonial legislation of 1959, as on the heritage of French emancipation in general, was powerfully legitimated by the FLN nationalist ideology. Internal documents dating from the war itself show that the FLN was perfectly aware of the extent to which the package of emancipation measures was driven by a counter-insurgency strategy to penetrate, gather intelligence and subvert the FLN base in domestic society.33 However, in its attack on the 1959 law the FLN fell back on, and reinforced, the conservative topos of the immutable family as a bastion of identity, a form of religious nationalism that bound
women into the status quo. The official FLN newspaper *El Moudjahid* noted of the 1959 law:

> Thus the French, who moreover are Christians or of the Jewish confession, as is, it seems, Mr Michel Debré, have dared to deliberately violate the Koran, immutable in its essence, and to impose by the sword on Algerian Muslims the secular laws of France, and this, in the most sacred of things, notably the *statut personnel* . . . a domain that belongs exclusively to the community of believers.\(^4^4\)

Frantz Fanon sensed the dangers of such a reactive FLN agenda reinforcing traditional practices that might carry negative consequences for women.\(^4^5\) But while he viewed this as only a temporary sacrifice of the war period this proved not to be the case and the FLN helped to create a long-term, post-independence mental association between almost any form of progressive agenda on women or emancipation, and the idea of an alien, western invasion and subversion of Algerian culture and society. As the conservative ideologue Malek Bennabi remarked in 1968, feminism represented a foreign import: ‘Our feminism must not be “made in somewhere”. It must be of our own brand’; while for the Minister of Justice, Benhamouda, the goal of any new Algerian code, ‘is above all to purify the structure of the family of all its un-Islamic elements’.\(^4^6\) The close links between the nationalist myth of Arabo-Islamic identity and the emphasis on a necessary reinforcement of classic Islamic law was promoted by Saïd Benabdallah, a leading ideologue and jurist, in his book *La Justice du FLN pendant la guerre de libération*. The nature of Algerian justice, he argued, could only be understood in relation to ‘the religious function of the revolutionary myth’ and a War of Independence that had been fought by the *moudjahid* (warrior of the faith) as a *jihad* (holy war) which was essentially, ‘a dynamic manifestation of auto-defence for the preservation and recovery of a patrimony of the highest value . . . It so happens that it was precisely in Algeria that Islam was the final refuge of these values that were hounded and profaned by an outrageous colonialism’.\(^4^7\) Nationalist discourse invariably presented women and the domestic habitus as the ultimate redoubt of Algerian identity, and this construct meant that the Islamic code of law which regulated the family would need to be cleansed of all French or western accretions that had polluted the pure tradition. Benabdallah wrote: ‘The strength of Algerian Islam resides in effect in the extent to which its spirit is in harmony with that of Algerian civilisation. It contains prescriptions that conform to the traditionalist way of life, and the system of juridical norms that it proposes are in agreement with the deeper structures of Algerian society’.\(^4^8\) This recourse to tradition
appears to have ruled out any attempt to engage in a progressive or liberal interpretation of Islam, but meant in effect a defence of the status quo and the most conservative features of marriage and family law.

In summary, the Algerian government delayed legislation on a post-independence family code since its hold on power was precarious and it preferred to avoid politically destabilising battles over such a sensitive issue between opposing camps that viewed themselves as socialist/ secular modernisers or as Arabo-Islamist defenders of ‘tradition’. Certainly Borrmans, a close contemporary observer, detected signs of such a split in the secretive workings of the drafting commissions of 1963–64 and 1966, and gave this as a reason why government shelved these projects. It is now evident, especially from the work of Gilbert Meynier, that such a split over the position of women had existed already among the higher echelons of the FLN during the war itself, but the weaker socialist or secularising current eventually lost out to the colonels (Ben Bella, Boumédienne) who seized political power at independence.

