

Shams

Sham marriages have for too long been an easy target for migrants seeking to circumvent our immigration rules, often assisted by organised criminals. Registrars are frustrated when they marry couples who are obviously sham; we need more effective tools to deal with it.

Immigration Minister Mark Harper
(quoted in Home Office 2013a)

In 2014 the Home Affairs Select Committee convened for a special session on the issue of ‘sham marriages’. It aimed to explore those ‘in-genuine’ marriages of ‘convenience’ imagined to be performed for the ‘benefit of gaining immigration status/advantages’ (Home Office 2013b). In the Home Affairs session, expert witnesses were called to testify on the ‘threat’ that sham marriages posed in modern Britain. Within the session, Labour MP David Winnick suggested that ‘all of us are agreed upon the dangers of sham marriages and want to see an end to them’ (Home Affairs Select Committee 2014). Following this ‘common-sense’ logic, shams were presented as a dangerous practice that not only undermined the immigration system but created a mockery of marriage itself and those engaging in it ‘truthfully’. Immigration, the story goes, does not simply threaten British society but it does so by undermining the normative institutions of marriage and family.

So, what is so dangerous about sham marriage? And in turn, what is a ‘sham’? Who is a ‘sham’? And what do ‘shams’ do? In this chapter I trace the way that fears about shams have driven a style of government in contemporary Britain built on demarcations of ‘genuine’ and ‘sham’

intimacies. Starting with immigration rules around family migration, I reveal how this has connected up with broader practices of domestication from social work to counter-terrorism. The sham, I go onto argue, has become a transit point for ongoing modes of colonial rule and the dispersal of what I call 'intimate borders'.¹

Built on the promise to protect heteronormative life, the right to family is enshrined in international law and historically in states' immigration policy. However, as I proposed in the last chapter, wealthier northern metropolises and settler states have consistently used European ideas of family to regulate the movement of people – especially in the case of movement to Britain from ex-colonies. From the late 1990s family migration (in the main, people moving on the basis of familial dependencies) was increasingly viewed as a problem for European states because it promised a right to permanent settlement and citizenship. Following the practices of monitoring Commonwealth citizens' familial relations that we saw in chapter 2, the emergence of concerns around sham marriage in the UK worked to bolster the state's ability to restrict who counted as 'family' in immigration law. With the rise of the Conservative-led coalition government's policy of the 'hostile environment' from 2011, this route was increasingly viewed as site for 'illegal migration' and 'criminal activity' (Home Office 2013a). It was increasingly presented as being akin to an existential security threat.

Whilst sham marriage has been increasingly criminalised, this equally rehearses concerns about what intimacies can be tolerated by the British postcolonial state. In the latest overhaul of the family migration route in 2011, then Home Secretary Theresa May led the reform of the family migration visa by arguing that the changes to the visa, which involved introducing a minimum income requirement for non-EU spouses/partners, were about making sure couples were 'genuine' (Home Office 2011a: 3). The visa focused on evidencing whether the affective and domestic bonds between a couple were both 'genuine' and 'subsisting'. Being a sham was not only making an intentionally 'fraudulent' claim for the benefit of immigration status but falling short of moral and economic claims to bourgeois domesticity (see Turner 2014; Carver 2016).

It is significant for our discussion that the reforms were preceded by a series of (perhaps now familiar) concerns that Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities were *over-represented* in family migration figures (Home Office 2011b). It was also thought that the practice of ‘international marriage’ could be used as a route for forced marriage, human trafficking and the reproduction of ‘unintegratable’ communities (Gill and Mitra-Kahn 2012). In the 2014 Home Affairs Select Committee session that I began with above, it transpired that the *real* danger of sham marriages was non-EU subjects marrying EU citizens for the benefit of residency and settlement. Far from a technical issue about circumventing immigration law, the idea of the sham has been loaded with suspicion regarding the ‘backwards’ kinship practices of former colonised people and their mobility. This continues to drive bordering practices today.

Policing the sham

In this context, we need to consider the slipperiness of the sham and its appeals to danger; foremost, how it brings together different racialised-sexualised markers concerning suspicious movement, suspicious kinship and suspicious communities. As we see above, the sham is not only sham marriage but also slowly reveals itself to be about ‘sham intimacy’. If the migrant is always suspicious – that is, a fraud or sham – intimacy is a particular site of danger (Ahmed 2016). The fraud of the migrant can be easily hidden (it is assumed) within the private confines of coupledness and the family. The job of the state becomes proving this fraud through the monitoring of the intimate relations of those claiming rights to see if they are ‘genuine’. But the sham is not only framed by a broad suspicion of the migrant. The sham is highly racialised. It mobilises a historical suspicion about the fraudulent and ‘backwards’ intimacies of non-European peoples born out of empire – foremost here, the (im)possibility of Asian and black family life. We thus need to be aware of how concerns about sham marriage bleed into sham intimacy, which translates into sham families.

This chapter sets out to explore the different points of contact that the sham brings together. It does so by reading the sham as one site for the reworking and reforming of colonial modes of domestication in contemporary Britain. I argue that a key point for the transference of empire-making within Britain is through 'intimate bordering' – the fostering or abandonment of bodies and subjects made a sham or 'out of place' by their relations to ideals of the modern family. Tracing the work of the sham helps us get at some of this, in particular by revealing how heteronormative claims to family continue to draw lines around who is civilised or backwards; whose intimacies are suspect and subject to intervention, scrutiny and containment. This works to police not only migrant subjects on the move but also racialised communities with settled rights in Britain.

If, as I argued in the last chapter, family taxonomies were central to how colonial projects were justified and directed under formal empire, I argue that a hierarchy of 'family forms' are just as central to the racialised treatment of Asian and black communities today. Whilst heterosexual family units were viewed as necessary for the development of the colonised population and the settlement of Commonwealth citizens in Britain during the mid- twentieth century, migrant families have been increasingly viewed as troubling the national-civilisational order. 'Family' is treated as a site for the reproduction of cultural difference, in which Islam is made highly visible.

From the late 1990s policy makers became increasingly fixated on the 'hyperpatriarchy' of Muslim families – especially with regard to the treatment of women and in debates around forced marriage. Whilst these concerns still drive immigration policy and family visa regimes, as I will show, they have increasingly fed into the question of the 'integration' of settled Muslim communities. After the onset of the Global War on Terror after 2001, the problem of suspicious intimacies has been increasingly bound into counter-terrorism strategy. Reworking the family taxonomies I presented in the last chapter, the markers of the modern or 'genuine' family are now found in appeals to liberal choice, romantic love and domestic governance. It is these seemingly

‘deracialised’ principles that are increasingly used to govern mobility and rights claims as well as the policing of settled communities within Britain.

In the first part of this chapter I explore the short history of intimate bordering in the UK, connecting this to the regulation of Commonwealth citizens through immigration law that I began in chapter 2. I then go on to demonstrate that what often drives this bordering is a particular gendered configuration of the unintegrated female migrant/citizen. Following Cynthia Weber’s (2016) proposal that we should examine the ‘worlding’ that particular figurations perform, I trace how the figuration of the unintegrated woman dominates debates around the sham and thus immigration and integration more broadly. I show how suspicions about the sham intimacies of Muslim communities have been networked into social work and the UK’s counter-terrorism programme Prevent. This provides an emergent site for the reworking of colonial forms of rule which work through different forms of intimate bordering.

