

Domestication

Bertha Mason is mad, and she came of a mad family; – idiots and maniacs through three generations! Her mother, the Creole, was both a mad woman and a drunkard!...

He lifted the hangings from the wall, uncovering the second door: this, too, he opened. In a room without a window, there burnt a fire guarded by a high and strong fender, and a lamp suspended from the ceiling by a chain. ... In the deep shade, at the farther end of the room, a figure ran backwards and forwards. What it was, whether beast or human being, one could not, at first sight, tell: it grovelled, seemingly, on all fours; it snatched and growled like some strange wild animal: but it was covered with clothing, and a quantity of dark, grizzled hair, wild as a mane, hid its head and face.

(Charlotte Brontë's initial introduction and description
of Bertha Mason, *Jane Eyre*, 1847: 246–247)

Fearful and ghastly to me ... It was a discoloured face – it was a savage face. I wish I could forget the roll of red eyes and the fearful blackened inflation of lineaments.

(Jane Eyre vocalising her encounter with Bertha Mason,
Charlotte Brontë, *Jane Eyre*, 1847: 247)

The above event, and the narrative of Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre* more broadly, provides a compelling theorisation of familial domesticity and the regulation of mobility under the British Empire. Bertha Mason, the subject of the above passage, is presented as the first 'creole' wife of Mr Rochester, one of the central protagonists in the novel. Her incarceration

in the attic of Rochester's house remains a powerful example of the nature of racialisation and control in Victorian England. This chapter uses the figure of Bertha and her treatment as a way of conceptualising and problematising the relationship between family, borders and empire and its continuity into the present day. Not only is Bertha subject to colonial racism, as we see in the above passage, but her dehumanisation also reveals the complex spatialisation of empire and networking of imperial power through sites of the intimate and the familial. Throughout this chapter, I move to tease out and explore these links.

In Brontë's novel we are told that Bertha was 'brought' to Rochester's English manor house after being wed. Being an heiress of a plantation in Jamaica she is described as a 'creole', or of 'mixed blood'. In Jamaica, Bertha was part of a section of the middle class fostered by the British as a barrier between former black, enslaved and indentured communities and white settler colonialists. Whilst her racialisation in Jamaica was more ambiguous and relatively privileged, on her arrival in England it is revealed that she harbours a madness within her which is presented in terms of the animalism of blackness and oversexuality. We are told by Brontë that such madness is 'inherited' through the mixing of blood, and the degeneracy of the colonial family ('idiots and maniacs over three generations' declares Rochester). Bertha is subsequently imprisoned in the attic and hidden away from local society, remaining both a living and active danger. We are told, for example, that she has the capacity for extraordinary violence. The novel's ending is conditioned by Bertha's death when she burns down Rochester's manor house, an episode which also leads to the blinding of Rochester. As a parable of intimate social relations, the story ends with the white, empowered protagonist Jane Eyre marrying Rochester as an act of choice and thus 'proper' love. Rochester slowly recovers his sight through Jane's intimate labour, love and care as his 'real' wife.

Through this chapter, I examine, perhaps counterintuitively, what the treatment of Bertha reveals about colonial rule, family and the management of mobility. I explore what Bertha can tell us about the duress of colonial rule, which I consider to relate to the domesticating

power of the modern state. I thus set out how family – as the dominant mode of European socio-sexual intimacy – played a role in race-making across European empire. I also examine the role that borders had in taming, domesticating and managing populations deemed familial and non-familial. Just as importantly, I stress how this is reworked into contemporary immigration practices and forms of government in postcolonial states such as Britain.

As many commentators have argued, *Jane Eyre* reveals, quite dramatically, the dual silencing and significance of race to both modern literature and the socio-economic relations of (Victorian) England. It is clear from the above quote that Bertha is represented through multiple accounts of imperial racism – animalism, madness, sensuality – for instance how she is described as grovelling ‘on all fours ... like some strange wild animal’. She is presented as dangerous, untamed (McKee 2009). Against, this construction, *Jane Eyre* is presented as the embodiment of the rising bourgeoisie and proto-feminism, shrouded as this is in unmarked whiteness (Gilbert and Gubar 2000). This provides a powerful demonstration of how race underpinned the formation of ‘modern’ freedoms, individualism and reason through empire. However, whilst the racialisation of Bertha is significant, what is arguably of more significance for this chapter is how she is confined to the attic of Rochester’s house. She is kept here under lock and key, as a wild and undomesticated presence within the bourgeois home, until her eventual ‘release’ when she burns down the house.

Focusing on the spatial/temporal location of Bertha is important. We can firstly consider how Bertha’s presence in the attic is symbolic of the authoritarian, paternalistic violence of colonialism and the control of mobility this was often premised on. This tells us important things about the character and place of borders and domesticity. Bertha is *within* the domestic space but presented as a ‘wild’ element. She is that which must be contained and regulated through carceral practices. She is bound to the attic as the lock, keys, doors, windows ‘border’ her in. Her movement is violently curbed and regulated as a threat and yet we must remember that she has been able to move across the Empire from

Jamaica to England, enabled as this was through marriage to Rochester and the passage of whiteness this relationship entailed. Mobility – or control of mobility through borders – was of course essential to imperialism, from the flow of capital, trade, administrators, labour to the dispossession of indigenous people from their land.

Whilst we can think of Bertha as ‘bordered’ in the attic, she is also simultaneously connected to the rest of the house and the British Empire. The novel reveals the many subtle intimacies of empire (Lowe 2015), which collapse down common-sense logics about where colonialism took place. Here we are shown, for instance, how capital circulations and dispossession binds plantation slavery in Jamaica to pastoral England and the ‘family home’. Rochester’s household is ultimately sustained by Bertha’s presence, not merely symbolically but materially. Plantation slavery in Jamaica underpins the wealth of the manor house. We learn from Jean Rhys’s retelling of Bertha’s story in *Wide Sargasso Sea* ([1966] 2000) that Bertha had ‘money’. She is the embodied connection of this structural link to Jamaica and the dispossessive suffering of slavery that continues to finance capital and shape landownership in England to this day (Hall 2013). Here we learn that bodies move or are captured along imperial lines, through the dictates of racialised capitalism (Robinson 1983); just as England (and Britain) itself is constituted as imperial terrain (Burton 1998: 5).

Bertha’s eventual death at her own hands is often read by postcolonial feminists as symbolising the violence of white imperial feminism (Spivak 1985; McKee 2009) – that is, how the emancipation of European women (symbolised by Jane) was built on the racialisation of women of colour and white women’s complicity with empire (Grewal 1996). To add to this, we should consider how Bertha’s death also produces the possibility of heteronormative family. Just as she threatens the possibility of ‘proper family’ – through her sensuality, darkness and madness – she is also arguably its redemption. It is her death, after all, that allows Jane and Rochester to form a union and have a son. Following Judith Butler (2010), we might consider how Bertha’s death is not grievable but instead celebrated. We learn here that not only does the ‘wild’ element of the

household need to be domesticated (through both containment and death) but in doing so this creates the possibility for 'proper' family life and the reproduction of whiteness. Bertha is forced to suffer colonial violence that both imprisons her but equally uses her as a resource to create and sustain European domesticity.