Although there were some initial signs of promise on the women’s question from the Ben Bella government, particularly in the passing of the Khemisti law of 1963, which increased the minimum age of marriage for girls from fifteen to sixteen years, this quickly evaporated. On International Women’s Day, 8 March 1965, a dramatic demonstration passed through central Algiers, during which many women threw their veils into the sea, blocked traffic and shouted slogans demanding an end to discrimination: ‘go and do the cooking, we’ll take care of the politics’. Ben Bella, during a deeply ambiguous speech in the Majestic cinema, stated there could never be socialism without the participation of women ‘within the framework of our Arabo-Islamic values’. On the same occasion one year later, Boumédienne, having seized power through an army coup, made an almost identical speech: progress, he said, ‘does not mean in any way imitation of western feminism. We say no to this kind of evolution since our society is an Islamic and socialist society . . . this evolution must not be the cause of the corruption of our society’. Lazreg, an eye-witness to the event, reports that women who tried to leave in protest were forced back to their seats by armed guards.

Politics and the failure of an organised women’s movement

Quite at odds with FLN populist nationalism, was the optimism of many commentators on the international socialist left in 1961–62 that the new republic would mark an extraordinary phase in the
simultaneous liberation of Algerian women from the fetters of colonialism and ‘feudal’ patriarchy. Frantz Fanon, for example, in L’An V de la révolution algérienne, optimistically forecast a ‘radical mutation’ in the role of women, gender relations and traditional family structures and the birth of a ‘new society’. Algerian women, it would seem, had through both their heroic sacrifice and the demonstration of an ability to act on a par with men, earned recognition of their moral right to full post-independence equality.

However, this was not to be, and the very group of women who might have been expected to form an avant-garde for a post-independence movement, the moudjahidate who had experienced an unusual degree of independence during the war and also enjoyed a high level of symbolic power, returned to a domestic role and withdrew from political activism. The atmosphere of political demobilisation and dejection at the reassertion of male domination and seclusion was typically expressed by Fatma Baichi: ‘After independence I no longer worked and I could not militate. My husband prevented me from going out: I could not even go and see my sisters in combat . . . And then even my brothers, even the youngest with whom I militated during the war, encouraged my husband to stop me from going out: “It’s all over now, she must not be allowed out, things are different now”’. For Baya Hocine too, ‘we [Algerian women] broke through the barriers and it was very difficult for us to go back to how things were. In 1962 the barriers were rebuilt in a way that was terrible for us’. Symbolic of this dramatic shift in the fortunes of women militants at independence was the fate of Djamila Boupacha, the most mediatised heroine, on her release from a French prison on 26 April 1962. Reluctant to return to Algeria where ‘the brothers [FLN] are going to return me to my life as a woman down there’, she was forced by the FLN to leave the protection of her feminist lawyer Gisèle Halimi, and was bundled under guard onto a flight to Algeria.

Why was it that so many of the moudjahidate, a highly militant and formidable group of women, should have so readily retreated from public life into domesticity? Many of the women interviewed by Amrane gave personal reasons: they were deeply scarred and exhausted by the war, and by 1962 were yearning for a return to ‘normality’ and, in particular, to get married and to have the children and family life that had been in many instances put on hold during the long eight-year war. However, such reasons do not explain the widespread disengagement from politics. Typical was the statement of one woman militant: ‘Independence, it’s the liberation of the country: our goal was achieved, we stopped there’, and, ‘I fought for independence, I had no other idea in mind. Me, I’m a woman: I thought after it’s them, the men, who are
going to take over, they know what has to be done for the independent country'. Saleha Boudefa has shown how this position was reinforced by a post-independence official discourse that, by claiming full emancipation of women had been gained at the moment of liberation, rejected any demands for further reform or change as illegitimate since full ‘liberation’ had already been achieved. Any agitation by women not under the umbrella of the FLN or the UNFA was treated as potentially subversive and anti-national. But in general there was a lack of political education and experience among the moudjahidate who were unable to develop a consciousness of the problems faced by women and the kinds of programme or demands that might begin to break the mould of patriarchy. Rather, the war-time élan of militant women was almost entirely captured by a simple, nationalist vision: as Zehor, a student, remarked, ‘Independence . . . it was not something clear . . . it was a paradise, a paradisiacal universe where everything would be easy’.

