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Uses and critiques of ‘civilisation’

modes and systems of decision-​making and conflict resolution, patterns of trade and exchange, and remarkable understandings of the biosphere –​to typical objects and practices for the purpose of defining which societies are ‘in’ and which are ‘out’ when it comes to stratifying hierarchies of progress. Civilisational analysis between the 1930s and the 1970s did not examine stateless and non-​nucleated societies very often. In developing an alternative to the integrationist image, proponents of processual sociologies and approaches endeavour to evade reductionist

in Debating civilisations
Weak empire to weak nation-state around Nagorno-Karabakh

officially turning the normative identity into a total identity, not only subordinating, but denying other strategies of orientation for individuals and groups inside the we-group.3 Here the radical exclusiveness of identity is rather the result of dynamics of violent conflict than its cause. As long as the Soviet state functioned in the sense that it prevented violent strategies of conflict-resolution between social groups, ‘culture’ as ability to command various social languages (from local over Caucasian to Soviet codes) was rather a means to connect, communicate and do

in Potentials of disorder

includes, among other things, • access for ecological governance to policy instruments used in sectoral policies; • build-up and/or strengthening of institutional structures to bring attention to issues of sustainability and provide arenas for solution of conflicts; • conscious strategies and means of monitoring ecological performance in terms of resources used and results achieved in relation to the sector’s overarching objectives (see Knoepfel 1995). Integration then becomes, in effect, similar to problems of coherence, co-ordination, conflict resolution, and effective

in Sweden and ecological governance
The analytical framework

August 2000). 79 T. Woodhouse and O. Ramsbotham, ‘Terra incognita: here be dragons: peacekeeping and conflict resolution in contemporary conflict; some relationships considered’ (Paper presented at the INCORE Conference on Training and Preparation of Military and Civilian Peacekeepers, University of Ulster

in The United Nations, intra-state peacekeeping and normative change
Evolution of the normative basis

-determination for Kampuchea and its international guarantees’, in D. H. McMillen (ed.), Conflict Resolution in Kampuchea (Brisbane: Centre for the Study of Australia–Asia Relations, Griffith University, Working Paper of the Third International Conference on Indochina, August 1989), p. 102. 42 Falk argues

in The United Nations, intra-state peacekeeping and normative change

the context of an overall solution’ and the ‘prevention of the recurrence of genocidal policies and practices of the Pol Pot regime’: see Jakarta Informal Meeting 2 ‘Consensus Statement’, issued on 21 February by Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, reproduced in McMillen (ed.), Conflict Resolution in Kampuchea , pp. 146

in The United Nations, intra-state peacekeeping and normative change

is not at war or fatigued by war, when his popularity is low initially, and when there is a bipartisan support for his actions’. Bradley Lian and John R. O’Neal, ‘Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and Public Opinion’, Journal of Conflict Resolution , vol. 37, no. 2 (June 1993). These tests do not capture the CNN effect or the world historical context of the late 1980s

in Mapping European security after Kosovo

for regional order. The collapse of the Arab–Israeli peace process was the nub of the failure and suggests that it is not hegemony but symmetry in power that facilitates order-building. At the Arab–Israeli level, conflict resolution was more likely to succeed when a relative power balance inflicts a certain symmetry of costs on the parties, giving each the incentive to accommodate the others’ interests. The relative Arab–Israeli power balance emerging from the 1973 war provided the incentive for both sides to enter the first peace process; a

in The international politics of the Middle East

. Peacebuilding strategies, however, have not been external to these processes. The UN and the contradictions of peacebuilding The UN’s peacebuilding strategies in the DRC are more reflective of the evolution of frameworks for conflict resolution than of the actual evolution of the conflict. Having been reluctant to intervene for a number of years, the UN turned the DRC into one of the first ‘laboratories’ for post-conflict statebuilding (Zeebroek 2008). After the more significant deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in 2001, the two missions – MONUC (until 2010) and MONUSCO

in Everyday resistance, peacebuilding and state-making
DSI approaches and behaviours

political-economic goals. Creating or sustaining physical stability remains the primary aim of the DSI, with local conflict resolution or socio-economic justice pushed to the background. Evidence of this effect of liberal peacebuilding is mixed. At a broad level, such a critique is justified if one considers the DSI’s propensity for engaging in the shielding of some actors for the sake of stability and as such legitimising former war entrepreneurs. At the same time, the DSI has proved that it will go to great lengths to install some neo-liberal reforms such as

in Building a peace economy?