

Small powers and great designs: diplomacy, cross-border patronage, and the negotiation of subsidy alliances in the north-western part of the Holy Roman Empire (late seventeenth century)

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In his study of mercenaries in north-western Germany in the early modern period, Peter Burschel stated that the end of the Thirty Years' War with the Peace of Westphalia did not mark a significant decrease in demand in the regional mercenary markets, which remained at a fairly constant level throughout the entire seventeenth century.¹ Even at a superficial glance at the political and military landscape in the north-western periphery of the Holy Roman Empire, this region may provide an example of the intense and prolonged susceptibility of the European order to military conflicts and their consequences, as it was particularly close to the main theatres of the Dutch conflicts with Spain, the Thirty Years' War and the major wars waged by Louis XIV against his European rivals.² Owing to the failure in negotiations between France and the Spanish monarchy in Münster, this military struggle continued up until the Peace of

1 Peter Burschel, *Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts: Sozialgeschichtliche Studien* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994), p. 113.

2 See, for instance, Andreas Rutz, 'Der Westen des Reiches als Kriegsschauplatz und Erfahrungsraum im langen 17. Jahrhundert', in *Krieg und Kriegserfahrung im Westen des Reiches 1568–1714*, ed. by Andreas Rutz and Marlene Tomczyk (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016), pp. 11–30. For the Rhine region in particular, see Max Braubach, 'Vom Westfälischen Frieden bis zum Wiener Kongress (1648–1815)', in *Rheinische Geschichte*, 3 vols, ed. by Georg Droege (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1980), vol. 2, pp. 219–365 (pp. 240–265). For the structural proneness to warlike conflict in Europe, see Johannes Burkhardt, 'Die Friedlosigkeit der Frühen Neuzeit: Grundlegung einer Theorie der Bellizität Europas', *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* 24 (1997), 509–574.

the Pyrenees in 1659 and gravely affected the territories on the left bank of the Rhine.

Other minor, mostly low-intensity, military conflicts in Europe following 1648 included the war between Sweden and Denmark, which again was part of a major conflict in northern Europe, two military confrontations between Sweden and the Hanseatic city of Bremen, the punitive action of Bishop Christoph Bernhard von Galen against his own city of Münster and its council's ambition to become a free city (alongside his many other military adventures), and territorial struggles such as the 'Kuhkrieg' (cow war), named after the capture of a significant amount of livestock during its course, between the duke of Neuburg and the elector of Brandenburg.³ This was followed by the more aggressive and expansionist posture of Louis XIV's foreign policy and the onset of a series of French wars of aggression, the attack on Spanish territories in 1667 marking the beginning of a period that has been dubbed the 'second Thirty Years' War'.⁴ Many of these conflicts, especially those on a larger scale from the 1660s onwards, involved subsidy treaties with German potentates in the region, where European diplomacy in relation to large and political conflicts in regional and local theatres often created interconnections and provided opportunities for some lesser estates of the Holy Roman Empire to engage in an elaborate form of military entrepreneurship undertaken by ruling princes.⁵

The eighth chapter in the Peace of Westphalia formally granted electors and princes of the empire the right to conclude *cum exteris foedera* with the soft and flexible provision stipulating that alliances should not be directed against the emperor and the empire.⁶ This enabled the armament of princes in asymmetrical relations with foreign princes and could eventually enable them to obtain certain possibilities of immersing themselves in the European concert of powers, enhance their status on the political stage, and make territorial gains. Traditionally, the right to conclude foreign military

3 For the conflict and the expansionist plans of the Brandenburg elector, see Ernst Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm: Der Große Kurfürst von Brandenburg*, 2 vols (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1971), vol. 1, pp. 211–216.

4 Burkhardt, 'Friedlosigkeit', p. 510.

5 See the classic account in Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force: A Study in European Economic and Social History*, 2 vols (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1964–1965), vol. 2, pp. 5–11.

6 Antje Oschmann, *Die Friedensverträge mit Frankreich und Schweden, vol.1: Urkunden. Acta Pacis Westphalicae, Serie III Abt. B* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1998), p. 11.

alliances was regarded as a clear step towards sovereign power politics outside the empire.⁷ More recent research, however, has rather placed it in the context of regional defence and peacekeeping or a right of resistance assumed by imperial estates. Despite the pursuit of their own interests, electors and princes engaging in treaties with foreign powers continued to regard the empire and its various internal security alliances – which could include foreign allies and their subsidies – as a central point of reference.⁸

The present chapter focuses on the practices of diplomacy and various cross-border negotiations concerning the formation of foreign subsidy alliances on various levels in the north-western periphery of the Holy Roman Empire in the first decades after the Peace of Westphalia. This field of inquiry is explored in three case studies: first, the attempt of the duke of Neuburg to use subsidies to recruit and equip more substantial military forces and the career of Georg Christian von Hessen-Homburg as negotiator and struggling military entrepreneur; second, the case study of Münster's prince-bishop Christoph Bernhard von Galen and his English subsidy alliance in 1665–1666 directed against the Republic of the Netherlands, and, third, the involvement of German princes in the Dutch War of 1672 and Wilhelm von Fürstenberg's diplomatic role in the formation of a subsidy alliance.

On the one hand, this chapter examines the practices of diplomats and cross-border patronage networks in negotiating subsidy treaties between asymmetrical partners and maintaining communication, ensuring flows of financial resources, and enabling the recruitment of mercenary armies. It particularly focuses on the activity of networks, clients, and brokers in the service of foreign powers.⁹ On

7 See, for example, Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförde, 'Der Westfälische Frieden und das Bündnisrecht der Reichsstände', *Der Staat* 8 (1969), 449–478.

8 Karl Otmar von Aretin, 'Die Kreisassoziationen in der Politik der Mainzer Kurfürsten Johann Philipp und Lothar Franz von Schönborn 1648–1711', in Karl Otmar von Aretin, *Das Alte Reich: Friedensgarantie und europäisches Gleichgewicht* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1986), pp. 167–208; Ronald G. Asch, 'The ius foederis Re-examined: The Peace of Westphalia and the Constitution of the Holy Roman Empire', in *Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One*, ed. by Randall Lesaffer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 319–337.

9 For a comparative European perspective on these problems, see the contributions in *Nähe in der Ferne: Personale Verflechtung in den Außenbeziehungen der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed. by Hillard von Thiesen and Christian Windler (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005).

the other hand, the chapter addresses how princes negotiated and balanced their various roles as subsidy takers entitled to autonomous military action and ambitious de-facto warlords with their roles as members of the Holy Roman Empire. The latter mandated their loyalty to its head and obliged them to maintain peace following the norms of the Peace of Westphalia. How did these actors seek to reconcile their often problematic alliances with various, often conflicting, roles with regard to their political environment? What was the role of the Holy Roman Empire as a political framework in respect to foreign subsidy alliances?

