: John Wiley & Sons, 2003).
71 Searle, Struggle for Syria, p. 293.
72 Michael Ionides, Divide and Lose: The Arab Revolt: 1955–58 (London: Cox & Wyman,
1960), pp. 109–97.
73 Keith Kyle, Suez (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1991).
74 Eden, House of Commons (23 December 1929), quoted in Kyle, Suez, p. 1.
75 See www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/releases/2008/october/suez-14-08-1956.htm
(accessed 10.11.15). See also Mark Garnett, Simon Mabon and Robert Smith, BritishForeignPolicy Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2017).
76 Michel Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba’ath [In the
without further orders. A Falkland Islands crisis was postponed only
by Spanish failure to find the British base before this dispute was in
1768 temporarily overshadowed on the international scene by the
Corsica question and the outbreak of a Russo-Turkish war.29
The failure of Britishforeignpolicy during the Chatham ministry
can be ascribed to internal factors as well as the unfavourable international scene, the distractions of party politics at home and the need
to devise measures for India and America. Yet when the new Parliamentary session began in
Austria would adhere
to her French alliance was not seen as a final rebuff, merely as a postponement of hopes cherished by many in Britain.
Unrealistic as the main thrust of Britishforeignpolicy may have
been, under Grenville it was nevertheless a success. Quite apart from
the 1765 coup in Sweden, which was to prove short-lived in the face
of French countermeasures, the Premier himself, continuing his hardline attitude already evident during the Bute ministry, resorted to
what in the next century came to be known as ‘gunboat diplomacy’.
Still resentful about the
non-intervention, and the only sanctions he
could accept were ‘the power of opinion and moral force’. 78 His condemnation of intervention had as its
primary target Britishforeignpolicy under the sway of Palmerston, whose
interventionism, according to Cobden, was against the interests of the British
people. 79 The fact that the
‘international man’ was also a pacifist activist 80 made his absolute principle of non-intervention
more convincing. 81 Moreover, Cobden
attitudes in this field,
however, do not necessarily translate easily into specific political
choices. For example, in the 1930s liberals were divided on
‘appeasement’ as the mainspring of Britishforeignpolicy, and
in recent years they have been divided on Western intervention in the Gulf,
the Balkans, Africa and, recently, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Liberalism in the twentieth century
The twentieth century began
, The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648–1815
(London and New York: Longman, 1983), p. 26; Peter H. Wilson, German
Armies: War and German Politics 1648–1806 (London: UCL Press, 1998),
pp. 63, 87, 107, 179, 206–207, 228, 267–269; Dwyryd Wyn Jones, War
and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1988), pp. 8–11; Jeremy Black, ‘Parliament and Foreign Policy
in the Age of Walpole: The Case of the Hessians’, in Knights Errant and
True Englishmen: BritishForeignPolicy, 1660–1800, ed. by Jeremy Black
(Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd
The Middlesex Election and the Townshend Duties Crisis
Peter D.G. Thomas
. MSS. 35608, fo. 290.
10 Walpole, Letters, VII, 239.
11 Scott, BritishForeignPolicy, pp. 131–5. Tracy, Navies, pp. 73–5.
12 Thomas, Townshend Duties Crisis, pp. 95–6.
13 Thomas, John Wilkes, pp. 90–1.
14 Trumbull Papers, p. 303. For the debate see Simmons and Thomas, Proceedings and Debates, III, 3–13. It is described in Thomas, Townshend
Duties Crisis, pp. 104–7.
15 Thomas, Townshend Duties Crisis, pp. 107–11.
16 Simmons and Thomas, Proceedings and Debates, III, 47–50.
17 Simmons and Thomas, Proceedings and Debates, III, 64–83.
18 Simmons and Thomas, Proceedings
BL Add. MSS. 32978, fos 235–41.
BL Add. MSS. 32988, fo. 49.
Lawson, George Grenville, pp. 258–69.
O’Gorman, Rise of Party, pp. 220–8.
BL Add. MSS. 32990, fo. 57.
BL Add. MSS. 32990, fo. 107.
Thomas, John Wilkes, pp. 68–76.
Thomas, John Wilkes, pp. 76–86.
Walpole, Memoirs, III, 146.
Legg, British Diplomatic Instructions, pp. 101–5.
Corr. of George III, II, 44.
For a detailed examination of the Corsica question see Escott, Thesis,
Scott, BritishForeignPolicy, pp. 112–24.
Thomas, Townshend Duties Crisis, pp. 76–8.
Thomas, Townshend Duties Crisis
eventually won.3 Callaghan
took office on 5 April 1976, and Anthony Crosland took over from the new
prime minister as foreign and commonwealth secretary. In his previous position, Callaghan had been influential in the formulation of Britishforeignpolicy
and he was determined to retain a dominant role in foreign policy-making.
Callaghan’s promotion to number 10 Downing Street thus ensured a degree of
continuity in the conduct of Britishforeignpolicy.4
On the other side of the Atlantic, events were tumultuous for the Ford administration, both domestically and in the
in Britishforeignpolicy that would place a renewed emphasis upon the US–UK relationship.
Heath’s seemingly Euro-centric foreign policy was to be reversed and Wilson let
it known that he would not be trying to create common political policies within
the EEC. In fact, Wilson’s renegotiation of the terms of Britain’s EEC entry even
questioned Britain’s membership.14
Wilson’s appointment of James Callaghan as foreign and commonwealth
secretary, coupled with the prime minister’s willingness to allow Callaghan a
degree of freedom in conducting foreign policy that was