I return to *Jane Eyre* as a site of the material processes of empire and coloniality throughout this chapter. I treat the novel as both an imprint of logics of empire (as a historical text) and a site of theorisation (bringing together abstractions which help us understand complex social phenomena). What is striking for me is how the figuration of Bertha holds together a set of unstable logics which are repeated across metro-imperial space and time – that is, from Jamaica to England, from the past into the present. Borders are shown to concern both the constraint and enabling of mobility (of bodies, relations and commodities); familial domesticity and white European socio-sexual relations are both presented as threatened but also conditioned by racialised 'others' and their movement. Colonial violence and dispossession reach across empire from colony to metropole, attached to certain bodies and populations, just as they remain entangled in sites of intimacy such as the 'family home'.

In this chapter I flesh out these tentative connections in more detail. I argue that what draws these processes (mobility, family, racialised violence) together is a compulsion towards domestication that defines the modern colonial and imperial state. To present this approach I build up different readings of Bertha from literatures focused on questions of domestication, colonisation and the family, and borders. The intention of this is to reveal how these literatures can help us build up an interconnected analysis and provide a set of tools which I travel with and extend over the next five chapters. To do so I ask three overlapping questions of the figure of Bertha Mason: what does it mean to say that Bertha is subject to 'domestication'? What does it mean to say that Bertha is made 'unfamiliar'? And, finally, how is Bertha bordered? The chapter is arranged around answering these three provocations.

Bertha, I argue, is domesticated within the manor house in *Jane Eyre*, but this domestication intimately binds her to the wider (non-fictional)

violence of empire and racialised colonial governance, of which bordering is one key tool. To set out a theory of domestication I synthesise work on the domesticating power of liberal states (Owens 2015) with Foucauldian approaches to the family (Foucault 1991; Stoler 1995; Feder 2007). Whilst I show how a Foucauldian analysis helps us understand how family worked as a technique of rule and normalisation central to the management of populations, I argue that such an approach still underdevelops the role that race, colonialism and mobility played in the emergence of modern liberal rule. In drawing upon the work of decolonial and postcolonial and black feminist scholars (Spillers 1987; McClintock 1995; Povinelli 2006; Lugones 2011), this provides a more historically nuanced account of the role of that ‘family’ has had in creating and sustaining colonial hierarchies of personhood – that is to say the categorisation of people and spaces into the human/not-quite/non-human (Weheliye 2014). I tie this intersectional account of race/humanity to the workings of the modern colonial state, which is constantly attuned to ordering populations around historically produced notions of family.

Whilst in contemporary scholarship the state is understood to sustain the life of the population, I argue that this is anchored to particular heteronormative claims of family (i.e. the domestic in the impulse to domesticate). We know from a long history of feminist scholarship that family worked to serve dominant social relations of capitalist heteropatriarchy and has thus been central to the organisation of violence. But to push this further we need to recognise how family emerged as a means of governing people differently based upon racial geographies of empire (Povinelli 2006; Rifkin 2015). ‘Family’ in this sense was always a particularistic claim to family as European and predominantly white bourgeois domesticity. We can consider how the figure of Bertha is denied personhood because she can never be part of the European/white family. But she is equally controlled by its parameters, such as being locked in the attic. What drives this chapter is the provocation that ‘family’ is not merely a site for racist, gendered and sexist ideas to manifest but part of the construction of racial demarcations and central to the operation and drive of colonialism and imperialism.

Once we better understand the role of family in empire-making, we are also better placed to understand the persistence of colonial rule into the present and how it is entangled in policing and creation of borders both within and beyond postcolonial Britain – that is, how the regulation of movement and settlement remain bound to the sensibilities and ‘grooves’ of imperialism (de Noronha 2018). Borders have been key tools of domesticating states concerned with movement. However, rather than a national history, this is an extensible imperial and globally orientated one (something I evidence in more detail in the next chapter). In thinking of borders/bordering alongside claims to family and domesticity, I want to recognise the role that bordering played and continues to play in hardening categories of race based on distinctions of who can move, who needs to be contained and who needs to be removed. Bordering can be attuned to supporting the movement of people based on claims to family life; or ‘making’ families such as through citizenship law; or borders can be about restraining movement as a threat to ‘proper’ family life. Forged through the imperial control of movement, borders continue to work as transit points for colonial ideas about familial intimacy today.

Domestication

It is my contention that we cannot understand the politics of either family or borders without understanding the role of the modern state, as a particular type of domesticating and colonising state. Questions of domesticity have arguably had a renaissance in contemporary scholarship. Whilst there has been a long history of work on the exclusory dynamics of normative domesticity and intimacy from queer theorists and feminist scholars (Barrett and McIntosh 1991; Stevens 1999; Duggan 2003; Oswin and Olund 2010), theorists of government and international order have also begun, tentatively, to bring analysis of the household into their work (Walters 2004; Kaplan 2005; Owens 2015; Weber 2016; also see Hage 1996). In this latter body of work, domesticity is less

about cultural norms but about how different scales of government bind the management of the state (the 'public') to domestic spaces (the 'private' and 'familial'). This work has been concerned with understanding domesticity as a particular form of state power, where social relations are crafted out of the use of violence to produce a 'domestic' and thus 'domesticated' social order (Kaplan 2005). In this reading, domesticity is not only a key aspect of liberal political economy (social reproduction, wage labour) but societies are arranged as domesticities, where life processes are administrated based on ideas taken from the governance of patriarchal households (Owens 2015). Drawing on some of these ideas, I firstly want to ask what it means to say that Bertha is subject to domestication.

In *Jane Eyre*, Bertha is subject to bordering practices which keep her contained in the attic – locked away from the rest of the household and wider society. But equally, she is fed, clothed and 'cared for' by her maid, Grace, who is also forced to move with Bertha from Jamaica. Rather than being expelled, Bertha is instead subject to both confinement and care (before her eventual death). Such conditions resemble other nineteenth-century carceral and institutional spaces such as prisons or asylums. Bronte rationalises such containment by pointing to Bertha's unruly and disordered characteristics (her madness, animalism, violent behaviour). Such discipline is far from exceptional but part of a broader logic of modern government (Foucault 1991). To say she is domesticated is to pay attention to how such violence is made to seem necessary to sustain the order of the 'civilised' manor household and, in turn, wider Victorian society.

To consider this a process of domestication is to recognise how the power to domesticate has been central to the operation of modern liberal politics. To Patricia Owens (2015) what defines the liberal state and social relations is the scaling up of household rule to the level of the state, which she argues emerged in the seventeenth century. Noticeably, this occurred as colonial expansion was intensified. The production and sustaining of societal and economic relations rely, Owens argues,

on domesticating the life processes of state inhabitants, through despotic means if necessary:

From this perspective, we might say that 'domestic' government occurs when the inhabitants of household space submit (are forced to submit through violence and other necessities) to the disciplinary authority of a household. After all, 'dominate' is by extension 'one of the derivatives of the Latin word *domus*'. (Owens 2015: 3)

Reflecting Owens's approach to domestication, Bertha's treatment echoes such relations of force: she is forced to submit to coercion, as part of the patriarchal rule of the household administered by Rochester. What defines modern state rule more broadly is this promise to domesticate those who may potentially resist or disrupt the regulation of life systems and the care of the household (also see Hage 1996). Violence is rationalised here precisely to pacify the internally and externally unruly. But domestication, as a liberal form of power, is premised on a developmental logic. Such violence is justified for the 'progress' and 'development' of the population and its backwards elements. It is not only punishment but also discipline for the reform and sustaining of social order. Bertha takes up the subject position of the undomesticated element within the home which 'threatens' the wider social order. Locking her away in the attic is not just a punishment but an act for sustaining and producing a domestic and 'civilised' order.

