2 Are ideologies developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of
any value in the twenty-first?
3 ‘While ideology shaped the twentieth century, we have now come to
the end of ideology.’ Do you think this is true, and if so is it a
cause for rejoicing?
4 Why do you think ‘ideological’ is seen as such a term of
abuse in modern Westerndemocracies?
5 To what extent would you agree
because of its
willingness to adapt to social change – and even initiate it. Its
pragmatism, lack of ideological constraints and an ability to tap into
deep-seated strains of popular emotion and beliefs have ensured its
importance in Westerndemocracies as a major political force. British
conservatism has been the most successful of the species, both in terms of
mobilising support for electoral victories and adapting to social
identified as the new revolutionaries.
A term coined by Herbert Marcuse in the 1960s to describe the way in
which Westerndemocracies contained and manipulated dissent, thus
preserving the power of the privileged.
More conventional leftist politics,
at least in Britain, was conducted by a new plethora of small, quarrelsome
WesternDemocracies: Statecraft, Desire and the
Politics of Exclusion , London: Routledge.
Drori-Avraham, A., S. Rozen and N.
Avigal, 2015. ‘Where there is no Free Will. Israel’s
‘Voluntary Return’ Procedure for Asylum-seekers’.
Hotline for Refugees and Migrants and ASSAF Report. Available at http://hotline.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/free-will-web-.pdf
(accessed 5 September 2015
steganography (messages hidden in digital images) or more simply the use of encrypted
emails. In addition, both criminals and terrorists have used global diasporas
and transnational ethnic networks as cover and recruitment for their activities. As a result, combating criminal and terrorist activity has become very
difficult without impeding the rapid flows of money, goods and services on
which modern commerce and finance depend; and without violating the
civil liberties which are the hallmark of westerndemocracies and facilitate
the efficiency of the market. Although the
that a large proportion of people in Western societies were, and
perhaps still are, revolted by the idea of homosexuality, and this had been
encoded in various repressive laws. Toleration takes the form, first, of nonenforcement of law, and then repeal. Yet, as Mill and Marx both point out,
the law can be tolerant without society being so, and discrimination continues to take many unofficial and indirect forms. Nevertheless, the situation is largely such that Westerndemocracies have accepted the obligation
of trying to work out ways in which gay people can be
in this volume suggest, the place and ideology of political
parties within the state system can either promote or hinder
gender mainstreaming. A monopoly of state power poses
difficult questions for gender equality. On the one hand, as
Jezerska points out in chapter 8, ‘In a political sense, the
women were officially equal with men under the communist system. For example, “the greatest number of women
in the unicameral parliament [in Poland] under the communist regime was 23 per cent in 1980–1985, far higher
than in many Westerndemocracies” ’ (p. 171
Westerndemocracies, a confident humanism has given way to an ethic of multiculturalism; for sure, an assumption of
underlying similarities is not entirely absent, but it is subordinate to a cautious
embrace of cultural diﬀerence. Which is why Britain’s prime minister, as he commuted the world in October 2001 shoring up support for the coalition against terrorism, allowed it to be known that, as he travelled, he read translations of the Koran.
What has become truly supranational is, of course, the very capitalism which Hesse
and others saw as humanism’s enemy. At one
December 1939, a report from Ascoli
Piceno described the popular feeling about Britain as ‘more or less unanimous,’
that is, that it was the ‘fomenter of discord among the peoples.’39
There was a class divide, as well. The ‘bourgeoisie’ (a label under which Mussolini lumped all the middle and upper-middle classes, which, he felt, did not
share his goal of anthropological transformation of the Italian people) more
often than others feared the war, or even hoped that Italy could reconcile with
the Westerndemocracies.40 An OVRA report stated that in Milanese commercial and
to come to blows, a puzzling state of affairs.
A secular, pro-Westerndemocracy, representing everything Iran despises, Ankara was positive that Tehran sought to export the revolution to Turkey. Ankara knew that it would be an extraordinary coup for the revolution should Iran manage successfully to subvert Turkey, a key Muslim state, a symbol of profane worldly rule, as well as a strategic and ideological adversary. Regularly and violently, Iran raged against the Turkish secular state, against Turkish democracy, and against Turkey’s blind