Between European ambitions, regional security, and military entrepreneurship: projects concerning a French subsidy alliance involving Philipp Wilhelm von Neuburg

Duke Philipp Wilhelm of Palatinate-Neuburg was originally destined to be a dedicated Habsburg loyalist, yet found himself in collaboration with French politics in the Holy Roman Empire and was temporarily one of France's most significant supporters.¹⁰ Following the untimely death of the Roman King Ferdinand IV in 1654, as a result of which the usually secure Habsburg succession on the imperial throne suddenly hung in the balance, the duke emerged as a serious contender for the throne. This made him one of the most important players in Mazarin's policy of installing a non-Habsburg candidate on the throne, even though Neuburg's successful candidacy seemed to become ever more unlikely the closer it came to the actual election after the death of Emperor Ferdinand III in April 1657.¹¹ Philipp Wilhelm's position was ambiguous. He never intended to break entirely with his house's traditionally close ties to the Austrian Habsburgs, but

10 For his earlier years and his 1650s political biography, see Hans Schmidt, *Philipp Wilhelm von Pfalz-Neuburg 1615–1690*, 2 vols (Düsseldorf: Schwann), vol. 1, 1973.

11 On the 1657/1658 imperial election, see Martin Göhring, 'Kaiserwahl und Rheinbund von 1658: Ein Höhepunkt des Kampfes zwischen Habsburg und Bourbon um die Beherrschung des Reiches', in *Geschichtliche Kräfte und Entscheidungen: Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Otto Becker*, ed. by Martin Göhring and Alexander Scharff (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1954), pp. 65–83; S.N.F. Gie, 'Die Kandidatur Ludwigs XIV. bei der Kaiserwahl vom Jahre 1658 mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Vorgeschichte', *Abhandlungen zur mittleren und neueren Geschichte* 61 (1916), pp. 1–108; Alfred F. Pribram, 'Zur Wahl Leopolds I., 1654–1658', *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte* 73 (1888), 81–222.

he utilized French interest in co-operation as an asset in furthering his immediate political concerns as a *Landesherr*.

Neuburg's involvement with the French and his subsequent attempts to obtain French subsidies for the formation of an army were not untypical of minor German princes in the region. Neuburg sought to obtain a certain degree of security for his territories scattered around the empire. His territories on the left bank of the Rhine were particularly affected by the ongoing Franco-Spanish conflict. In this situation, the French eventually guaranteed the integrity of his possessions in the north-west; France offered to mediate in relation to Neuburg's conflicts with Brandenburg, and offered to represent his interests in any peace negotiation with Spain.¹² Nevertheless, the duke's interests in co-operation with France went beyond profiting from the efforts of French diplomacy on his behalf. In 1656, Philipp Wilhelm considerably raised the stakes for his compliance with French policies and demanded a subsidy treaty that would allow him to raise a sizeable armed force of around twenty thousand men.¹³ The projected military alliance would support all of Philipp Wilhelm's political roles and ambitions.

First, the alliance would have solidified the duke's position in a still volatile military conflict in the lower Rhine region and helped protect Neuburg's territories. The alliance would also have been instrumental in keeping at bay Neuburg's main rival, the prince elector of Brandenburg with whom he was involved in a series of territorial struggles and by whom he felt threatened.

Second, Neuburg underlined the mutual usefulness of this armament project and offered offensive as well as defensive alliances with the French, alliances that would allow him to contain the Spaniards on behalf of his French sponsors or, if required, directly engage them in offensive military action in the Spanish Netherlands. This was also in accordance with the duke's immediate interests as a territorial ruler, as he particularly struggled to end the long-term Spanish occupation of the town of Jülich.¹⁴ Neuburg also pointed out that his army could be employed in the larger European arena

12 Schmidt, *Philipp Wilhelm*, pp. 101–102.

13 *Ibid.*, pp. 155–156.

14 For Jülich under Spanish occupation and the political ramifications, see Günter Bers, *Don Gabriel de la Torre: Ein spanischer Gouverneur der Stadt und Festung Jülich (1641–1660). Zur Stadtgeschichte im Dreißigjährigen Krieg* (Jülich: Verlag der Joseph-Kuhl-Gesellschaft, 2013).

of conflict with the Habsburgs, even though the duke's plans for strategic movements and the necessary neglect of his more localized strategic interests seemed rather unrealistic.

Third, leading an army and being militarily and financially aligned with a major European power could also grant 'political capital' on both an instrumental and a symbolical level on the European stage for otherwise comparatively insignificant princes. Philipp Wilhelm was indeed preoccupied with an ambitious and lofty project on a large European scale: his desire to be elected king of Poland, thereby rising to a status in European social and political prestige above his rank as an otherwise relatively insignificant prince of the Holy Roman Empire.¹⁵ Cardinal Mazarin showed some interest in the alliance but remained sceptical towards Neuburg's plans, while also suspecting that Neuburg's desire for French subsidies and the recruitment of a sizeable army were partly meant to impress the potential voters among the Polish nobles.¹⁶

While neither Neuburg's Polish ambitions nor his prospects as regards the imperial throne ever materialized (or were very promising to begin with), his ambitions were persistently supported by one particular actor in the French camp: Georg Christian of Hesse-Homburg, a converted Catholic German prince originally employed in the Spanish army, who had 'defected to the French side and who offered his services'.¹⁷ Mazarin and his close collaborator in all foreign affairs, the former ambassador at the Peace of Westphalia, Abel Servien, formed a patron-client relationship and employed Homburg to broker French subsidies, pensions, and political concessions to German electors and princes in the run-up to the imperial election. They intended to capitalize on Homburg's various entanglements in the empire, which also included close relations with Neuburg.¹⁸

15 Schmidt, *Philipp Wilhelm*, pp. 156–159.

16 Archives diplomatiques du ministère des Affaires étrangères (AMAE), Correspondance Politique, Allemagne, vol. 133, fol. 164r, Servien to Mazarin, 14 July 1656.

17 His political biography is detailed in Margarethe Hintereicher, *Georg Christian von Hessen-Homburg (1626–1677): Offizier, Diplomat und Regent in den Jahrzehnten nach dem Dreissigjährigen Krieg* (Darmstadt: Hessische Historische Kommission, 1985).

18 Hintereicher, *Georg Christian*, pp. 89–133; Tilman Haug, *Ungleiche Außenbeziehungen und grenzüberschreitende Patronage: Frankreich und die geistlichen Kurfürsten 1648–1679* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2015), pp. 179–192.

A closer look at Homburg's employment as a client not only corrects the implicit image of informal local brokers and 'enablers' who merely paved the way for 'proper' French diplomats. Contemporary modes of formalization and officialization allowed Homburg to shift between informal and formal roles as a negotiator, doubling as a French diplomat with the 'proper' French envoy, Robert de Gravel, as his formal subordinate.¹⁹ The case of Homburg's employment also reveals some risks and dysfunctionalities in conducting external affairs by local proxies. Not only were Homburg's diplomatic missions prone to end in embarrassing blunders, since he was less familiar with the empire's political culture than expected. His close ties to Neuburg also represented a liability with regard to the room for manoeuvre of French diplomacy in the empire. Homburg increasingly confounded his roles as French negotiator and as a de-facto client of Philipp Wilhelm. Apart from Philipp Wilhelm's candidacy to the imperial throne, Homburg actively promoted the latter's military ambitions.

