s state socialisms, from Hungarian aspirations to a bridging role in Europeansecurity policy to Gorbachev's imagination of a ‘common European home’, at a time when elites might have been losing faith in the alternative global project of connecting the state socialist world and Global South (Mark 2015 ). Pragmatic–technocratic reformers, and strategists expressing fears of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, were both ‘appropriating’ this position in Yugoslavia by 1989 (Kilibarda 2010 : 40). Late Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav ‘nesting orientalisms’ thus rejected
Security and complex political emergencies instead of development
Gorm Rye Olsen
the WEU to carry out peacekeeping operations. The Cologne decision meant that the European Union
acquired the right to make decisions on the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’, which
include ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, [and] tasks of
combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’ (Lenzi, in Khüne
et al., 1995: 48). According to Guido Lenzi, sub-Saharan Africa was important
because the region ‘is an area for Petersberg missions’. And, on the other hand,
it is important because it can contribute to ‘a global affirmation of the
Sociology, 6(4): 390–408.
Leonard, Sarah (2010) ‘EU border security and migration into the European Union:
FRONTEX and securitization through practices’, EuropeanSecurity, 19(2): 231–254.
Makridakis I. (2010) ‘Συρματενιοι, Ξεσυρματένιοι· Όλοι. Χιώτες πρόσφυγες και στρατιώτες
στη Μέση Ανατολή: Αφηγήσεις 1941–1946’ [Syrmatenioi, Xesyrmatenioi, Oloi: Chiot
Testimonies of Refugees and Soldiers in the Middle East: 1941–1946]. Athens: Estia.
Manners, Ian (2008) ‘The normative ethics of the European Union’, International Affairs,
Migdal, Joel (2001) State in
Future of Security and Development, 4 (New York: St Martin’s
Press in association with UNU/WIDER, 2000), pp. 26–50.
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation
37 Assembly of the WEU, Parliamentary Cooperation, p. 4.
38 Muthiah Alagappa, ‘Regionalism and Conflict Management: A Framework for
Analysis’, Review of International Studies, 21:4 (1995), pp. 359–87, esp. p. 378.
39 Buzan, ‘Logic of regional security’, p. 21.
40 ‘Charter for EuropeanSecurity’ (Istanbul: OSCE, November 1999), para. 13. For
the OSCE’s role in this context
Otmar Höll, Johannes Pollack and Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann
campaign, both positively as well as negatively. While the SPÖ and the
Member States and the European Union
Greens argued in favour of neutrality, the People’s Party, the FPÖ and the
Liberals denied the importance of the subject in a European election.
However, one significant change occurred in this debate, at least in terms
of rhetoric. The discourse on NATO membership, pursued by the three
latter parties, shifted to a call for an independent Europeansecurity
system without NATO. Interestingly, EU enlargement did
Council of Europe nor the OSCE had been able alone to satisfy this
The Washington Summit also decided to build a EuropeanSecurity
and Defence Identity within the alliance. The policy called for a much
stronger European responsibility in handling future conflicts of the
Kosovo type. New threats would be brought to NATO’s attention,
giving it a right of ‘first refusal’. In cases where the alliance would not
want to act as such, a European Union chain of command would be
expected to take over responsibility, borrowing equipment from NATO
(and especially the United
president Dmitri Medvedev stated that it was ‘hard to escape the
conclusion that Europe’s architecture still
bears the stamp of an ideology inherited from the past’. 11 He thus emphasised Moscow’s
attempt to advance a new Europeansecurity treaty to overcome this.
Indeed, these proposals and other elements of Russian foreign policy
during the Putin era can be understood as attempts to revise the results
European political cooperation by a commitment to a Common Foreign and
Security Policy and the subsequent development of the European Rapid Reaction
Force signalled a determination at least to move forward on that front,
initially through the mechanism of the Western European Union but ultimately
through the creation of a EuropeanSecurity and Defence Policy. We need
still to explore whether these aspirations have been converted into a
settle problems over borders and minorities, which could threaten
Europeansecurity – and much more importantly, any eventual
enlargement process (European Council 1993 ). See the Joint Action convening the Pact
(European Council 1993 );
the ‘Concluding Document from the Inaugural Conference for a Pact
on Stability in Europe’, EU Bulletin , no. 5, 1994; and the
‘Political Declaration adopted at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (2002) The Military Balance
2002–2003 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for IISS).
15 See the Bundeswehr website: www.bundeswehr.de.
16 Defence White Paper 1994, paragraph 202, p. 23.
17 Mary Elise Sarotte (2001) German Military Reform and EuropeanSecurity,
Adelphi Paper, no. 349 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for IISS).
18 George Robertson (2003) ‘The Role of NATO in the Twenty-First Century’, Speech at the Welt am Sonntag Forum, Berlin, 3 November.
19 Rainer Brüderle quoted in ‘Liberale wollen eine Berufsarmee’, Süddeutsche