, are status-quo oriented and seek to ensure that
no single power can dominate. Moreover, the states of Eurasia and interested
external powers such as the United States all view radical political Islam and
international terrorism as common threats and share interest in the quest
for international order. Eurasia is not a region where interstate war is
likely.4 And yet, traditional security concerns dominate the dynamics of
multilateralism. The inability of the Eurasian states to develop western-style
institutions or to embrace cooperative multilateralism effectively is
contemporary meanings of ‘race’, racism and post-racialism
before the understanding of what constitutes racism and what it means to be racist
is explored in the narratives of EDL activists. Notwithstanding the argument
that hostility towards Muslim minorities constitutes a ‘new racism’, however, the
exploration of attitudes to Islam among EDL supporters is postponed until the
following chapter in order to allow a detailed and discrete discussion.
‘Race’: buried alive or artificially resuscitated?
How can the EDL appear a blatantly ‘racist organisation’ to those outside it
had been compromised and that
purification by means of a return to the well springs was required. For
religions with a strong basis in scriptures, notably Protestant
Christianity, Islam and Judaism, this involves going back to what is taken
to be the original meaning of the texts, texts whose ultimate validity is
their divine inspiration. Fundamentalism is, however, not confined to these
faiths. There are versions of it in
supra-state identity became as important in shaping Arab state behaviour as the distribution of material power stressed by realism. The contradiction between the global norm of sovereignty, in which state interests are legitimately the object of foreign policy, and the regional norms of Pan-Arabism (or, to a lesser extent Pan-Islam) which expect these interests to be compatible with the values of the indigenous suprastate identity community, have caught Arab foreign policy making elites, in Korany’s (1988: 165) words, between the logics of raison d’état and of ‘raison
, Turkey’s first politically Muslim Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, did not Islamize its foreign policy, nor did he bring excessive Muslim policies to bear on its domestic affairs.
The 1990s were also successful for Turkey internally, although here the results are clearly more mixed. The Kurdish revolt has been curbed, the Turkish economy has achieved some important gains, secular–religious disagreements have not worsened, and wider circles – hitherto not a party to the decision-making procedures in Turkey – have taken part in municipal, national
: confronting relativism in Serbia and Croatia
Serbia’s greatest historical enemy – the Ottoman Empire – seemed largely
irrelevant in reinterpretations of Serbian history. While there was a great deal
of anti-Moslem, anti-Islamic rhetoric, there were few attacks on Turkey itself
for its past occupation of the region. Nor was there much anti-Ottoman propaganda. Other traditional enemies – such as Bulgaria, a constant threat
during the first half of the twentieth century and a key mover and shaker
during the Balkan Wars – were consigned to obscurity. When history was
In a 1992 issue of Time magazine, in an article on Turkey, the writer inserted the following “ad” in the middle:
Nation to serve as go-between for the Western world and the Middle East and assist in turning suspicion into cooperation. Must be firm U.S.–European ally desirous of still closer ties yet, Islamic in religion and culture, capable of serving as a role model of secularized Western democracy for other Muslim states. Ethnic links with some of those states, booming free
Turkic steppe nomads who plagued the northern Chinese were also integrated into the caravan trade, making them distinct
as a peripatetic people.
Nearly a thousand years later, the SeljukTurks penetrated Islamic lands prompting cultural renewal amongst urban elites (McNeill and McNeill, 2003: 130–3).
An unintended effect of their presence was to reconfigure the composition of
Sunni and Shia forces. They gave effect to a cultural transformation through the
shock of frontal conflict. Later weakened by the Crusades, an arm of the Seljuk
Turks remained in Anatolia and
suprastate Arab and/or Islamic identities are strong, regime legitimacy may be contingent on adherence to Arab-Islamic norms in foreign policy. This may mean contesting the penetration of the region by the core powers and it may de-legitimise relations with certain states: thus, while some Arab states have been pushed by economic dependency or security considerations to establish relations with Israel, these remain largely illegitimate at the societal level.
The impact of identity is not, of course, uniform. Where there are high levels of public
September 11 2001 attack by Islamic terrorists on the very heart of America led the US into its second Middle East war in a decade. At the end of 2001, the region, far from entering the ‘zone of peace’, was at risk of becoming the arena for a ‘clash of civilisations’. What went wrong? Such an outcome might have been anticipated given the way globalisation was ushered into the Middle East – namely by a profoundly unequal war whose outcome gave the Western victors excessive power over the region and insufficient incentive to satisfy the interests and values of the region