Difficulties increased when Mazarin and Robert de Gravel began to knit closer ties to Johann Philipp von Schönborn, the elector of Mayence, who (albeit ambiguously and reluctantly at first) embraced the proposals for an alliance that resembled the later Alliance of the Rhine.²⁰ Homburg saw Neuburg's subsidies and armament as being in jeopardy and derailed Gravel's negotiations in dismissing Johann Philipp's projects concerning a security alliance as ill-conceived illusions. He insisted on the necessity of arming the duke of Neuburg, which initially succeeded in slowing down Gravel's rapprochement with Johann Philipp.²¹

However, not only Homburg's unconditional fidelity towards Philipp Wilhelm compromised his French services as a French client and negotiator. Insisting on French subsidies and an alliance treaty for Philipp Wilhelm coincided with his desire to establish himself as a military entrepreneur, for which he obtained a French commission and funds to recruit a regiment for the French army, which he hoped

19 This is explicitly stated in Homburg's Instruction, see AMAE, Correspondance Politique Allemagne, vol. 137, fol. 205v, *Seconde Instruction de M. le Prince de Hombourg assisté du S. de Gravel*, Paris, 27 April 1657.

20 For the rapprochement of France and Mayence, see Claude Badalo-Dulong, *Trente ans de diplomatie française en Allemagne: Louis XIV et l'Électeur de Mayence (1648–1678)* (Paris: Plon, 1956), pp. 23–26.

21 AMAE, Correspondance politique Allemagne, vol. 137, fol. 375r, Homburg to Servien, Frankfurt, 24 June 1657.

to lead into battle himself. Yet, Homburg not only proved to be rather inept in this task; he was now actively undermined by the French envoy Robert de Gravel, his colleague and bitter rival, who intervened to cut off and redirect Homburg's funds.²² A French-funded army under Neuburg's command could also have profited the ambitious yet unfortunate Homburg as a would-be military entrepreneur. Despite being relegated to second rank concerning French political affairs of the empire, Neuburg still managed to obtain some degree of French subsidies to keep an armed force in his territories along the Rhine. With the final decision to join and contribute to the Alliance of the Rhine (after the failure of a non-Habsburg election) with a partially French-funded army corps in 1658, however, the French intended to cut back seriously on any individual armament for German princes. Instead of arming the duke of Neuburg, Mazarin initially proposed making him the supreme commander of the troops of the new defensive alliance.²³ Philipp Wilhelm von Neuburg joined the alliance, but in relations with the reluctant French *plenipotentiaires* he and his negotiators still insisted on further French payments to keep Neuburg's army in order to safeguard his territories.²⁴ One year later, in 1659, the Peace of the Pyrenees was concluded and Mazarin ostensibly negotiated the release of Jülich on Neuburg's behalf. Even though Neuburg remained a French sympathizer, Mazarin now felt free to reject further demands for French subsidies by the duke, let alone French financial support for any ambitious Polish projects.²⁵

22 Hintereicher, *Georg Christian*, p. 154.

23 For the Alliance of the Rhine of 1658 and French participation, see Roman Schnur, *Der Rheinbund von 1658 in der deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte* (Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1955); Anuschka Tischer, 'Die Vorgeschichte des ersten Rheinbundes von 1658', in *Der Erste Rheinbund (1658)*, ed. by Martin Peters, historicum.net, www.historicum.net/themen/erster-rheinbund-1658/der-rheinbund-in-geschichte-und-gedaechtnis/die-vorgeschichte-des-ersten-rheinbundes-von-1658, retrieved 4 November 2017. For Mazarin's proposal, see: Mazarin to Robert de Gravel, Dijon, 19 November 1658, in *Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin pendant son Ministère*, ed. by Gustave d'Avenel/Adolphe Chéruel, 9 vols (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1894–1906), vol. 9 (1906), p. 101.

24 AMAE, Correspondance politique, Allemagne, vol. 141, fol. 298v, Gramont and Lionne to Mazarin, Frankfurt, 18 August 1658. The idea of further French subsidies for Philipp Wilhelm von Neuburg does not seem to have vanished that easily, as suggested by Schmidt, *Philipp Wilhelm*, p. 279.

25 AMAE, Correspondance politique, Allemagne, vol. 146, fol. 112r–v, Mazarin to Robert de Gravel, St Jean de Luz, 12 September 1659.

England's unlikely continental sword: the challenges of
Christoph Bernhard von Galen's subsidy alliance with the
Stuart monarchy 1665–1666

Georg Christian von Homburg's severe setbacks in both the diplomatic and the military entrepreneurial arena did not cost him his political or military career. In 1665, he found himself being the official field commander at the head of an army invading the Dutch Republic.

Obtaining this post, however, was directly related to the military ambitions of another German prince, whose diplomacy had succeeded in co-opting a major European conflict to secure funding for a military operation that also benefited his local interests and ambitions. Christoph Bernhard von Galen, the prince-bishop of Münster, was known for his uncompromising political stance and military aggressiveness, highly unusual at the time for an ecclesiastical prince and a cleric.²⁶

The most frequent objective of the bishop's military activity, and the driving force of his willing involvement as a provider of a military force subsidized by foreign powers, was attacking the Dutch Republic. A domineering political and economic actor in the regional power system, the Dutch had created a system of political dependencies and protections among the princes and prince electors of the empire, a system which included Dutch garrisons in Cleves curtailing the direct power of Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg as the nominal overlord of the territory.²⁷ Dutch protections directly affected Christoph Bernhard's political ambition when his own city of Münster

26 Particularly for Christoph Bernhard's foreign and imperial policies, see Wilhelm Kohl, *Christoph Bernhard von Galen: Politische Geschichte des Fürstbistums Münster 1650–1678* (Münster: Regensburg, 1964); Ernst Marquardt, *Christoph Bernhard von Galen: Fürstbischof von Münster* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1951); Peter Berghaus, Gerhard Langemeyer, and Peter Ilich, *Bommen Berend: Das Fürstbistum Münster unter Bischof Christoph Bernhard von Galen 1650–1678* (Greven: Cramer, 1972). For Christoph Bernhard's role conflicts, see Bettina Braun, *Princeps et episcopus: Studien zur Funktion und zum Selbstverständnis der nordwestdeutschen Fürstbischöfe nach dem Westfälischen Frieden* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), pp. 323–342.

27 For the particular situation in the margraviat of Cleves, see Michael Kaiser, 'Temps de l'occupation – temps de la liberté: les territoires du duché de Clèves et du comté de la Marck sous l'occupation des Provinces-Unies', in *Les ressources des faibles: Neutralités, sauvegardes, accommodements en temps de guerre (XVIIe–XVIIIe siècle)*, ed. by Jean-François Chanet and Christian Windler (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2009), pp. 241–260.

sought to establish itself as a free city and initially succeeded in obtaining Dutch support and protection. The city was eventually coerced back into submission by the pugnacious bishop by means of military force.²⁸

In 1663, Christoph Bernhard came in even more direct conflict with the Dutch when his troops occupied entrenchments near Diel in eastern Frisia to collect debts from their ruling house – debts to which the bishop claimed he was entitled. His soldiers were forced to stand down by Dutch forces, who acted as protectors of the Frisian estates.²⁹ In response to this humiliating injury to his honour and a long-standing desire for territorial expansion, Christoph Bernhard offered himself as an ally and continental military arm of the English, who were about to enter the Anglo-Dutch War of 1665–1666.³⁰ Alongside alliances with Brandenburg and Philipp Wilhelm of Neuburg, it was a subsidy treaty with the Stuart monarchy that would provide Christoph Bernhard with considerable means for recruiting an army and conducting a punitive military action in the Netherlands which should be carried out in close co-operation with London. The campaign should also eventually secure the town and domain of Borkelo for Christoph Bernhard. In June 1665, his Lieutenant-Colonel Heinrich Alexander Wrede travelled to London to conclude the alliance, which granted £150,000 to the bishop of Münster to fund his armament.³¹ This was very welcome and indeed necessary financial aid, as the prince-bishop still partly depended on the budgetary rights of his estates and had by far overstretched his financial capacities even before the Dutch campaign was planned.³²

28 Alwin Hanschmidt, 'Zwischen bürgerlicher Stadtautonomie und fürstlicher Stadtherrschaft (1580–1661)', in *Geschichte der Stadt Münster*, 2 vols, ed. by Franz-Josef Jakobi (Münster: Aschendorff, 1994), vol. 1, pp. 249–299 (pp. 284–287).

