base in the Commons. In the four sessions
from 1771 to 1774 the opposition did not even force a Lords vote on
the Address, and the Rockinghamite party made the best of a bad job
by exploiting the procedural device of printed Protests against Lords
decisions, using them as a vehicle for press portrayals of opposition
viewpoints. The House of Lords was again a mere sounding-board.
The contrasting independence of the House of Commons stemmed
from the electoralsystem. The electorate was beyond the control of
government, and not merely because of its size, for which 300
. Moreover, this mechanism is also likely to
be conditioned by other factors, such as electoralsystems. For
example, electoralsystems based on proportional representation are
more likely to increase sensitivity to ‘green’ social demand than are
‘winner-takes-all’ systems. This is so for at least two reasons. First,
‘green parties’ stand a better chance of being represented. Second,
many small political parties are more likely to absorb new demands
than few and large political parties.
2 Ten to fifteen years ago, a concern for research economy would have
been a strong
At its height it never returned even one MP (partly, of course, due to the
British electoralsystem, but mainly because of its unpalatable political
views). In 1967, however, the National Front (NF) was formed. It purveyed a
strongly anti-immigrant policy, rather than the anti-Semitism of the BUF.
Itself an amalgam of a complex grouping of tiny racist parties, the National
Front was riven by dissension and splits, and although it caused something
The origins of the Algerian women’s movement, 1945–54
challenge by close police surveillance of the new women’s organisations, and by careful structuring of the Algerian electoralsystem and
‘representative’ institutions so as to totally exclude Muslim women.
This containment, which was symptomatic of the overall blockage of
reform by settler interests intent on preserving their domination, helped
drive the nationalists from a reformist towards a revolutionary solution.
The failure of reform through the decade 1944–54 enables us to see how
the military-led programme of emancipation after 1954, examined in
M1822 - MACMASTER
Third, on the rare occasion that French parties do get their act together,
the results are usually beneficial. The combined RPR–UDF lists of 1986
would have won an even greater victory had a majoritarian electoralsystem been in place. In 1997, the cohesion of the gauche plurielle at least
in terms of candidates provided a newly humble alternative to the disasters
of four years previously that could capitalise on the right’s unpopularity.
Similarly in 2002, the UMP behind the newly incumbent president
presented the possibility of an effective
through a new electoralsystem which considerably restricted the participation of minorities, and in which a law
requiring quotas for women was only partially applied.6
Women accounted for 10 per cent of Assembly representatives. CPME came up with the slogan ‘Women in the Assembly with their own voice’ and actively supported women
candidates. During the campaign, CPME held workshops in
provinces for the discussion of proposals to be presented to
the Constitutional Assembly, and worked with CONAMU
and other women’s organizations for a number of months
indigenous knowledge systems and to structure political
institutions accordingly – the state, representative institutions, electoralsystems – is the root cause of social and
political dissonance, of schizoid political cultures that mimic
modernity while exuding xenophobic fundamentalisms.
Constraints on democratization in South Asia
There is little doubt that today democratization in South
Asia has become a multifaceted process that is both deepening in its form and extending across the region. Even
when there have been recent reversals, as in Pakistan
and the status of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’.
From the institutional level of analysis, I look first at the paths chosen by the different states in response to extremist parties. However, before discussing the administrative and legal barriers imposed by democracies on extremist parties, another latent structural barrier, i.e. the electoralsystem – discussed in chapter 1 – should be clarified. The electoralsystem was not intended to block extremist parties from gaining representation. However
-Gaullist moderate right – local
notables for the conservatives, local notables plus Catholic associative networks for the Christian democrats. For Gaullists, ‘we’re a real party,
with real activists’, as one member said; ‘the UDF is a country club’.1
From the Gaullist movement to the president’s party
UDF notables, on the other hand, described the Gaullists’ modus operandi
as fascisante (Frémontier, 1984: 180–1).
Lastly, the right was also predictably divided by presidential rivalries
under the two-ballot electoralsystem. First-ballot competition need not
Transgressing the cordon sanitaire: understanding the English Defence League as a social movement
support for such parties2 in the UK did not rise above 1 per cent until
2010–12; even then, at 1.8 per cent, support remained well below that in neighbouring countries such as France (13.6 per cent) and The Netherlands (12.7 per
cent) (Minkenberg, 2013: 20). The reasons for this are explored in more nuanced
ways by others (see Goodwin, 2011a) but might be summarised as resulting from
a combination of: the first-past-the-post electoralsystem, which significantly
reduces the incentive to vote for candidates with little chance of securing victory
in a given constituency