The Law and Politics of Responding to Attacks against Aid Workers
Julia Brooks and Rob Grace
, as Clements (2018) has examined, of the asymmetric power dynamics at play when humanitarians negotiate. Hard pressure, in the form of physical threats, is more readily available to many humanitarian negotiators’ counterparts, especially armed actors. Humanitarian actors can, and in many cases do, use armed protection to level the otherwise asymmetric field. A reading of the history of humanitarianism reveals operational linkages between humanitarian actors and armed actors to have a long and rich historical pedigree ( Pérouse de Montclos, 2014 ). Nevertheless
Why Building Back Better Means More than Structural Safety
Best is the enemy of good
Italian proverb popularised in the French by Voltaire
Relief is the enemy of reconstruction
Attributed to Otto Koenigsberger by Ian Davis ( Davis and Alexander, 2016 : 32)
Is safe the enemy of safer?
The expressions ‘Build Back Better’ (BBB) and ‘Build Back Safer’ (BBS) are popular humanitarian shelter straplines. Championed by special envoy Bill Clinton, ‘Building Back Better’ was the ambition after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami ( Clinton, 2006 ) – is also one of the Priorities for Action of the 2015
German Responses to the June 2019 Mission of the Sea-Watch 3
-named Triton, which, however, did not result in a decrease of drownings in the Mediterranean.
Privately funded NGOs have carried out SAR missions in the Mediterranean since August 2014, when Migration Offshore Aid Station (MOAS), which was founded and largely funded by Maltese-based entrepreneurs Christopher and Regina Catrambone, commenced SAR operations with its rescue vessel M/Y Phoenix . MOAS was soon joined by established humanitarian organisations such as Save the Children and NGOs specifically set up to carry out SAR missions. Their approaches varied, with MOAS and
spatial limits of the Bundeswehr’s remit, easing in a new precedent, while being justiﬁed on humanitarian grounds
and linked to notions of German ‘responsibility’.
The catharsis occasioned by the Gulf War was made up of ﬁve interconnected elements:
Discord emerged between external demands and conditions within
Germany. Policy-thinking was caught between expectations and
fears at home and abroad, and sought to do justice to both. As a
result, the sanctity of existing constitutional constraints on Bundeswehr deployments and Germany’s eurocentrism became jaded,
that in 1999 had sanctioned the Bundeswehr’s Kosovo deployment, one with an overtly combative character, the decision to deploy
was accompanied by a strong humanitarian rationale, thus enabling the
Government to shore up domestic and parliamentary support.
Change was also afoot across the Atlantic with the emergence of new
foreign policy thinking, which in its essence cut across the grain of the
EU’s (and Germany’s) overtly multilateralist approach to security
issues. The neo-conservative narrative, as Elizabeth Pond calls it, was
already in gestation in the 1990s
is the interdisciplinary debate about the
Anthropocene. Anthropocene is an informal descriptor of the current
geological era, which draws attention to the unprecedented impact –
from the point of view of Earth's history – of human species and
their activities on the planet's climate, biodiversity and
environment. In short, the label of the Anthropocene suggests that
Germany, the use of force and the power of strategic culture
history still pointed to restraint from military engagement or
whether that same history now led Germany to embrace active military participation. More than the Gulf War, Yugoslavia showed how
there could be a possible option for the use of military force that was
between the excesses of paciﬁsm and militarism, showing that for Germany a principled practice of non-violence was no longer tenable in
post-Cold War Europe.
Longhurst, Germany and the use of force.qxd
Germany and the use of force
In short, this period saw the rupture of a
Simone de Beauvoir and a Global Theory of Feminist Recognition
sceptical about this approach. A central
concern is that to be recognized for one's gender has been a source
of much oppression in history, and that it is therefore
unsatisfactory to rely on the concept of recognition in pursuing
feminist goals (McNay 2008 ; Nicholson 1996 ).
While these concerns are significant, a cosmopolitan
feminist account of recognition still retains
during 2000. The Australian Government’s response (as of 2001) has been to downgrade its cooperation with UN human rights bodies.
Within Australia, Indigenous disadvantage is sometimes assumed to be largely self-inflicted or, perhaps more commonly, rooted in a cultural context that is profoundly out of step with modern life or in an ancient history of dispossession. Thus, in 1999, the federal government rejected the proposal that an official apology be made to the Aboriginal Australians as part of a process of reconciliation and instead offered an
murderers, rapists and thieves.” 15 The celebrated Greek author, Nikos Kazantzakis, swore that for the Greeks freedom means purging themselves of the corrupt Turkish traits acquired under Ottoman rule. 16 The Greek Consul in Montreal took umbrage at a series of lectures held in a local university entitled: “Turkey: Two Millenniums of Art and History,” protesting that the Turkish nation “had settled in the region much later” and that most of the discoveries cited were a part of the Greek cultural heritage. 17
Pangalos’s sacking in February 1999