: John Wiley & Sons, 2003).
71 Searle, Struggle for Syria, p. 293.
72 Michael Ionides, Divide and Lose: The Arab Revolt: 1955–58 (London: Cox & Wyman,
1960), pp. 109–97.
73 Keith Kyle, Suez (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1991).
74 Eden, House of Commons (23 December 1929), quoted in Kyle, Suez, p. 1.
75 See www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/releases/2008/october/suez-14-08-1956.htm
(accessed 10.11.15). See also Mark Garnett, Simon Mabon and Robert Smith, BritishForeignPolicy Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2017).
76 Michel Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba’ath [In the
Sweden and the lesser powers in the long eighteenth century
Press, 1969); Michael Roberts, Splendid Isolation, 1763–1780: The Stenton
Lecture 1969 (Reading: University of Reading, 1970); Ingrao, The Hessian
Mercenary State, pp. 135–162; Jeremy Black, A System of Ambition? BritishForeignPolicy 1660–1793 (Harlow: Longman, 1991), pp. 204ff; Wilson,
‘The German’, 786–787; Wilson, German Armies, pp. 311–312, 326; Scott,
The Birth, pp. 146–147. Sweden received very substantial British subsidies
in 1805–1816; Åmark, Sveriges statsfinanser, pp. 594, 852–856; Sherwig,
Guineas and Gunpowder, pp. 366–368, passim; Jan Glete, ‘The
BL Add. MSS. 32978, fos 235–41.
BL Add. MSS. 32988, fo. 49.
Lawson, George Grenville, pp. 258–69.
O’Gorman, Rise of Party, pp. 220–8.
BL Add. MSS. 32990, fo. 57.
BL Add. MSS. 32990, fo. 107.
Thomas, John Wilkes, pp. 68–76.
Thomas, John Wilkes, pp. 76–86.
Walpole, Memoirs, III, 146.
Legg, British Diplomatic Instructions, pp. 101–5.
Corr. of George III, II, 44.
For a detailed examination of the Corsica question see Escott, Thesis,
Scott, BritishForeignPolicy, pp. 112–24.
Thomas, Townshend Duties Crisis, pp. 76–8.
Thomas, Townshend Duties Crisis
The Middlesex Election and the Townshend Duties Crisis
Peter D.G. Thomas
. MSS. 35608, fo. 290.
10 Walpole, Letters, VII, 239.
11 Scott, BritishForeignPolicy, pp. 131–5. Tracy, Navies, pp. 73–5.
12 Thomas, Townshend Duties Crisis, pp. 95–6.
13 Thomas, John Wilkes, pp. 90–1.
14 Trumbull Papers, p. 303. For the debate see Simmons and Thomas, Proceedings and Debates, III, 3–13. It is described in Thomas, Townshend
Duties Crisis, pp. 104–7.
15 Thomas, Townshend Duties Crisis, pp. 107–11.
16 Simmons and Thomas, Proceedings and Debates, III, 47–50.
17 Simmons and Thomas, Proceedings and Debates, III, 64–83.
18 Simmons and Thomas, Proceedings
, The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648–1815
(London and New York: Longman, 1983), p. 26; Peter H. Wilson, German
Armies: War and German Politics 1648–1806 (London: UCL Press, 1998),
pp. 63, 87, 107, 179, 206–207, 228, 267–269; Dwyryd Wyn Jones, War
and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1988), pp. 8–11; Jeremy Black, ‘Parliament and Foreign Policy
in the Age of Walpole: The Case of the Hessians’, in Knights Errant and
True Englishmen: BritishForeignPolicy, 1660–1800, ed. by Jeremy Black
(Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd
attitudes in this field,
however, do not necessarily translate easily into specific political
choices. For example, in the 1930s liberals were divided on
‘appeasement’ as the mainspring of Britishforeignpolicy, and
in recent years they have been divided on Western intervention in the Gulf,
the Balkans, Africa and, recently, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Liberalism in the twentieth century
The twentieth century began
non-intervention, and the only sanctions he
could accept were ‘the power of opinion and moral force’. 78 His condemnation of intervention had as its
primary target Britishforeignpolicy under the sway of Palmerston, whose
interventionism, according to Cobden, was against the interests of the British
people. 79 The fact that the
‘international man’ was also a pacifist activist 80 made his absolute principle of non-intervention
more convincing. 81 Moreover, Cobden
eventually won.3 Callaghan
took office on 5 April 1976, and Anthony Crosland took over from the new
prime minister as foreign and commonwealth secretary. In his previous position, Callaghan had been influential in the formulation of Britishforeignpolicy
and he was determined to retain a dominant role in foreign policy-making.
Callaghan’s promotion to number 10 Downing Street thus ensured a degree of
continuity in the conduct of Britishforeignpolicy.4
On the other side of the Atlantic, events were tumultuous for the Ford administration, both domestically and in the
in Britishforeignpolicy that would place a renewed emphasis upon the US–UK relationship.
Heath’s seemingly Euro-centric foreign policy was to be reversed and Wilson let
it known that he would not be trying to create common political policies within
the EEC. In fact, Wilson’s renegotiation of the terms of Britain’s EEC entry even
questioned Britain’s membership.14
Wilson’s appointment of James Callaghan as foreign and commonwealth
secretary, coupled with the prime minister’s willingness to allow Callaghan a
degree of freedom in conducting foreign policy that was
comprehensive and widely accepted viewpoint on foreign policy.
Windrich has argued that Labour followed a ‘socialist’ foreign policy in
the post-war years;9 Winkler that the party developed a ‘League of
Nations’ policy.10 Certainly these years were marked by a fair degree of
THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE WORLD
agreement within the different wings of the party on the basis of a
Britishforeignpolicy, despite the widespread and enduring differences
between the various groups and factions of the party and the mutual
suspicion between the