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Security and complex political emergencies instead of development
Gorm Rye Olsen

making on EU external relations is still based on the principle of intergovernmentalism. The CFSP continues to be clearly intergovernmental and thus open to separate actions from individual EU member states parallel to the common or multilateral policies. According to the Maastricht Treaty (Title V, Article J), the CFSP is mainly a matter for the Presidency of the Council. The Treaty does not describe an explicit role for the Commission. Irrespective of this, the Commission has become more and more involved in day-to-day foreign policy making, and has actually

in EU development cooperation
Open Access (free)
Another awkward partner?
Karl Magnus Johansson

supposedly ‘national interests’ are at stake, the political priorities are very much those of the social democrats. From the outset, a 2444Ch16 3/12/02 Sweden 2:06 pm Page 371 371 priority was to turn away the debate from institutional issues in particular. As a non-member at the time, Sweden was not in a formal position to influence the contents of the Maastricht Treaty. Nevertheless, leading social democrats were critical of the focus on institutional reform and monetary union. They wanted to put other issues on the EU agenda, notably employment. At the same time

in Fifteen into one?
Neil McNaughton

Thatcher agreed to with great reluctance). In theory, therefore, Britain could have entered the single currency system up to the point when she was forced out of the ERM in September 1992. Delors was undaunted by Thatcher’s opposition and moved steadily towards the ratification of his plan. He was finally successful at Maastricht in 1992. Maastricht Treaty 1992 Formally known as the Treaty of European Union, Maastricht marked a significant step forward. The name of the organisation changed to the European Union. This change was more than cosmetic. The term ‘Union

in Understanding British and European political issues
A political–cultural approach
Lisbeth Aggestam

defence questions. The Maastricht Treaty clearly stipulated that the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy should aim to assert the EU’s identity on the international stage. This progressive deepening and widening of European integration in foreign policy raises a number of interesting questions, particularly regarding the significance and future role of the state in foreign policy: Are states no longer the most important

in Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy
The logics underpining EU enlargement
Helene Sjursen and Karen E. Smith

additional criteria. The trend towards ‘variable geometry’ or ‘multi-speed Europe’ – codified in the Maastricht Treaty opt-outs for Britain and Denmark – was to stop with the current member states. Applicants had to accept the entire Community system, the acquis communautaire , and be able to implement it. This included the single European market and the Maastricht provisions on Economic and Monetary Union. An applicant state had

in Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy
Open Access (free)
Cas Mudde

contains eighteen chapters, primarily as a consequence of a restructuring of the themes. Some chapters are accompanied by the note ‘This chapter will be revised by the party council, according to the resolution at the federal party meeting of 26/27.06.1993, and will be put chap2 28/5/02 40 13.31 Page 40 Germany before the next party meeting for decision-making.’10 The new programme was a reaction to two different events: the unification of Germany and, even more important, the Maastricht Treaty. As a consequence of the latter, European politics has its own chapter

in The ideology of the extreme right
Open Access (free)
Recovery and hubris; effervescence in the East
Kjell M. Torbiörn

summit in Milan in June 1985. It led to the Single European Act (SEA), adopted in 1986, which entered into force in 1987. The Single European Act is a complicated treaty (although less so than its successor, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union). The most important parts are not those by which the competencies of, and interplay among, the EC’s organs were being modified.10 Rather, it was this one article, 8.A, which was incorporated so as to amend the founding EEC Rome Treaty: ‘The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing the

in Destination Europe
The European Union and social democratic identity
Gerassimos Moschonas

something important happened at the heart of Europe that was comparable in its impact to the creation of the Common Market in 1957. The Single Market, the enlargement of the scope of liberalisation in new areas, the reinforcement of majority voting in the Council of Ministers, the more active role and the new dynamics of the Court and Commission (notably under Jacques Delors), the strengthening of the European Parliament, the foundation of the European Central Bank and, more generally, the impact of the Maastricht Treaty, took integration to a new level (Ferenczi 2008: 56

in In search of social democracy
Richard Parrish

Treaty came as a surprise despite the prevailing political climate in which Amsterdam was negotiated. Following the traumatic ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, it was widely expected that the EU would adopt measures in the new Treaty that would attempt to bring Europe’s citizen’s closer to the EU. Sport was considered one such issue through which the EU could achieve this objective. Despite this, sport was not mentioned in draft versions of the Treaty and was not included on the formal agenda of the Reflection Group. It was reported that when challenged on the

in Sports law and policy in the European Union
The evolving European security architecture
Dimitris N. Chryssochoou, Michael J. Tsinisizelis, Stelios Stavridis and Kostas Ifantis

WEU framework.45 Actually, it was the French that launched the idea of an – autonomous from NATO – ESDI back in 1991, by attempting to establish an organic link between the Union and the WEU in the Maastricht Treaty. The WEU, like NATO, did undergo a major transformation during the 1990s, until the decision by the Union to absorb it at the Cologne European Council in June 1999. During the Cold War, WEU military functions were largely eclipsed by NATO. The development of EPC in the early 1970s also overtook the WEU’s political functions. The WEU lost a further role

in Theory and reform in the European Union