This chapter offers an interpretation of John Rawls whereby political principles of toleration are justified in virtue of the legitimate expectation that citizens themselves move beyond toleration in their political discourse by engaging with one another in public reason. It shows that some assumptions about citizens' personal attitudes must be made before political toleration can be claimed to be appropriate. Revealing these assumptions shows that reflections on the nature of pluralism are a red herring with respect to arguments for political toleration. Toleration of disliked or disapproved of people requires refraining from repression and official discouragement of the practices constitutive of these differences. Political principles of toleration are necessary for preserving peace, stability and justice between people divided by incommensurable differences.
Their basis and limits
Rights appear in every plausible theory of justice and dominate contemporary political rhetoric. Critics, as a matter of course, raise two objections to this proliferation of rights talk. First, they argue that no clear justification exists for rights. As a result, every political issue can be turned into a demand for rights. Second, they object that rights encourage individualistic and anti-social behaviour. This chapter explores two approaches to rights: the interest-based (IB) approach and the obligation-based or Kantian view. Both approaches are shown to offer coherent justifications that can avoid turning all political concerns into a matter of rights. The chapter compares the ways the approaches relate to other social duties. It shall be argued that only the Kantian approach fully escapes the second criticism by positively requiring that we supplement rights with other social virtues.
Edited by: Catriona McKinnon and Dario Castiglione
The idea of toleration as the appropriate response to difference has been central to liberal thought since Locke. Although the subject has been widely and variously explored, there has been reluctance to acknowledge the new meaning that current debates offer on toleration. This book starts from a clear recognition of the new terms of the debate, reflecting the capacity of seeing the other's viewpoint, and the limited extent to which toleration can be granted. Theoretical statements on toleration posit at the same time its necessity in democratic societies, and its impossibility as a coherent ideal. There are several possible objections to, and ways of developing the ideal of, reasonable tolerance as advocated by John Rawls and by some other supporters of political liberalism. The first part of the book explores some of them. In some real-life conflicts, it is unclear on whom the burden of reasonableness may fall. This part discusses the reasonableness of pluralism, and general concept and various more specific conceptions of toleration. The forces of progressive politics have been divided into two camps: redistribution and recognition. The second part of the book is an attempt to explore the internal coherence of such a transformation when applied to different contexts. It argues that openness to others in discourse, and their treatment as free and equal, is part of a kind of reflexive toleration that pertains to public communication in the deliberative context. Social ethos, religious discrimination and education are discussed in connection with tolerance.
Catriona McKinnon and Dario Castiglione
Toleration was supported along two main lines of reasoning, although the ascendancy of arguments for religious tolerance can be traced to considerations of prudence and political realism from a more principled perspective. One was overtly sceptical and secularist, undermining the truth-content of religious beliefs and their relevance for social and political coexistence. The other was more subtly latitudinarian, questioning the control that we have on our own beliefs, and the self-defeating nature of imposing outward conformity on intractable inner convictions. Theoretical statements on toleration posit at the same time its necessity in democratic societies, and its impossibility as a coherent ideal. The success of 'zero tolerance' as a slogan for a less forgiving society bears witness to the diffusion of such a mood in public opinion.