Executive versus legislative power
Cameron Ross

appointed and dismissed cabinet members and other officials of executive power. However, in other cases legislative organs of power were required to give their approval for: chairs of the government (Adygeya, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Ingushetiya, KarachaevoCherkesiya, Tatarstan, Mordoviya, Sakha, North Osetiya-Alaniya), first deputy and/or deputy chiefs of executive power (Irkutsk, Saratov, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, Kareliya, Sakha, Tyva, Tambov oblast), all members of the government, ministers, and leaders of state committees (Altai, Buryatiya, Tatarstan, Marii El

in Federalism and democratisation in Russia
Cameron Ross

.1 Dates of declarations of sovereignty Republic Date of declaration of sovereignty North OsetiyaAlaniya Kareliya Khakassiya Komi Tatarstan Udmurtiya Sakha (Yakutiya) Buryatiya Bashkortostan Kalmykiya Marii El Chuvashiya Gorno-Altai Tuva KarachaiCherkessiya ChechenoIngushetiya Mordova Kabardino-Balkariya Dagestan Adygeya July 20, 1990 August 9, 1990 August 15, 1990 August 29, 1990 August 30, 1990 September 20, 1990 September 27, 1990 October 8, 1990 October 11, 1990 October 18, 1990 October 22, 1990 October 24, 1990 October 25, 1990 November 1, 1990 November 17, 1990

in Federalism and democratisation in Russia
Cameron Ross

not contradict the Constitution’. FAD3 10/17/2002 5:42 PM Page 37 Federalism and constitutional asymmetry 37 But these provisions are simply ignored in a number of republican constitutions which defiantly proclaimed the supremacy of their constitutions over the Federal Constitution (e.g., article 7 of the Constitution of Sakha, article 15 of Bashkortostan, article 1 of Tyva, article 1 of Dagestan, and article 7 of Komi).24 Article 1 of Tyva’s Constitution stated that at times of political or state crisis in the republic, the Republic’s Constitution was to

in Federalism and democratisation in Russia
Open Access (free)
Corruption breeds violence
Pavel K. Baev

occasional skirmishes and, more importantly, significant uncertainty regarding Georgia’s ability to survive as an independent state. It is obvious that the civil wars in Georgia in 1990–93 erupted as a consequence of the break-up of the USSR;1 however, in most Soviet constituent republics the inevitable destabilisation resulting from that cataclysm did not take such violent forms. Many regions in Central Asia (the Fergana valley), in the North Caucasus (Dagestan, see Chapter 6 in this volume) and in Georgia itself (Ajariya) had explosive combinations of risk factors but

in Potentials of disorder
Open Access (free)
Cameron Ross

Representative: Army General Viktor Kazantsev. District capital: Rostov-on-Don. Republics of Adygeya, Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and North Ossetia; Krasnodar and Stavropol Krais; and Astrakhan, Rostov and Volgograd oblasts. Urals District Presidential Representative: Colonel-General (Police) Peter Latyshev. District capital: Yekaterinburg. Chelyabinsk, Kurgan, Sverdlovsk and Tyumen oblasts; and the Khanty-Mansii and Yamal-Nenets autonomous okrugs. Volga District Presidential Representative: Sergei Kirienko. District

in Federalism and democratisation in Russia