interchangeably now with the antique form of he (‘a’) in Barnado’s: ‘Looks a not like the
King?’ (46). Here and in his preceding observation that the entity appears ‘In the same
figure like the King that’s dead’ (44), Barnado relies on a form of recognition that is
also a form of re-cognition, i.e. a form of cognition that is based on comparison.
Marcellus picks up the same comparison moments later, asking Horatio ‘Is it not like
the King?’ (61). Yet Horatio’s response to Marcellus, ‘As thou art to thyself ’ (62), teasingly suggests that, insofar as
known under the conditions inherent in the I, what right does one have to
suggest we have access to nature in itself?
The essential idea of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie is that, in the same way as
the I of self-consciousness is both active and yet can try to reﬂect upon itself as
an object, nature is both actively ‘productive’ (in the sense of Spinoza’s natura
naturans) and is made up of objective ‘products’ (natura naturata). The understanding deals with transient ‘products’ and is consequently conﬁned within the
limits of determinate cognition
have just seen, if one is to be able to designate
oneself with the signiﬁer I, one cannot rely solely on the shared, general structure of Geist manifested in language.
Friedrich Schlegel’s claims about the relationship between music and feeling
cited in Chapter 1 show one way of connecting this issue to music:
Now if feeling is the root of all consciousness, then the direction of language [towards
cognition] has the essential deﬁcit that it does not grasp and comprehend feeling
deeply enough, only touches its surface . . . However large the riches language oﬀers
On Achebe’s endorsement of Ikem’s views, and on his revisionist liberalism, see
David Maughan-Brown, unpublished paper, ‘Anthills of the Savannah’s solution to
The Trouble with Nigeria’, ACLALS Triennial Conference, University of Kent,
Canterbury, 29 August 1989, pp. 4–5.
11 As Ikem discovers in his second encounter with Braimoh, the taxi-driver. The ceaseless circlings of such cognitions about ‘the people’ are of course a measure of
Achebe’s political pessimism. See Ascherson, ‘Betrayal’, p. 3.
12 Rutherford, ‘Interview’, p. 3.
13 On interpreting the past
Religion and spirituality in environmental direct action
Bronislaw Szerszynski and Emma Tomalin
of lifestyle and forms of action, is necessary in order to save the planet from
Action, healing and ceremony
Religion is not just about the cognition and articulation of certain beliefs and
values; it is also about action. Similarly, activities within the environmental direct
action movement of the 1990s also served to confirm and validate key movement
meanings. Here we explore three different kinds of action in this way: healing,
worship and celebration, and direct action protest itself.
Gatherings attended by activists tended
Digital photography and cartography in Wolfgang Weileder’s
space over a period of time, rooted to the
ground as slices of time tick past.
Both Weileder and Rafman have created physical art objects that do not
deny a Dionysian aspect to online maps and the photography that is used
within them. However, each of them also presents deep concerns with these
forms of map. Rafman worries about the tendency for Google’s cameras to fall
upon ‘the poor and the marginalised’, and sees the artist’s role as challenging
‘Google’s imperial claims’ and its ‘right to be the only one framing our cognitions and perceptions’ (Rafman, 2011: 7
Association and distinction in politics and religion
visible symbols of the divine, in political structure or in art’. 6 Yet, at the same time, it is the human creation, not the divine infinite, which is accessible to human cognition and perception. Religion may be the word of God, but all its evident or accessible components are the construction of humans – a point made, and causing great offence, in Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses . Since the divine can only express itself to humans in human form or to human perception, it can only ever be a human experience and communicated by human creation. The charge
from Kant’s notion that aesthetic
contemplation is a pleasure free of appropriative interest. In order to reinforce
the idea that this pleasure is not based upon the continually renewed need to
overcome dissatisfaction, Schopenhauer combines Kant’s notion with a
Platonist metaphysics. Both the thing in itself and the Platonic Idea testify for
Aesthetics and subjectivity
Schopenhauer to the limitations of the time-bound phenomenal world. We can
only transcend these limitations by separating our cognition from its motivation
by the Will. To do this one must lose
the conservatisation of the Centre and
The long march back
the social democratisation of the Right, the NSD conjures a totalitarianism of the mainstream.
We have received our first hint of why I refer to this as the age of mainstreams. Mainstreaming signifies the contemporary closure of social cognition, value and action around conservatism. But because this process is
less visible in some countries than in others, a politics of the mainstream
may also offer the potential for reopening the social field. In order to unpack
with the human remains from its troubled past,
whether potent or toxic, but we will frame our analysis with the
recognition that Kenya’s problems with human remains of this kind
are far from unique. We begin, therefore, with a wide-ranging discussion of the politics of the dead in the context of museum collections generally, which we describe as a classic example of what
is termed a ‘wicked problem’. We then move on to contextualise
16 Human remains in society
the Kenya case, giving a detailed account of the human remains
currently housed in the Osteology