The outbreak of the War of Independence in 1954 had also led to the dissolution of the significant women’s organisations that had emerged between 1944 and 1954 (UFA, AFMA, JUDMA) (see chapter 1). By 1962 the majority of militant women who wished to continue political activism could only find an outlet for this within the hegemonic, ‘state feminism’ of the FLN. As women militants disbanded in 1962 from the ranks of the FLN so they found themselves isolated, cut off from other militant women, without any alternative means of organising outside the conservative and stifling embrace of the one-party state apparatus. Finally, comparative evidence from many other twentieth-century wars in which women were called upon to make a huge sacrifice – both in taking on board roles or forms of work previously reserved for men, as well as extremely dangerous and vital forms of resistance that often went unacknowledged by men (organising clandestine supply routes, safe-houses, look-outs, medical aid) – have shown how extremely powerful the processes of demobilisation and domestic ‘normalisation’ have been, even in societies that had a much longer and more developed history of feminism. This was particularly true for women in metropolitan France who after the Liberation, despite enfranchisement by de Gaulle in 1944, did not witness any dramatic break with the past. As one woman remarked, ‘For me, the Liberation brought no changes. We took our lives up as we had left them before and I was very happy to do so’.

This was also the experience shared by ‘Muslim sisters’ after radical phases of nationalist resurgence in the Maghreb and Middle East, and there was nothing particularly ‘remiss’ or unusual in this respect about Algerian women. The most remarkable similarity existed between the
experience of Algerian and Moroccan women militants: at the moment of independence in 1956 the majority of Moroccan moudjahidate withdrew from post-independence political activity into the role of housewives and mothers. The husband of the resistance fighter Saadia Bouhaddou, for example, insisted that she wear the djellaba, ‘After independence, my husband told me, “You’ve proved yourself capable of doing all that. Now it’s time for you to stay at home”’.66 Alison Baker, in her study of Moroccan veterans, found that only one of them, Fatna Mansar, had stayed involved in politics after independence or had any ‘concrete ideas of political, economic, and social programs that might have come out of the national liberation movement’.67 Baker concludes that the majority of the resistance veterans did not emerge from the War of Independence, having radically breached traditional boundaries of gender seclusion, with the developed political consciousness that western observers might have expected: on the contrary they remained conservative on most social issues and shared the views of the men in their milieu.68

Some of the best evidence on the enormous difficulties faced by Algerian women trying to mobilise and gain any kind of voice in relation to women’s issues and rights in the immediate post-war period comes from the research of Hélène Vandevelde-Daillière. While teaching at the University of Constantine she carried out, with the aid of students, between February 1969 and February 1970 an extensive survey of opinion among 1,059 women and 233 men in both urban and rural zones.69 Vandevelde-Daillière shows in detail how women were almost totally excluded from the male-dominated political system, both from the FLN one-party apparatus, the trade union movement, as well as from elected representation at local and national level. For example, in the first local elections for the Assemblées Populaires Communales (APC) on 5 February 1967, only ninety-nine women were elected to the 10,852 seats (0.9 per cent), and by 1971 this had declined even further to forty-six (0.5 per cent).70 The sole official organisation for women, the UNFA, which did not even hold its first Congress until November 1966, was an integral part of the FLN machine, followed the party line, and lacked any significant base among the female population. This organisation fits closely Ellen Fleischmann’s category of ‘state feminism’, a form that served to channel and contain any potential movement, stifling and discouraging any initiatives that might challenge male-led conservative policies. When the first provisional Executive Committee of the UNFA organised a street demonstration on 8 March 1964, International Women’s Day, the government ordered a change in the membership, leading the entire committee to resign in protest.71 Most of the more
politicised militants who were involved in the early days of the UNFA began to drop out from its activities, like the peasant and ex-maquisard Jemaa: ‘At independence I tried to get involved in the UNFA, but I was of no use to them, they preferred women who make applause and who do not talk too much like me’.  

