Catherine Baker

the USA; instead, active translations of US biological and cultural racial thinking were already forming interpretive frames in Bulgaria for white Bulgarians' perceptions of Roma (Todorova 2006 : 6–7). Bulgarian Communists also worked Stalinist notions of racialised differentials in modernity, then Cold War state socialist views of race, culture and development, into their racial formations. These translations of racialisation and whiteness thus did not only reach Bulgarians on migrating to the USA, as mainstream US labour/migration histories would suggest, nor did

in Race and the Yugoslav region
Jonathan Atkin

there was a moral disintegration, both of troops and civilians …’24 Chapman placed this disintegration of moral values higher than the sacrifice of a generation in his personal scale of the effects of the war and their relative gravitas. In this, he echoed the view of the author R.H. Mottram who, when he examined the post-war state of things in Three Personal Records of the War, counted the ‘moral exhaustion of civilised peoples’ as ‘most serious of all’ of the resulting problems that he could identify.25 Chapman pointed out that war altered the routine of life

in A war of individuals
Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher

‘Popular Front’ in Azerbaijan, ‘RoundTable/Free Georgia’ in Georgia and the ‘Chechen National Congress’ in Chechnya) led to internal instability and eventually to internal war. State weakness can cause violence. Therefore, it may be assumed that rebuilding state capacities must be a high priority of new leaders. A quite unexpected lesson to be learned from the study of organised violence in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus is that this assumption is not necessarily true. This lesson pertains in the first place to unrecognised would-be states (the formally secondorder units

in Potentials of disorder
Weak empire to weak nation-state around Nagorno-Karabakh
Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher

, respectively, not by disciplined armies but by a motley gathering of entrepreneurs of violence, unprofessional volunteer fighters, nationalist believers and few (though decisive) professional officers and soldiers from the former Soviet army. The returning biznesmen-patriot 163 Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher type of ‘big men’26 proved to be the greatest challenge for stabilising post-war state institutions, particularly in the Armenian case where they returned victorious and were conscious of the fact that in any functioning state system their education, abilities and

in Potentials of disorder
Steven Fielding

constitutional change; indeed, given that it would only encourage nationalists, such a course was dangerous.55 Others were not so confident that nationalist support would disappear – but agreed its rise reflected problems general to the United Kingdom. In arguing for Scottish legislative devolution during the late 1950s, Mackintosh proceeded from the assumption that all Britons wanted to control the expanded post-war state bureaucracy. His solution was to create a number of elected sub-parliaments, to bring government closer to the people; these would enjoy responsibility for

in The Labour Governments 1964–70 volume 1
Marta Iñiguez de Heredia

this is part of a continuing process, the dynamic of fostering informal governance arrangements has generated a cohabited context of citizens and military, exposing the inextricable relationships between war, state-making and resistance. N OTES 1 For an overview of academic debates see: (Autesserre 2012a; Cuvelier, Vlassenroot, and Olin 2014; Turner 2007 Ch. 1). 2 Its latest mandate was extended until August 2016 (UN Security Council 2015). 3 A more general overview can be found in Pugh (2005); Williams (2008); World Bank (1997; 2007; 2012a). 4 E.g., ex

in Everyday resistance, peacebuilding and state-making
Open Access (free)
Jonathan Atkin

that of men – even when sharing an enlightened, liberal background with them, as within Bloomsbury and its circle. But women emerged from a range of backgrounds and contexts – including that of political agitation linked to specific political aims – whose motivation towards protest, when confronted by the specifics of war, became more individualistic in character and less a part of an organised ‘movement’ or liable to be led by the propaganda of the war-state. Many women in the period leading up to the outbreak of the conflict could lay claim to a history of

in A war of individuals
Open Access (free)
Jonathan Atkin

– By a Fellow of Trinity’, which he believed would have ‘immense sale’ in intellectual circles, Strachey was equally practical, knitting mufflers for soldiers, learning German and considering the position of intellectuals in the war, concluding that ‘We’re all far too weak physically to be of any use at all. If we weren’t we’d still be too intelligent to be thrown away in some really not essential expedition.’41 The natural place for intellectuals, thought Strachey – if they must be incorporated into the war-state – was, perhaps not surprisingly, in the National

in A war of individuals
Open Access (free)
Global Britishness and settler cultures in South Africa and New Zealand
Charles V. Reed

the Cape ... made their ignorance hereditary.... Such were the subjects Great Britain acquired in the beginning of the last century. They were the antithesis of Englishmen in habits both of life and of thought. 171 One popularly conceived way of countering the influence of the Afrikaners in the post-war state was to promote

in Royal tourists, colonial subjects and the making of a British world, 1860–1911