The (re)emergence of the ‘problem’ of family migration

In the UK what reignited the recent anxiety around sham marriages was the lifting in 1997 of the infamous ‘primary purpose’ rule, which governed the movement of married or unmarried partners into the UK from 1979 (Menski 1999). The primary purpose rule meant that couples had to prove that the move of a partner to the UK would not result in an economic benefit or advantage. This in effect created an explicit colour bar on family migration after 1979. It made it extremely difficult for non-white male partners from ex-colonies to secure settlement as they could nearly always be seen as ‘gaining a benefit’ (Wray 2015). As with the Immigration Act 1971 and British Nationality Act 1981, primary purpose was set up in a way so that it privileged the movement of white spouses from Anglo settler colonies and those within the European Economic Community.

Whilst primary purpose was configured around the threat of male Commonwealth citizens, intimate scrutiny was still placed on feminised bodies. Smith and Marmo (2014) detail how border agents at Heathrow Airport during the late 1970s used their discretionary powers to inspect the 'suitability' of fiancées arriving from India by carrying out 'virginity tests', which took the form of the physical inspection of these women's hymens. During this period, as we might remember from the last chapter, family dependents and fiancées could travel to live with a Commonwealth citizen settled in Britain. Border officials were tasked with disproving this relationship. The highly invasive inspection of women's genitals reimposed orientalist notions of chaste and passive South Asian women; no Indian bride, the logic went, could marry without being a virgin (Levine 2007). Discovering who was a sham in this setting reduced South Asian women's bodies to objects of flesh to be examined (Spillers 1987). The mediocre attempts by British authorities to either apologise or rectify these wrongs reveal a broader normalised distain for the body of the colonised. It should be noted that in Enoch Powell's now infamous 'Rivers of Blood' speech (in 1968), whilst it was the figure of the sexualised and violent black man that Powell warned was a threat to British society, it was the female 'migrant' who was cast as the reproducer of unBritishness. Just as it did across the Empire, the natal feminised body provided a key site for playing out concerns about 'race relations' and the reproduction of difference in Britain. And this continues today.

When the New Labour government withdrew the primary purpose rule in 1997, this heralded almost immediate calls to re-monitor the movement of migrant partners for settlement. This was in part precipitated by the rise in the number of partner applications from former colonies. For example, applications from Pakistan went from 1,960 in 1996 to 5,080 in 1998 (BBC 1999). What stimulated this anxiety was a series of interconnected fears regarding the social landscape of 'multi-cultural' Britain. In this setting, sham marriages became fused to the regulation of immigration through issues of 'integration', the 'problem' of settled minorities communities and specifically 'cultural practices' of forced marriage.

We can trace the emergence of the prominence of sham marriage to the Immigration Act 1999, which stressed the urgent need for closer scrutiny of migrants moving for 'family life'. Whilst the New Labour government of this time was rhetorically invested in celebrating 'multicultural Britain' and supporting ethnic minority rights, this Act immediately worked to restrict the movement of subjects from outside of the EU. Border officials were tasked with monitoring whether a relationship was a marriage of 'convenience' by assessing whether a couple had an intention of living together. Civil registrars were also obligated to report 'suspicious' marriages to the Home Office.

These techniques were later supplemented with increasing scrutiny over the 'genuine' and 'subsisting' nature of the relationships of those claiming a right to settlement through the family migration route. After 1999, sham marriages became a normalised concern across governments of all political leanings. To reflect some of these changes it is worth noting that in 1999 partners travelling for family unification (as partners of British citizens or those with leave to remain) had to prove their intention to live together and the nature of their 'continuous' relationship. By 2014, couples had to prove that they were participating in a 'genuine' and 'subsisting' relationship according to strictly regulated income, language and cohabitation requirements (Charsley and Benson 2012).

What is a sham?

So, who is caught up in the sham? What cultural figurations energise it; give it 'colour' and fleshiness? How does this work to shape particular border strategies? During the re-emerge of the 'problem' of family migration in 1999, a BBC *Newsnight* report and subsequent article provided details of the emerging crisis around shams (BBC 1999). In doing so it exemplified the connections that were emulated across numerous policy documents, immigration acts and legislation over the next seventeen years. I read this report as a manifestation of the dominant

ideas that are attached to shams, which become enshrined by the legal apparatus of the British state during the 2000s.

The BBC report is described as an investigation into 'Fighting arranged marriage abuse'. Its key task was in explaining to the British public how 'cultural practices' of arranged marriages – linked in the report to Pakistan and Asian communities in Britain – were often 'shams' for the benefit of mobility and settlement. Quoting an official in the British High Commission in Islamabad, the report argued that: 'There is no doubt that a lot of the girls are being forced to bring husbands into Britain against their will but we are powerless to do anything about it' (BBC 1999). Marriages, we are told, particularly in Asian and Muslim culture, are forced upon girls through family and community pressure and for the benefit of male patriachs. It is worth quoting the article at length to reveal the connections it makes visible:

The 'problem' is that the present Labour government scrapped the hated 'primary purpose' rule in one of its first initiatives after coming to power in 1997. Labour wanted to appease the sensitivities of Britain's ethnic communities. Under the old system, officials at the High Commission could ask couples intimate questions about each other ranging from favourite toothpaste brands to preferred sleeping positions to determine whether the 'primary purpose' of the visa application was a marriage of convenience or based on true love. The change in rules had an immediate effect. In 1996, there were 1,960 applications for entry from Pakistan to Britain from would-be husbands. In 1998, after the law was changed, there were 5,080. (BBC 1999)

Here the rise in applications after the end of primary purpose is presented as evidence of the rise of sham marriages. Suspicion is cast over the family relations of anyone travelling from Pakistan. Colonial ideas of the 'backwards' kinship practices of colonised people are then bound to social problems within the UK, in particular the treatment of women in 'ethnic communities'. We are told that 'forced marriage' (collapsed into 'arranged marriage') is an increasing risk to social order: 'The police in Bradford, where the Asian community add up to 19% of local people,

are overwhelmed by appeals from Asian women for help' (BBC 1999). The article voices concern regarding primary purpose; however, the overhaul of the policy is presented as merely an attempt to appease minorities ('appease' being a word that in the British context is frequently linked to the historical appeasement of Nazi Germany in the 1930s). Intimate bordering such as passing judgement on the right to mobility based on knowledge of toothpaste and sleeping positions is suddenly presented as entirely reasonable and necessary.

Importantly in this report, 'marriages of convenience', 'arranged marriage' and 'forced marriage' are frequently slipped together as if they are the same thing. Ann Cryer, MP for the northern English town of Keighley, is quoted in the report as arguing for the state to step in to immediately stop the 'cruel practice of making their girls go back to Pakistan to marry first cousins or those to whom their family owe a favour' (BBC 1999). Her remarks show how the sham was bound to the apparently 'backwards' practices of Asian communities. British Asian patriarchy, she argues, have such little respect for women's rights that 'girls' (always infantilised) are merely traded for 'family favours'. Just as orientalist anthropologists sought to delineate the 'Eastern' marriage form (Goody 1990) – with its propensity for incest, hierarchy, honour and absence of love – Cryer discovers the modern expression of this orientalism. Most shockingly for her, the 'Eastern family form' is found alive and well in her constituency in West Yorkshire.