The majority of women interviewed by Vandevelde-Daillière demonstrated a crushing demoralisation and resignation, and an apparent inability to conceptualise the political universe beyond the doorstep or to answer the most basic questions on the outside world, which was viewed as the domain of men. One sign of the political marginalisation of women was the tolerance by government in 1967–70 of husbands going to the ballot station on behalf of their wives, a practice eventually legalised between 1975 and 1991. However, Vandevelde-Daillière’s survey did detect signs of a real, but latent, discontent among both urban and rural women; a wish to see a major change in values, and a more open access to social life and the realm of politics. Because such aspirations were massively blocked by men, who were more content to support the status quo in relation to gender roles, there was every indication of a profound malaise. The degree of alienation and unhappiness among women tended to remain buried away and largely invisible, in part because there was no organisational basis through which women could express their individual and collective voice: ‘It is a matter of concern that the behaviour of women who, for the great majority, appear submissive to social convention, is in fact constrained by social pressure and that women submit to social norms because they have no other choice . . . Women remain submissive in appearance but are internally victimised’.  

The role of women during the War of Independence played a significant part in this incipient prise de conscience, as well as their ability to vote, first gained from the colonial regime in 1958. In the opinion poll a majority of women mentioned the struggle for national liberation as the prime cause of their interest in politics. But the evidence suggests that the majority of the moudjahdate, and of women in general who had experienced the radicalising impact of involvement in the war, became rapidly disillusioned with the post-independence regime and retreated into the private domestic sphere or, for the better educated, threw their energy into professional occupations as teachers, doctors and social workers. But, as Amrane shows, of the eighty-eight militants in her study, only three profited from any upward social mobility, and in two of these instances this was primarily due to the elite position of their marriage partners. More typical perhaps was Kheira, who went into the maquis as a nursing assistant, but by the 1970s was divorced with four children and living in a dark, cellar-like room. About a third of
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urban and two-thirds of rural women studied by Vandevelde-Daillière believed that their position in relation to men had remained the same or had become ‘more submissive’ since the end of the war.79

This is not to say that there was no active women’s movement that challenged the regime during the 1960s and 1970s, but this was largely confined to a few hundred educated and professional women and even they, as the feminist Marie-Aimée Helie-Lucas notes personally, found it difficult to acknowledge the strength of the chains of nationalist ideology and to begin to oppose it.80 However, the war as a memory and symbol of women’s potential did have an eventual, longer-term impact on the emergence of an independent women’s movement when it resurfaced after 1980.81

Finally, particularly revealing is the overwhelming hegemonic power of the official discourse on women that was internalised by members of the UNFA and other potential activists.82 This discourse defined women’s essential role as that of mother and wife, ‘submissive in her function of reproduction and the satisfaction of the needs of men’.83 But in this domestic function women, far from being separated from the life of the nation, fulfilled their fundamental vocation by giving birth to, and nurturing, male heroes of the past (the soldiers and chouhada of the war) and the generations of the future Algeria. To celebrate the Year of the Child in 1979, El Moudjahid commented: ‘the infant reassures the mother as to her fertility, strengthens her position within the family and social group, attests to the virility of the male, throws light on his capacity . . . Grant us as husband the male who will increase our economic power’.84 Here the vision of women joined up with the long-established ideology that presented them as the moral and cultural guardians of the core values of national identity. The maternal-nationalist discourse was charged with a sentimental affectivity which valued women through their silent suffering and their willing sacrifice of martyr sons and husbands in the liberation struggle.85 Implicit in this ideology was that women could only lay claim to heroism through Algerian males: and this construction served to conceal and to block investigation of the kinds of economic, social and legal issues that specifically affected women in their own right.