In considering modern and liberal rule as domestication, we need to see this as a colonising form of power and one attuned to the claims of Eurocentric civilisation which drove the expansion of empires. Domestication works as a liberal humanist project in which European order is imagined to be universal and universalised through imperialism. Under colonial logics, indigenous lands were viewed as undomesticated but also prime spaces for the bringing and building of social order which could replicate the relations of private ownership, production and labour in the metropole. Domestication is thus attached to ideas of progress; it is the will to produce order in its absence that justifies

colonial violence and in doing so links the domestication of societies in the metropole with colonies. Colony and metropole are thus intimately connected but never treated equally (more on which later). The will to domesticate is, therefore, to conquer, dominate, colonise and paternally 'develop' those peoples and spaces who have yet to find their inner domesticity (Kaplan 2005: 26).

When John Locke justified the violent appropriation of native Amerindian land in the seventeenth century it was precisely because of this appeal to domestication – symbolised in pacifying, taming and labouring of a territory that was not so much empty as 'unproductive' and 'wasted' (Gidwani and Reddy 2011). As Anthony Pagden (2003: 183) argues:

Since the right to unclaimed land was a natural right, any attempt to prevent it from being exercised, by vicious aboriginals, constituted a violation of the natural law. As such they could, in Locke's celebrated denunciation, 'be destroyed as a Lion or a Tiger, one of those wild Savage beasts, with whom Men can have no Society nor Security.' ... Furthermore, it could also be argued that even if the aboriginals offered no opposition to the seizure of their lands, by failing to exercise their natural rights to improvement, they have also failed as people.

In considering Locke's justification of the destruction of 'wild savage beasts' we find here a key element of the genocidal logic of domestication – the destruction of those deemed unsuitable for domestic and civilised order (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010). To return to *Jane Eyre*, it is Bertha's savagery and untamed nature which is deemed as ultimately threatening the household. Her death is normalised and merely treated as part of the march of progress and the reclaiming of the household by its more worthy (modern and white) inhabitants – Rochester and, eventually, Jane.

Here domesticity relates to particular forms of developmental violence (Neocleous 2008). Under European empire, domesticity formed part of the conditioning of lands and people for the spread of racialised capitalism through primitive accumulation (Robinson 1983; Marx 2008:

363; Neocleous 2011). This was arranged through forms of dispossessive violence, through territory acquisition, dispersal and land enclosures and the development of 'colonial sciences.' What many of these processes focused upon was the management of movement. James Scott (2017) has highlighted the extensive role that coercion played in the move towards sedentary social organisation and its often contingent and fractured history. The control of movement through emergent bordering was increasingly a facet of European colonial expansion and consolidation from the seventeenth century. This was not merely orientated towards the restraint of mobility (sedentarism or containment) but also the compulsion to move in practices of urbanisation, labour migration, resettlement, plantation and reserve management, and forced migration.

Whilst the gendered household was viewed as essential for the reproduction of social relations in the metropole (at least from the mid-eighteenth century; see McKeon 2005), this was often the opposite in colonies, where domestication sometimes worked to pacify populations into village or household structures (Owens 2015: 173–208). However, it also often worked to create land for settlement and pools of mobile labour, leading to the destruction of kinship patterns. What early nineteenth-century colonial administrators in India obsessed over, was not movement as such but unregulated and 'unrestrained' movement (see Sleeman 1839). Just as with vagrancy in the metropole, it was pilgrimages, roaming banditry, nomads who unnerved the expanding colonial state (Singha 2000). Control over movement functioned within the evolving dictates of imperial capitalism as the opening up of new markets demanded labour to move, often across or within specific European empires. This demanded sites of capture to filter the flow of people through practices such as indentured labourer contracts, medical inspections, work camps, detention and expulsion. As Hagar Kotef (2015) argues, this form of rule necessitated categorising certain types of movement as with value or without value.

Here I have begun to outline how domestication emerged as a colonising mode of power from the seventeenth century. This was organised around the administration of 'developmental' claims to violence, order

and the management of movement (in which we see the emergence of bordering/borders, which I expand on below). To this end, we can consider how Bertha is domesticated as an unruly and uncivilised presence (linked to how violent 'civilisation' occurred in colonies) through the control of movement and the administration of her life systems. She is provided for in terms of food and shelter but always through the possibility of normalised violence and coercion. Bertha's treatment in England shows that domesticating violence is not necessarily attuned to the geography of imperial expansion but race. Bertha is presented as of the backwards colonised world and thus in need of further domestication within English society. This reminds us that whilst domestication took place in metropolises and colonies, who was subject to different forms of violence and oppression was rationalised by demarcations of personhood and humanity (more on this below).

Family and domestication

Whilst some scholars treat domestication as primarily household rule (Walters 2004; Kaplan 2005; Owens 2015), that is to say in the case of *Jane Eyre* Bertha is controlled and managed as part of the household, I argue that we need to consider how domestication and with it claims to civilisation and superiority always rely on normative claims to family. It is my argument that domestication works by privileging and fostering particular types of domesticity that are deemed familial. To Anne McClintock (1995), the promise of domesticity that energised Victorian imperialism was intimately bound to the social and economic relations of the white bourgeois family. To consider domestication as not just ordering but also as an appeal to a certain imaginary and practice of order is to recognise its relationship to unfolding normative and naturalised appeals to family. It also recognises how family in this moment is specifically related to other intimacies – home, household, marriage, heterosexual reproductivity and so on. Domestication is bound to the rise of the heteropatriarchal family that was increasingly viewed as the

model of social relations and civility from the middle of the eighteenth century. To speak of domesticity and domestication is already to invoke the role of family in the historical constitution of the properly domestic/undomesticated.

What I am interested in is how domesticity emerged as a form of power which institutionalised the family as a key part of social order. I then want to ask what political work the family does in regards to colonialism. This matters because once we are able to appreciate the relationship between family, the colonial state and power, we can better understand the role family played in racial demarcations of civilised/uncivilised, modernity/backwardness that were so central to empire and the management of movement. So, this leads me to ask: how is Bertha made (un)familial?

We might consider that the treatment of Bertha, her domestication within the home, is far from merely about maintaining order. It is instead concerned with need to discipline her body because of her proximity to family. This relates to the heteronormative impulse to protect and produce the sanctified space of the Victorian bourgeois family home. Bertha is presented as bereft of the appropriate sensibilities that would make her familial – she fails, for example, the normative gendered subjectivity of at first ‘wife’ and then ‘motherhood’. Just as many other subjects and populations are made ‘deviant’, ‘dangerous’, ‘threatening’ because they fail to live up to or threaten the normative arrangement of family, Bertha is made unfamiliar. To consider this, is to pay attention to the way that ‘family’ emerged as a normative set of social and affective relations and the role it plays in colonial/imperial government.