This report ties together various types of shams. The sham expands to more than the circumventing of immigration controls also to include forced marriage. Because of the cultural location of forced marriage, it became linked to the practice of intercontinental, diasporic and arranged marriage. As forced marriage was transformed into an issue of mobility and women's rights, it shaped the family migration debate and the remit of policy-making. In this period, forced marriage came to exemplify the generalised oppression of women within so-called 'ethnic communities' (Wilson 2007), both within Britain and in 'backwards' colonised spaces such as Pakistan. The sham became enlisted in a set of equivalences, putting the problem of the Asian and then (later) Muslimified body

and kinship practices front and centre (Razack 2008). Through the figuration of the deviant forced marriage, all other marriage forms conducted by these communities become shams.

Policing shams

How can you tell if a marriage is a sham, that is if it isn't beauty and the beast?

Keith Vaz MP, Home Affairs Select Committee Meeting,
24 June 2014

Ann Cryer's warning in 1999 that the 'cruel practice' of forced marriage would lead to social and civil unrest foreshadowed future governments' commitments to deal with sham marriage. Here the practice of international relationships and particularly arranged marriages were presented as always 'risky' to women (Gill and Mitra-Kahn 2012). A push to criminalise forced marriage was accompanied by bordering techniques which increasingly focused on scrutinising the intimate relations of those travelling for family unification. In the context of the War on Terror and the hypervisibility of the 'problem' Muslim, the debate around the improper intimacies of minority communities also began to energise wider imperial forms of violence. The reconstruction of anti-Muslim racism after 2001 made deviant intimacies and patriarchal violence a particular problem of Islam (Cowen and Gilbert 2008). The domesticating role of the colonial state was energised to reform and modernise such intimacies through the regulation of mobility, interventions into Muslimified households and, with this, the staging of a war of 'civilisations'. All this coalesced in various ways around the paternalist role of 'protecting women's rights' (Farris 2017).

In 2003 migrant partners were refused access to public funds of the welfare state and had to provide certification that their houses were not 'overcrowded' (Gedalof 2007). English language proficiency became a requirement of partners in family unification cases by 2010. Such policy

changes were saturated with racialised logics of control. For instance, whilst justifying the new crackdown on sham marriages in 2002, Home Secretary David Blunkett argued that Asian communities practising arranged marriages should choose potential spouses from within the British Asian community, rather than risk putting their daughters in danger (BBC 2002a). Changing their 'traditional' practices was a fair demand, according to Blunkett, because 'those who come into our home – for that is what it is – should accept those norms' (quoted in Brown 2011). Not only were Asian communities 'guests' – forever unwanted migrants – but they were undermining the 'genuine' family home of white Britons.

Whilst campaigners struggled to criminalise forced marriage in legislation (until 2014) – mainly because of resistance from black feminist groups (see Larasi *et al.* 2014; Wilson 2014) – depictions of forced marriage bolstered further immigration practices focused on shams. In 2008 the age at which someone could sponsor a migrant partner was raised to 21. The proposal was viewed as a way of limiting forced marriage as younger adults were viewed as overly susceptible to the pressure of both their family and community (Home Office 2007). In turn, it reminds us that communities practising intercontinental marriage will always remain *immature*. And furthermore, that forced marriage travels to Britain from former colonies.

The hypervisibility of forced marriage was greeted with thoughtful concern from many black and Asian women's associations, many of whom argued against criminalisation and the conflation of forced marriage and immigration (see Southall Black Sisters 2001; Wilson 2007; Razack 2008; Larasi *et al.* 2014). This was often ignored by law makers. Instead, paternalistic and often overtly colonial logics saturated discussion of shams in this period. For example, during the unveiling of civil legislation against forced marriage in the House of Lords, Lord Lester argued that the amendment was a direct continuity of reforms to eliminate the 'barbaric' practices of sati and child marriage in colonial India (Hansard 2007). Colonial nostalgia here begets contemporary coloniality.

Family visa rule changes

In 2012, in a move that many commentators viewed as the return of primary purpose, the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government introduced a complete overhaul of the family migration route. Here the multiple delineations of the sham coalesced to re-energise further intimate bordering. Whilst Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities were made hypervisible within Home Office reports (see Home Office 2011a; 2011b), the government made it explicitly clear that community practices of arranged marriage would be protected in future changes. Instead, policy makers focused on creating an ‘objective’ template of what a ‘family’ *should* and *could* be (Home Office 2011a: 7), so as to regulate marriages of convenience, forced marriage and ‘in-genuine’ and ‘un-subsisting’ relationships all at once. However, this ‘objective template’ of partnerships was informed by a particular white, bourgeois imaginary of liberal romantic love, household governance and equally energised through a fear of suspicious and deviant intimacies.

Changes to the family visa after 2012 meant that in order to live with a partner from outside the European Economic Area (EEA), British citizens and settled persons had to earn at least £18,600 a year, effectively barring 47 per cent of those working in Britain from applying. The non-EEA partner also had to prove a higher standard level of English than previously accepted, and the couple was forced to evidence cohabitation (or proof of intention of cohabitation). Theresa May, then Home Secretary, made it clear that this new visa system was about distinguishing between ‘genuine’ and ‘in-genuine’ relationships, and about providing a material and objective test that these relationships were ‘subsisting’ (Home Office 2011a). The changes to the visa were equally accompanied with more stringent reporting duties tasked to registrars administering marriage; they were given a checklist to investigate whether the marriage they were due to perform was one of ‘convenience’ or ‘forced’ (Carver 2016: 273).

The 2012 regime effectively works to regulate the possibility of a whole host of undomesticated intimacies moving for settlement. It does

so by testing household income as an ingredient of a 'subsisting relationship'. But it equally judges applicants on intimate histories of their lives together in ways that emulate specific norms of heterosexist 'progress', such as through evidencing marriage, sharing private property, cohabitation, savings, reproduction, childrearing, shared language (see Turner and Vera Espinoza 2019). In this setting, the sham works to queer certain groups as outside of the 'modern' family and nation. Whilst same-sex couples can increasingly be included in legal rights to family life, if they emulate the domestic arrangements and progressive imprint of liberal consumption, monogamy and choice, this works to exclude a host of other intimacies and practices of kinship which are marked as unfamiliar (for parallels see Puar 2008).

Because of the way that forced marriage conditioned the reforms and the apparent 'over-representation' of South Asian communities in histories of family migration (Sirriyeh 2015; also see Home Office 2011a: 43–45), the Home Office's 'objective template' needs to be seen as a site for producing and monitoring racialised-sexualised deviancy. The visa does this by also excluding other non-normative intimacies such as non-married homosexual couples, multiple-partner relationships, non-cohabiting couples, the poor/workless, which are also managed by the distinction of the 'genuine' or 'sham' couple.

It is important to recognise that the push to discover shams through complex categories of domesticity has had a dramatic effect on visa application and refusal rates. Between 2007 and 2015 applications for all forms of migration for family life fell by 52 per cent. Family unification figures (i.e. those moving to be with a British citizen or settled person) also show a dramatic decrease of 41 per cent in the same period, from 53,300 in 2006 to 21,600 in 2015 (Blinder 2017). With the introduction of high-income requirements in 2012, refusal rates for family unification rose from 16 per cent in 2011 to over 40 per cent in the last quarter of 2012 (Blinder 2017). Such rates of refusal are seen as a success by the Home Office in both meeting targets to lower immigration and in the context of the government's hostile environment to weed out scams and sham marriages.