The official discourse further marginalised or isolated the voice of independent women by categorising them as ‘feminists’, a term that carried particularly negative connotations of a dangerous and foreign movement that threatened the national interest. The conservative discourse of Ben Badis and the Ulemas had, since the 1930s, engaged in a strong moralising and puritanical stereotyping of western women as decadent and effete beings, self-centred creatures dedicated to the
pursuit of leisure, who had lost touch with the true maternal destiny of women and dedication to child-care and the home. This discourse created a dualistic model in which the authentic Algerian woman, as guardian of the Arabo-Islamic society, was the radical opposite of the western woman.

This discourse was clearly reflected in a series of letters published by the ex-communist newspaper *Alger républicain* in early 1963 in which men engaged in a debate on the emancipation of women. Significantly, men opposed to feminism portrayed it through a stereotyped image that was drawn from the urban west, French cinema, advertising and magazines, the universe of Brigitte Bardot and Roger Vadim’s *And God Created Woman* (1956). ‘K. I. A’ of Climat-de-France in Algiers wrote to say that, with the notable exception of women maquisards and a few highly educated professionals, he did not want to see an emancipation that meant women going to milk bars and dancing the twist or the ‘cha cha cha’.86 Ahmed Agrane of Medea also rejected feminism ‘à la “Sophia Loren” or the woman who puts on make-up to go out ‘for a walk’ while leaving her children to hang about in the street’. Youth was being seduced by western values and losing touch with Algerian customs that remained best preserved in rural society, ‘that which our ancestors handed down to us (the wife of the prophet, etc.)’. The solution was to close the doors to Occidentalism and to place emancipation in the hands of men: ‘Give work to every man, educate them, teach them the rights of women in Muslim society’.87 ‘K. H.’ wrote to *Jeune Afrique*, ‘I want to bring the attention of our leaders to the perversion of morals . . . Young ladies have abandoned the veil and, with it, all decency. Obscene, their bodies half naked, with a provocative walk, they infest the streets. They seek to compete with men and, to do this, they smoke and give themselves over to drink’.88 This conservative moralism, which was in a straight line of descent from the preaching of the puritanical *Ulema*, far from being an expression of uneducated prejudice, could be found at the highest levels of the government.89

A minority of men, who shared a socialist perspective and belonged to the FLN French Federation, supported a more progressive agenda on women. For example, Areskiou Lamari wrote from the thirteenth arrondissement in Paris on behalf of several ‘brothers’ in favour of abolishing seclusion, polygamy, arranged marriage and repudiation and upheld the shining example of the Soviets in Central Asia. ‘No nation is free as long as half the population remains oppressed’. But Lamari’s model of emancipation was also based on a rejection of western feminism, ‘a pretend liberty à la colonialiste’, symbolised by the dangers of sisters drinking beer and engaging in other excesses.90
The association between the term ‘feminism’ and a stereotypical, moralistic view of western women seems to have been shared by many Algerian women and even the UNFA, which warned, ‘we must avoid feminism’. The official discourse placed women almost entirely within a moral-cultural perspective: through their dedication to the family and the home they were seen as providing a barrier to the ills of modern society, ‘the decline in morals’, ‘the erosion of the family’, the ‘rise in juvenile delinquency’, etc. This ideology served to conceal and block understanding of the social and economic causes of the problems facing post-independence Algeria, as well as the specific political issues facing women, from problems of health and birth-control to training, employment, child-care and housing. If the nation was perceived to be going to the dogs this was singularly the responsibility of women in erring from their allotted function as reproducers, educators and providers. Finally, and most crucially, the dominant discourse could attack the subversive agenda of western ‘feminism’ since it was all-too-clearly associated with the concerted emancipation drive of French colonialism between 1957 and 1962. This association between the detested oppressor and ‘feminism’ provided the conservative religious and patriarchal forces in Algerian society almost unlimited powers of marginalising any nascent political women’s movement as fundamentally anti-nationalist, a fifth column for cultural imperialism. One of the unseen consequences of the French campaign for emancipation was thus to assist in the creation of a conservative nationalism that was to carry extremely negative consequences for Algerian women for the next twenty years and beyond.