29 Kohl, *Christoph Bernhard von Galen*, pp. 178–180.

30 For the genesis and the history of this particular alliance, see Carl Brinkmann, 'Charles II and the Bishop of Münster in the Anglo-Dutch War of 1665–6', *The English Historical Review* 21 (1906), 686–698; Kohl, *Christoph Bernhard*, pp. 197–199.

31 Offensiv- und Subsidienvvertrag des Königs von Großbritannien mit dem Fürstbischof von Münster, London, 3 June 1665, in *Akten und Urkunden zur Außenpolitik Christoph Bernhards von Galen (1650–1678)*, 3 vols, ed. by Wilhelm Kohl (Münster: Aschendorff, 1980–1986), vol. 1 (1980), pp. 455–456.

32 For these sorts of difficulties, see Theodor Verspohl, *Das Heerwesen des münsterischen Fürstbischofs Christoph Bernhard von Galen 1650–1678* (Hildesheim: Lax, 1909), pp. 99–101.

This alliance between a major European power and what must from the Stuart perspective have been seen as a minor and distant principality not only was unlikely and asymmetric but also entailed a series of practical political challenges. To begin with, the diplomatic negotiations and political and military co-ordination of activities between the bishop and the Stuart king reveal the former's ability to mobilize diplomatic negotiators and 'trans-territorial' networks in order to overcome the lack of formalized relations.

In the case of the 1665 alliance, the English Catholic exile community and its entanglements with the Catholic peerage provided a communication node between the unlikely allies, where more formalized diplomatic contacts were sporadic at best.³³ Following Christoph Bernhard's informal talks with William Temple in Münster, the bishop managed to send an English 'ex-patriate', Father Joseph Sherwood, a Benedictine monk of noble descent, to London for the detailed negotiations on the terms of the subsidy alliance.³⁴ Sherwood was 'available' for the services of a German prince-bishop in England, as his monastery in Lamspringe near Hildesheim had been re-established by English Catholic exiles and maintained close contacts with its noble benefactors in England, who donated resources for the reconstruction of the convent church.³⁵

Sherwood's mission reflects the frequent use of hybrid social actors, in terms of ethnic and cultural affiliation, as negotiators – actors who were supposed to capitalize on their familiarity with the social and political culture on the ground as well as on their interpersonal relations in order to achieve success. Yet, while Sherwood seems to have been favourably perceived by his English interlocutors, and even after the negotiation demonstrated his abilities to gather political information on English affairs through various channels – he even managed to obtain a letter of recommendation from King Charles in 1673 – it is not easy to determine to what degree he mobilized any personal networks derived from 'social capital' through his closeness to the Catholic peerage or other

33 More generally on the English Catholic communities, see Geert H. Janssen, 'The Exile Experience', in *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Counter-Reformation* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 73–90.

34 Kohl, *Christoph Bernhard*, p. 198.

35 For this monastery, see *Lamspringe: An English Abbey in Germany 1643–1803*, ed. by Anselm Cramer (Ampleforth: Ampleforth Abbey Trustees, 2004).

interpersonal relations for his negotiations on behalf of the bishop of Münster.³⁶

When the flow of the much-needed subsidies began to stall, Sherwood was once again sent to London with an urgent mission to unblock the funds. Christoph Bernhard strongly suggested that he should exploit the very few contacts that von Galen himself had established with English diplomats in the empire, namely those with Temple and the brother of the Catholic Irish peer and ambassador to the imperial court in Vienna, the Earl of Carlingfort. For the same mission, Sherwood was also given substantial funds, 'to give a gratification ... if the entire sum of the remaining one [i.e. the subsidy rate] could thus be unblocked'.³⁷ If necessary, in other words, Sherwood was instructed to bribe English officials to free up the remaining portions of the English subsidies – a practice requiring some local knowledge of the workings of a foreign court and administration, but not necessarily very close long-term personal relationships, on the part of the negotiator on the ground.

Later, the aforementioned Wrede, who seems to have shared some personal familiarity with Temple, was once again sent to England to urge that the remaining subsidies be paid out.³⁸ But, without additional favourable advocates for Christoph Bernhard's cause, Wrede was simply instructed to be persistent in his appeals to Arlington and other court officials.³⁹ Wrede's effort was unsuccessful. The flow of money remained insecure and, particularly after the emperor and Brandenburg launched attempts to mediate a peace, Christoph Bernhard's loyalty to the alliance increasingly appeared compromised.⁴⁰ Members of the prince-bishop's chapter, who opposed

36 See, for instance, VWA, Ass. L, 489, Nr. 3, Sherwood to Christoph Bernhard, Hildesheim, 29 November 1669; for the letter of recommendation: VWA, Ass. L, 489, Nr. 32, Charles II to Christoph Bernhard, Whitehall, 29 March 1673.

37 'daß die verehrung davon in memorial gemeldet, gegeben werden solle, wan dadurch die gehele summe des restants loß zu machen'; Nebenmemorial Christoph Bernhards für Pater Joseph Sherwood OSB zur Gesandtschaft nach England, Münster, 2 November 1665, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 1, p. 532.

38 Temple to Wrede, Brussels, 10 May 1665, in *The Works of Sir William Temple*, 4 vols (London: S. Hamilton, 1814), vol. 1, pp. 220–224.