To appreciate the colonial racialised-sexualised logics at work here, it is worth noting how refusal rates for family unification visas differ starkly based on country of origin. For example, the refusal rates in 2016 for family unification of partners from Pakistan was 40.6 per cent, Nigeria 49.1 per cent and India 31.8 per cent; meanwhile, the refusal rate for those from the US, Canada and Australia varied from 10 to 14 per cent (Home Office 2016). If mobility was arranged around an explicit imperial colour line throughout the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, this is reimposed starkly here. The imperial colour line regarding movement and settlement is organised around whether intimate relations are deemed 'genuine' or 'sham'. Whilst appearing to be about economic and technical criteria, the visa is able to function as tool of racial governance, and it does so in classic neoliberal fashion by appearing to be 'without race' (Goldberg 2008). This is not about race, the story goes – merely about 'genuine' and 'subsisting' family forms (for an alternative reading see Kofman 2018).

The body and the border

The manner in which claims to family are increasingly evaluated and evidenced in this regime of intimate bordering is important. Just as previous border regimes focused on the body in order to read and assess shams, so does this one. 'Proving' that someone is not in a 'genuine' relationship involves a commitment to both an ideal of coupledness (culturally located) but also an assessment of the feelings of love which are viewed as innermost – that is, as embodied and affective (D'Aoust 2018). The enhancement of registrars' obligation to report suspected sham marriages and civil partnerships (from 2014) reflects the affective and embodied politics of assessing the 'non-genuineness' of couples. Civil registrars across Britain must now assess *every* couple who want to register a marriage or civil partnership. But of course, given the existing racialised-sexualised coordinates of the sham, this *all* is disingenuous. This assessment can occur during the interview conducted when applying for a ceremony or on the day of a ceremony itself (Home

Office 2014a). If reported to the Home Office, sham couples can have their ceremonies interrupted, their union revoked and face criminal prosecution and deportation. Since 2014, EU nationals involved in sham marriages can also be considered for deportation. This is significant, as prior to this such practices focused on non-EU nationals (Home Office 2015: 14).

The strategy of Home Office officials arriving to break up ceremonies is a reminder of how central the spectacular protection of heteronormative institutions alone is to the politics of shams (D'Aoust 2018; Wemyss *et al.* 2018). Just as border officials judge the embodied intimacy of the couple, eye contact, affection, body language, shared languages, caresses, handholding, kissing all become features of the 'look of love', which registrars now use to assess a couple who may be sitting in a municipal waiting area or embarking on a civil ceremony (Home Affairs Select Committee 2014). Here the 'paper identity' of a visa assessment slips over into judgements made about the deeper 'truth' of the migrant's body and its relation to others (White 2014).

It is worth remembering how imperial regulation of movement often fixated on the racialised body to evidence and reveal inner and intimate 'truths'. Border officials in South Africa policing indentured labourers at the turn of the twentieth century relied upon judgements as to whether a child looked like they were related to an accompanying adult. Such judgements conditioned whether a child or dependent could be allowed to travel with a family member and claim the rights of a British subject. This was coded through skin, eye or hair colour, dress and their mannerisms towards each other. Shah (2012) reminds us of how disease screenings in North American ports from 1870 surveilled the migrants' body for the inner truth of their productivity. Here urine and stool samples provided an 'inherent truth' of whether a migrant would be a burden on the state through disease, immoral practice or 'unsuitability' for labour (Shah 2012: 200). The invasive 'virginity tests' performed on South Asian fiancées at UK airports in the 1970s demonstrated how the colonised and feminised body is expected to reveal intimate truths that 'paper reality' (a passport or visa) obscures. In this context the

push to re-centre bodily relations in the assessment and evidencing of shams, in both the spectacle of the wedding ceremony and the registrar interview, follows a history of such bodily scrutiny and, with it, ways of seeing (see chapter 6 for more on this). Such intimate bordering is always about capturing but also permitting the 'inner truth' of the potentially devious body and its affective relations.

The sham in late liberalism

As I have set out above, the sham does a lot of work to energise intimate borders. It intensifies scrutiny over migrants' bodies and the policing of racialised communities, limits the possibility of international intimacies, and it regulates an evolving colour line around family unification to the UK. It makes judgements on proximities and the potentiality of 'family' within the now national space. This means breaking up, separating and intervening in kinship and intimate relationship that appear unfamiliar. In the last chapter I discussed the centrality of taxonomies of marriage and family forms to colonial government, particularly the way that family forms were networked into legal systems of colonial states (private property, inheritance, marriage) and then into the regulation of imperial mobility (through ports of exit, entry, labour camps, shipping mandates). The parallels to the function of the sham deserve teasing out, and in doing so they will help us think through a colonial and racial rather than only national orientation of intimate borders and the violence they reproduce.

Whilst the intimate bordering attached to shams is considered to be about fraud and the violence of forced marriage, it is equally energised by developmental logics of 'liberal love' and tenses of modernity and backwardness (Povinelli 2006). As I have previously discussed, nineteenth century family forms were organised around an evolutionary hierarchy of humanity, with the white heterosexual family at the top and black kinship patterns at the bottom (see Hoad 2007: 56; Sharpe 2010). Arguably, this template of heteronormative 'progress' continues under

the guise of the 'modern family', defined as it is by liberal notions of choice, consumptive domesticity and love. It is these colonial hierarchies of intimacy/family/humanity that are reasserted through the policing of the sham and UK visa rules.

Berlant (1997) argues that what is central to liberalism is the autonomous, bodied intimacy of the liberal subject, who through mythologies of private/public and inner sanctuary (see McKeon 2005) is presented as having a pre-political/social capacity for love. Romantic love (often heterosexualised) is viewed as the pillar of modern liberal subjectivity because it relies upon the fetishising of 'choice' and the passion of 'intimate' emotions (which are internal to the individual subject), as well as coalescing around heteronormative appeals to childrearing and parenthood. Here we should consider how liberal love becomes a particularly powerful way of reasserting secularised forms of Christian marriage as the template of domestic modernity and progress. Whilst these claims to liberal love are 'universal' (i.e. everyone has a capacity to love in the same way), this is built on distinctions between liberal/progressive and backwards/illiberal intimacies, which equally replicate the distinctions between the white and black family (Collins 1998). To Povinelli (2006), 'progressive', forward-looking (autonomous) subjects choose their intimate relations and reproduce out of love. Against this, 'backwards' cultures – what Povinelli calls 'genealogical communities' – are instead bound by tradition, obligation and duty. They are rendered underdeveloped, stuck in a distant past without 'value'. Here who is backwards- or forwards-facing, who has value, is arranged around supposedly universal claims to intimacy (such as the claim that the UK visa is about 'genuine couples').

As we can witness with the above examples of the role the sham performs in UK immigration practices, who can access rights is organised around how they match up to the (white) 'modern family' – that is, how they emulate notions of genuine intimacy and domesticity. This is detailed in visa regimes where applicants must prove they are 'genuinely' intimate by evidencing that they are a 'romantic couple', with the particular affective and behavioural bonds this assumes, such as communicating and feeling

towards each other in ways that are intelligible to the state (D'Aoust 2018). Evidence of appropriate domesticity is then judged on evidencing cohabitation, consumption, private property, economic productivity, wage labour. This became enshrined in legal and bureaucratic practice with the 2012 family unification visa changes with the new income requirement and tests of 'genuineness'.