As we know from a long history of feminist and queer scholarship, the family is far from a natural entity, although it has been naturalised (Barrett and McIntosh 1991; Federici 2004). Instead, a dominant understanding of family – universalised around the world through imperialism and apparently neutral claims to the humanness of love – is a historically contingent, particularist set of social relations. To speak of family is not free of power; it is bound to particular European

ideas about familial, heterosexual, Christian marriage, intimacy and liberal claims to romantic love and empowerment. To refer to family as I do, is to speak to this history. The provenance and dominance of this notion of 'family' and its relationship to government and the state is worth lingering upon.

Whilst I refer to the dominant idea of family and domesticity as 'European', the emergence of the nuclear family as the dominant mode of intimate and affective relations is historically tied to both the expansion of the modern capitalist state and imperial encounters. Against more diffuse domestic and kinship practices, the family was heterosexualised and increasingly promoted by state and church authorities across much of Northern Europe (Stevens 1999: 218–227; McKeon 2005). Foucault (1991) views this as a central aspect of the shift towards biopolitical governance and liberal capitalist social relations, intensified from the mid-eighteenth century. In his words, at this moment 'biopower bestowed a regulatory function on the one type of sexuality that was capable of reproducing labour power and the form of family' (Foucault 1991: 47). What this means is that the family emerged and was fostered as the 'natural' unit of human intimacy because it was networked into social reproduction and could form an important role in governing. Governing, that is, both desires and sensibilities but also the wider life of populations.

One reason that authorities invested in 'family', through legal regimes of marriage for instance, was because this allowed the organisation of national and imperial inheritance (Neti 2014). The heterosexual family was viewed as the properly domestic and morally superior form of intimate relations – including procreative sex, child care, socialisation – because it was networked into the broader management of the health, vitality and wealth of the population (Berlant 1997). The family could reproduce labour, maintain capital relations and (elite) citizenship through private property, legal inheritance and birth rights (Federici 2004). But natal reproduction (and the gendered labour this entailed) was also concerned with more ambiguous biological inheritance. Older notions of kinship 'bloodlines' were racialised through eugenic science in the

nineteenth century (Davin 1978). Reproductive sex, and with it family, was treated as a site for the maintenance of pure racial heritage against threats of ‘impurity’ such as through miscegenation. To recall how Bertha Mason is racialised in *Jane Eyre* reflects this eugenic logic – her madness is not only inherited but also a product of the dangers of racial ‘mixing’ (see Stoler 2002).

Within this history, the family emerged as a transit point for concerns about racial health, control and national/imperial inheritance (Cott 2000). Here we can consider how not fitting into the normative intimacies of familial domesticity was enough to be cast as deviant or threatening (Alexander 2006). To be familial, that is to say following the path of heteronormative life and progress, was to be maintained as a moral and social good; against this, to be unfamiliar was to be deemed abnormal, threatening and a risk (see Feder 2007; Taylor 2012). This played out differently within metropolises and across European colonies (as I will discuss in more detail below), where people could be deemed ‘sexualised threats’ (homosexuals, deviants, the diseased) or ‘racialised threats’ (colonised peoples, slaves, aliens) to family.

Race, family and empire

Working with a Foucauldian inspired account of the family can help us connect its historical emergence to questions of power, the expansion of the liberal domesticating state and demarcations of familial/unfamilial. This is important because we need to recognise how the institutionalisation of the family has been central to the management of populations, and with this life and death (also see Repo 2013). We should appreciate here how the will to domesticate, and the organised violence this often entails, is bound up with both the normative appeal of ‘family’ as the dominant unit of not only social reproduction but also intimacy (i.e. wider proximate and socio-sexual relations of ‘being together’). However, we cannot stop here. Not only is the conception and history of family that I have begun to tease out here

largely Eurocentric but it also relies on an underdeveloped formulation of race.

Stoler's work, particularly *The Education of Desire* (1995), resituates Foucault's account of the sexualisation and racialisation of the family within a more accurate imperial and colonial history. Against Foucault she shows how ideas around the bourgeois family crystallised and were intensified in colonial settings and how this circulated back into European metropolises (also see Stoler 2002, 2016). Intimacy was networked into colonial power and the management of intimacy, and with it the codification of familial/unfamilial subjects, was played out in colonies as much as within Europe. Stoler (2002) shows how the management of the 'innermost' was exemplified in colonies, for example in formal and informal rules over sexual partners, cohabitation and marriage laws, institutional practices which delineated the coloniser and colonised. Rather than viewing family as primarily linked to national concerns about population, the role of family is better understood in the context of imperial ideas about the future of white colonisers and the future of maintaining, settling and controlling empire.

Stoler's work is wonderfully illustrative of elements of the imperial/colonial coordinates of 'family'. However, her work is primarily focused on expanding and nuancing Foucault's account of sexuality and race, and with this she replicates some of the omissions found in his account of family. Whilst questions of intimacy are transferred to a colonial setting in Stoler's account, race is still often reduced to sexuality. By this I mean that race is often about the threat to heterosexual reproduction and is framed in terms of racial (im)purity. For Foucault, race was about the distinction or 'break' between who could live and who could die within a population. And many scholars influenced by Foucault remain wedded to this rather narrow theorisation (including, I might also add, my own previous work). For example, in Foucault's genealogies of race, 'internal' racial threats (madness, the insane, diseased, deviants) often flatten out what he calls 'external' racial threats – those of foreigners and the colonised (McWhorter 2009; Venn 2009). In Foucault's slightly reductive analysis of race as the 'death function', any form of abandonment

or reduction in the sustenance of life can be equated with racism (see Reid and Dillon 2009; Turner 2017; for a critique see Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2019). So, whilst acknowledging that phenomena such as the anxiety caused by eugenics around vitality and racial health was formative of colonial rule, I want to go further and argue that this does not fully get at the longer historical pattern of racial hierarchies, cultural imaginaries and embodied histories of violence that colonialism enacted and that ‘family’ is equally wrapped up in.

To put it more simply, we need to recognise the role that family played in empire as *European* and *white*. In order to get at this, I turn to other postcolonial, decolonial and black studies accounts of race and family to tease out how appeals to family, as a European construct, continue to form part of the processes of race-making, and with this tease out what is at stake in my assertion that Bertha Mason is made unfamiliar.

