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Emotion, affect and the meaning of activism

that the rational and the emotional may be entwined in social movement participation rather than constituting alternative explanations of motivation to engage (Crossley, 2002: 50). Indeed, Jasper (1998: 398) argues many aspects of collective action in social movements that have been viewed as primarily cognitive in fact have emotional dimensions to them. This chapter starts with a brief discussion of theoretical debates on emotion and affect in relation to social movements and adopts the notion of ‘affective practice’ (Wetherell, 2012: 4) as a means of understanding

in Loud and proud

teleologically, as the locus of the realisation of reason. Instead he regards history as the zoology of the species mankind. The reasons that this view leads Schopenhauer to lend such importance to art take one to the core of some of the philosophical questions raised by aesthetics in modernity. Schelling regarded art as a means of coming to terms with the cognitively inaccessible motivating forces upon which reason is founded, and this gave art an active role in the subject’s self-understanding. Schopenhauer, in contrast, regards art as the only means of temporarily escaping

in Aesthetics and subjectivity
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Art and interpretation

use rules, as one does in a craft, but that the application of rules cannot be made completely rule-bound, on pain of a regress of rules for rules. Kant had already suggested this point when he described judgement’s role in the use of cognitive rules as follows: If judgement wanted to show universally how one is to subsume under these rules, i.e. distinguish whether something belongs under the rule or not, this could only happen via a further rule. But because this is a rule it requires once more an instruction by judgement, and thus it is shown to be the case that

in Aesthetics and subjectivity
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Hamlet, adaptation and the work of following

signature of the Thing “Shakespeare”: to authorize each one of the translations, to make them possible and intelligible without ever being reducible to them.’61 As Derrida suggests, there is evidently a claim here that is in a certain sense ‘cognitive’ but non-reducible – as such it is bound to prove unsettling for any humanist in search of authentic originality. Genius calls us to follow: not in any slavish sense of imitation but rather in the hope that we gather around the disjuncture that makes following a possibility. In the case of Hamlet, as we have seen, the official

in The new aestheticism
Debates about potential and ambition in British socialist thought

and aspirations under existing exploitative conditions this did not mean that this was their ‘natural’ and permanent psychological outlook. Rather, they had been constrained by the limits imposed on their opportunities and expectations. Higher aspirations and new skills could be learned through habit and training. Writing in Justice on 16 June 1894, William Morris emphasised that ‘it must be remembered that civilization has reduced the workman to such a skinny and pitiful existence, that he scarcely knows how to frame a desire for any life much better than that

in In search of social democracy
Sustaining literature

inadequate. If reason, calculation, practice and day-to-day thinking have led to a tragic inability to think beyond the expediency of the present, then perhaps it is the task of literature and the humanities to address our sentimental, affective, habitual and non-cognitive comportment towards the world. Scientific knowledge and the dissemination of facts, warnings and already-incurred losses have not only made little impact on effective policy and lifestyle change; the intensity and enormity of the problem may have generated a sense of practical impossibility. Here is

in Literature and sustainability

essentials of public reason and democracy, since they, too, are proper subjects for deliberation, and indeed part of the continuum of forms of deliberation in public life in a pluralist society. Even if we may challenge the essentials of any political conception of justice, toleration must still impose some limits on deliberation if it is to support rather than undermine democracy. A reflexive conception of toleration clearly pulls in two directions and reveals tensions in the deliberative ideal under the condition of pluralism. On the one hand, its ideal is democratic

in The culture of toleration in diverse societies

, regional state-building. Art. A TEU states that ‘The Union shall be founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established in this Treaty’. Accordingly, the Union provides for a general umbrella under which the pre-established Communities continue to exist as separate legal entities. The EC is the more advanced component of a three-pillar structure complemented by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The latter pillars, by establishing two additional ‘pluralist

in Theory and reform in the European Union
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Crossing the seas

, thinking of this kind marked a significant shift. It’s too simple, fifty years on, to suppose that such insights have always been with us. In the epoch of decolonisation a generation of West Indians found themselves wrestling with the ‘deep’ – symbolic and cognitive – systems of England. This comprised coming to terms with the formal curriculum of the metropolitan culture, internalised through the

in West Indian intellectuals in Britain

‘limited good’ in Finnish and Karelian folk belief was already identified in 1960 by Toivo Vuorela. 15 This cognitive orientation was expressed in the Finnish-Karelian culture area through the concept of ‘luck’ ( onni ), which was thought to exist in finite quantity, as well as the ‘stealing’, ‘spoiling’, or ‘breaking’ of this luck. If a cattle owner’s onni decreased (the cows became sick or stopped

in Witchcraft Continued