39 Christoph Bernhard to Wrede, Münster, 8 January 1666, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 1, p. 521.

40 Wrede to Christoph Bernhard, Oxford, 7 January 1666, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 1, p. 525.

the treaty, had anticipated such difficulties and warned him of the unreliability of their English partner – ‘England virtually never kept its word to anyone’ – and further suspected that communication and co-ordination with such a distant ally with complicated political structures would be difficult.⁴¹

These difficulties eventually affected the military success of the alliance. While von Galen quickly earned his nickname ‘Bommen Berend’ (‘Bomber Bernd’) for his troops’ extensive use of mortar fire against fortified sites throughout the campaign, there was very little military co-ordination with the English, who suspended plans for an invasion even though Christoph Bernhard’s army attempted to establish landing zones.⁴² The frequent lack of English subsidies exposed the serious underfunding of the campaign and its complete dependence on contributions by the occupied, which were hard to come by as the invasion quickly began to stall. Desertions and the bribing of the scarcely paid officers and troops by the Dutch massively contributed to the dismantling of Christoph Bernhard’s army.⁴³

Even before Christoph Bernhard’s army was on the march, a second difficulty had begun to emerge. Dutch networks and the political, social, and financial entanglements of neighbouring German princes and nobles within the United Provinces stymied Christoph Bernhard’s attempts to spend his promised English funds in the region’s mercenary markets, and particularly to enlist the units of the dukes of Brunswick, all of whom had recruited forces during an armed internal conflict between the various branches of the House of Brunswick. Von Galen enlisted the Brunswickian Colonel Johann Georg von Gorgas to undertake and co-ordinate recruitments in the north-western part of the empire; but, when he attempted to negotiate with the dukes of Brunswick over the transfer of a substantial part of these forces, Duke Georg Wilhelm had already committed his troops to the Dutch, apparently in exchange for a reduction of his debts in the Netherlands. His rival Duke Georg Friedrich right away rejected any co-operation with Münster’s recruitment efforts.⁴⁴

41 ‘Engelantdt hette baldt niemanten wort gehalten’; Protokoll des Domkapitels, s.l., 18 September 1665, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 1, p. 474.

42 For the fiscal-military rationale of this strategy for the collection of contributions, see Redlich, *German Military Enterpriser*, vol. 2, pp. 11–12.

43 Floris der Kinderen, *De Nederlandsche Republiek en Munster geburende de Jaren 1650–1666* (Leiden: Gebroeders van der Hoek, 1871), pp. 265–293.

44 *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 1, pp. 458–459. For Gorgas’s substantial contribution, see Georg Tessin, ‘Beiträge zur Formationsgeschichte des Münsterischen

Dutch ‘micro-politics’ became even more visible when Christoph Bernhard failed to employ as his supreme commander the experienced military entrepreneur Count Georg Friedrich von Waldeck, who had also recruited troops for the confusing Brunswick conflict. Christoph Bernhard’s efforts were to a large extent blocked as a result of Waldeck’s affairs and dependencies in the Netherlands. Not only did he cite his friendship and kinship relations to the Dutch political and military establishment, notably to Maurice of Nassau; his estates in the Netherlands and other financial affairs also committed him to the Dutch camp.⁴⁵ Later, in 1672, Waldeck would assume supreme command of the Dutch army facing, among others, Christoph Bernhard’s troops.⁴⁶

When, in 1665, the general states began to realize the danger posed by von Galen’s recruitments, they reinforced their troops and enlisted the Brunswickian units.⁴⁷ The dismayed prince-bishop in turn wrote angrily to Waldeck and expressed his disappointment that Waldeck had refused ‘the general’s rank in our imperial army’.⁴⁸ This rather odd reference to the Holy Roman Empire points to a third complicating and limiting factor in the asymmetrical alliance that Christoph Bernhard had entered. Even though a subsidy treaty with a major European power may have helped imperial princes assert a superior political and social status, the case of Christoph Bernhard demonstrates that a prince still had to reconcile the waging of a war supported by foreign subsidies with the overarching framework of the Holy Roman Empire and its internal alliances and mutual security guarantees, designed to stabilize the Peace of Westphalia and prevent foreign conflicts from spilling over to the empire.

The English offensive military alliance was clearly one of the main opposing factors, which is why the emperor and the imperial

Militärs’, *Westfälische Forschungen* 32 (1982), 87–111 (p. 90). Christoph Bernhard to Franz Egon von Fürstenberg, Münster, 18 June 1665, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 1, p. 457. Kohl, *Christoph Bernhard*, pp. 199–200.

45 Kohl, *Christoph Bernhard*, p. 200.

46 For Waldeck’s career, see Gerhard Menk, *Georg Friedrich von Waldeck (1620–1692): Eine biographische Skizze* (Arolsen: Waldeckischer Geschichtsverein, 1992). For the counts of Waldeck as European military entrepreneurs, see Andreas Flurschütz da Cruz, Chapter 7 above.

47 For the Dutch efforts to recruit the Brunswick troops, see der Kinderen, *De Nederlandsche Republiek*, pp. 289–293.

48 ‘Das generalat über unsere Reichsarmee’; Christoph Bernhard to Georg Friedrich Graf von Waldeck, Borculo, 30 September 1665, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 1, p. 476.

estates assembled in Regensburg and why even Christoph Bernhard's initial allies Brandenburg and Neuburg universally rejected his war. The fact that the Stuart monarchy, as the deputies at the imperial Diet complained, had made inroads in the empire via Münster and used English money for establishing an 'armoury' (*riißthaus*), where even a second-rate warmongering prince could procure a sizeable army and shatter a precarious peace, was regarded as a considerable security hazard.⁴⁹ Thus, Christoph Bernhard fashioned his own English-subsidized campaign so as to make it form part of a legitimate imperial war effort. Indeed, he claimed that he was reinstating territories of the empire occupied by the Dutch and thus acting not only on the basis of legitimate purposes as a *Landesherr* but ultimately in the shared interest and on behalf of all imperial estates as a defender of the empire.⁵⁰ However, this bold claim seems more than anything to have baffled and angered the assembled deputies and shattered any desperate hopes for obtaining additional funds or troops for the war effort.⁵¹

Being a member of the aforementioned Rhine alliance himself, Christoph Bernhard also attempted not only to overcome the stiff French opposition to the offensive alliance but also to present the Dutch conflict as a case of collective self-defence for all the members of the alliance. Success in this attempt would have granted him additional military and financial assistance in the face of dwindling English resources.⁵² He also planned to persuade Sweden, as a fellow imperial estate and member of the alliance, to join the war against the Dutch.⁵³

Regarding the empire and its estates, another factor entered the equation. Despite the bi-confessional alliance with England, the prince-bishop still had to shake off the impression of a religious

49 Basserode to Christoph Bernhard, Regensburg, 19 November 1665, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 1, p. 497.

50 Basserode to Christoph Bernhard, Regensburg, 9 November 1665, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 1, p. 493; Christoph Bernhard to Basserode, n.p., 15 October 1665, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 1, p. 481.

51 Christoph Bernhard to Basserode, Regensburg, 10 December 1665, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 1, p. 505; Basserode to Christoph Bernhard, Regensburg, 9 November 1665, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 1, p. 493.

52 Christoph Bernhard to Louis XIV, Münster, 7 January 1666, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 1, p. 519.

53 Instruktion des Fürstbischofs von Münster für Friedrich Korff-Schmising zur Gesandtschaft an den französischen Hof, n.p., August 1665, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 1, p. 467.

war waged by a zealous ecclesiastical prince (which he blamed on defamation instigated by the Dutch and the faithless Waldeck).⁵⁴ Although von Galen was indeed a zealous and intolerant sponsor of Catholic reform in his own bishopric, there is a remarkable absence of professed religious motivation for the military actions in 1665–1666.⁵⁵ The pope, for example, was officially notified only well after the campaign had ended and was then given Christoph Bernhard's more secular justifications for the war.⁵⁶ Confronted with allegations of leading a war of religion by the negotiators of Brandenburg, von Galen actively stressed his otherwise problematic English alliance and claimed: 'one must not imagine that one could turn this war into a religious matter, since [von Galen] ... had joined forces with England'.⁵⁷ Obtaining subsidies from a foreign Protestant power could here conveniently be used as an argument to absolve von Galen from allegations of breaking the religious peace mandated by the treaties of 1648.

There was not very much denominational solidarity among fellow Catholic and ecclesiastical potentates with regard to Christoph Bernhard's aggressive stance either. Instead, the position of Cologne's elector and archbishop Max Heinrich and his principal collaborators, advisers and ministers, the two brothers Franz Egon and Wilhelm von Fürstenberg – who were both by far the most important clients and agents in the French diplomatic network in the empire – was highly ambiguous.⁵⁸ As French clients, they should have stridently opposed Christoph Bernhard's planned attack on the Dutch and

54 Christoph Bernhard to Basserode, St Ludgersburg, 18 September 1665, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 1, p. 473.

55 For Christoph Bernhard's strong confessional stance in his own territory, see Manfred Becker-Huberti, *Die tridentinische Reform im Bistum Münster unter Fürstbischof Christoph Bernhard von Galen 1650–1678* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1978).

56 Christoph Bernhard von Galen to Pope Alexander VII., Münster, 2 July 1665, in *Die Korrespondenz des Münsterer Fürstbischofs Christoph Bernhard von Galen mit dem Heiligen Stuhl (1650–1678)*, ed. by Alois Schröer (Münster: Aschendorff, 1972), pp. 332–335.

57 'Man dürfe sich aber nicht einbilden, als wen man aus dieser kriegsunruhe ein religionswerck machen wollte, den er sich ja mit Engelandt ... verbunden hette'; Schöning to Frederick William of Brandenburg, Meppen, 5 November 1665, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 1, p. 488.

58 Particularly with regard to Wilhelm von Fürstenberg, see Max Braubach, *Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg (1629–1704)* (Cologne: Röhrscheid, 1972); John T. O'Connor, 'William Egon von Fürstenberg, German Agent in the Service of Louis XIV', *French Historical Studies* 5 (1967), 119–145.

stopped any attempt at recruiting troops in his territories in its tracks, given the fact that Louis XIV resolutely opposed the war against the Dutch and vowed to protect the Republic.

Nevertheless, Christoph Bernhard was granted recruitment privileges on Cologne territory.⁵⁹ On the one hand, the Fürstenberg brothers tried to dissuade Christoph Bernhard from war on behalf of the English, whereas, on the other hand, it is likely that they banked on a military disaster and even occupation of the bishopric of Münster, in hopes that such a development would prompt Rome to unseat the belligerent prince-bishop.⁶⁰ This unholy speculation was driven by micropolitical interest and the scramble for the amassment of benefices by Archbishop Max Heinrich and the Fürstenbergs, who hoped to install their master in Christoph Bernhard's place and had also committed the French crown to assist them in their own quest for free episcopal sees in 1658.⁶¹ By the start of Christoph Bernhard's campaign, Wilhelm von Fürstenberg tried to move his French patrons in this direction, even though no French request on that matter was ever presented in Rome.⁶²

However, Louis XIV eventually acted upon his warnings to the prince-bishop and sent troops to terminate Christoph Bernhard's campaign, although these troops took no direct action but rather oversaw the increasing disintegration of Christoph Bernhard's army. When Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg in this situation renewed his offers for mediation in peace talks (alongside a thinly veiled threat to otherwise join the war on the Dutch side), Christoph Bernhard von Galen suspended the military campaign and entered into negotiations that ultimately resulted in the Peace of Cleves in 1666 and Christoph Bernhard's temporary abandonment of territorial expansion at the expense of the United Provinces.⁶³ It was only then

59 Christoph Bernhard to Franz Egon von Fürstenberg, Münster, 18 June 1665, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 1, p. 457.

60 Braubach, *Fürstenberg*, pp. 96–97.

61 Max Braubach, 'Der Pakt der Brüder Fürstenberg mit Frankreich', in Max Braubach, *Kurköln: Gestalten und Ereignisse aus zwei Jahrhunderten rheinischer Geschichte* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1949), pp. 19–42.

62 Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg an Lionne, Oberkirch, 16 September 1665, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 1, p. 472.

63 Ernst Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm: Der Große Kurfürst von Brandenburg: Eine politische Biographie*, 2 vols (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1978), pp. 89–93.

that the English government stepped in for a last-ditch effort to save their alliance, dispatching William Temple to Cleves and then to Münster to stop the treaty and its subsequent ratification and to provide some of the overdue subsidies with a view to keeping the bishop in line. Lamentably for his principals, Temple succeeded neither in persuading the prince-bishop to remain in their alliance nor in reversing the payment of English subsidies after Christoph Bernhard had signed the peace treaty.⁶⁴

Gearing up for the 'grand dessein': German princes and the negotiation of French subsidy alliances for Louis XIV's Dutch War

By 1668, the strategic situation on the larger European scale had changed a good deal: the Netherlands gradually emerged as the principal enemy of Louis XIV, and he began to arrange French diplomacy in Europe as a tool to enable large-scale warfare against the Dutch. This constellation would ultimately commit the Fürstenberg brothers and Christoph Bernhard to the same political camp. Soon after the end of the War of Devolution (1667–1668), Wilhelm von Fürstenberg shifted into high gear as Louis XIV's principal negotiator in the empire to broker subsidy alliances with German princes – alliances that should, on the basis of his and foreign secretary Lionne's thinking, enable them to recruit armies that would participate in a French attack on the Netherlands.⁶⁵ As shown in Paul Sonnino's comprehensive study of the run-up to the Dutch War, these negotiations proved to be complicated and the French attack had to be delayed repeatedly; it is also evident that the military outlines for the campaign and the subsequent roles of the German allies frequently changed.⁶⁶

Fürstenberg's negotiations in the Holy Roman Empire demonstrate particularly well how the French diplomatic effort to form subsidy alliances relied on French cross-border patronage relations as an

64 For this last episode, see William Temple to John Temple, Brussels, 10 May 1666, in *Works of Temple*, 4 vols, pp. 242–252.

65 Braubach, 'Der Pakt der Brüder Fürstenberg'; Hans Böhmer, 'Forschungen zur französischen Rheinpolitik im 17. Jahrhundert: Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg und die französische Diplomatie in Deutschland', *Rheinische Vierteljahrsblätter* 4 (1934), 225–259.

66 Paul Sonnino, *Louis XIV and the Origins of the Dutch War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

important tool of French diplomacy. Fürstenberg and other actors acted within a local French network of informants, political brokers, and (unofficial as well as official) negotiators. They were obligated to the crown in ‘cross-border’ patron–client relationships that resembled the networks of clients serving as channels for royal patronage to provincial elites in exchange for their compliance in organizing provincial politics, which contributed to the political integration of the kingdom’s periphery.⁶⁷ As French clients, the two Fürstenberg brothers were not only indispensable pillars of French politics in the empire. As clients, the Fürstenbergs amassed multiple, often rivalling, loyalties – a very common phenomenon found in many patronage relations in the early modern period. They carefully balanced and played out their many roles as powerful counsellors, ministers, and diplomats to a prince elector, clients of the French crown, clergymen, and members of a traditionally pro-Habsburg noble house to their own advantage to improve their noble status, ecclesiastical careers, or revenues.⁶⁸

Moreover, the negotiations for subsidy alliances reveal how Wilhelm von Fürstenberg imposed his family’s respective ‘micropolitical’ interest on to the negotiations and the operational preparations for war. In his treaty with Cologne, Fürstenberg made sure that the alliance treaty with Archbishop Max Heinrich would not only secure the Dutch-occupied city of Rheinberg for his elector and principal but also guarantee the Fürstenbergs several rich Dutch-controlled manors.⁶⁹ Moreover, Wilhelm von Fürstenberg himself joined the ranks of German military entrepreneurs when, in the run-up to the war that his negotiations would eventually facilitate, he began recruiting a regiment on his own with French funds in 1669 and thus joined the ranks of German military entrepreneurs. But interestingly, Wilhelm insisted on posting his regiment under French command, not under that of Max Heinrich’s army operating on the basis of French subsidies.⁷⁰ Considering Fürstenberg a client of the French crown does not mean that he simply served the interests of a unified governmental mind on a strictly local level.