The human and the familial

We are better able to grasp the power relations of modernity and domesticating power once we examine the manner through which racialisation as dehumanisation was made possible. Decolonial and black studies scholars have argued that we should examine who has historically been brought into the social calculus of ‘human life’ (Quijano 2007; Wilderson 2010; Weheliye 2014) – that is, the socio-political relations that have disciplined humanity into ‘full humans’, ‘not-quite-humans’ and ‘non-humans’ (Weheliye 2014: 5). To understand how dehumanisation is constitutive of modernity, is to recognise that modernity – and with it, liberal state power, capital accumulation and humanism – rests on the active denial and dispossession of personhood for colonised peoples. Here colonised peoples’ ways of being in the world, systems of knowledge, spiritualism, bodies, cultures were rendered incomplete, worthless and absent by European colonial practice and ideology. Decolonial scholars such as Walter D. Mignolo (2011) point to the legacy of violent acquisition

of territory and resources by Iberian states from the fifteenth century to elaborate on this – five hundred years of violence leaves its mark. European colonial science discovered ‘Man’ in the Enlightenment at the same time it discovered its partial and non-human others (Wynter 2003). These processes relied upon and set in place racial distinctions that did not just view non-European peoples as subservient or as potential resources but also as eradicable and unworthy of subjectivity and personhood. They were denied a place in the family of ‘Man’ that grew out of humanist and enlightenment ideas of society and politics (Wynter 2003; Lorde 2007).

Ramon Grosfoguel *et al.* (2015), drawing upon Boaventura de Sousa Santos’s (2007) notion of the ‘abyssal line’, argue that race must be understood as the fundamental demarcation between human/not-quite/non-human (although they leave out the middle category). Race was productive of particular spatial and temporal logics maintained by colonialism and its afterlife in coloniality and neo-imperialism. Not only were non-humans ‘discovered’ through European colonisation but they were presented (and remain presented) as lost and stuck in time – as backwards and undeveloped peoples and geographic zones (Fanon 1961). This is exemplified in the treatment of colonies, which are spaces of endless arrested development and zones of the ‘non-human’.

Importantly for us, this spatial distinction between human/non-human worlds is complicated by mobility and bordering. When non-modern and once-colonised people move to the Global North, they remain treated as not-quite/non-humans as we see today. Borders (more of which below) continue to delineate and reproduce these distinctions within metropolitan spaces such as in policing tactics, housing policy and the creation of ghettos, camps and detention centres. Just as in formal colonies, the not-quite/non-human continues to be treated as undeveloped; once in the Global North non-humans are cast as those who ‘refuse’ to modernise because their culture and kinship practices ‘hold them back’. The divide between human/not-quite/non-human is not about citizenship but about who has access to colonially conditioned

forms of modernity and humanity. As Grosfoguel *et al.* (2015: 647) argue:

The zones of being and non-being are not specific geographical places, but rather positions within racial power relations that operate at a global scale between centres and peripheries, but that are also manifested at a national and local scale against diverse racially 'inferior' groups. Zones of being and non-being exist at a global scale between Westernised centres and non-Western peripheries.

What then defines the racial demarcation between human/not-quite/non-human is not geography to Fanon and to Grosfoguel and his colleagues, but instead a relationship to violence. Inferiorised populations, demarcated as non-human, can be subject to structural and arbitrary forms of violence as the norm. Think again of how this is justified in the case of Bertha: violence sticks to her body as it moves across the British Empire rather than being bound within the space of the colony.

Those people defined as human can be subject to violence, but this is rare and exceptional. This structure of violence is so normalised and pervasive that it is barely noticeable to those who occupy the position of the human. Whilst oppression does take place within zones of the human, this often takes the form of struggles over rights (e.g. the labour movement, gender equality, LGBTQ rights). In contrast, within spaces of the non-human (such as the colony, ghetto, plantation, detention centre, refugee camp) oppression more often than not is conducted through systematic and unaccountable violence (also see Mbembe 2003). We might consider here the experience of slavery or the genocide of indigenous peoples structured empire. For contemporary examples, we might instead ruminate on how colonial warfare conducted in the Middle East occurs without accounting for civilian deaths (Gregory 2004), or how refugees, rather than being 'saved', are left to flounder and drown in the Mediterranean on a daily basis as rich European countries and governments watch on (Saucier and Woods 2014).

To Frank Wilderson (2010) what underpins this violence and the hierarchies of the human is the defining experience of 'anti-blackness'.

Chattel slavery, Wilderson argues, was the ultimate form of ‘social death’ (Patterson 1982), which denied Africans any access to humanity. Importantly, this continues to structure the experience and dispossession of people and communities racialised as black today. We should remember how ‘Africans went onto the ships and came out black’, argues Wilderson (2010: 38). What defines anti-black racism is the propensity for gratuitous violence and suffering, which structures the zone of the not-quite/non-human. To Weheliye (2014), an analysis of anti-blackness tells us about the bodied character of colonial racism and who succumbs to normalised and unexceptional violence. This is because anti-blackness also structures all aspects of dispossession – it shapes who has access to humanity (those who are not-quite and non-humans).

Whilst Wilderson (2010: 38) is hesitant to show the contingency of this racialised violence, Grosfoguel *et al.* (2015) suggest that demarcations between human/not-quite/non-human are relatively flexible and rely upon prior histories of racialisation and shifting relations of force. For instance, we could point to the flexibility of anti-Muslim racism that has intensified and expanded after 9/11. Or look at the treatment of Roma citizens throughout the EU who were never ‘colonised’ formally but are frequently subject to racialised (and with this often gratuitous) violence. If whiteness is bound to the position of the human, blackness remains bound to the position of the non-human; people are racialised between these structural positions (see Mbembe 2017: 4).

So, in examining the rise of domestication we need to stay attuned to how slavery and colonial dispossession continues to shape who has access to humanity and thus what drives distinctions between life and death, rights and violence. Equally, we need to historically situate where practices of government emerged from in the global-colonial order, in experiments of colonial rule, in the management of mobility, in appeals to intimacy that worked across metroimperial space and organised around the movement of inferiorised people. Domestication must be understood to work differently based upon historical and shifting racial markers of the human. This has implications for how we should approach

questions of the role of family and the production of ‘unfamiliar’ subjects and populations.

Being attuned to the historical experiences of colonialism, imperialism and their contemporary manifestations helps us better understand the role of family in these ongoing processes. Arguably, the family plays a powerful and constitutive role in the racial markers and delineation around who is human/not-quite/non-human. Rather than a site where preconceived ideas about race are played out (i.e. as contagion through reproduction), ideas about family were hardened in colonial encounters. In turn, the family held together an unstable set of claims about who was civilised/uncivilised, modern/backwards, which rationalised and sometimes constituted the treatment of colonised people as not-quite/non-human. To put this more simply, the emergent model of the European family, and with it, what McClintock (1995) calls the ‘cult of domesticity’, worked as a means of denying humanity to colonised populations. It was constitutive of racial power as much as it is a container of racist ideas.

In this next section I want to elaborate more on this point and bring us back to the question of Bertha as unfamiliar. Below I sketch out how I see the relationship between family, race and colonialism, which is typified with three overlapping but distinct processes: 1) *development*: the equation of family with progress or development; 2) *dispossession*: the dispossession of colonised populations from structures of family/inheritance/social and economic capital; and 3) *control*: the destruction of pre-colonial kinship structures and the imposition of European models of family as a mechanism of pacification and control.

Family as development

As I have previously set out, ‘family’ is bound not only to bourgeois heterosexuality, but European and white heteronormativity. The presence and conduct of socio-sexual, affective and kinship relations that appeared ‘outside’ of this mode of domesticity have consistently been cast as incomplete, deviant or absent. Populations were judged on whether

Europeans considered them (in)capable of demonstrating or practising elements of this model of domesticity. This placed people and cultures within a hierarchy of developmentalism based on the codification of family/domesticity (Hoad 2000). Whilst deviant others were constantly discovered within Europe (i.e. the failure of working-class mothers or homosexuals), what structured this hierarchy was discovering whole populations that appeared bereft of 'family life' in non-European and colonised lands. This structured claims around who was to be domesticated and how.

