capabilities on all sides helped preserve the systemic status quo. In addition, the shared elitist (dynastic or oligarchic) ideology of the regimes brought them to accept the rules of a multi-polar system – that no state should endanger the vital interests of its neighbours (Maddy-Weitzman 1993: Mufti 1996: 21–59; Seale 1965: 5–99). The Arab League attempted to both institutionalise respect for the sovereignty of individual states while acknowledging shared Arab identities and facilitating a collective response to the common threat from Zionism. Its legitimacy was, however
different regions which shared no history of statehood or common identity – the Sunni Arab centre around Baghdad, a majority Shi’a south and the Kurdish north. None of Iraq’s pre-Ba’th regimes found a viable state-building formula which could stabilise this centrifugal society. The monarchy, resting on a thin stratum of landlords and tribal chiefs and lacking popular support and nationalist legitimacy, was only kept in power by the British; ironically, the one issue which united most of Iraq’s disparate politically active population and produced the 1958 revolution was
The net neutrality case studies illustrate
‘how’ participation can occur in many modes, but they also
stress that effective participation in governance is not only a matter
of greater numbers of people representing different groups, but is also
contingent on the legitimacy of spaces for participation. For code-based
governance, this is often linked with expertise, but as the case of net
society, which was still suffering
from the after-shocks of Yeltsin’s violent assault and dissolution of the
Moreover, Yeltsin’s victory over the parliament was a pyrrhic victory.
For although a ‘presidential Constitution’ was officially ratified in
December 1993, the Constitution was fundamentally weakened by questions over its legitimacy. As we discussed in chapter 1, one of the central
preconditions for a democratic federation is the voluntary membership of
its subjects. But in December 1993
). The toxic yardsticks and standardized practices
of science can become both a source of legitimacy for “fenceline” communities,
but also the means of their downfall (Ottinger 2013).
The politicized nature of science has led academics and activists to call for
the democratization of science and expertise, advancing forms of citizen science
and participatory public interventions in science and policy (Irwin 1995; Fischer
2000; Carolan 2006). The community-based environmental justice research
examples discussed earlier, in Part I of this book, exemplify some of the
different ideas or approaches can be detected in the literature on democratic consolidation in Latin
America. They are, first, the game-theoretical idea; second,
longevity; third, legitimacy; fourth, the ‘checklist’ approach.
Take each in turn. The game-theoretical idea considers a
democracy to be a set of rules and adopts rational choice
techniques to discuss both rule-making and participatory
strategies. Przeworski’s (1991: 26) famous claim that ‘democracy becomes consolidated when under particular political
and economic conditions a particular set of institutions
Brigitte Nerlich, Sarah Hartley, Sujatha Raman, and Alexander Thomas T. Smith
legitimacy and transparency in politics and policymaking?
What role do interested citizens play in the creation of science and
the making of science policy? Who controls the new technologies and
enterprises of openness and transparency? And what will happen in
the future, given radical changes that are happening in science and
technology, as well as politics and policy, globally and nationally?
Trying to find answers to these questions provides us with a muchneeded opportunity to rethink the relationship between science and
politics and, more importantly, the role of
problem: the public discourse
created by the ideology of global capitalism undermines the legitimacy of
many choices that for over half a century have been traditionally
acknowledged as the prerogative of states. In particular, the legitimacy of
any state regulation of markets is being increasingly questioned: there is
no longer a domestic market to regulate, the market is global and as such
outside the state’s power. Moreover
by France. As he puts it, “political
legitimacy in a democratic polity is not derived from nationhood or voluntary
association but from popular self-government, that is, citizens’
participation and representation in democratic institutions that track their
collective will and common good” (p. 41).
I shall return later to Bauböck's rejection of nationhood
as a basis for jurisdiction, but first I want to try to unpack these
a mark of legitimacy. Recent projects include ‘Future
Female: A 21st Century Gender Perspective’, and ‘Women
2000’, a report on the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action in the UK (WNC, 1999).
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