This system arguably provides a new taxonomy of family forms where people are placed in a hierarchy of worthy/suspect/unworthy intimacies. Here bodies and communities (such as South Asian and Muslim communities) can be demarcated as 'backwards' because of an adherence to 'tradition' and 'cultural practices' which are viewed as working against the evolutionary empowerment of women, minority sexualities and apparently universal race-blind values of romantic 'autonomy' or 'choice'. They are cast as always/already imminently suspect. These notions of the 'modern family' thus produce racialised effects without appealing to race. Because the modern family is naturalised as universal, against which everything else is a sham, people are racialised by their relationship to 'backwards' kinship practices. They are judged as to whether they have 'developed' towards the template of the modern family. Far from being objective, the current template of family within the UK visa system directly polices people moving from ex-colonies such as Nigeria, Bangladesh and Pakistan. This is the ongoing coordination of 'family' as racial governance.

In order to assess where people fit within this reworked taxonomy, authorities rely on further colonial practices of intimate bordering. Judgements are made concerning the 'look of love' by border agents, registrars, lawyers. Such judgements are networked through cultural notions of what is properly familial and appropriately intimate. This is *colonial* not only because of the continuity of orientalist representation. This form of liberal government shares a series of logics, knowledge and practices which are recalibrated and adapted across imperial time and space, and continues to shape who has access to modes of reproduction – that is, who is sustained and fostered and who is excluded or abandoned.

Once we take the dynamics of where the majority of applications for family unification originate from into account, we need to see this within a history of imperial citizenship. We should remember here that the revoking of imperial citizenship in 1981 turned Commonwealth citizens into migrants without rights to settlement in the UK, which they had held, up until this point, through historical birth right. The movement of people for family life is in part driven by the necessity of diasporas (created by empire) to sustain themselves. What the discourse of the sham does is obscure the fact that until 1981 and prior immigration acts, these communities had a right to move and settle in the UK. And that bonds of kinship, histories of mobility, the material grooves of dependencies across the structurally unequal 'commonwealth' continue to shape who moves where.

The emergence of the discourse of shams energises the racial-sexualised hierarchies of empire (by deciding who is genuine/sham). It equally hides the way that colonised peoples have been dispossessed of legal heritage and rights, and the unequal structure of racialised/imperial capitalism which enriched the metropole at the expense and dispossession of colonies, which remain impoverished (for a parallel argument see Andrews 2018: 28–33). Think for a moment why many of the poorest former colonies, such as Bangladesh, remain such large contributors to family unification. This is no accident.

The imperilled and unintegrated woman

'Liberal love' plays a significant role in how hierarchies of civilisation are readdressed in contemporary government. But what equally drives the bordering process around shams is a particular racialised-gendered figuration of feminised victimhood. This is the figure of the unintegrated female migrant. This figuration does a huge amount of political and cultural work to sustain the domesticating force of colonial government – it gives bordering *life* and *flesh*.

To Weber (2016: 28), ‘figurations’ are repeated tropes, images and imaginaries that come to dominate social meaning and produce common-sense understandings about political phenomena. As Razack (2008) has argued, it is the ‘imperilled Muslim woman’ who propels so much of the debate surrounding forced marriage across Europe. In this section, I want to sketch out how variations of this figuration are located within the bordering moves attached to the sham, but also in the wider cultural and political landscape of late liberal Britain. I show how the unintegrated woman was increasingly Muslimified post-2001, and became known as a victim of traditional patriarchal culture. After the 7/7 bombings in London and the growth of ‘homegrown’ radicalisation, this passivity has been translated into complicity and active engagement with the reproduction of terrorism. This shows the extent to which intimate borders not only shape immigration policy around shams but also wider forms of rule such as integration and security strategies.

The imperilled brown woman holds a significant place in the annals of colonial government, often rehearsed in the axiom of ‘white men (and women) saving brown women from brown men’ (Spivak 1988). If the figuration of black womanhood was haunted by the afterlife of slavery, oversexualised and unchangeable, the ‘brown woman’ was known as underdeveloped but often ‘saveable’ – invariably *not-quite* rather than *non-human*. The reformist agenda of imperial feminism focused on the particular predicament of colonised women who were viewed as an un-emancipated and underdeveloped form of femininity in places such as India (Mohanty 1984; Grewal 1996). As Mohanty (1984) argues, the figure of the colonised and underdeveloped woman has historically worked to shore up white, feminine subjecthood as ‘progressive’ (also see Lorde 2007). In this context, white femininity is viewed as supported and sustained by the ‘modern family’ (as a less patriarchal and emancipated sexual arrangement); against this, underdeveloped femininity is presented as trapped within the structures of backwards kinship, patriarchal violence and the third-world home.

Sham marriage is depicted as working at the expense of women. Women can be at risk of importing patriarchal husbands from abroad. However, the more dominant figuration of the 'at-risk' woman is as the newly arrived migrant-housewife. To MP Ann Cryer, defending the push to criminalise forced marriage, the problem is that 'Asian girls who are *brought in* as wives are frequently abandoned by their husbands and their in-laws' (BBC 2002b, my emphasis). Here the feminised subject is coerced and passive to demands of patriarchal culture. She is only ever a *wife* and only ever 'brought in'. But she is also risky because she is assumed to be *unintegratable*.

From 1999 this at-risk femininity shaped bordering strategies which were intensified after the onset of the War on Terror. Reflecting the higher percentage of women who apply through the family migration route (Blinder 2017), borders increasingly focused on the need for female migrants to 'integrate' and 'partake' in British society. It was assumed that as male migrants were expected to work, they would learn English. Against this, the female migrant was assumed to be housebound – removed from the labour market, unable to speak English or learn 'British values'. The removal of welfare benefits in 2002 for non-EEA partners focused on this 'problem', as did the requirement to speak English and take the British citizenship test prior to naturalisation (see Turner 2014). Such strategies were viewed as 'supporting' the figure of the non-English-speaking housewife into the labour market and out of the ghettoisation of minority communities (Home Office 2011a). Deploying ideas of 'undeserving' welfare scroungers, the female migrant was viewed as needing coercive support to reach her 'potential' and 'contribute to British society'. To Theresa May, this was why an objective test of intimacy was needed for family migrants (Home Office 2011a). Just as testing migrants' knowledge of British society became a requirement of citizenship, emulating practices of intimacy and cohabitation became a requirement for settlement and proof of a potentiality for harbouring '(un)British values'.

The gendered character of these bordering practices has been shared in other areas of social government, particularly with regard to integration.

In 2016 the 'Integration Tsar' Louise Casey authored a government report which mirrored the concerns of previous immigration policies but focused on settled communities of racialised citizens. In the report the 'dangers' of communities living 'separate' or 'ghettoised' lives was viewed as a failed strategy of a too-generous family migration regime (Casey 2016). What made this problem worse was that 'minority' women, it was supposed, were failing to integrate into British society (also see Cantle 2002). Muslim women, the report argued, exemplified this trend. They were presented as lacking opportunities in the job market, bound to domestic duties, rarely speaking adequate English and tied to the demands of reproductive labour.