Goody (1990) shows how colonised peoples were categorised as more or less human through what she calls 'marriage taxonomies' (similar to Ferguson's taxonomies of perversion), which compared 'races' by how they related to a template of Christian marriage. African tribal structures, for instance, were long considered incompatible with European marriage (thus colonial administrators developed the legal category of 'tribal' or 'custom' marriage in much of West Africa); Indian castes were often differentiated through an apparent propensity for nuclear family relations (with Brahmins at the top). Alongside this, Eastern Islamic cultures were viewed as particularly deviant, with polygamy and incest thought to be rife.

Such categories were not merely abstract anthropological distinctions or examinations of 'cultural difference'. Discovery of the apparent absence of 'proper family life' often propelled and justified colonial expansion and, with it, violence. In *Sex and Conquest*, Trexler (1995) shows how heteronormativity was at the heart of Spanish and Portuguese material conquest in the Americas. He argues that the apparent 'sodomy of male homosexuality' witnessed by colonialists 'bestowed a right to conquer' on the Iberians. Here, 'Missionaries proclaimed to the Aztecs, Maya and the Incas that sodomy was their downfall and the myth of Christian God had decided to send the Iberians to conquer the Americas because they engaged in homosexual behaviour' (Trexler 1995: 89). Such appeals to deviancy and perversity were performances around which appropriation and violence became legitimated in colonial encounters. Equally, as Rifkin (2015) has illustrated, indigenous American kinship practices

were cast as proof of their existence in a 'state of nature' – polygamy, matrilineal, matrilocal residence and pre-marital sex were taken as signs of 'absolute foreignness' to European modernity (Cott 2000: 25). Greg Thomas (2007) makes a similar case for what he calls the sexual conquest of Africa.

Signs of family were equally taken as notes of progress and the possibility of redemption. James Mill (1817: 135) would justify the paternal British colonial project by alluding to the immorality of both Chinese and Indian peoples through the racial marker of dirt and their incapacity for domestic care and labour: they were, he argued, 'both in the physical sense, disgustingly unclean in their persons and houses.' But in the building of the colonial state in India, signs of habitation, of domestic dwellings or 'retarded' family structures shaped how British colonialism was arranged around paternal logics of domestication and the spreading of capitalist social relations (Semple 2013) – that is, compared to the genocidal violence targeted at indigenous populations, or African slavery. Who was considered more or less familial marked out developmental distinctions between not-quite/non-humans, as well as with humans – such as the promotion of white European settlers across empire.

Family as dispossession

Family did not merely create hierarchies of development but also worked as a central aspect of the dispossession of colonised peoples. Perhaps the most notable example of how family emerged as an organising principle of dispossession is how the enslaved and slavery were rendered in relation to ideals of family life. In the constitution and legitimation of slavery, normative claims to family played a vital part of both the conversion of African bodies to chattel and the contestation of freedoms under settler colonialism (Burnham 1987). Not only did the violence of the Middle Passage and the orchestration of the slave trade in the West Indies, America and the ports of England destroy forms of kinship and intimacy but slaves were understood as being incapable of 'family'

and through such claims of immorality were subsequently written out of family law and its claims to ‘humanity’ (Dayan 2011).

Under settler colonialism in America, Burnham (1987) argues that courts declared slaves:

To be a different kind of human being – innately and immutably immoral (therefore not legally ‘marriageable’), too dumb and childish to themselves parent (therefore incapable of childrearing), and sexually licentious (therefore unsuited to ‘marriage’ and family bonds).

The day-to-day violence of the plantation was often structured around the mutual denial and management of intimacies – between slaves, freed slaves, white workers and plantation masters (Sharpe 2010). Whilst slave women were deemed sexual property and often suffered agonising forms of sexual violence, slave masters sought to promote restricted forms of ‘slave family’ but often only to complement the extractive system of labour, production and chattel (and satisfying Christian claims to the ‘proper treatment’ of slaves) (Hartman 1997). Ritualised slave ‘marriage’ was viewed as having a ‘quieting effect on restive slaves’ (Burnham 1987) and could be economically profitable through the potential for reproduction. As slaves were written out of family law, they could never legally be parents or hold rights of family unity and so children were the property of the master. This system was shored up by settler colonial law, which identified slave ownership through the very organisation of patriarchal family. As Thomas Cobb argued in 1858:

Southern slavery is a patriarchal, social system. The master is the head of his family. Next to wife and children, he cares for his slaves. He avenges their injuries, protects their persons, provides for their wants, and guides their labors. In return, he is revered and held as protector and master. (Quoted in Burnham 1987: 194)

‘Family life’ was legally and normatively coded through white bourgeois domesticity – as a ‘moral good’ only achievable to some. ‘Family’ was denied in the precise moment of black dehumanisation because it was

already etched around claims to whiteness and European superiority. To Hortense Spillers (1987), this means that 'black family' is not even thinkable within the dominant social calculus; it was rendered an *impossibility*. This has lasting consequences for how we theorise anti-black and colonial racism (with its gender and sexuality), because the historical formation of the family, which emerges as a naturalised social unit, is made possible through the dispossession and denial of affective relations and kinship to specific populations.

Family as control

Spillers's point about the unthinkability of the 'black family' rests on the evisceration of markers of identity that Europeans used to organise social relations, such as gender and sexuality. Such markers of European personhood (being a 'man', 'woman', 'mother' or 'father', etc.) were actively denied through colonial violence and slavery, which again is replicated and legitimated through colonial science and enlightenment thought (Shilliam 2014). To Maria Lugones (2011), colonialism (or what she calls coloniality) is both an evisceration of pre-colonial social and cultural structures and the hegemonic dominance of European forms of intimacy. By this we should consider how European ideas of personhood were used to describe colonised populations as both deviant and/or 'incomplete'. For example, to Lugones, gender and sexuality were imposed on colonised people as forms of European ideology and social relations. To consider how family worked as a form of control, we should recognise that colonised people began to learn of, and perform, themselves as gendered and sexualised. But equally, because of race, this process of subjectification was always viewed as 'incomplete'. It was cast as a deviant version of the European ideal type.

This reveals a double violence: pre-colonial socio-relations were and continue to be constituted as backwards and often violently destroyed or intervened in, just as European modes of social relations were/are imposed through legal codes, colonial administration and inclusion within imperial capitalist markets, production and labour relations.

Here a model of family could be used as a means to reveal the backwards nature and underdevelopment of societies but also as a means to force change on colonised populations imagined to be in need of emulating codes of domesticity.

Debates over how to domesticate colonial populations through forms of developmental violence thus faltered around this vision of heterosexual/human progress. In parallel to this, colonial rule was often performed through acts of social engineering, such as we see with experiments in social work in colonies (working with some parallels to such interventions in metropolises). Marriage and domesticity schools provided one particular site in the 'civilisation' of underdeveloped societies (see, for example, Mair 1944). Here we can think of the family as relating to particular forms and practices of control.

