already deployed along the Turkish–Syrian border: “[It is] Turkey [which] now faces a growing military danger from the major build-up of arms in Syria.” Depicting that state of affairs as a threat to Turkey was, by all accounts, an exaggeration: most of the Syrian army, then numbering 50,000 men, was deployed along the Israeli border or in and around Damascus as a shield against coup d’état attempts; its equipment, albeit modern, had yet to be properly integrated. On the other hand, Turkey boasted an army of half a million men. It was NATO’s largest land force
state service, of which military service is just one possibility (e.g. REP 1993: 10) The issue of defense features only secondary in the programmes too, where it is linked mainly to the ever-changing position on NATO. In 1983 the programme pleaded for full incorporation of Germany into NATO as well as for more European cooperation in defense politics (albeit with close cooperation with the US). The next programme included no explicit references to either NATO or defense. In 1987 loyalty to NATO was made dependent upon the condition that its interests were similar to
Kosovo. A criminologist should not expound on the political or military dimension of such a conflict but should warn of the risk, if it exists, and then analyse the possible criminal consequences of the conflict. With a mind to the future the criminologist should also think preventively and see how best to integrate the notion of respect for the law into the ‘specifications’ of future international operations or peacekeeping actions. What happened prior to the NATO military intervention in Kosovo? In Europe (in France and Great Britain, but also in the United States
an implicit or explicit axiom among CFSP analysts that it is best seen as a unique phenomenon. Consequently, it has been regarded as futile to examine similarities and differences between, say, CFSP, WEU, OSCE and NATO. The CFSP is certainly a unique phenomenon but one could and should ask whether it is also an example, among others, of multilateral intergovernmental forms of cooperation. In other words, how different is intergovernmental
Morgenthau Plan NATO twin-track decision nazism neocorporatism new politics new social movements Northern Leagues Nuremberg tribunal Oder–Neisse line oil crisis Ombudsman Ostpolitik
Intergovernmental Conference JHA Justice and Home Affairs (pillar of the EU) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation OEEC Organisation for European Economic Co-operation OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe QMV Qualified Majority Voting SEA Single European Act TEU Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) UN (see UNO) UNO United Nations Organisation WEU Western European Union WTO World Trade Organisation Miscellaneous
National Assembly approves censure motion, forcing resignation of government (the sole instance of this device being utilised under the Fifth Republic constitution). 28 October 1962 Referendum approves direct election of president (62 per cent vote in favour). 22 January 1963 Franco-German Treaty signed. 1 July 1966 de Gaulle withdraws French troops from NATO
. This changed in 1974, when Joop Glimmerveen entered the scene and put the NVU on the political map. His openly racist campaign for the local election in the Hague of that year, under the slogan ‘The Hague should remain white and safe’, won him and the party substantial publicity. The NVU did not win a seat in the local council, but its name was established as was the position of Glimmerveen as the new party leader. Johann Georg Glimmerveen, born in 1928, was a rabid anti-communist veteran of the Korean War, who afterwards worked as a clerk at a NATO office in the
create an ‘Arab NATO’ – using the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a model – to create a similar body in the Gulf. Riyadh also backed a surge in US military forces in the Persian Gulf in 2019, and expanded naval drills with the US in Gulf waters in 2020. Iran appears dismissive of these coalitions, and refuses to recognise the Saudi-led narrative that it is engaged in proactive diplomacy to build collective security. Perceiving threat, Tehran prefers to point out that Saudi Arabia is unable to enter into a war with
began to purchase weapons from Moscow. The West’s reluctance to sell Turkey arms for fear that they might be used against the Kurds and its, to Turkey, irritating habit of threatening to deny Turkey weapons in order to, as Ankara sees it, blackmail it into improving its human rights performance, forced the Turks to look for other more reliable, less fastidious arms suppliers. Russia was the obvious choice, and Turkey in urgent need of arms, had few qualms in buying them from NATO’s principal ex-enemy. Moscow, in turn, desperate for money, was only happy to oblige