From Afghanistan to Iraq

Longhurst, Germany and the use of force.qxd 30/06/2004 16:25 Page 77 4 The momentum of change. Germany and the use of force II: from Afghanistan to Iraq Germany’s engagement in Kosovo in a combat capacity appeared to have shifted the parameters of German security policy and perspectives on the use of force, apparently to ‘solidify the new consensus’ over foreign and security policy.1 Indeed, Kosovo did seem to confirm that the trajectory of change already apparent in the 1990s was leading to a normalising of Germany’s relationship with the use of force

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Confronting relativism in Serbia and Croatia

’s conflicts. These categorisations seem to have been assimilated into Serbian and Croatian propaganda. While Milošević could happily share a weekend at Karadjordjevo with Tudjman, carving up Bosnia, there was no friendliness between Milošević and the Kosovar leader Ibrahim Rugova or the Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović. While these men were seemingly in favour of peace, not war, Milošević preferred the company of a fellow warmonger and opportunist. The Battle of Kosovo had seemingly sealed the fate of the Moslems. There could be no reconciliation between these two

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to offend brutally the opinion of moral people in their own or other countries’. 2 The four interventions were successful in stopping the ‘effusion of blood’. They were not merely better than nothing (as in the case of Somalia today), too late (Rwanda) or leading to inordinate destruction, refugees and civilian deaths (Kosovo/Serbia). The insurgents themselves sought foreign armed intervention to save them. With the exception of the Cubans

in Humanitarian intervention in the long nineteenth century

of whom advocated the increasing autonomy and liberalisation of Croatia.5 By 1990, large numbers of émigrés had been brought in for the February HDZ Congress, mixing with Croatian and Hercegovenian nationalists.6 Tudjman’s party, with its American-designed posters and slogans, appeared Western and progressive. He alluded to a referendum on Croatian independence, and promised to recreate the Croatian state in all its former glory. While the re-annexation of Kosovo and Vojvodina formed a central part of Milošević’s election strategy it, Tudjman focused on the

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clear view of Serbian and Croatian arguments, half the debate is missing. Clearly, a comparative study of Serbian and Croatian propaganda is long overdue. While it is obvious that the Serbs were the main aggressors in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo, there is no doubt that Croats, Kosovar Albanians, and Bosnian Moslems were not simply innocent bystanders, waiting to be ‘ethnically cleansed’. There were many examples of these other three groups either instigating violence, or responding to it with force of their own. To many, it might seem obvious why Serbs and Croats

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A never-ending story of mutual attraction and estrangement

adopt a more aggressive stance. Fluctuating Euroscepticism can also be located in dissenting factions of the ruling PASOK party. Under the present leadership of Costas Simitis, the party has a resolutely pro-European official position. Still, the dual shock from the Ocalan affair (the Kurdish leader who had earlier sought asylum in Italy, then was offered sanctuary in Greece, was granted refuge to the Greek embassy in Kenya only to be abducted by Turkish security forces when leaving the embassy) and from the far more important Kosovo crisis (where Greece sided quite

in Fifteen into one?

the Bundeswehr’s remit to embrace a far wider set of security tasks in the 1990s called for a realignment of its structures and capacities. At the forefront of this project, at least in the early 1990s, was a need to modernise the Bundeswehr, to create a deployment capability based on rapid reaction for low-intensity peacekeeping. In time, and especially after the war in Kosovo of 1999 and renewed efforts at the EU level to create an effective military dimension (ESDP) to boost the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), expectations and pressures for swifter and

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. The largest migration, in 1690–1, saw tens of thousands of Serbs flee Kosovo and southern Serbia when Ottoman forces retook territory the Habsburgs had temporarily held in 1686–90. Orthodox Christian settlers, often ‘Vlachs’ in seventeenth-century Habsburg sources, were identified and addressed by their Church and the nineteenth-century Serbian national movement as Serbs, fixing their collective identity along religious and ethnic lines. With programmes for Croat national unification (the Kingdom of Croatia, an autonomous part of Hungary, plus other Habsburg

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Communism, post-Communism, and the war in Croatia

, Serbia was seen to have been simultaneously exploited, both by the richer republics of Croatia and Slovenia, and by poorer republics, such as Kosovo and Macedonia. Rather than attack the massive foreign debts, the corruption and the wholesale neglect of the economy by Tito and his Partisan clique, known affectionately at the ‘Club of 1941’, Serbian writers chose to focus on what they perceived to be the deliberate and conscious impoverishment of Serbia. In reality, Serbia’s poverty was an indirect result of much larger problems. Administrative versus natural borders As

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Security and complex political emergencies instead of development

role. The ambition to develop ‘Europe’ into a significant foreign policy actor has existed ever since the start of the European Community (Cafruny and Peters, 1998: 1ff; Cameron, in Rhodes, 1998: 20). The possibilities for realising this aim have increased considerably due to the ending of the Cold War and not 80 EUD5 10/28/03 3:13 PM Page 81 Changing European concerns least because of what happened in the Balkans during the 1990s, including the events in Kosovo in 1999. It is often forgotten that the Community’s development policy was actually one of the first

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