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A political–cultural approach
Lisbeth Aggestam

of other member states or a European dimension. These words of a senior British foreign policy-maker reflect the experience of foreign policy cooperation between member states of the European Union for more than a quarter of a century. 1 Over the years, the level of ambition to speak with ‘one voice’ in foreign affairs has steadily increased to include even security and

in Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy
Open Access (free)
Thomas Robb

relations. Likewise, for Henry Kissinger, ‘international relations cannot be conducted without an awareness of power relationships’.37 Edward Heath was equally frank in articulating that ‘realism’ had to be the bedrock of any British foreign policy.38 The following chapters, therefore, provide an analysis of the key political engagements between the two countries. 01_Strained_partnership_001-023.indd 13 06/11/2013 12:43 14 A strained partnership? The context for US–UK relations The Nixon presidency has long fascinated historians, political scientists, journalists and

in A strained partnership?
Thomas Robb

-assessing foreign policy 25 such arguments. The Nixon administration’s indifference towards the special relationship coupled with a British foreign policy pursuing a more European path resulted in the special relationship becoming near redundant. It was only once the consequences of the global economic and energy crisis of 1973–74 became apparent that the special relationship became prevalent again.6 Central in many of these accounts is the role played by certain individual policy-makers. Henry Kissinger, in particular, is seen to have had a malevolent effect upon US

in A strained partnership?
Peter D.G. Thomas

service. This strategy sufficed to maintain British naval supremacy, since all Choiseul’s efforts to rebuild the French navy foundered on lack of materials, manpower, and money, and so did the Spanish attempt. At the time of the Falkland Islands Crisis of 1770 some eighty British ships were soon fit for action, and there was every confidence Britain could defeat the combined enemy fleets.33 If the conduct of British foreign policy posed more problems than could be anticipated in 1760, the attention of both government and Parliament was increasingly taken up by imperial

in George III
The Stamp Act Crisis
Peter D.G. Thomas

, Macartney in Russia, pp. 13–33. Scott, British Foreign Policy, pp. 95–7. 15 Escott, Thesis, pp. 66–100. Scott, British Foreign Policy, pp. 91–5. 16 Powell, Thesis, p. 110. 17 Walpole, Memoirs, II, 144–5. 18 Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, pp. 132–6. 19 Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, pp. 137–8. This view is confirmed by Lord Hardwicke’s later comment. BL Add. MSS. 35428, fo. 22. For a more literal interpretation, see Langford, First Rockingham Administration, pp. 80–2. 20 Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, pp. 138

in George III
Jonathan Colman

relations between the Labour government and the United States, characterised above all by Wilson’s determination to secure his ties with the White House, in keeping with his personal inclinations and his view that close cooperation with Washington was fundamental to British foreign policy. The Labour victory President Johnson had never feared a Labour victory in Britain, but he felt it necessary to ease any

in A ‘special relationship’?
Rhiannon Vickers

relationship with the USA as part of the post-war settlement, arguing that Britain would be unable to meet all its possible European and imperial commitments without military support from the USA, particularly within the context of an expansionist Soviet Union. During the last few months of the war, Attlee and the Labour ministers became increasingly involved in the development of the postwar international settlement. For Labour Party members, their expectations of change in both British foreign policy and in international relations intensified as victory, and the prospect

in The Labour Party and the world, volume 1
Thomas Robb

3 A year of discord 1973–74 No special relations. Correct. They’ll [Britain] have the relation with the French. President Nixon to Henry Kissinger, 9 August 19731 A year of discord At the onset of 1973, the US–UK relationship was entering a new epoch. The East of Suez withdrawal had lessened Britain’s global commitments and Britain officially entered the EEC on 1 January 1973. Heath was determined to chart a more Euro-centric British foreign policy, which would involve the creation of common political, foreign, monetary and energy policies within the EEC. The

in A strained partnership?
Wilkes and America
Peter D.G. Thomas

Austria would adhere to her French alliance was not seen as a final rebuff, merely as a postponement of hopes cherished by many in Britain. Unrealistic as the main thrust of British foreign policy may have been, under Grenville it was nevertheless a success. Quite apart from the 1765 coup in Sweden, which was to prove short-lived in the face of French countermeasures, the Premier himself, continuing his hardline attitude already evident during the Bute ministry, resorted to what in the next century came to be known as ‘gunboat diplomacy’. Still resentful about the

in George III
India and America
Peter D.G. Thomas

settlement there without further orders. A Falkland Islands crisis was postponed only by Spanish failure to find the British base before this dispute was in 1768 temporarily overshadowed on the international scene by the Corsica question and the outbreak of a Russo-Turkish war.29 The failure of British foreign policy during the Chatham ministry can be ascribed to internal factors as well as the unfavourable international scene, the distractions of party politics at home and the need to devise measures for India and America. Yet when the new Parliamentary session began in

in George III