principal regional institutions have largely failed to cultivate cooperative multilateralism. Can they do so singularly or in combination in the future? Multilateral form and the security dilemma The basic conditions underlying western models of multilateral institutional cooperation do not exist in Eurasia.3 In the transatlantic context, the major institutions reflected a benign American hegemony and acquiescent western European states. NATO, for example, survives because its combination of American power and institutional attributes enhanced cooperation between its
This book focuses on the paradoxical character of law and specifically concerns the structural violence of law as the political imposition of normative order onto a "lawless" condition. The paradox of law which grounds and motivates Christoph Menke's intervention is that law is both the opposite of violence and, at the same time, a form of violence. The book develops its engagement with the paradox of law in two stages. The first shows why, and in what precise sense, the law is irreducibly characterized by structural violence. The second explores the possibility of law becoming self-reflectively aware of its own violence and, hence, of the form of a self-critique of law in view of its own violence. The Book's philosophical claims are developed through analyses of works of drama: two classical tragedies in the first part and two modern dramas in the second part. It attempts to illuminate the paradoxical nature of law by way of a philosophical interpretation of literature. There are at least two normative orders within the European ethical horizon that should be called "legal orders" even though they forego the use of coercion and are thus potentially nonviolent. These are international law and Jewish law. Understanding the relationship between law and violence is one of the most urgent challenges a postmodern critical legal theory faces today. Self-reflection, the philosophical concept that plays a key role in the essay, stands opposed to all forms of spontaneity.
In May 1958, and four years into the Algerian War of Independence, a revolt again appropriated the revolutionary and republican symbolism of the French Revolution by seizing power through a Committee of Public Safety. This book explores why a repressive colonial system that had for over a century maintained the material and intellectual backwardness of Algerian women now turned to an extensive programme of 'emancipation'. After a brief background sketch of the situation of Algerian women during the post-war decade, it discusses the various factors contributed to the emergence of the first significant women's organisations in the main urban centres. It was only after the outbreak of the rebellion in 1954 and the arrival of many hundreds of wives of army officers that the model of female interventionism became dramatically activated. The French military intervention in Algeria during 1954-1962 derived its force from the Orientalist current in European colonialism and also seemed to foreshadow the revival of global Islamophobia after 1979 and the eventual moves to 'liberate' Muslim societies by US-led neo-imperialism in Afghanistan and Iraq. For the women of Bordj Okhriss, as throughout Algeria, the French army represented a dangerous and powerful force associated with mass destruction, brutality and rape. The central contradiction facing the mobile socio-medical teams teams was how to gain the trust of Algerian women and to bring them social progress and emancipation when they themselves were part of an army that had destroyed their villages and driven them into refugee camps.
The book explores the relationship between violence against women on one hand, and the rights to health and reproductive health on the other. It argues that violation of the right to health is a consequence of violence, and that (state) health policies might be a cause of – or create the conditions for – violence against women. It significantly contributes to feminist and international human rights legal scholarship by conceptualising a new ground-breaking idea, violence against women’s health (VAWH), using the Hippocratic paradigm as the backbone of the analysis. The two dimensions of violence at the core of the book – the horizontal, ‘interpersonal’ dimension and the vertical ‘state policies’ dimension – are investigated through around 70 decisions of domestic, regional and international judicial or quasi-judicial bodies (the anamnesis). The concept of VAWH, drawn from the anamnesis, enriches the traditional concept of violence against women with a human rights-based approach to autonomy and a reflection on the pervasiveness of patterns of discrimination (diagnosis). VAWH as theorised in the book allows the reconceptualisation of states’ obligations in an innovative way, by identifying for both dimensions obligations of result, due diligence obligations, and obligations to progressively take steps (treatment). The book eventually asks whether it is not international law itself that is the ultimate cause of VAWH (prognosis).
the EU must conform to a number of conditions according to the Treaty of Rome. These are: 1 They must accept all existing EU legislation. 2 They must be members of NATO (to avoid any conflict of interest over foreign and defence policy). 3 They must have adequate safeguards for human rights. 4 They must have democratic political systems. 5 Their economies should be basically capitalist. This does not prevent some public ownership of industry and public services, but, essentially, free markets must be allowed to operate. Otherwise, Europe would no longer be a truly
source of divergence in US and UK policy. MBFR was an area of deeper concern for both US and UK policy-makers. If not handled correctly, the British government believed MBFR could critically undermine NATO, and Heath wanted the issues surrounding MBFR to be vigorously analysed within NATO. Only once this had been accomplished would NATO undertake serious discussions with the Warsaw Pact. Nixon initially gave little attention to the concept, but by 1971 – due to a mixture of domestic, international and economic motives – the president gave the idea more interest. US
and the use of force of conscription enabled the new Bundeswehr to build up a substantial personnel base and augmentation strength within the context of NATO, thus contributing to West Germany’s international rehabilitation. Furthermore conscription, alongside a number of other new civil–military mechanisms, served as a bridge-builder between the new armed forces and a society largely opposed to the rearmament process and suspicious of all things military. An upshot of this was that conscription over time became more than just a staﬃng mechanism, symbolising the
with Nixon in 1969–70 he had personally irritated the president. His appointment of John Freeman, an ardent critic of Nixon, as UK ambassador to Washington in 1968 was especially unwelcome.9 Personal characteristics aside, Wilson’s insistence that Britain keep its accelerated plans for an East of Suez withdrawal, along with his unwillingness to offer a greater commitment to NATO, only vexed US policy-makers further.10 For Wilson, the fashion in which Washington ignored his efforts at 04_Strained_partnership_128-174.indd 129 06/11/2013 13:50 130 A strained
Rumsfeld recollected, the fact that he was appointed as Nixon’s third representative to NATO in February 1973 – following David Kennedy’s resignation some eight months earlier – suggested that the Nixon ‘administration’s interest in [NATO] was at best modest’.10 More important still was that Nixon believed that relations with Europe were taking on a new competitive form. Certainly, throughout 1969–72, the US–EEC economic relationship had manifested in fierce competition, and political changes that were evolving would present new challenges for US–EEC relations. The most
that Turkey might seek to deflect its internal troubles by provoking a quarrel with Greece. 7 The Greek horror of a communist onslaught faded in the 1960s, only to be replaced by growing fears of a potential Turkish threat, fed in part by Greece’s acute consciousness of its relative military weakness. The 1974 defeat in Cyprus, Athanassios Platias confessed, laid bare the fact that Greece had no deterrent or offensive capabilities, other than those provided by the United States and NATO. And, he pointed out, in Cyprus the latter conspicuously failed to come to