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Arthur B. Gunlicks

percent of the eligible voting population, which is considered to be very low. This set the stage for Brandenburg’s identical requirement of 20,000, Saxony’s requirement of 40,000, and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern’s requirement of 15,000 signatures, the latter two of which constitute slightly more than 1 percent of the population. Saxony-Anhalt’s requirement of 35,000 signatures is about 1.6 percent of its population.25 These low requirements have been criticized by some for their potential abuse by extremist groups or even by opposition parties. If the parliament does not

in The Länder and German federalism
State-based institutions to advocate for gender equality
Anne Marie Goetz

, and the ways in which they are represented politically, will shape women’s civil society strategies, as will the relationship between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. For instance, where there is robust multi-party competition, as in Chile, women’s groups may pursue confrontational, high-visibility strategies in the hope of interesting opposition parties in taking up their concerns in the legislature. The nature of the state is of great significance to the effectiveness of women’s ‘voice’ in civil society. The nature of access opportunities to

in Mainstreaming gender, democratizing the state?
Open Access (free)
The Conservatives in crisis
Philip Lynch and Mark Garnett

government to opposition was not going to be easy for a Conservative Party that had been in power for eighteen years and whose members had little experience of opposition. Opposition parties find it difficult to set the agenda and are frequently at the mercy of factors beyond their control, hoping to profit from the misfortunes of the government. Two main tasks present themselves. On the one hand, the opposition must exploit the failings of the government with carefully-crafted attacks on their integrity and record, without themselves appearing excessively opportunistic or

in The Conservatives in Crisis
Open Access (free)
The leadership gamble of William Hague
Mark Garnett

fifty-eight. But after the 1959 general election the deficit between the government and the opposition parties had grown to 100 seats; Labour’s tally had actually fallen by nineteen. When other factors are considered this was arguably a worse performance than the Conservatives in 2001. But while Gaitskell soldiered on, Hague hurriedly fell on his sword. It is perfectly respectable to claim that the result in 2001 would have been the same whatever Hague had done. No one can be sure that the Conservatives would have fared better under a different leader – although it

in The Conservatives in Crisis
The Member States between procedural adaptation and structural revolution
Jürgen Mittag and Wolfgang Wessels

Frequently, a consensus pervades in which both governmental and opposition parties approve of the integration process. Nevertheless, there is a small number of parties opposing further integration and, more importantly, in some cases an increasing internal party factionalism concerning the strategy towards European integration. Since Maastricht, the debates on European policy in some Member States have brought about another cleavage in national party systems. The salience of both pro- and anti-European arguments have led to an additional dividing line between or within

in Fifteen into one?
Eşref Aksu

consultants. Elections were held on 29–30 September 1992, with 18 parties running for office, and 12 parties securing representation in the Parliament. Though UNITA had gained 70 seats, making it the largest opposition party, 50 it did not accept the results and returned to its military campaign against the MPLA government. The Bicesse process had failed. Increasing emphasis on human rights and

in The United Nations, intra-state peacekeeping and normative change
Joost Fontein

a long-established pattern of using a narrow and exclusivist legacy of the liberation struggle to buttress its own legitimacy. This includes undermining that of opposition parties, including ‘old’ (and ‘new’) ZAPU, the fractious factions of the MDC with whom it was then sharing a ‘unity government’, and, more recently, a host of emergent Ndebele pressure groups such as the Mwthazi Liberation Front (MLF), a radical group agitating for secession for Matabeleland. It is not surprising therefore that the crude politicking at Chibondo provoked the anger of those linked

in Governing the dead
Open Access (free)
Fragmented structures in a complex system
Andreas Maurer

-unified Republic would act as a dominant leader in the Union.9 However, as the Maastricht and the more recent Amsterdam IGC process of 1996–97 revealed,10 Germany did not aspire to use its potential to engage in unilateral power politics. Despite domestic concerns especially on EMU, neither the federal government nor the parliamentary opposition parties attempted to exploit Germany’s potential against its traditional role of an important but ‘tamed power’.11 The political class is associated with the ‘traditional’ set of priorities in EU politics: achieving and consolidating EMU

in Fifteen into one?
Rhiannon Vickers

associated with Chamberlain’s failures, while at the same time depriving the Chamberlain government of the wider legitimacy it would have gained from the support of the main opposition party. Furthermore, Labour managed to support the war, but not the government, without appearing to be undermining the war effort, which leant credence to the developing perspective that Britain needed a broader coalition government that included all the political parties. Labour’s statements on the long-term aims of the war in the first few months of hostilities were often slightly nebulous

in The Labour Party and the world, volume 1
Russia as ‘a Europe apart’
Andrew Monaghan

sovereign states and intervene in their internal affairs to destabilise them by manipulating public opinion. Similarly, Moscow accused the USA of encouraging support for opposition parties in Russia at the time of the protest demonstrations in December 2011 and early 2012. Putin suggested that hundreds of millions of dollars of foreign money had been spent on influencing Russian domestic politics, and

in The new politics of Russia