In conclusion, and returning briefly to the key test of legal reform, we have seen how the late colonial state faced considerable difficulty in making any major impact on Algerian social and family structures. The basic administrative means, including a comprehensive état civil, were simply too inadequate to guarantee enforcement of the liberal marriage and family law of 1959. However, the newly independent republic maintained a discreet silence on the fact that a law that had been so fiercely attacked as an instrument of colonial subversion was left on the statute books until 1975. One reason why the new state was willing to do this was because the 1959 law was so widely ignored by both the population and the courts. Avoidance of an objectively progressive law suited the purposes of the FLN government since it helped guarantee political tranquillity. Likewise the state constantly stalled on a new code, allowed courts to follow their own devices (mainly leaning to a traditional reliance on sharia), and abandoned civil society to an entrenched patriarchy. As Claudine Chaulet notes, ‘The function of family solidarities changed: from a method of survival, they changed into a means of...
establishing an autonomous nucleus working within and against the multifaceted penetration of the State’, an interpretation supported by the work of Mounira Charrad.\textsuperscript{93} Ben Bella and Boumédienne, in contrast to Bourguiba, abandoned the issue of reform for women because they believed the weight of family structures and ideology were simply too entrenched to be transformed without incurring the risk of a political earthquake. However, while it may in general be true that governments which introduce radical legal change far in advance of the degree of social progress reached by a nation take the risk of generating a political backlash, this is not to say that they have no room for manoeuvre. In the Algerian case the political elites made the costly mistake of formulating an official discourse and policy that reinforced, rather than helping to contain or alter, the most negative features of Arabo-Islamic conservatism, patriarchy and misogyny. In doing so they set Algerian society on course for an eventual catastrophe and the resurrection of Islamic fundamentalism that erupted in bloody civil war, a conflict that was distinguished above all by a vicious, generalised violence which once again targeted women as the symbols of a westernised subversion of Islam.

Notes

1 The term ‘neopatriarchy’ has been adopted by contemporary Algerian sociologists like Mahfoud Bennoune and Lahouari Addi, mainly from the work of Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Sharabi’s thesis (p. 4) is that ‘over the last one hundred years the patriarchal structures of Arab society, far from being displaced or truly modernized, have only been strengthened and maintained in deformed, “modernized” forms’.
2 On the economic transformation see especially Bennoune, The Making of Contemporary Algeria, Part 3.
3 For an overall, comparative view of such modernisation processes in the Middle East see Valentine M. Moghadam, Modernizing Women. Gender and Social Change in the Middle East (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 1993).
4 Kateb, École, population, 74–5.
7 Camille Lacoste-Dujardin, \textit{Un village algérien: structures et évolution récente} (Algiers: SNED, 1976), and \textit{Des mères contre les femmes}. Chaulet,
La Terre, les frères et l’argent; Lahouari Addi, Les Mutations de la société algérienne. Famille et lien social dans l’Algérie contemporaine (Paris: La Découverte, 1999). Carlier, Entre nation et jihad, 235, notes that pre-1954 nationalism was unable to escape, ‘the pressure of the urban quarter, of custom, the tribe. They were constantly reminded of the demands of the family, the needs of the patrimony. The açabiya’ [clan loyalty] constantly offered a resistance to the party of the people that believed it could defeat it’.

