, in the direction of the ‘immunised’ pole by the very fact that, for the first time, the objective and powers of the Shabak, as well as the means of accounting for its actions, will now be more clearly defined. 2 Another step in the same direction can be detected in the Ministry of Justice’s repeated efforts to address state policy regarding the ‘incitement to violence’ offence and confine it to a legal framework, thus replacing the Ordinance for the Prevention of Terrorism and other widely used administrative measures. In the summer of 2001
’s stated policy of not mining West Bank water for transfer across the Green Line to Israel proper. A quarter to a third of the pumped water was to go to Arab communities, with the remainder to go to Jerusalem and to Jewish settlements. Large shafts were to be dug and 18 to 20 mcm were to be pumped annually. The depth and scale of the wells, some Palestinian hydrologists believed, threatened to dry out
population does not produce the revenue that is used to implement state policy, it is assumed, it has no right to claim a role in determining policy. See, for example, Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (eds) (1987), The Rentier State (London: Croom Helm). 23 Another study argues that more democratic
high-ranking official to the Arctic Council. The Arctic includes two countries –the USA and Russia –that can be assigned great power status from their historical or current global roles. ‘Small-state’ policy entrepreneurs focused intently on securing the participation of the USA and Russia. And the two countries played critical roles in the growth of circumpolar Arctic cooperation. The Soviet Union and Mikhail Gorbachev desecuritised Arctic space, and the USA agreed to support the AEPS and Arctic Council (in the end, and albeit on specific terms). This suggests
development of new structural variables as products of trends aiming at revising 124 Theory and reform in the European Union institutional entities and state policies. These trends can be seen as directly linked to problems and challenges of redefining basic tools of analysis: structure and the nature of the system, national interest, state sovereignty and power. In this context, any discussion about the prospects of a new system of collective security in Europe – as they have been expressed through the decisions taken in Maastricht, Amsterdam, Berlin and Madrid – should
‘the people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race were, in terms of citizenship, to be Turkish’. A number of problems emerge from this definition, concerning belief, language, national belonging and ideology, although state practice has been different, which had a ‘racist-ethnic visage’ and a focus upon language.93 The Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925 brought such issues to the fore, notably questions about Kurdish integration into the new state. State policies to such questions involved relocation and ethnic redistribution and were supported by grassroots
depicts King Salman placing money into a jihadi piggy bank, while another shows the King throwing a boomerang with the face of a jihadi away from the kingdom 226 226 Houses built on sand towards Syria. By their very nature boomerangs return to where they were thrown from, suggesting that such problems will return to Saudi Arabia in the future. State policy in the face of regional and international challenges has only served to support such perceptions. Amid a range of political, economic and ideological challenges, regimes have firmly positioned themselves within
from a warfare to a welfare state. Another is the context of international politics in Eurasia, which presently compels states to focus on relative rather than absolute gains in the calculation of state policy. A third is located in the inability to foster a collective identity encompassing the European and Eurasian states, which, in turn, will impair international cooperation and institution building. The European and Eurasian states are at different stages of evolution: the European state has lost or willingly abandoned sovereign prerogatives in the interest of
to globalisation (Reich, 1991; Department for International Development, 2000). The overwhelming image is one of a convergence of state policy, firm behaviour, and societal response around a single ‘best’ solution. Much of this analysis subordinates the politics of restructuring to the economic imperative of particular policy responses. Distinctive social institutions, understandings and practices are neglected in the process of identifying converging agendas. Amoore_Global_02_Ch1 20 6/19/02, 12:07 PM Globalisation, restructuring and flexibility 21 Policy
-ordinated with other countries; that the growth of public spending should be curbed; that the welfare state can be defended but not extended; that privatisation may be unavoidable and, when it eradicates monopolies, desirable; that equality, though still appealing as a goal, may be tempered by the need to preserve incentives and competition; that the power of international financial institutions – and above all, of financial markets – may be contained, if at all, only by international agreement and not by unilateral state policies. MUP_Torbion_06_Ch6 124 22/9/03, 1:47 pm