We can thus place Casey's report in a tradition of both imperial feminism but also an example of what Farris calls 'femonationalism', where the discourse of feminist works to energise white nationalist stigmatisation of 'unprogressive' and 'anti-women' cultures (Farris 2017). To Casey, the oppression of women is structured by the Muslim community and household where 'women are treated as second-class citizens' (Casey 2016: 120). Whilst women themselves were to blame for this social breakdown and tasked with their own emancipation, the ultimate responsibility for this lagging behind was the patriarchy, misogyny and homophobia of Islam.²

What is significant about the Casey report is that it works to silence the patriarchal structures of contemporary liberal capitalism, forces which often push women into precarious and reproductive labour and the way that immigration practices enhance this gendered and raced precarity and vulnerability (Anderson 2013; Tepe-Belfrage and Montgomerie 2016). Instead, oppression is deemed cultural (Razack 2008). To Casey, this is about 'cultural values' and behaviour: 'The harms and inequalities [of non-integration] are often a result of practices and behaviours that are out of step with modern British values and in many cases the law' (Casey 2016: 120). What Casey views as the fault of patriarchal Islam in creating 'unintegrated' and 'unlawful' bodies and spaces (the urban ghetto and the immigrant household) also became tied to the risk of terrorism, as 'unintegrated' communities and failed

households create a further risk of 'radicalisation' (Casey 2016: 46). The unintegrated (Muslim) woman is described here, as she is more widely, as both 'at risk' and 'risky'.

Haunting these depictions of the unintegrated (Muslim) woman are past colonial figurations which join up and reveal her predicament. The unintegrated (Muslim) woman is spatialised within the confines of the household – that is, hidden away from the proper public space of the labour market, civil value and emancipated (white) femininity. Shades of light and dark become important metaphors of civility here, just as they did with debates concerning *purdah*, the harem and *sati* in British India (Grewal 1996). The murky space of the unintegrated household is a site of cultural dangers – where English is not spoken, where 'tradition' rules, where claustrophobic patriarchy oppresses expression, individuality and eventually love. The path to modernity is throwing open the shutters and letting the light in.

Just as failed black motherhood was defined by an absence of patriarchy, the suspicious intimacy of the Muslim family is too much patriarchy. As her relations are only ever a sham, the Muslim woman is unable to experience (or is held back from) progressive intimacy and the choice of liberal romantic love – linked to both the financial autonomy of work and 'breaking free' of her community bonds. She is unable to contribute to the value of the nation and liberal progress. The task of authorities is rationalised by intervening in these intimate relations and modernising them.

As Razack (2008) argues, the unintegrated (Muslim) woman can be 'saved' and offered shelter in the national 'home' but only if she renounces her community and reforms. This paternalistic dynamic dominated during the early 2000s, promising 'inclusion' and support to modernise (Wilson 2007). However, with the extension and expansion of counter-terrorism logics across numerous areas of social government, the Muslim woman is increasingly cast as dangerous and in need of more disciplinary domestication. Tactics of 'integration' found in the Casey report increasingly mirror the concerns of the security services and the production of the British Muslim community into a 'suspicious

community' after 9/11 and the London bombings of 2007. The notions of women not speaking English or no English being spoken in the home fixate on fears about the socialisation of children as future citizens (Casey 2016: 55, 58, 117); getting women into the labour market is a battle of values to get minorities to 'contribute' to the nation; learning British values is viewed as essential for containing and battling 'radicalisation' within the home.

This heterosexual futurism increasingly locates (Muslim) motherhood as a socio-biological threat to the civilised nation. With the 'rise of Islam' figured as an existential threat to white European and British order, this has connected to an increased interest in Malthusian demographic science where European Muslims are presented as 'taking over' other settled communities (see Sherwood 2017).

Casey (2016: 9) poses this threat in terms of how 'international marriage' brings in new and 'unintegrated' migrant bodies who fail to adapt to British ways of life (bound as they are to backwards spaces):

Rates of integration in some communities may have been undermined by high levels of transnational marriage – with subsequent generations being joined by a foreign-born partner, creating a 'first generation in every generation' phenomenon in which each new generation grows up with a foreign-born parent. This seems particularly prevalent in South Asian communities. We were told on one visit to a northern town that all except one of the Asian councillors had married a wife from Pakistan. And in a cohort study at the Bradford Royal Infirmary, 80% of babies of Pakistani ethnicity in the area had at least one parent born outside the UK.

The social problem here is directly presented as a cycle of reproductive takeover. Geographies of race (those 'strangers' coming from elsewhere) meet the push to whiten and civilise ('integrate') existing minority communities. The resistance of citizens of colour to integration into the nation is revealed in the *will* to sustain their strangeness through intercontinental marriage and reproduction – symbolised in the 'wife from Pakistan'. The sham is less about these marriages being 'of convenience' or even

‘in-genuine’ or ‘forced’. The sham here is the reproduction of racialised bodies birthed by the ‘unintegrated’ (Muslim) woman.

Here what underpins questions of shams in immigration policy are not only concerns about marriages of convenience but also about the maintenance of a broader domestic order. The undomesticated/unintegrated Muslim woman is central to the restrictive immigration policies and changes to family migration visas. But this equally energises and drives broader racialised concerns about the demography of contemporary Britain, and the reproduction of settled citizens with questions of security. From being ‘at risk’, and a subject of interventionist tactics to ‘save’ her, the unintegrated woman is increasingly viewed as ‘risky’, a threat to be managed. This reveals how intimate bordering joins up across different areas of government, affecting migrants and racialised, settled communities in connected ways.

Counter-terrorism and intimate borders

Logics of reproduction, natalism and heteronormative intimacy that I began to uncover above have played an increasingly vocal role in the contemporary deployment of counter-terrorism in Britain. This connects up with the way that the War on Terror has been fought through the enforcement of heteronormativity (and homonormativity) globally (Puar 2008). For instance, it has long been suggested by security services and the judiciary that incidents of forced marriage could provide information on the whereabouts of Islamic extremism and terrorist activity (Wilson 2014). Crown Prosecutor Nazir Afzal argued in 2014 that there was a distinct correlation between ‘hotspots of radicalism and hotspots of honour-based violence’:

If you went in the Special Branch of the Terrorist Unit and looked at their map, you would see significant links, significant correlation [to incidents of forced marriage]. So, maybe there is something about ... extremism, the way people think around those issues, that links in with what happens with women in their families too. (Quoted in Wilson 2014)

Through this logic, 'extreme' beliefs which lead to terrorism are born out of what happens in families. If you follow the treatment and body of the unintegrated woman – at risk of forced marriage – you will eventually find extremists/terrorists, so the narrative goes. Of course, such a bonding together of concerns about the treatment of women to questions of terrorism is hardly novel. Feminist and postcolonial scholars have shown how the feminisation and sexualisation of 'others' has structured the Global War on Terror, driving imperialist 'saviour complexes' and the wider grammar of suffering/violence (Rao 2014; Richter-Montpetit 2014; Welland 2015; Weber 2016). UK counter-terrorism has reproduced these global dynamics. However, since 2010 and the extension of the Prevent strategy, 'family values' have been increasingly weaponised as a means of finding and combating terrorists (Puar and Rai 2002; Cowen and Gilbert 2008). Here the figure of the unintegrated (Muslim) woman is not only constituted through victimhood but also as an alive and present danger.

