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Open Access (free)
Francisco E. González and Desmond King

the United States because of its profound commitment to individual liberty and a free society: ‘the idea of freedom is the most contagious idea in history, more contagious than the idea of submission to authority’ (in Etzold and Gaddis 1978: 388). Anti-communism and anti-totalitarianism drove US foreign policy from 1947 and dictated the content of ‘Americanism’ as the defence of individualism and democracy. This agenda is signalled in a 1950 memorandum from the National Security Council describing Americanism as a doctrine adhered to at home and abroad: ‘The

in Democratization through the looking-glass
Promises and perils
Prashanth Parameswaran

Introduction Southeast Asia has traditionally occupied a marginal role in US foreign policy in general and US Asia policy in particular, and American commitment to the region has remained quite ambivalent since the end of the Cold War. But during his time in office, US President Barack Obama raised the level of US attention given to Southeast Asia and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to a level not seen since the end of the Vietnam War. 1 Seeing Southeast Asia and ASEAN as vital to preserving what it referred to as the rules

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
Open Access (free)
The United States in the Asia and Indo-Pacifics
Inderjeet Parmar

administrations to 2019; inevitably, and because the term “Indo-Pacific” was routinely absent from the lexicon of most scholars and policy makers (both in the United States and the Asian region) during Obama’s time in office, the authors individually explore the record of Obama in particular within the Asia Pacific region his administration identified as the most crucial to American interests. A key focus of this volume, then, is the examination of transition. Within this transition of US foreign policy from Obama to Trump there lie continuities and changes, durabilities and

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
From Afghanistan to Iraq
Kerry Longhurst

. One of the many effects of that day was the emergence of a fundamental difference between US and German perspectives regarding the use of force and how best to combat the sources of global terrorism. The transformation that US foreign policy underwent after (and arguably even before) September 11 brought into focus the peculiarities and continuities present within German security thinking. The Longhurst, Germany and the use of force.qxd 80 30/06/2004 16:25 Page 80 Germany and the use of force next section discusses at some length the evolution of US

in Germany and the use of force
Obama, Trump and the Asia Pacific political economy
Michael Mastanduno

proposed the term “responsible stakeholder” to convey that China had benefited greatly from its integration into the American-led world economy, and in return needed to do its part to ensure global stability, defined in terms of the priorities of the US foreign policy agenda. 11 Obama’s team embraced China’s promise as a responsible stakeholder. The President frequently stated that the United States ‘welcomed the rise of China’ and characterised US–China relations as the most important bilateral relationship of our time. 12 The administration took opportunities to

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
Autopilot, neglect or worse?
Nick Bisley

worrying lack of concern about nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia and promised a trade war with the world’s second largest economy. As President, Trump looked like he might govern US foreign policy in the same norm-busting manner in which he had campaigned, with dramatic consequences for regional security. But after two years in office, those hoping for radical change in US security policy towards the region have been disappointed. Much in the way that Obama’s Pivot was more about the presentation of US strategic policy and involved much less substantive change

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
Oliver Turner

partnerships, with the term hegemony more appropriate than ‘misleading’ assertions of empire or imperialism. 5 Andrew Hurrell concurs, but suggests that notions of an institutional American empire often neglect the centrality of force and coercion to US foreign policy, and its intrusions into others’ domestic affairs. 6 As suggested by Ikenberry who sees a deeply rooted ‘neo-imperial logic’ in US political culture, 7 hegemony and empire are not mutually exclusive. Charles Maier, indeed, laments the polarising nature of the word empire and resists its application to the

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
The Marshall Plan films about Greece
Katerina Loukopoulou

that were aligned with the US foreign policy. The majority of the MP films about Greece mobilise a particular kind of humanitarian narrative, one that evokes the ancient Greek heritage in such a way that it stands not only for Greece’s reconstruction but also for Western Europe’s future and its alignment with the US vision of a geopolitical ‘pax Americana’. My argument is that

in Global humanitarianism and media culture
Open Access (free)
Ian Scott and Henry Thompson

and corporate corruption. Away from the screen, Clooney’s political work has combined a critique of US foreign policy and an extensive humanitarian profile. Yet it is Clooney’s fame that is foregrounded more often, not least in the celebrity pages and gossip columns, where his Hollywood star still shines brightly. By contrast, what is striking about Stone is that his involvements seem to have no lighter alter-​ego side: no musical documentaries, no celebrity partygoing, no whimsy. Stone’s increasing online presence shifted the narrative of his work away from an

in The cinema of Oliver Stone
Thomas Robb

US had also undergone a re-assessment of its global position and the Nixon administration had reconfigured US foreign policy with its détente agenda. The Paris Peace Accords (January 1973) officially ended the US’s involvement in Vietnam, and superpower détente had resulted in the opening to the PRC and the establishment of US–Soviet bilateral diplomacy. 1973, therefore, presented new circumstances in which US–UK relations would be conducted, and it was the adaptation to this that created a number of problems for US–UK relations.2 First, Britain’s membership of the

in A strained partnership?