67 Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-century France* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

68 For the workings of this clientele and the practices of the Fürstenberg brothers and other actors from the 1650s to the 1670s, see Haug, *Ungleiche Außenbeziehungen*.

69 Braubach, *Fürstenberg*, p. 220.

70 *Ibid.*, pp. 231–232.

The French stance on the vast system of subsidy alliances with German princes was subject to the interplay of ministerial and court-faction infights, which typically aligned themselves with conflicts over larger political issues. As the crown's client in the empire, Fürstenberg had close ties to the French foreign secretary Hugues de Lionne, who acted as a kind of patronage manager towards French clients abroad but with whom Fürstenberg also had a personal friendship, Lionne having been a French ambassador at the Frankfurt imperial election of 1657–1658.⁷¹ As Lionne's confidant, Fürstenberg subsequently saw his project of alliances heavily contested by Lionne's bitter rival Louvois, the French minister of war, who sought a more exclusive role for the regular French troops throughout the campaign.⁷²

As a client, Fürstenberg was not merely an instrument for French interests and brokerage in the empire; he had easy access to the court and the king and could play his own party in the faction rivalries. Still, Wilhelm's room for manoeuvre in terms of subsidy alliances became substantially curtailed with Lionne's death in 1671 when Louvois temporarily took over as foreign minister. Fürstenberg's negotiations for subsidy alliances were also riddled with other difficulties. Not only would it eventually prove too complicated to co-ordinate the complex interests and rivalries of the elector of Brandenburg, Philipp Wilhelm von Neuburg, or the dukes of Brunswick into an offensive alliance; Fürstenberg's leverage for the negotiation of military alliances was also dependent on French payments to the courts of larger European powers – for example costs associated with Sweden's abandonment of the Dutch, which at one point effectively defunded Fürstenberg's planned subsidy alliances.⁷³

Finally, in 1672, Fürstenberg could muster two rather 'obvious' offensive subsidy alliances with Max Heinrich of Cologne, still firmly in the grip of the influence of both Fürstenberg brothers, and with Christoph Bernhard von Galen who got a chance to rekindle his infamous feud with the Dutch, now aided by French subsidies. While Max Heinrich as a particularly weak monarch was practically carried into the alliance by the Fürstenberg brothers, Christoph Bernhard von Galen's involvement was more proactive: he had already become a beneficiary of French subsidies in exchange for his neutrality during the War of Devolution in 1667 and immediately

71 *Ibid.*, p. 36.

72 Sonnino, *Dutch War*, pp. 140–141.

73 *Ibid.*, pp. 151–153.

invested the funds in a modest rearmament.⁷⁴ With the Peace of Aachen in 1668, this source of revenue was cut off abruptly. No payment of French subsidies to Münster in peacetimes was to be expected, as was pointed out by Friedrich Korff-Schmising, one of his negotiators, who was sent to Paris to collect these debts.⁷⁵

The preparations for a French war against the Dutch Republic were hence eagerly awaited by Christoph Bernhard, who needed little persuasion to insert himself into a coalition for a renewed attack on the Dutch for a highly paid subsidy alliance. Several delays and the preliminary offer of a less lucrative and merely defensive alliance, which effectively froze him out of what he called the ‘grand dessein’, apparently only rendered the prince-bishop nervous and angry.⁷⁶ Finally, in 1672, the bishop joined an alliance to go on the offensive against the Dutch with France and Cologne that secured him 13,000 *écus*, for which he had to provide nine thousand troops, while Max Heinrich committed a contingent of around eight thousand for 11,000 *écus*.⁷⁷ Münster and Cologne did not enter the war as distant proxies but operated closely together with the French army. Being in a subsidy alliance with France also meant that Münster was expected to provide supplies, mainly ammunition, for the entire coalition army.⁷⁸

Christoph Bernhard von Galen’s alliance was widely rejected in the empire. His own chapter would generally have approved of subsidies for an armed neutrality or defensive warfare, but it was staunchly opposed to an offensive campaign with the French that endangered the safety of the bishopric.⁷⁹ Dealing with his own chapter also led the bishop (in opposition to the earlier English

74 Kohl, *Christoph Bernhard*, pp. 255–256; Tessin, ‘Formationsgeschichte’, p. 93.

75 Korff-Schmising to Christoph Bernhard, Paris, 13 December 1669, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 2, p. 181; Korff-Schmising to Christoph Bernhard, Paris, 13 December 1669, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 2, p. 182.

76 Friedrich Korff-Schmising to Christoph Bernhard, Paris, 24 March 1670, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 2, pp. 221–222; Verjus to Louis XIV, Bielefeld, 13 June 1671, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 2, p. 289; Kohl, *Christoph Bernhard*, p. 334.

77 Kohl, *Christoph Bernhard*, p. 354; Braubach, *Fürstenberg*, pp. 219–222.

78 Französisch-münsterische Konvention, Ostendorf, 22 January 1672, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 2, p. 357; Louvois to Christoph Bernhard, Rumigny en Thiérarche, 30 April 1672, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 2, p. 397.

79 Protokoll des Domkapitels zu Münster, Münster, 8 March 1672, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 2, p. 367; Protokoll des Domkapitels zu Münster, Münster, 12 March 1672, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 2, p. 369.

alliance) to emphasize more decidedly the confessional nature of the military action he was about to join.⁸⁰ Consulting his ‘conscience counsellor’, the Jesuit Theodor Körler, the bishop inquired if his duty, born out of an allegiance to the pope as a protector of church possessions, the opportunity of a triumphant victory over heresy, and his Christian conscience, compelled him to wage an aggressive war alongside the ‘roi très chrétien’ and a fellow ecclesiastical prince. Fashioning the Dutch War as a religious conflict in this respect also served more opportunistic purposes, as von Galen also inquired whether it was then permissible to completely ignore his chapter in the decision to enter the war.⁸¹ While Pater Körler generally approved of guarding and eventually regaining Catholic territory, he found neither the imagined papal commission nor the conscience argument convincing.⁸²

The chapter continued to disapprove of an offensive war in a French alliance. This could not be changed, either by religious justifications or by constructing a ‘preventive war’ against the Dutch who, allegedly, were about to attack the bishopric and other parts of the empire, which meant that stopping them in their tracks would be an act of patriotism and guarantee of peace towards the bishopric and the empire.⁸³ Likewise, Pope Clement X himself repudiated any military adventure in the Netherlands with regard to Christoph Bernhard.⁸⁴ All of this eventually caused Christoph Bernhard to send his army into the field without any further consultation.