These different aspects of the role that family played in the construction of colonial rule (development/dispossession/control) are significant because they reveal how the family is both a tool of government and a means of disciplining and delimiting access to humanity. Far from being an internal European process, dominant ideas of who was (un)familial emerged through and out of colonial encounters. In this way, family became a key aspect of racial thought.

Here we consider how the contemporary politics of the family, and with it, heteronormative codes of the 'good life' and 'love', remain bound to this history. The family is tied up with distributions of the human which are constantly recast in modern liberal government. The family is not only bound to modern rule through reproduction but as a cultural configuration which sustains and fosters claims of the human, and with it the centrality of whiteness. Just as decolonial and black studies scholarship demonstrates the continuity of anti-black and colonial racism into the current moment, we need to stay attuned to how this functions through appeals to the family. Family can work as an energising force of colonial rule into the present, precisely because it appears to work freely of its racialised and colonial past. In postcolonial societies that appear to disavow 'racism' as prejudice, such as Britain, family plays a significant role in the reinvention and persistence of modes of colonial

dispossession. Family is naturalised as love, care, comfort and thus hides its relationship to past or present violence.

We might turn back to the figure of Bertha Mason, confined to Rochester's attic, to think through how family works here. Rather than as untamed or mad, it is how Bertha is translated in terms of colonial blackness that define her condition and legitimise the suffering she is subject to. This reveals how anti-black racism was anchored across metroimperial space, tied as this was to depictions of evil, corruption and otherworldly deviancy. Bertha, like the swathes of darker-skinned people she is connected to in the colonies and plantations of Jamaica, is precisely without God, beyond the terms of the human. Even if she is 'privileged' in Jamaica (as not-quite-human), she is transformed into non-human on her arrival in the metropole, where she is darkened and presented as a danger. This dehumanisation is organised around biological depictions of darkness which constantly focus on her body and sensuality, against that of the reasoned and objective characters of her white 'superiors'.

However, the racialisation of Bertha is bound to the family home. She is corrupting the white domestic space that Victorian England fetishised. She is already viewed as bereft of family because of her kinship connections to Jamaica, which are cast as not properly domestic but merely a bloodline of toxicity and degeneracy. We might remember, for instance, Rochester's declaration that Bertha's family was 'three generations of idiots and maniacs'. Her mother is presented as a 'drunkard'. Rochester eventually declares to his peers that he should be allowed to 'seek sympathy with something at least human' (Bronte [1846] 1992: 246). As with Burnham's and Spillers's examples of black slaves above, Bertha is depicted as incapable of proper familial intimacy. To this end, Foucauldian accounts of family can only give us part of Bertha's story. They can only help us explain her death as surplus to the reproduction of English society – that is, as a figure of 'abnormality' or 'contagion'. This fails to explain how her body and subjectivity is already rendered impossible and killable through her connection to colonial racism, the suffering of slavery and her incapability of European patriarchal

intimacy and family life. Instead, it is important to understand how she has already been racialised through these prior attachments as not-quite-human.

Borders and bordering

In considering how domestication functions, it is also important to explore the role that borders and bordering played in this form of government and in colonial expansion. One of the key provocations I began with is that Bertha is 'bordered'; she is subject to bordering such as being locked in the attic and contained by the patriarchal and racialised governance of the household. In this last section I want to linger on the relationship to borders/bordering and the part that they have played in colonial rule, family and race-making. This helps us tease out a particular way of approaching borders/bordering in the book, but it also helps us situate both the changing nature of colonial rule in our current moment and the spatial complexity of colonialism – that is, the intimate connections of colony and metropole, which are central to the analysis of contemporary postcolonial Britain. I thus ask, what does it mean to say that Bertha is subject to borders/bordering?

Bronte illustrates how Bertha is confined to the attic through physical barriers. And yet her enclosure works in parallel with other forms of bordering that target her body, that tie her to the domestic space of Rochester's household and that also facilitate particular forms of movement which are paralleled across metroimperial space. We are introduced to a catalogue of techniques and practices of bordering. Bertha cannot move as a free subject; she is bound to the rule of her husband, who is her warden. Here, symbolically, but as I have argued above also materially, Bertha is bound (unevenly) to the plantation slavery of Jamaica, a mode of dispossession and accumulation which was structured around enclosure, confinement but also the facilitation of movement (the Middle Passage, chain gangs, the enclosure of the plantation) (Browne

2015). Mobility and violence are intimately entangled here. Whilst Bertha could only move to England from Jamaica as the wife of Rochester, equally her only way to escape the confines of the household, her marriage, England, is through her self-immolation.

This helps us think about what borders are and where they go. Borders work as physical barriers and enclosures. Borders work through and on the body, capturing, producing, differentiating people as 'out of place', 'strange', 'uncanny'. Borders work as the dispossession of rights, subjectivity and personhood. Borders work through the socio-sexual relations of the intimate 'couple', where (im)mobility is made possible and restrained through the family. Borders work in multiple scales that rely upon and foster different sites of social authority – the settler state, colonial law, immigration practice, citizenship, the household. Borders do not only work to capture but also to facilitate moving bodies.

Reading Bertha in this way contributes to disrupting the idea of borders as fixed territorial entities, tied to the policing of immigration and sovereign national territory. Here we can consider how borders follow and surveil bodies as part of the domesticating state. However, despite a complex and highly developed conception of the border, studies of borders, both from within migration studies and even from critical border studies, still broadly remain fixated on the evolving and contemporary nature of borders – and in doing so deny their colonial histories and orientations.

Whilst the 'line-in-the-sand' definition of borders has long been disputed and transformed, borders are still largely equated with state sovereignty, the nation state and practices of immigration (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2009). This work is often necessary because of the dramatic shift in the reach and complexity of sovereign borders in northern states, for instance the extra-territorial character of EU borders (Tazzioli 2014; Vaughan-Williams 2015; BurrIDGE *et al.* 2017); or the outsourcing of border control to private companies (Walters 2016); or the means through which immigration practice has proliferated within and across social government agencies in states such as the UK under

policies such as the hostile environment (Yuval-Davis *et al.* 2018; also see Bigo 2006). These all deserve analytical and theoretical attention. Whilst I want to pay attention to contemporary shifts in immigration policy, I also want to treat borders/bordering as part of a longer and evolving process of imperial governance and domestication.

Imperial rule – that is to say the management of empire – and individual colonial administrations were both fixated on mobility long before the invention of immigration law (which we can date to the late nineteenth century in white settler states, and the early twentieth century in Britain; see Ballantyne 2005). Mobility, we should remember, was an important component of domestication. Bordering shaped primitive accumulation and was central to acquisition of territory (Gidwani and Reddy 2011). Following Simone Browne (2015), we need to recognise how the structure of slavery produced lasting experiments in racial surveillance, containment and expulsion, for example in detailed identity documentation, insurance policies and incarceration. Let us not forget that the mass movement of African people to the Americas through slavery represents the greatest forced migration in human history.