Prevent and sham families

Over the course of the late 2000s the development of UK counter-terrorism, working in tandem with the deployment of counter-insurgency practice in the colonial wars of Iraq and Afghanistan, would begin to focus on preventing threats of 'extremism'. In various evolutions of the project, this has meant focusing attention on Muslimified households and the intimacies within them for signs of 'radicalisation'. After the 7/7 attacks in London, counter-terrorism authorities stepped up their implementation of the anti-radicalisation programme known as the Prevent strategy. Originally conceived to promote a form of self-governance over Muslim communities and organisations in the UK, after 2010 Prevent increasingly drew upon the recent experiences of counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq (and Northern Ireland, Kenya and Malaysia) (Sabir 2017). Prevent focused on extending responsibilities for reporting extremism and radicalisation, seen as the underlying cause of violence, onto a host of social government bodies.

From 2015 any public-facing organisation in the UK has had a legal duty to report possible incidences of radicalisation, defined as espousing or being socialised into 'extreme views'. As I have argued elsewhere, if counter-insurgency is known as 'armed social work', then in the UK social work has become a natural ally of counter-terrorism (Turner 2018; also see Owens 2015). With new reporting obligations, social work (alongside health, educational, welfare service) became a key tool in monitoring radicalisation born out of suspicious intimacies.

In 2015 Birmingham City Council became the first authority in Britain to add the risk of radicalisation to their categorisation for assessing 'troubled families'. Troubled families are families that can be subject to disciplinary interventions by the state based on a number of socio-economic and behavioural factors, from intergenerational worklessness to child truancy (see Casey 2012; Crossley 2016; Turner 2018). This inclusion, it should be noted, came in the wake of the 'Trojan Horse' scandal, in which reports claimed that certain schools in the city were teaching and practising 'radical' forms of Islam (even if the reports were later discredited). The inclusion of radicalisation into the definition of troubled families reflects how social workers nationally are now expected to monitor the familial relations of households for signs of radicalisation. Issues of child protection and safeguarding vulnerable individuals are now built into the official guidance on how to spot 'those being drawn into terrorism'. As Prevent duty guidance reveals:

The Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 places a duty on local authorities to give due regard to support people from being drawn into terrorism. This includes identifying individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism, assessing risk and developing appropriate support to address that risk. The government states that this needs to be incorporated into existing policies and procedures; in particular the need to do this within local authority safeguarding is highlighted. (HM Government 2015)

The 'assessment of risk' as to whether someone is being radicalised is thus networked into the existing logics and practices of social work.

Social workers are seen as a key resource here because of the way that they can access the 'private' interior of households and observe the function of the family. Child safeguarding is a particular focus in counter-terrorism practice because young children are viewed as distinctly *at risk* of being radicalised and taking up 'unBritish values'. This has been intensified through elite claims linking terrorism with child abuse, as demonstrated in an article in the *Telegraph* in 2014 where Boris Johnson, then Mayor of London, argued that the radicalisation of children urgently needed to be treated as a form of such. Following this, in 2015 a UK court ruled that that the parents of a 16-year-old girl were emotionally abusing her through exposure to 'ISIS propaganda' (McKendrick and Finch 2015).

As with the risk of forced marriage, terrorism is continually presented as a cultural problem in which Muslim parents teach their children the dangerous practices of Islam and intimately socialise them into deviant/terroristic activities. Here the take-up of terrorism is not cast solely in terms of dangerous masculinity (see chapter 4) but as a feminised process of socialisation within the family, in which motherhood is made highly visible. Practitioners' training guides for Prevent make this fear of proximity and reproduction explicit (see Smitherson and White 2017). It is suggested that 'high-risk indicators of radicalisation' are not necessarily holding or expressing 'extreme views' but living in proximity to someone expressing extreme views (Smitherson and White 2017: 10).³ Further emphasising the socio-sexual and affective dimension of child radicalisation, it is often viewed as a form of 'grooming' (for more on this see London Safeguarding Children Board 2018 and the next chapter).

Social workers are supposed to jointly assess 'risk of extremism' as they identify other risks such as child abuse, absence of care, domestic violence. Here factors which may be used to assess radicalisation or the *potential* for radicalisation in the bodies of children are often linked to existing imaginaries of the intolerable (familial) practices of Muslim communities. For example, 'medium risk indicators' of radicalisation are whether a child is 'at risk from harmful cultural practices ... e.g. FGM [female genital mutilation], Forced Marriage, removal from education,

honour based violence, abuse linked to faith or belief, etc.' (Smitherson and White 2017: 11).

Radicalisation is constituted here as a 'cultural process' attached to Islam. Radicalisation emerges from other intolerable 'cultural practices' again symbolically attached to the 'sham families' of Muslim communities. Radicalisation is child abuse; radicalisation is born out of the milieu of the Muslim family; existing familial problems (family breakdown, alienation, generation conflict) become in this way translated into terrorism. This mirrors claims that littered the Casey report, in which the figure of the unintegrated (Muslim) woman provided a breeding ground for radicalisation. If the unintegrated woman migrant risked reproducing unBritish values in her home and through the body of her children, here the intimate space of the Muslimified home is a radicalising space. Just as sham marriage is presented as a danger of immigration that threatens 'real' marriage and family, the War on Terror becomes fought within the home of the sham family.

Unsurprisingly, whilst social work guidance notes stress that 'extremism' should be interpreted broadly as including far-right or even environmental extremism, 90 per cent of all referrals to Channel (the 'community' arm of Prevent) in 2015 were of Muslims. The intimate bordering that social work now performs can be orientated towards intelligence gathering; it can lead to the targeting of subjects for anti-radicalisation programmes, just as it can be about taking children into care. As radicalisation is treated as an issue of national security, the intimate surveillance of social work is bound to mundane and exceptional forms of security – arresting, imprisoning and even deporting subjects thought to be a threat (Kapoor 2018). Precisely because of the way that terrorism is viewed as secretly 'bred' within spaces of failed domesticity – such as the proximity of children to 'extreme' views – the Muslimified household becomes reconfigured as a space of (un)known dangers, but also as a site of preventative management and control.

As I have demonstrated over the course of the last section, the figure of the unintegrated (Muslim) woman is able to capture a host of related anxieties about the intimate family 'problem' of racialised communities,

of postcolonial British society, mobility and insecurity. As with the threat of sham marriage, the sham family and sham mother present multiple dangers which demand intervention by the state in ways that mirror past forms of control. The unintegrated woman is at risk and always risky. She must be 'helped' and protected but also protected against. Tied as she is the failure of the Muslim family, she (and her household) becomes a site to struggle over, domesticate and reform for the future of heteronormative order and the preservation of Britishness. In keeping with the global/imperial logics of the War on Terror, she is cast as a failure by not being part of the modern family and yet she is viewed as threatening it through her 'backwardness'. In doing so she risks threatening not only British society but the order of (white) Western civilisation.

