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Order and security in post-Cold War Europe
Dimitris N. Chryssochoou, Michael J. Tsinisizelis, Stelios Stavridis and Kostas Ifantis

5 Geopolitical imperatives of system change Order and security in post-Cold War Europe Introduction This chapter addresses the question of how change at the international system level has produced those political outcomes related to European security and defence design post-Cold War. It is both a description and an evaluation of the way in which Europe’s security arena has changed, as well as an attempt to come to terms with the process that led to the ‘internalisation’ of system change. By ‘internalisation’ we mean the process – or better, the causal

in Theory and reform in the European Union
David P. Calleo

, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the attempts to reform NATO through the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), the negotiations with prospective new EU members in central and eastern Europe, along with the struggle to recast the EU’s constitution. In effect, the EU seems determined to make itself the dominant institution in the new panEurope.3 Europe’s big ambitions leave it rather vulnerable. Completing the European Union on a pan-European scale will require, at the very least, a long period of

in Limiting institutions?
Joshua B. Spero

Joseph Kruzel, deputy assistant secretary of defence for Europe and NATO, and General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, who had served previously as NATO supreme allied commander of Europe. Though the initial demand for PfP reflected a desire to provide a short-term alternative to expanding NATO’s membership, the concept eventually evolved so that it truly changed early post-Cold War thinking about multilateral European security cooperation. At its core, the PfP is premised on a belief that the more civilian strategists and military operators

in Limiting institutions?
Open Access (free)
Thomas Robb

sceptical as to how the CSCE and MBFR would benefit the UK. At their most melodramatic, the British regarded both sets of negotiations as having the potential to critically undermine European security. For US–UK relations, the negotiations had been a point of disagreement and Wilson’s return to office did little to alter this. Shortly after returning to power, Wilson had read an article in the Economist about the CSCE which sparked his interest in the subject and he therefore ordered a full review of British policy towards the CSCE.165 After receiving various opinions on

in A strained partnership?
Open Access (free)
Reinterpreting Russia in the twenty-first century
Andrew Monaghan

, one that has become increasingly systemic since the mid 2000s. That Russia and the West see the post-Cold War history of European security in very different – and increasingly diametrically opposed – terms is likely to render their positions unacceptable to each other, and truly common and shared interests few and far between. Indeed, the war in Ukraine has highlighted conflicts of interest and friction in values

in The new politics of Russia
Kerry Longhurst

between the defence minister and the three service inspekteuren. Further enhancing the generalinspekteur’s position a führungszentrum of around sixty-five staff was assigned to him in early 1995.8 Step-change in Bundeswehr force structure was prompted first by NATO’s London Declaration of 1990, which heralded the move away from forward defence. Reacting to this, already in 1991, Generalinspekteur Klaus Naumann outlined what change in the European security environment meant for the Bundeswehr. In addition to the usual protection of German citizens, he stressed that to

in Germany and the use of force
Open Access (free)
Kjell M. Torbiörn

’s European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), was to be used only in extreme cases of conflicts in Europe or its vicinity. Emphasis would be laid on the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’ of peacekeeping or peacemaking. These also included conflict identification and prevention, including emergency assistance, police training, the building of a civil society and even trade policies for economic stability. The tasks of the Western European Union, which up to then had served as the main expression of European security defence policies, would for all practical purposes be taken

in Destination Europe
Henrik Larsen

lines of Campbell (1992) , the identification of a concept of security in the EU discourse is also interesting because the articulation of threats, an ‘other’, is a crucial part of establishing a foreign policy identity. The question then is, what elements are constructed as threats to European or EU security? Wæver (1996) : 122) argues that the threat to European security is not found in space but rather in time: Europe

in Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy
P. Terrence Hopmann

. When combined with the ‘human dimension’ that infuses all of the OSCE’s work, this conflict-prevention capacity constitutes the special contribution that only the OSCE brings to the European security ‘architecture’. This is an especially important function that needs to be nurtured and strengthened with the active support of the OSCE’s largest, wealthiest and most powerful participating states, especially the United States. The special role of the OSCE In the field of medicine, the principle that ‘an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure’ has long been

in Limiting institutions?
Open Access (free)
The study of European Union relations with Mercosur
Arantza Gomez Arana

the US in certain crises. Second, the EU needs to accept the ‘complex interdependence’ that affects foreign policy, therefore the EU will have to cooperate with other states. Could Hill have been calling for multilateralism? In 2003, the EU launched the European Security Strategy. Much of the discussion in the literature about the concept of the EU as a strategic actor has been developed in relation to this policy. For example, Quille (2004) takes from the European Security Strategy the main goals of the EU as being: to tackle perceived external threats, to extend

in The European Union's policy towards Mercosur: