from the 1973 war and the oil embargo out of the weakness to be acclaimed as a ‘hero of peace’. He personalised relations between states, naively convinced that his embrace of American leaders, including his ‘friend Henry’ (Kissinger), would be enough to change America’s pro-Israeli policy. His eagerness to jettison Soviet support and rely totally on American diplomacy was an eccentrically personal choice that appalled his professional foreign policy advisors. To Sadat, the Russians were ‘crude and tasteless people’ while Egypt’s alienation from the US was unnatural
(2000/01), pp. 128–61, esp. p. 159; and Gideon Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and
Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics, 51:1 (1998), pp. 144–72.
Mark Kramer, ‘Neorealism, Nuclear Proliferation, and East-Central European
Strategies’, in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds), Unipolar Politics:
Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War (New York: Columbia University
Institutions of security governance
Press, 1999), pp. 428, 437–8, 462.
15 For a survey of assessments of the PfP, see Henry
The restructuring of work and production in the international political economy
: 2). The state and corporate actors Strange positions in relationships of ‘triangular diplomacy’ are presented as ‘managers’ of globalisation,
resonant with Charlotte Hooper’s ‘frontier masculinity’ in which business
solutions are sought for global dilemmas (Hooper, 2000: 67; see also Hooper,
2001). Diplomatic practices, espionage and the activities of statesmen have
defined what Hooper terms ‘hegemonic masculinities’ that now merge with
business discourses to create images such as that of James Bond and HenryKissinger ‘sitting next to an Economist reading
–ACP relationship is losing its uniqueness, this chapter examines
the evolution of the Union’s policies towards the five regions. Firstly it notes
the expansion of the Union’s commitments, globally and in the EU’s neighbourhood, and sets out the key reasons behind this expansion. It then analyses why and how there has been change in the Union’s relations with each of
the five regions.
The end of the Cold War: geography as
determinant of foreign policy?
In 1973 the Community member states took offence when HenryKissinger,
in his infamous ‘Year of Europe’ speech (Nuttall, 1992: 86
. It is
quite capable of defeating the threats to it that are apparent in the
REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING
1 David Held, ‘Democracy: From City-states
to a Cosmopolitan Order’, Political Studies , 11 (1992), pp.
2 Apocryphal reference.
3 HenryKissinger, US Secretary
dance artist to represent the US on those tours was José Limón,
who went to Latin America in 1954 (Prevots 2001).
Martha Graham was one of the most prominent artists to take an
active part in this programme. Clare Croft, who has written extensively
about dance and cultural diplomacy in the US, argues that Graham was
defined as a ‘grand lady of dance’ in a memo sent in 1974 from HenryKissinger to Gerald Ford (Croft 2015: 105). But Graham’s centrality in
American dance predated the State tours. The State Department consequently assumed she had international value
materialise. The price hikes of the OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum
Exporting Countries) oil cartel – termed ‘the moral equivalent of war’ by
the then US Secretary of State HenryKissinger – were more a healthy
reminder to the industrialised countries that they could not go on
wasting energy in the way they had been up until then. The truth of the
adage ‘a barrel of oil saved is a barrel of oil produced’ began to sink in,
leading to companies and individuals starting to economise on an asset
previously taken as both cheap and inexhaustible – in the form of less
before our statement was made’. 80 Wilson’s effort to establish a close relationship
with Nixon enjoyed only limited success, because no real rapport ever
emerged between the two leaders. For example, Wilson suggested after their
first handshake that they should address each other by their first names.
Nixon’s National Security Adviser, HenryKissinger, noted that
‘A fishy-eyed stare from Nixon squelched this idea’. 81
them. To get even small Israeli concessions, such as acceptance of the Rogers Plan, the US had to pledge ever more support to Israel (Walt 1987: 108–10). Israel’s arms dependency gave the US little leverage over it owing to the Israelis’ penetration of US domestic politics and a tacit threat to escalate the conflict or even to ‘go nuclear’ if the US abandoned them (Evron 1973: 178–80). President Nixon and his Secretary of State, HenryKissinger, developed a strategy that would make a virtue of Washington’s weak leverage over Israel: by keeping Israel too strong to be
of these origins. Thereafter, commonly experienced systemic forces seemed to divert them on to the same road toward moderation. They shared the defeat of 1967 and the rise to power, in reaction, of newly ‘pragmatic’ leaders – Sadat and Asad – in 1970. Both initiated limited liberalisation at home and inter-Arab détente abroad. Together they launched the October 1973 war and together they started on the path of post-war negotiations with Israel. Together – and only together – they might have reached a comprehensive Middle East peace for, as HenryKissinger remarked