In May 1958, and four years into the Algerian War of Independence, a revolt again appropriated the revolutionary and republican symbolism of the French Revolution by seizing power through a Committee of Public Safety. This book explores why a repressive colonial system that had for over a century maintained the material and intellectual backwardness of Algerian women now turned to an extensive programme of 'emancipation'. After a brief background sketch of the situation of Algerian women during the post-war decade, it discusses the various factors contributed to the emergence of the first significant women's organisations in the main urban centres. It was only after the outbreak of the rebellion in 1954 and the arrival of many hundreds of wives of army officers that the model of female interventionism became dramatically activated. The French military intervention in Algeria during 1954-1962 derived its force from the Orientalist current in European colonialism and also seemed to foreshadow the revival of global Islamophobia after 1979 and the eventual moves to 'liberate' Muslim societies by US-led neo-imperialism in Afghanistan and Iraq. For the women of Bordj Okhriss, as throughout Algeria, the French army represented a dangerous and powerful force associated with mass destruction, brutality and rape. The central contradiction facing the mobile socio-medical teams teams was how to gain the trust of Algerian women and to bring them social progress and emancipation when they themselves were part of an army that had destroyed their villages and driven them into refugee camps.
There has been much research on the process of 'domesticating the empire', the methods by which French and other imperial regimes attempted to intervene in, regulate or remake indigenous family life in its own image. This chapter aims to investigate the overt and implicit meanings of the model of family life, companionate marriage and gender roles that underpinned the emancipation campaign. It was French policy in Africa, Indochina and elsewhere to encourage wives of the military and colonial service to volunteer for welfare work with native women. The wives of senior army officers and certain types of female army personnel (mainly nurses) played the key role in forming the Mouvement de solidarité féminine (MSF). The chapter presents three case-studies of three circles, Héliopolis, Rio-Salado and Palissy, to illustrate the inner workings of the local MSF.
The Algerian War saw thousands of women being mobilised, in an ad hoc way, as a result of the shortage of trained nurses to tend to wounded fighters in make-shift field hospitals. This chapter examines two groups of Algerian women militants. The first is the minority of urban-based and usually better-educated commandos (the fidayate), many of whom later escaped to the maquis. The second is the tens of thousands of anonymous peasant women 'civilians' in the rural areas (moussebilate) who provided vital support to the moudjahidines (fighters in Armée de libération nationale (ALN) units). The chapter explores the extent to which the Front de libération nationale made any impact during the course of the war on the deeply embedded sociocultural, economic and political practices relating to gender. In late 1957 and early 1958, the ALN demobilised moudjahidate from the maquis, a decision that reasserted male authority.
The French army faced a particularly daunting task in its ambition to create a strategy of contact, which would enable it to penetrate into the lives of the great mass of Algerian women that inhabited the interior. The key instrument of contact that was developed during Operation Pilot and then extended to the rest of Algeria from late 1957 onwards was the mobile socio-medical teams (EMSI). This chapter considers the role of the EMSI. The Fifth Bureau and army commanders frequently expressed high hopes that the EMSI, through their ability to reach over to peasant women and penetrate the previously impermeable fortress of the Muslim family, would provide important intelligence. The chapter examines the inherent weakness and incapacity of the organisation and the extent to which the official propaganda drive, concerning an efficient, trouble-free organisation, impressive in its humanity and scope, met resistance from the Algerian peasantry.
Emancipation was seen as preempting the dangers of the Front de libération nationale (FLN) itself organising women and offering to liberate them. Overall the French 'emancipation' strategy failed miserably, a failure that was linked to the extraordinary inability of European decision-makers to recognise the enormous weight and complexity of Muslim society and its deep-seated durability and powers of resistance to colonial attempts to re-shape it in its own image. Islamist groups unleashed a wave of violence against women, forcing them to wear the hijab, or to retreat from education and employment back into the seclusion of the home. The impacts of French emancipation of Algerian women had been perverse, and achieved the very opposite results from its proclaimed goals. Through the fatal association between women's liberation and the assault on the Muslim nation, the French succeeded in reinforcing the reactionary elements within the FLN and Islamist currents.
The French army faced a major problem in its campaign of emancipation, how to reach out to the mass of over four million women, most of whom were illiterate and scattered over the surface of a huge territory in villages or secluded settlements. The task of developing contacts that could reach all Algerian women presented a formidable challenge. This chapter looks at the role of mass media communication which was developed centrally by the government and military to reach women across the entire geographical space of Algeria. It looks at the propaganda use of film which provided a powerful, visual means for reaching an uneducated audience. The chapter examines the content of the radio programmes that were specifically designed for women. The French army had experimented with radio propaganda in 1951 during the war in Vietnam but had abandoned the idea because of the paucity of receivers among the population.
This chapter, which covers the first half of the Algerian War from 1 November 1954 until the coup of '13 May' 1958, falls into two parts. During a first phase from 1954 to mid-1956, which was dominated by the governorship of Jacques Soustelle, the Algiers government made little attempt to formulate a policy that was directly aimed at Muslim women. The second phase, which lasted from 1956 until 1958, saw the appearance of an intense debate that was focused on Algerian women. The Algiers government of Robert Lacoste responded with a range of initiatives that included a propaganda campaign on emancipation and un-veiling. The psychological warfare officers of the Fifth Bureau were interested in the counter-insurgency and repressive implications of women's emancipation. Jean Servier appears to have been the first person during the war to design a military programme that was directed specifically at peasant women.
The origins of the Algerian women’s movement, 1945–54
This chapter provides a brief background sketch of the overall social, economic and political situation of Algerian women during the post-war decade. It looks at the movements to show the new forms of activism and organisation that emerged after 1944, and the differing ideological currents at work. The chapter looks at Algerian women's movements to show in more detail the new forms of activism and organisation that emerged after 1944, and the differing ideological currents at work. The chapter discusses the role of Union des femmes d'Algérie, Union démocratique du manifeste algérien, and Association des Ulema musulmans algériens. In May 1945, the colonial regime unleashed an extremely violent repression at Sétif and imprisoned thousands of nationalists, but far from bringing the independence movement to a halt this simply deepened the political crisis and drove the nationalists towards the preparation of an armed insurrection.
Throughout the period from early 1956 to early 1958 putschist forces had been gathering strength both within the army and among rightwing settler organisations and these eventually coalesced on 13 May 1958 when crowds gathered in the Forum and stormed the General Government buildings. This chapter examines the all-male 'fraternisation' ceremonies of 16 May, before moving on to the symbolic unveiling from 17 to 18 May, because of the light that it sheds on the organisation of the psychological warfare offensive. The centrality of the Forum parades during the journées of '13 May' can be considered as a form of ralliement. The chapter also examines how the Fifth Bureau got Algerian men to assemble on 16 May for the displays of 'fraternisation'. It explores the social, political and class background of the women on the unveiling demonstrations.
This chapter provides a general contextualisation and interpretive framework to set the scene for the more detailed investigation that follows. The term 'emancipation' is used in the sense that it was used constantly during the Algerian War by the colonial government and military. The French emancipation agenda was built on a Eurocentric cultural model of domesticity through which Muslim women would reach true freedom by a modernisation process that would 'westernise' them in every respect. It is argued that the French army had a much stronger motivation to deploy a discourse and practice of liberation than the Front de libération nationale, which assumed a more reactive position. In the drive to bring Algerian women on side, the military had come to share one of the key ideological beliefs of Algerian nationalism, the view that women and the family constituted the last remaining bastion of religious, cultural and social identity.