8 Lacoste-Dujardin, Des mères contre les femmes, 269–70; see also M’Rabet, La Femme algérienne, 52.


10 Diane Singerman, ‘Where Has All the Power Gone? Women and Politics in Popular Quarters of Cairo’, in Göçek and Balaghi (eds), Reconstructing Gender, 174–200, shows how older women, as heads of households, shared in such informal networks, in particular by arranging marriage alliances that increased the economic and ‘political’ power of the group.


12 Jansen, Women Without Men, 18–19. Jansen, p. 97, provides evidence that men suffered anxiety about their masculine identity through an inability to guarantee the seclusion and honour of wives, daughters and mothers.

13 Vandevelde-Daillière, Femmes algériennes, 166, 180–1, notes extreme levels of female seclusion in the bidonvilles where rural migrants were concentrated. For an excellent anthropological investigation of how extended, Muslim family units adapted to ‘western’ built forms see Alison Shaw, A Pakistani Community in Britain (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).

14 Vandevelde-Daillière, Femmes algériennes, 30–1. Algerian popular discourse often associated the position of secluded Algerian women with the grave, the cemetery and death: as in a saying used by the Minister of Justice, Mohamed Bedjaoui, at a conference in May 1968, ‘The woman in her husband’s house or in the tomb’, Revue algérienne des sciences juridiques, économiques et politiques, 5: 4 (December 1968), 1048.

15 Ibid., 160–71, 181.

16 Lacoste-Dujardin, Des mères contre les femmes, 81–3.


18 Vandevelde-Daillière, Femmes algériennes, 25.


22 The high point of the intellectual socialist current, represented by Mostefa Lacheraf, Reda Malek and Mohammed Harbi, appears to have been achieved with the Programme of Tripoli of May 1962, but this line was quickly marginalised by Ben Bella who reinforced a conservative religious position. Lacheraf opposed this on two grounds: ‘First, Islam carries within it the weight of values that belong to an archaic, rural civilization and its integration into political ideology can work as a brake on the modernisation of the country. Secondly, conservative forces are going to depend on religion in order to perpetuate backward values in relation to the family, the condition of women and social relations’: Harbi, *Le FLN, mirage et réalité*, 333–4.


26 Harbi, *L'Algérie et son destin*, 22–33; see also Carlier, ‘Nationalisme et populisme’, in *Entre nation et jihad*, in which he characterises nationalist ideology as ‘vague, catch-all’, so lacking in clarity that it could be all things to all people, papering over internal divisions of class and clan.


