that I am proposing this is understood as a ‘demand of reason’. But how can reason demand of me that I relativise my deeply held ethical beliefs in this way and accept that the reasons that are good ethical reasons for me are not (yet) good reasons in the context of general justification? Do I have to be a sceptic or a relativist or a ‘comprehensive liberal’ to accept this? That is, do I have to believe either in no ethical truth, or in the equality of different ethical beliefs, or in the value of ethical autonomy and the ‘good life’ of being a tolerant person? These

in The culture of toleration in diverse societies
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people who may live in distinct parts of the federation that encompasses them, for example, India and Russia, or even Canada with its French-speaking minority in Quebec province, where it is the majority. Federation is a practical alternative to fragmentation into small independent states if there is sufficient recognition among these people of the common economic, security, or other advantages of union that they might enjoy while also retaining some degree of autonomy. A third reason for federation is history. It is difficult to imagine the federations in Germany or

in The Länder and German federalism
Community, language and culture under the Celtic Tiger

, rather than policies aimed at strengthening community per se. Through their developmental interventions, the colonial and postcolonial states have increasingly reified the Gaeltacht as an administrative zone. The general tendency has been towards an increase in state centralisation, the reduction or elimination of local government powers, and the suppression of any form of local autonomy.20 The Irish state portrayed the Gaeltacht as the ‘storehouse’ or ‘treasure’ of identity in a nation state that was constitutionally defined as Irish-speaking. In reality, Irish

in The end of Irish history?
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– in other words, as long as that action was not one which determined his or her identity’. In short, TZP7 4/25/2005 4:55 PM Page 133 The welfare of future generations 133 acts of identity creation are not necessarily identical to acts of harm and so it is possible to harm those who we have brought into being, even if there is another possible world in which they would never have existed at all. What exists in the gap between acts of identity creation and acts of harm? Autonomy. And so how would we harm future generations? By reducing their capacity or

in After the new social democracy
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Towards an archaeology of modernism

simultaneous. In a gesture that will always strike his critics as intolerably fast, Adorno conceives of autonomy in art as categorially or formally setting art into opposition to society: Melancholy as form 169 Much more importantly, art becomes social by its opposition to society, and it occupies this position only as autonomous art. By crystallizing in itself as something unique to itself, rather than complying with existing social norms and qualifying as ‘socially useful,’ it criticizes society by merely existing, for which puritans of all stripes condemn it. There is

in The new aestheticism

different kinds of elections. This was facilitated by the party’s flexibility, a by-product of its ‘weakness’ – the party has comparatively low membership, a small bureaucratised national office, and a tradition of local autonomy. For example, differential candidate selection procedures within the PS afford different degrees of influence to the national and local organisations.2 Part-cause and part-effect of the flexibility and ‘weakness’ of the PS is the hold that local notables – what Mény calls the ‘Republican aristocracy’ (1995) – have over the national party

in The French party system
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La gauche de la gauche

in traditional areas of conflict such as class or religion (Kriesi et al., 1995). They espouse ‘post-materialist’ themes and use unconventional forms of participation (Dalton and Kuechler, 1990). While the orientation of the first, post-1968 wave centred on policy, with movements cultivating close links with political parties, the second wave has been characterised by a desire for autonomy from traditional institutions and shaped by motives which are held to be expressive and affective rather than instrumental. Conflicting interpretations of this shift in emphasis

in The French party system
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Another time

9 Discussion: another time The very institutions that are directly responsible for much of the rigidity of our life— namely the Schedule and the Calendar—can also be seen as being among the foremost liberators of the modern individual. (Zerubavel 1985, 166) In this quote, Zerubavel suggests that the calendar and the clock can also be among the “foremost liberators of the modern individual.” As social actors we have more autonomy than we think and this includes re-articulating conventional temporal schemas and resisting heteronormative imperatives. Earlier in

in A table for one
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The international system and the Middle East

tended to dominate the region on behalf of a relatively united ‘core’. The first of these hegemons, Great Britain, came near to imposing an imperial order in the Middle East (Brown 1984: 112–39). After the interval of bi-polarity, in which the Arab world attained considerable autonomy, the sole American hegemon has returned to its attempt to establish a Pax Americana in the region. The result, according to Barry Buzan (1991), is that the Islamic Middle East is the only classical civilisation that has not managed to re-establish itself as a significant world actor

in The international politics of the Middle East

determinants. Foreign policy determinants In any states system state elites seek to defend the autonomy and security of the regime and state in the three separate arenas or levels in which they must operate, although which level dominates attention in a given time and country may vary considerably. The regional level: geopolitics    In a states system like the Middle East, where regional militarisation has greatly increased external threats, these often take first place on states’ foreign policy agendas

in The international politics of the Middle East