There was also more fierce resistance to Christoph Bernhard’s action, particularly by his fellow imperial estates and by Emperor Leopold I, who sent one of his generals and diplomats, the marquis de Grana, to the bishopric to formally reprimand von Galen for his offensive alliance.⁸⁵ With the gradual involvement of the emperor and

80 Christoph Bernhard explored a confessionally homogeneous subsidy alliance by the end of 1666, see *Denkschrift 1666* [late 1666], in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 2, p. 41.

81 Braun, *Princeps*, p. 340.

82 Gewissensvotum des P. Körler, early 1672, in *Korrespondenz Christoph Bernhard*, pp. 453–456.

83 Christoph Bernhard to the Münster Chapter, St Ludgersburg, 30 March 1672, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 2, p. 376.

84 Clement X to Christoph Bernhard, 30 April 1672, in *Korrespondenz Christoph Bernhard*, pp. 449–450.

85 Ferdinand von Fürstenberg to Christoph Bernhard, Neuhaus, 8 April 1672, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 2, pp. 387–388; Marquis de Grana to Leopold I, Lennepp, 13 April 1672, in *Akten und Urkunden*, vol. 2, pp. 388–389.

an increasing number of imperial estates in the conflict following the initial phase of the Dutch War, the role of the political framework of the empire and its impact on patron–client relations and military entrepreneurship in foreign services changed. Such warlike subsidy alliances were now treated no longer as infractions of the Peace of Westphalia in a larger sense or as hazards in relation to territorial security and religious peace but increasingly as treason or breaches of fealty towards emperor and empire. With no unified procedures in place that could put the empire in a formal state of war, a *Reichskrieg* against France was cumulated through a subsequent combination of legal measures in 1673–1674.⁸⁶

This development was accompanied by a series of violent acts which were ostensibly aimed at disrupting the peace negotiations under way in Cologne and included the singling out of Wilhelm von Fürstenberg as the main promoter of treasonous subsidy alliances and armaments.⁸⁷ Fürstenberg was eventually kidnapped and imprisoned by a band of imperial officers as a corrupt traitor and defector. Keeping his regiment in French service while allegedly ignoring an imperial mandate to withdraw to the empire weighed particularly heavily in these accusations⁸⁸ While Fürstenberg's own contradictory assemblage of identities between affiliations in France and the empire turned against him during the Dutch war, in effect this also blocked any penal consequences for Fürstenberg and made his eventual release an important *point d'honneur* for the French during the peace negotiations in Nijmegen.⁸⁹

Not unlike Fürstenberg's treatment, an act of spectacular violence was also planned and approved by some officials in Vienna to counter Christoph Bernhard's collaboration with France. Even before the empire had started to enter the war, a young officer, Adam von der Kette, was dispatched to Münster to assassinate von Galen.⁹⁰ Even though these plans were revealed at an early stage, Christoph Bernhard appeared scared at the prospect of being treated as a rebel

86 See Christoph Kampmann, 'Reichstag und Reichskriegserklärung im Zeitalter Ludwigs XIV', *Historisches Jahrbuch* 113 (1993), pp. 41–59.

87 For the failure and Habsburg disruption of the peace talks in Cologne, see Marie-Felicia Renaudin, 'L'échec du congrès de Cologne: De la fête au drame', *Revue d'histoire diplomatique* 118 (2004), 223–249.

88 Käthe Spiegel, *Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenbergs Gefangenschaft und ihre Bedeutung für die Friedensfrage 1674–1679* (Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1936); Haug, *Ungleiche Außenbeziehungen*, pp. 430–450.

89 Paul Otto Höynck, *Frankreich und seine Gegner auf dem Nymwegener Friedenskongreß* (Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1960), pp. 21–22.

and an enemy by the emperor, and his resolve to fight in the French coalition began to crack. Yet, only after two disappointing campaigns in the Netherlands, von Galen decided to switch sides and join a ragtag coalition of imperial troops and allied princes. This decision was born not solely out of a strong desire for his own security or feelings of what might be called imperial patriotism but also out of the failure of his French allies to secure his territories against Dutch reprisals and, on a regular basis, provide the guaranteed subsidies for his large army.

Still acting as a minor prince turned military entrepreneur, Christoph Bernhard would not commit his troops to the imperial coalition in the German north-west without securing for himself an extraordinarily advantageous monthly rate of subsidies of 15,000 *reichstaler* (after an immediate payment of 40,000 *reichstaler*) and a very generous command over the army.⁹¹ Nevertheless, Christoph Bernhard's stance toward subsidy alliances turned even more 'entrepreneurial' as the excruciating war dragged on and frequently led him to lend out his troops to, for instance, the king of Denmark, the countess of Frisia, and other members of the anti-French coalition.⁹²

Conclusions

The cases presented in this chapter have shown that subsidy alliances not only provided major European powers with what would today be called boots on the ground and the necessary infrastructure for pursuing military campaigns; they also afforded minor princes the chance to promote their interests in territorial security or expansion, as well as possibly providing them with a military asset of symbolic value to enhance their status on the larger European stage. Brokering such alliances between asymmetrical partners was often undertaken with the help of cross-border networks or clients of

90 For a more comprehensive account of this attempt, see Eberhard Wiens, 'Beiträge zur Geschichte der Verschwörung des Adam von der Kette gegen das Land und Leben des Fürstbischofs von Münster, Christoph Bernhard von Galen', *Westfälische Zeitschrift* 4 (1841), 289–321; see also André Krischer, 'Eine grausame und gefährliche Verräterey und Conjunction: Der versuchte Anschlag auf den Münsteraner Fürstbischof Christoph Bernhard von Galen 1673', in *Höllische Ingenieure – Attentate und Verschwörungen in kriminalitäts-, entscheidungs- und sicherheitsgeschichtlicher Perspektive*, ed. by Tilman Haug and André Krischer (Constance: UVK, forthcoming).

91 Kohl, *Christoph Bernhard*, pp. 409–416.

92 *Ibid.*, pp. 475–478.

foreign powers in the empire, who inserted their own interests and prospects for rewards into these negotiations. In other cases, such as the English alliance with Münster, the lack of functional ‘lubricants’ for communication and military coordination as well as a certain susceptibility to Dutch ‘counter-patronage’ significantly impaired the subsidy alliance.

While the political framework of the empire and its internal system of alliances explicitly allowed for external alliances for security and peacekeeping purposes, these factors also placed some constraints on subsidy alliances; examples include the ways in which the Rhine alliance put the duke of Neuburg’s armament into question or presented offensive alliances as a danger to the contemporary order of peace. With the more active involvement and transformation of the empire into an actor of foreign power politics during the Dutch War, French subsidy alliances came close to treason, while other foreign subsidies remained crucial to keeping actors like Christoph Bernhard von Galen in the war. Thus, foreign subsidy alliances after the Peace of Westphalia provided new political opportunities for German potentates to impose themselves on the European stage; but their asymmetrical alliances not only reveal a multiform diplomatic game with multiple loyalties and ambiguous negotiators, they also show that the princes’ affiliation to the empire as a political body remained a significant norm of reference with which they sought to align their alliances in one way or another.