Conclusions

Discussions of sham marriages have had an increasing amount of attention in academic scholarship and within the media (for example see Wray *et al.* 2015; Kofman 2018; Wemyss *et al.* 2018). Much of this work and media attention has focused on how family migration policy has taken an evermore restrictive direction, leading to the break-up, detention, separation of international and migrant families. The detention of families in centres such as Yarl's Wood and the separation of children and parents seeking asylum on entry to the United States under the Trump administration has brought such policies into starker focus. Liberal, pro-migrant rights activists and media campaigns have tended to focus their attention on repealing these laws and practices by highlighting how immigration rules break up and destroy 'real' families. Campaigns such as the 'Divided Family Campaign', 'Bring them Home' or 'Love Letters to the Home Office' constantly invoke heteronormative images of family life to demonstrate what is threatened by these intimate borders.⁴ I approach this work with some caution.

In this chapter I have instead shown how the sham has poured scrutiny on the intimate relations of migrant subjects and settled communities alike. In viewing 'family' as central to empire-making, both historically and within contemporary Britain, I have explored the political work that appeals to family (and in this case the modern family) make possible. For example, it is a claim to 'genuine' family life that continues to drive intimate bordering practices such as scrutiny of migrant families, or social work interventions regarding radicalisation. In light of this, it is of course important to recognise who is allowed access to family life and to map out where family rights are eviscerated (as many pro-migrant campaigns do). However, calling for a defence of family rights without scrutiny of the history of the Empire, fails to get at the heart of the problem we are dealing with in Britain and other northern states. By appealing to save 'real' families, this fails to appreciate the multiple subjects who are queered and racialised through an appeal to 'real' families. Instead, this chapter has explored how an appeal to protect 'real' families and cast others as shams already drives colonial power.

In tracing the multiple incarnations of the sham – sham marriage, sham intimacy, sham family, sham motherhood – I have shown how demarcations around the 'genuine' or 'sham' family energise different intimate borders, from immigration and integration strategy, to social work and counter-terrorism. I have shown how the sham is concerned with delineations between 'genuine' families and suspicious intimacies. Whilst the idea of the sham emerged in relation to immigration practice and the mobility of people for family life, the idea that people can be distinguished into those who are properly familial and those who are shams has many manifestations. It is not only migrants that are policed here through scrutiny of sham intimacy. As I showed with the discussion of forced marriage, reforms surrounding the discovering and capturing of sham marriages not only concerned mobility but the domestication of settled racialised communities within the UK. Whilst immigration policies have produced evolving forms of intimate borders to regulate international marriage and partnerships, integration strategies, policing,

social work and counter-terrorism operations have coalesced to discover and monitor 'sham' families.

Whilst focused on protecting the nation from intolerable and unBritish intimacies, this domestication remains colonial in orientation. Orientalist representations of backward, savage and under/oversexualised peoples still drive the treatment of those moving to and living within Britain. Here 'family' remains a significant transit point for colonial power because of the way it disguises racialisation. Who is a sham is organised around a liberal and progressive notion of the 'modern family'; defined as this is by autonomy, romantic love and consumptive domesticity, and 'contribution'. It is this liberal and outwardly deracialised account of family that arguably organises who is properly 'familial' or 'unfamilial' – that is, who is sustained and fostered and who is dangerous and subject to exclusion and abandonment. For example, it is the treatment of women that distinguishes Muslim communities as 'backwards', and their inability to 'evolve' their kinship practices that marks these communities as suspect. As with family taxonomies under the British Empire, this reworks a civilisational tense, where people are racialised as being 'underdeveloped' based on supposedly universal claims to intimacy, romantic love and liberal values. This is then used to organise access to rights and citizenship of both migrants and settled communities alike.

The figure of the unintegrated (Muslim) woman continues to marshal the contemporary domesticating state, both in its push to police the movement of people and equally to integrate minorities. The constitution of feminised victimhood of course has a longer paternalist imperial history. However, what marks out the figuration of the unintegrated (Muslim) woman is how she is treated as both at risk and risky. If the passive Muslim housewife was once viewed as a victim, in need of saving, she has increasingly been constituted as a threat – that is, as a natal reproducer of terrorism within the sham family. Just as failed black motherhood occupied a site for the reproduction of social disorder throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the Muslim woman is increasingly viewed as someone to be contained. The Muslim woman can reproduce but increasingly cannot be a genuine mother.

Thus, whilst we need to be attuned to questions of how families are separated, we must also be aware of how intervention, separation and violence is done in the name of family. If family was offered a means of *developing* the unintegrated woman, under counter-terrorism and renewed visa policies it is increasing used as a form of *control*.

We can consider here how claims to protect against shams continue to organise varying degrees of violence – the separation of international kinship structures, the deportation of those who fail to gain the correct visa or fail the application, the criminalisation of those who are deemed a sham. Alongside this we can place wider practices of the hostile environment, the joining up of immigration rules with housing policy and healthcare, for example, or the increased use of immigration raids on places of work and within homes to criminalise and push people into detention (Corporate Watch 2018: 65). Such hostility joins up with the increasingly intense policing and surveillance of Muslim communities and households through both the work of security officials and social workers. Not only does the surveillance of sham families lead to intervention by social workers in cases of child protection (which can mean the removal of children from a home) but intelligence gathering and reporting by social workers can lead to criminal prosecution, counter-terrorism raids, detention without trial, passport removal, the possibility of more state violence and even extradition (see Kapoor 2018). Here sham marriages are not only a danger but the sham family becomes extraordinarily dangerous.

Whilst intimate bordering attached to the sham concerned discovering and regulating suspicious intimacies, what I turn to in the next chapter is how the family is also tied to ‘monstrous intimacies’. Here I take up in more detail what is done in the name of protecting the ‘proper’ family. I do so by examining how the liberal and progressive appeals to the modern family are always/already bound to whiteness. I explore what is done in the name of protecting the white family, which is viewed as ‘under attack’ from racialised others. To do this I examine the increasing trend of citizenship deprivation in Britain, a practice which I argue tells us much about the ‘sticky’ nature of contemporary borders.

Notes

- 1 This chapter is based on archival research undertaken by the author at the National Archives in 2016 and 2017, as well as a discourse analysis of immigration policy documents, integration strategy documents and social work guidance between 1999 and 2018. In order to examine the material, I draw upon Weber's (2016) work on 'figuration' to study how the sham is imagined and brought to life, attached as this is to a particular embodied gendered figuration of threat and 'victimhood'. This pays attention to the performative and 'worlding' role that powerful imaginaries have in shaping state practice – such as immigration law. As Weber (2016: 28) argues, 'figurations emerge out of discursive and material semiotic assemblages that condense diffuse imaginaries about the world into specific forms or images that bring specific worlds into being.' For further discussion of this methodological approach see Weber (2016: 28–29).
- 2 The hypervisibility of Islam in Casey's report is striking. For example, in a four-page section on religious 'regressive attitudes', only two lines at the end of the text are devoted to the Jewish and Christian faiths – and even then, mostly in parentheses as an afterthought. Meanwhile, four pages of extensive detail outline the 'regressive attitudes' held by Islamic communities in the UK.
- 3 Revealing the flimsiness of the definition of 'extreme', an 'extreme view' is defined as even '[refusing] to acknowledge other viewpoints' (Smitherson and White 2017: 10).
- 4 Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants campaign 'Bring Them Home': www.bringthemhome.org.uk/; Love Letters to the Home Office: <http://lovelettershome.org/>. Also see BBC (2018b) for another example.