defined as terrorist crimes. In addition to
such manoeuvring, Riyadh employed other strategies to regulate political dissent and
opposition. The Ministry for Culture and Information placed legal requirements on
anyone wishing to blog to have a licence; those wishing to apply for a licence had to be
in possession of a college degree and be over the age of twenty.27
Another mechanism of control that became increasingly prominent at this time
was the regulation of citizenship, where the politics of identity and ensuing revocation
of citizenship rights from individuals
Catriona McKinnon and Dario Castiglione
the Advisory Group on Citizenship established by the British Government
(the ‘Crick Report’), for instance, places a heavy emphasis on tolerance
in its learning outcomes (which schools have a statutory responsibility to
deliver). The Report states that children ought to be disposed to the ‘practice of toleration’, and have the ‘ability to tolerate other view points’.7 But
even in the absence of policy-based requirements that toleration be cultivated in citizens, it is reasonable to expect that political philosophers
nineteenth century, the development of the political power of the middle
classes within capitalist states also refined the concept of the nation. The
creation of mass democracies and notions of popular sovereignty during the twentiety century
created the notion of nationality being related to citizenship .
Nations and national identity, in the eyes of some commentators, are
validity of political claims promoted at
more aggregated levels of society. There are several areas of
empirical investigation – corresponding to various aspects
of state–society relations – where recent anthropological
findings provide insights into these relations. The remainder
of this chapter discusses just two of them, very briefly: identity politics (registers of citizenship), and issues of public
authority in local political arenas (legitimacy).
Political pluralization in Africa, as elsewhere, has heightened
political competition and multiplied
citizenship and discourse. However, a state like France was too big to
appeal to the sorts of strong solidarity that existed in medieval
city-states, where it was likely that everyone knew each other. The looser
phenomenon of national consciousness provided an appropriate story around
which solidarity could be built.
Quite literally, the state was deemed to be the national
project. It belonged to everyone, because everyone was
Tuœman’s political integrity.
Three additional Franjoist themes informed some of the government’s key
policies and shaped its conception of national identity. Each depended on a
particular understanding of Croatian national identity and drew upon a particular interpretation of the historical statehood narrative. These were the focus
on the primacy of Croatian sovereignty and independence, an exclusivist
approach to citizenship, and the promotion of conservative clericalism.
Protecting the sovereignty and independence of Croatia was the one issue
that united the
in the common life of
a community in which they do not wish to have the entitlement to define
and in this way change the dynamic away from tolerant inclusion to the
differentiation of citizenship. How might such differentiation enter into a
just regime of toleration?
I argued earlier that the Amish and indigenous groups do not enter into
a close cooperative relationship with the larger tolerating community and
thus accept being democratically unequal in influence over some decisions,
in exchange for the maximum degree of non-interference possible. It is
Domestically, the hundred years after the Civil War
(1861–65) were characterized by a gradual abandonment of
narrow assimilationism and the enactment – in the 1960s –
of legislation, prompted by the civil rights movement (Morris
1984), to uphold the rights of citizenship of all Americans.
Addressing the legacies of pre-1960s discrimination and
racism (Fields 1990; Jordan 1968; Kelley 1994) proved a platform for a multiculturalist reformulation of American national identity, or in David Hollinger’s phrase a ‘post-ethnic
politics’ (Hollinger 1995). The
citizenship and also to the approach taken here, and considers what is in this case the essentially political nature of ‘social and economic’ rights.
The pattern of difference and similarity among the three case studies at best allows the studies to talk to each other, clarifying some points and opening up ambiguities in others. Despite the range of difference among the cases, it is important to note that they certainly do not cross the whole gamut of forms of abuse. Even across the range of three case studies, key aspects of the argument
of people’s aspirations for non-violence or justice or compassion in the face of the experience of violence, exploitation or marginalisation, as well as on the historically hegemonic power of modern liberal democracies to back this claim. This category of the universal, however, is less an expression of the natural shape of things than part of the conceptual construction of the state and of specific models of citizenship. Within classical liberalism the rights of universal man are rights within a state just as the trope of universal man emerged as an imagined