’, the principle that IAPs should not discriminate between different applications, services and content accessed by their users. 3 This victory for net neutrality proponents came after 20 years of attempted discrimination between content streams within the walled gardens of both fixed and mobile IAPs, such as AOL in the 1990s, and Vodafone Live/360 in 2002–11, which was intended to challenge the Apple App Store
Net neutrality … is a term apparently the [European] Council shuns like the plague. Because that was their first objective: this term had to get out of the directive … there is no definition of net neutrality … no assurance of equal treatment, non-discrimination and free movement of traffic
network neutrality has a history dating back to 1999, and was introduced via merger conditions placed on major IAPs. The debate began when academics feared that cable TV’s closed business model would overtake the Open Internet in 1999. 9 While issues about potential discrimination by IAPs have been current since at least 1999, the term ‘network (net) neutrality’ was coined in 2003. 10 The pre-history of
discrimination in 2001. 4 The second is delay: attempting switching/transparency solutions throughout the period since 2006. This achieved some success: changes in General Conditions in 2006–08, supplemented in 2011. 5 Ofcom also pioneered Quality of Experience measurement, using SamKnows to measure performance from 2010. The third element is to degrade and obfuscate the debate, from a
: over the years we have also come to realize that competition law is not the answer to every problem … This is a message in which I have insisted repeatedly in the context of the debate on the role of competition policy in addressing data protection/privacy concerns. 18 Abusive discrimination in access to networks is
neutrality privacy problem is not a lack of regulatory tools per se, but potentially a lack of forensic skills to analyse the potential consumer harms that can be created by unjustified or ‘unreasonable’ discrimination. Regulators can monitor both commercial transactions and traffic shaping by IAPs to detect potentially abusive discrimination. No matter what theoretical legal powers may exist, their usage in practice
constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the EEC Treaty, although exemptions from the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality are permitted but linked with the practise of sport on a non-economic basis.1 A The birth of EU sports law and policy 9 number of years later in Heylens, the ECJ addressed the issue of the recognition of qualifications for sports trainers.2 However, it was not until the seismic Bosman ruling of 1995 that the full implications of previous case law became apparent.3 In the case, Jean Marc Bosman, a
protection and anti-discrimination measures were agreed. The Declaration on Sport was also annexed to the Treaty. More The future of EU sports law and policy 207 concrete decisions on institutional reform were delayed until the 2000 Nice Treaty. Treaty revisions have altered the cultural context of integration. The list of activities contained within Article 3 now extends beyond the scope of negative integration. The Treaty also contains a commitment to promote positive integration. In this connection, Article 3 includes activities of a more social and cultural nature
citizens through the integrationist qualities of sport. These exchanges should contribute to a better knowledge and acceptance of the social and cultural differences between member states. • encouragement of participation in sport, as a means of promoting the health of European citizens. • support of sporting activities for social ends, aiming to combat unemployment and discrimination, racism and violence, by promoting equal opportunities between men and women. • help for sporting initiatives in the realm of education, as much at the level of management training and
tickets. Not only were consumers unlikely to substitute the World Cup ‘product’ for another event, but the Commission found the relevant geographic market was the entire EU/EEA. Given such a dominant position the organisers should have ensured that they did not abuse this by instituting a discriminatory distribution system. The discrimination against non-French residents was reinforced by the CFO advising such people that tickets could only be obtained from national football federations and tour operators. As the ticketing arrangements were similar to those adopted in