These practices to regulate movement under empire not only predate but condition the regulation of movement today. This means recognising two overlapping points:

- 1) The management of movement evolved out of the concerns of hierarchising and mapping people based on racial categories (whether ‘useful’, ‘valued’ or ‘dangerous’ movement). So, there has been an imperial and colonial logic and orientation which has underpinned bordering/borders – that is to say who can or cannot move. We might call this the ideological dimension of bordering.
- 2) As well as a historic and ideological orientation towards managing what Lake and Reynolds (2008, referencing W. E. B. Du Bois) call the ‘global colour line’, bordering practices themselves were honed under colonialism – that is, the techniques and strategies of managing, categorising and regulating who could move and

who could not – and were often born out of the direct control of colonised people (i.e. indentured labourers, slaves, colonial criminals). Even when practices such as vagrancy laws were used in the metropole, they were often experimented with and refined in colonies. We might call this the practical dimension of bordering. In the context of the British Empire, many of the strategies and practices that would become UK immigration policy and the role of border agents/agencies were already honed in (settler) colonies before being transferred back into the metropole (more of this in the next chapter).

Here I want to further elaborate on the conceptual distinction I introduced earlier between borders and bordering, which I use in tension throughout the book. This is to both recognise the *longue durée* of colonial history of the management of movement and also the contemporary power of immigration practices and law. When I speak of borders, I refer to practices which have a specific connection to immigration policy – that is to say the sovereign law of a particular state with regard to migration, settlement and citizenship. When I speak of bordering, I refer to the broader process through which people are made ‘out of place’. This is attuned to how bordering was and is constitutive of the broader push to domesticate through colonisation and draw distinctions around people who are familial/unfamilial. Bordering is concerned with the broader means through which movement has been managed and hierarchised through racial categories – human/not-quite/non-human. Borders, to my mind, are a specific subset of bordering which rework, integrate and re-energise bordering strategies.

This distinction is of course contingent, and bordering practices can often become border practices, and vice versa. For example, we might consider how housing policy in the UK has long been an area for the governance of racialised populations. Not only are black, Asian and migrant communities often denied social housing, they are also confined, through intersecting inequalities, to certain parts of urban spaces (such as the top floors of high-rise apartment buildings; see Danewid 2019).

In the Immigration Act 2014, housing law was joined more forcefully to immigration law as it obliged all housing providers and landlords to check the immigration status of their tenants. Here bordering (the spatial governance of racialised populations) becomes institutionalised in the border – that is to say immigration control. Bordering begets borders.

By linking borders/bordering to the duress of colonial rule, it is important to recognise that borders and bordering do not affect all people equally. Borders emerged around the management of racialised mobility, not mobility of people per se. Here categories of citizenship and the division between migrant and citizen are not particularly helpful (although I use these distinctions empirically). Whilst many migrants (i.e. non-citizens) are regarded as unproblematic and ‘valued’, many subjects with citizenship remain a continual problem – they remain ‘unfamiliar’ and not of ‘value’ (more of this in chapters 3 and 5). In Britain, long-standing black and Asian communities and postcolonial diaspora remain viewed (and often treated by the state) as migrants, even though they have formal citizenship and have been settled for generations (more of this in chapter 4). Their relationship to the state refracts many of the violent tactics of bordering that we see experimented with on migrant groups such as asylum seekers or irregularised migrants.

What is important here is how bordering is attuned towards making people ‘out of place’ in ways that reassert colonial categories of the not-quite/non-human, including distinctions about how they do family or how much they have progressed towards familial domesticity. This racialisation can target those who move as subjects of empire – from former British colonies such as Jamaica, Nigeria, Pakistan – but also people who move from peripheral spaces (not only former British colonies) and who are treated akin to subjects of empire (e.g. those from Turkey, Algeria or Central Asian republics) (see Grosfoguel *et al.* 2015). Whilst borders/bordering may affect other populations (i.e. predominantly white migrants or citizens), those populations are rarely

the initial target of these practices even if they are pulled into the dragnet of domestication.

Bordering the family

So, finally, what of the relationship between bordering and family? I have teased out some subtle connections above but there are some concrete ties that are worth demonstrating briefly. Put simply, bordering and borders work to both discover and regulate those who become deemed unfamiliar. But they also work towards promoting and fostering family. I noted before how the bordering of Bertha Mason tells us of both the embodied dimension of bordering – how it is felt, experienced and targeted on bodies – and also how this is energised by claims to protect or foster family where it is absent. Equally, the claim to heterosexual intimacy and marriage that initially binds Bertha to Rochester allows a certain limited form of movement from Jamaica to England. This is important.

As I explore throughout the rest of this book, bordering can work to protect and foster but also delimit affective relations and family. Bertha, we should remember, is bordered into the attic as a threat to the family (the wild, untamed element within). Bordering regulates population health, filtering and managing those who may be threatening. This could be through anxiety over what particular bodies are understood to carry and bring with them when they enter or move across a territory – disease, criminality, immorality or, equally, labour power, resources and skills. Bordering can be targeted to manage who can be intimate with whom in a particular (imperial, colonial and then national) space. We can find this, for example, in rules on ‘family migration’, which dictate which forms of intimacy, kinships or dependencies can move for family life (see chapter 3).

So, bordering can be initiated in the name of family – for its production or protection – but family can be promoted both to make possible and

to curb movement. Borders/bordering can emerge as a way of capturing and containing the perils of other modes of sexuality and intimacy, for example in promoting certain family dependencies to domesticate and contain the sexual threat of groups. In the context of the movement of people after formal decolonisation, who was counted as family often dictated and continues to shape inheritance of rights and who can move, who can settle and who can claim rights in Britain. As citizenship is often inherited (such a model has dominated in the UK since 1981), who is considered a family, through appropriate relations of intimacy, is guided by histories of racialised sexuality. But this is not only symbolic. It also works to structure people's material life chances – their access to resources, capital and labour power – by organising who can inherit what, who can gain rights of settlement. Who can be a family is one key site through which inequality is reproduced.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have set out a particular approach to family and borders through an exploration of domestication. By drawing on theories of domesticity I have demonstrated how the modern state is a domesticating state and that domesticity played a central role in empire-making. Using different readings of the treatment of Bertha Mason in *Jane Eyre* I sketched out how domestication is constantly energised by a historical appeal to family. 'Family' was not only gendered and sexualised, I argue, but was a central force in patterns of racialisation across European empires. This means understanding how family played into the constitution of some people as modern and civilised (human) and others as uncivilised and backwards (thus not-quite/non-human). It is my provocation that such appeals to family remain central to racialised governance today, often expressed in forms of bordering within post-colonial societies such as Britain. Appeals to family recode and remake racialised distinctions born out of colonial rule, and in doing so energise often-violent practices of authoritarian and disciplinary borders and

bordering. I offer that 'family', as a site of racial and heteronormative power, continues to work as a means of development, dispossession and control into our contemporary moment.

Departing from the example of Bertha Mason that I drew upon throughout this chapter, I now look to evidence the role of family in colonial rule and bordering across the British Empire. In the next chapter, I examine a more detailed history of these relationships across metro-imperial space. I look to evidence and nuance my claims about the historical role of family and race-making, and how this was central to the governance of mobility across the Empire and was then brought into immigration practice and policy in the British metropole.