34 Borrmans, *Statut personnel*, 537.
36 Mir-Hosseini, *Marriage on Trial*, has through her direct observation of Moroccan and Iranian court procedure demonstrated the significant gap between Islamic law and practice, including women’s ability to maximise their own interest through flexible negotiation of the rules.
37 Charnay, *La Vie musulmane*, is focused on the colonial period.
38 Fauque, *Stades d’évolution*, 14, noted that urban women were more aware of their legal rights, but often failed to take action through fear of their husband, unless this was managed on their behalf by men of the maternal family group.
40 Vandevelde-Daillière, *Femmes algériennes*, 68–9, 176.
42 Ibid., 185; Borrmans, *Statut personnel*, 517.
43 Harbi and Meynier (eds), *FLN: Documents*, 609–12.
48 Ibid., 635.
49 See also Marshall and Stokes, ‘Tradition and the Veil’.
52 Catherine Levy, a teacher and UGTA militant, has provided an eye-witness account. The following day fifty women with marks of physical assault came to the UGTA to seek help after their husbands had repudiated them: ‘La Journée du 8 mars 1965 à Alger’, *Clio*, 5 (1997), http://clio.revues.org/document415.html?format=print; see also Borrmans, *Statut personnel*, 539.
54 Lazreg, *Eloquence*, 151.
57 Amrane-Minne, *Des femmes*, 123, 146; see also M’Rabet, *La Femme algérienne*, 55.
60 Saleha Boudefa, ‘Image de la femme dans les discours officiels’, *Femme, famille et société. Journées d’études 2–3 et 4 juin 1987* (University of Oran: URASC, 1988), 194–5, 199. Boudefa, 191, quotes the position held by Algerian women delegates at the International Congress of the Fédération Démocratique Internationale des Femmes (FDIF) at Copenhagen in 1958: ‘It is because of their participation in the liberation struggle that women have acquired a prominent position in society; they will only be able to enjoy their rights in the framework of an independent Algeria completely cleansed of the colonial regime’.
64 Diamond, ‘Women’s Aspirations’, 93.
65 See Fleischmann, ‘The Other “Awakening”’, 107–16, on nationalist movements in Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Syria, Iraq and Palestine as providing the ‘honourable door’ through which women could participate in public life, but most often a nationalism that failed women after the goals of independence or regime change had been achieved.
67 Ibid., 180.
68 Ibid., 11, 273–7.
69 Vandevelde-Daillière, *Femmes algériennes*, 10, 86, 110. In her autobiography, *Malgré la tourmente*, Vandevelde-Daillière, a Catholic militant supporter of the FLN during the war, describes her difficulty as a women carrying out such research, regarded as ‘scandalous’ in a climate of deepening Islamic conservatism and official authoritarian disapproval.
72 Ibid., 264. See Ighilahriz, *Algérienne*, 217–23, a leading official in the UNFA from 1974 to 1978, for an inside view of the conservative nature of the UNFA and its tight control by the FLN one-party state.
73 Vandevelde-Daillière, *Femmes algériennes*, 290–4, 303; Shaheed, ‘Controlled’, 1003.
74 Ibid., 10–12, 223–5.
75 Ibid., 90, 233–41.
76 Ibid., 234.
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78 Ibid., 262.
79 Vandevelde-Daillière, Femmes algériennes, 216.
81 Natalya Vince, ‘To Be a Moudjahida in Independent Algeria: Itineraries and Memories of Women Veterans from the Algerian War of Independence, 1954–1962’, PhD, University of London, July 2008, appeared too late to be consulted, but should throw further light on this evolution.
82 I am indebted in the following to Saleha Boudefa, ‘Image de la femme’, which provides a lucid analysis based on official statements, speeches and press.
83 Ibid., 189.
84 Ibid., 189: see also p. 202, a quotation from President Chadli in which he defined the role of women as that of preparing ‘the new generation . . . through her labours in the bosom of the family, the fundamental cell of society, where she can achieve that which the State and man cannot’.
85 This over-charged emotional emphasis on the role of the mother was rooted in the extraordinarily intense relationship that Algerian sons invested in the mother, rather than in the spouse: see Lacoste-Dujardin, Des mères contre les femmes.
87 Ibid., 152 (15 January 1963).
88 Jeune Afrique, 27 July 1964, quoted in M’Rabet, La Femme algérienne, 42.
89 Knauss, The Persistence of Patriarchy, 98–9, quotes Mohamed Khider, general secretary of the FLN in Ben Bella’s cabinet: ‘The way of life of European women is incompatible with our traditions and our culture . . . We can only live by the Islamic morality. European women have no other preoccupations than the twist and Hollywood stars’.
90 Alger républicain, 140 (1 January 1963). The more progressive stance of Algerian men in France in relation to women requires further study: this appears to reflect in part their higher level of contact with modern urban society in metropolitan France, with the values and life-style of the French working class, and the fact that many thousands of migrants married or co-habited with European women.
92 It is possible that this negative construction was reinforced by the fact that among the very small number of women activists that tried to organise during the difficult years between 1962 and the family code of 1984, most of them from the tiny minority of highly educated and professional women, was a significant number of militants of European origin, some of them married to Algerians, including Monique Gadant, Jacqueline Guerroudj, Hélène Vandevelde-Daillière and Danièle Djamila Amrane-Minne.
93 Quoted in Lacoste-Dujardin, Des mères contre les femmes, 287.