that these ideas have proved particularly attractive to a left that is struggling to redefine its project after the collapse of state socialism and the
declining appeal of a top-down, bureaucratic corporatism and welfarism,
and to respond to widespread concerns about the deteriorating social
fabric and ‘hollowed-out’ politics of the contemporary market societies
that neo-liberalism is creating. Republican ideas seem to promise a route
back to the values of freedom and democracy that the twentieth-century
left seemed too often to lose touch with, at the
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, pp.
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, pp.
J. Christman, ‘Liberalism and Individual
Positive Freedom’, Ethics , 101 (1991), pp. 343–59. On
the positive concept of freedom see also C. Taylor, ‘What
’ realism and liberalism as opposed to
neo-realism and neo-liberalism.
An example is C. Douzinas and R. Warrington,
Justice Miscarried: Ethics and Aesthetics in Law (New
York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994). While postmodernism is usually
presented as being irreconcilable with ethics, Bauman notes that as
totally clear, but probably lie at least in part in
the decline in formal religious observance from the early twentieth century,
alongside the decline of political Liberalism which had strong temperance and
anti-gambling sections. Certainly the National Anti-Gambling League and
other formal anti-betting organisations were much less well supported between
The falling attendance of the ‘respectable classes’ at churches, the growth of
leisure alternatives to Sunday church- or chapel-going, and the growing urbanisation of Britain, all contributed to a failure to
reverted to Horkheimer's original argument that workers were the
‘ultimate target’, they took up the core issue raised in Marx's
critique of Bauer, the connection between Enlightenment and the Jewish question,
now reformulated in terms of the connection between liberalism and antisemitism.
They maintained that liberalism appeared fundamentally opposed to Nazi
antisemitism but could not provide the basis for a coherent response as long as it
continued to assume
sixth and final phase from 1990 onwards and entered into popular consciousness.
Finance and financialisation emerged as forces of globalisation par excellence.
Counterpoints, critiques, dialogues
Time–space compression altered communication, media, finance, investment,
trade and governance, and set the parameters of how the politics of opposition
to neo-liberalism and global inequalities would take shape.
The last two waves are the ones normally known as globalisation. More historically minded perspectives begin with the fourth or even third wave
Brigitte Nerlich, Sarah Hartley, Sujatha Raman and Alexander Thomas T. Smith
science in public, the role of
publics in science, and the role of expertise in science and policymaking,
as well the role of faith in science and society. Others have examined
these issues, but we seek to put them in conversation with wider
political developments around migration, religion and neo-liberalism.
The chapters in this volume are based on work carried out within the
Leverhulme-Trust-funded Making Science Public research programme
(2012–2017), which explored the relationships between science, politics
and publics through a number of topical case
values is to
approach it from the public’s point of view. What do they want from a political
party? In varying degrees, the public want three things: opportunity, security
and hope in the future. We have to show how our values will offer these
Conservatism is an organic political philosophy; it grows and changes.
It has appeared in the recent past to be dominated by economic liberalism.
That is not enough. We are also a party of social progress; of recognition of
our responsibilities to others. We are the party of the British constitution,
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distinctive meanings ascribed to national ‘models’ within the construction of
globalisation are rarely problematised. Indeed, there is an assumption that the
pressures of globalisation have heralded an undisputed victory for AngloSaxon neo-liberalism, and a defeat for social market corporatism. As I have
shown, however, the making of a ‘global Britain’ has served a particular set of
functions in the framing of the need to ‘harness’ globalisation via labour
flexibilisation. Such representations extend beyond the terms
, neoliberal critiques first emerged in the 1930s and 1940s. 15 At this time, a small number of economists and political philosophers reacted against what they saw as a crisis of liberalism, in which liberal governments created mechanisms for securing individual freedom (from disease or old age) by collectivising social risks. 16 Faced with post-war planning and destructive totalitarian regimes, neoliberal theorists sought to rethink liberalism, and recast state interventions in social and economic realms as a risk to the individualised self-determination supposedly at the