Crisis, reform and recovery

The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 shook the foundations of the global economy and what began as a localised currency crisis soon engulfed the entire Asian region. This book explores what went wrong and how did the Asian economies long considered 'miracles' respond, among other things. The combined effects of growing unemployment, rising inflation, and the absence of a meaningful social safety-net system, pushed large numbers of displaced workers and their families into poverty. Resolving Thailand's notorious non-performing loans problem will depend on the fortunes of the country's real economy, and on the success of Thai Asset Management Corporation (TAMC). Under International Monetary Fund's (IMF) oversight, the Indonesian government has also taken steps to deal with the massive debt problem. After Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency's (INDRA) failure, the Indonesian government passed the Company Bankruptcy and Debt Restructuring and/or Rehabilitation Act to facilitate reorganization of illiquid, but financially viable companies. Economic reforms in Korea were started by Kim Dae-Jung. the partial convertibility of the Renminbi (RMB), not being heavy burdened with short-term debt liabilities, and rapid foreign trade explains China's remarkable immunity to the "Asian flu". The proposed sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) (modeled on corporate bankruptcy law) would allow countries to seek legal protection from creditors that stand in the way of restructuring, and in exchange debtors would have to negotiate with their creditors in good faith.

Why China survived the financial crisis
Shalendra D. Sharma

The Asian financial crisis 5 The domino that did not fall: why China survived the financial crisis When the financial crisis unexpectedly hit the high-performing East and Southeast Asian economies in mid-1997, it was widely believed that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would be the next domino to fall. China’s extensive intra-regional trade and investment linkages with the rest of Asia, and the fact that the Chinese economy suffers from many of the same debilitating structural problems that long plagued (and ultimately did incalculable damage) to the

in The Asian financial crisis
Jaewoo Choo

2504Chap6 7/4/03 12:40 pm Page 105 6 The geopolitics of Central Asian energy Jaewoo Choo This chapter assesses the rising geostrategic and geoeconomic importance of Central Asian oil and natural gas for China and the United States – the most transparent source of Sino-American conflict in this region. The initial rationale for Chinese engagement in Central Asia, despite the emergence of China as a net oil-importing nation in 1993, was not driven by the search for an alternative and secure source of oil and natural gas.1 Rather, Chinese policy reflected a

in Limiting institutions?
Chinese puzzles and global challenges
R. Bin Wong

Bayly 04_Tonra 01 21/06/2011 10:20 Page 103 4 Historical lessons about contemporary social welfare: Chinese puzzles and global challenges R. Bin Wong Explaining China’s past to find approaches to our common future We look out at the world around us and see problems and possibilities created by our social practices. We have some basic ideas about where conditions are better and where they are worse, on the basis of which our thinking about development seeks to create the traits found in good conditions elsewhere. The history that typically matters to

in History, historians and development policy
David P. Calleo

towards a more plural world order with several great powers. That has been, I suspect, the general drift in Eurasia over the past ten years and it will not now change. Europe’s postwar retreat Thirty years ago it was fashionable to observe that Europe was only a regional power, whereas the United States was a global power. When Americans talked about being ‘global’, they meant the Far East. Our attention was focused there because American diplomacy was about to play its ‘China card’, its greatest coup of the Cold War. By exploiting the breach between China and the

in Limiting institutions?
Obama, Trump and the Asia Pacific political economy
Michael Mastanduno

-orienting of former adversaries – Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia – into partners supportive of US-inspired economic and security orders. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, post-war administrations sought to broaden and deepen the US hegemonic order. The United States cast itself as indispensable to global order and as the self-appointed regional stabiliser in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. It sought to entice Russia and China, despite not being US security allies, to follow the post-war German and Japanese examples and partner with Washington in support of an

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
Robert Sutter

that characterised Obama government diplomacy. On the one hand, his approach had the advantage of keeping opponents (like China) as well as allies and partners on the defensive in dealing with the new President. Trump came to see the wisdom of abandoning his earlier cavalier treatment of allies Japan, South Korea and Australia. He built cordial personal ties with most important regional leaders. On the other hand, American engagement in the region remained episodic, featuring intense pressure beginning in 2017 to prevent North Korea’s nuclear weapons development

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
Dr Williams’ Pink Pills for Pale People and the hybrid pathways of Chinese modernity
Alice Tsay

I don't suppose there is a proprietary medicine manufacturer of importance in any part of the world who has not, at one time or another, encouraged his imagination to play with the idea of the prosperous business he might build up, and the wealth he might accumulate, if he could, by some means, convince a reasonable number of Chinese of the efficiency of his remedies. 2

in Progress and pathology
Mass graves in post-war Malaysia
Frances Tay

have been excavated  – have sparked social and political debates.4 In marked contrast, the response of the Malaysian general public has been largely muted, except in cases where the reinterment of remains has threatened state-sponsored dominant narratives. The reasons for this seeming ambivalence are manifold. In the first instance, the main ethnic groups in the territory – comprising indigenous Malay and migrant Chinese and Indian minorities – experienced the occupation differently. As such, there is no shared collective memory that 222   Frances Tay can be

in Human remains and identification
Autopilot, neglect or worse?
Nick Bisley

, Trump has not yet instigated any significant shifts. Indeed, the level of continuity with his predecessor’s policy is striking, particularly given his instinct to reject almost anything to do with the Obama presidency. Alliances have been reaffirmed, as has the One China policy. Indeed, much to the surprise of critics and friends alike, Trump developed a good working relationship with China’s President Xi Jinping, engaged with regional multilateralism and even participated in the Asia summit season in November 2017, albeit in a slightly chaotic fashion by opting out

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific