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Alexis Heraclides and Ada Dialla

applicable only if all states were distinct nations, in which case ‘the government must deal directly and alone with its people’, with no foreign interference. 90 But most states were not nations, and empires trampled on nations aspiring to freedom. These two factors did not lead Mazzini to advocate military intervention. He allowed only for two exceptions to non-intervention: (1) to offset a previous intervention in support of despots, that is, counter

in Humanitarian intervention in the long nineteenth century
Open Access (free)
Reflections in a distorting mirror
Christoph Zürcher

republics of the Yugoslav federation became sovereign nation states, recognised by the international community. Second-level territorial units, however, were denied independence, even in cases where they actively sought it. The international community reacted pragmatically to the problem of how to deal with crumbling empires: all first-level republics were, according to the principle of the self

in Mapping European security after Kosovo
Alexis Heraclides and Ada Dialla

). 11 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 274–308. 12 C. Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007). 13 J. Habermas, ‘Bestiality and Humanity: A War on the Border Between Legality and Morality

in Humanitarian intervention in the long nineteenth century
Impact of structural tensions and thresholds
Eşref Aksu

powers. What seemed ‘internal’ conflicts to the old colonialists (meaning internal to their colonial empires, as in Algeria or Rhodesia) were considered ‘international’ by the superpowers (meaning that the other superpower might intrude into that conflict at any moment). In this sense, the UN’s response to intra-state conflicts could not but reflect an overwhelming preoccupation with international

in The United Nations, intra-state peacekeeping and normative change
Open Access (free)
Language games in the Kosovo war
Mika Aaltola

blood, life and death, and, therefore, with war itself. 26 Since Kosovo had been the site of the 1389 battle between Serb forces (in ‘reality’ these forces were ethnically mixed) and the army of the Ottoman Empire, it evoked images of violent early death and horror. Although an event of the distant past, the Field of Blackbirds at Kosovo Pole symbolised the cataclysmic defeat in which the flower of the

in Mapping European security after Kosovo
Public presence, discourse, and migrants as threat
Giannis Gkolfinopoulos

Europeans). It is not just that a much respected historic building was occupied by homeless aliens, but that these aliens, as Muslims, are both totally alien and adversaries to Greek nationals. The anti-Muslim stance in Greece is deeply rooted in the national(ist) project of the fight against the Ottoman Empire for the constitution of the Greek state (1830). Turkey, seen as the heir of the Empire, is

in Security/ Mobility
Heikki Patomäki

didn’t speak . . . It would be some time before I fully realised that the United States sees little need for diplomacy; power is enough. Only the weak rely on diplomacy . . . But the Roman Empire had no need for diplomacy. Nor does the United States. Diplomacy is perceived by an imperial power as a waste of time and prestige and a sign of weakness. 9

in Mapping European security after Kosovo
Eşref Aksu

at stake and the normative preferences that accompanied them. The chapter will conclude by examining the implications of this ambiguity for the ensuing normative synthesis. Historical background Cyprus, the home of a Hellenic civilisation, became part of the Ottoman Empire in 1571. The island came under British rule in 1878. During the decolonisation decade, the trilateral

in The United Nations, intra-state peacekeeping and normative change
Pertti Joenniemi

about something quite different, since the classic Realist reasons for war fighting (the conquest of territory, oil, empire, or other ‘sovereign rights’) did not apply. These modern reasons for war were absent because the conflict in Kosovo centred around the pursuit of moral aims (rather than traditional politics) by other means. The vocabulary employed related more to the tradition of a just war (a

in Mapping European security after Kosovo
Just war and against tyranny
Alexis Heraclides and Ada Dialla

nature’. 4 The Romans rendered the just war idea a clear legal theory, most of all Cicero, who maintained that there are two just causes for resorting to war: redressing an injury and repelling an invader, with peace the ultimate aim of war. 5 The early Christians condemned war as evil and opposed to the will of God. But when Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire with the Edict of Milan (313), a more positive stance regarding war was called

in Humanitarian intervention in the long nineteenth century