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Reinterpreting Russia in the twenty-first century
Andrew Monaghan

stated that the UK’s ‘security and that of our neighbours in Eastern Europe is menaced by President Putin’s flagrant disregard for international law in Ukraine’, even that Russia was the number one threat to the UK. Indeed, Hammond’s remarks are illuminating about how Russia has come to be seen in the West, and are worth citing at length

in The new politics of Russia
Current policy options and issues
Jenny H. Peterson

serious gap within international law regarding the use of legal mechanisms to deal with economically motivated activities during conflict: ‘the liability of economic actors would not be for economic crimes, as these are essentially absent from the Rome Statute [which governs the ICC], save for the war crime of “pillage and plunder”. . . The prosecutors in the ICTY and ICTR have shown little interest in pursuing economic actors’ (2005: 427–429). At present, international tribunals and law are not equipped to deal with the economic activities which may fuel or accompany

in Building a peace economy?
Open Access (free)
Theorising Arctic hierarchies
Elana Wilson Rowe

formulated by the five Arctic coastal states, rather than the Arctic Council as a whole. This new delineation within the Arctic states themselves was contested. Problematically, the newly highlighted outsider group included Finland, Sweden and Iceland. These countries are members of the Arctic Council, Theorising Arctic hierarchies     67 but not coastal states as defined under international law. Both Russia and Canada were keen to promote the ‘Arctic 5’ as a new sub-​grouping in Arctic politics. Russia was a supporter of the meeting that resulted in the Ilullissat

in Arctic governance
Open Access (free)
Elana Wilson Rowe

the Arctic Council can be explained in many ways. The national interests of all Arctic states are reasonably well served by existing political arrangements and the international law provisions of UNCLOS, and few Arctic actors would stand to benefit from bringing external strife to such a stable situation. Both Russia and the USA are large states with traditions of running complex foreign policies that allow for separation of issues and problems, and internal contradictions. The indigenous polities that transect the national borders of the North advocate for (and

in Arctic governance
Open Access (free)
The dancer of the future dancing radical hope
Dana Mills

violence, those responses subverting intention at times but creating different spaces in which bodies could meet and heal together. The dance continues through the dabke, allowing for people to join and create a shared embodied symbolic space where international law cannot allow that to be created. The argument then creates an embodied dialogue between the dabke dancers, stalled in checkpoints, and Arkadi Zaides’s unravelling of a space for a chorus of Palestinian narrators, made absent by systematic infringement upon their human rights. The argument dances equality and

in Dance and politics
Open Access (free)
Svante Norrhem
and
Erik Thomson

’avoir formée’. See Carl Trolle Bonde, Anteckningar om Bondesläkten, Riksrådet Grefwe Gustaf Bonde III (Lund, 1898), p. 285, and La Courneuve, Archives diplomatiques (AD), Memoire et documents, Suède, 25 (Instructions for comte d’Usson before travelling to Stockholm as ambassador 1774). 45 Randall Lesaffer, ‘Amicitia in Renaissance Peace and Alliance Treaties (1450–1530)’, Journal of the History of International Law 4 (2002), 77–99. 46 Lucien Bély’s La société des princes, XVIe–XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Fayard, 1999); Wolfgang Weber, ‘Interne und externe Dynamiken der

in Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation in Europe, 1494–1789
Peter H. Wilson

prevent their own subjects from aiding other powers. The ‘success’ of each state has depended not only on its ability to assert itself militarily but also on its being recognized as a ‘state’ by its neighbours. The emergence of diplomatic conventions and international law is only one aspect of this process. Europe contained a host of semisovereign entities, like the German and Italian principalities and city-states, which not only struggled to preserve or enhance their autonomy but also provided war-making resources to other, larger states. These exchanges have

in Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation in Europe, 1494–1789
Civilisation, civil society and the Kosovo war
Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen

One might argue that the West constructed the Kosovo war in terms of civilisation by default. As the bombing campaign had only the shakiest of foundations in international law, the West realised that its legal arguments were weak and that it was therefore time to use the heavy rhetoric of civilisation. This illustrates the political importance, rather than the emptiness, of the concept of civilisation

in Mapping European security after Kosovo
The logics underpining EU enlargement
Helene Sjursen
and
Karen E. Smith

often settled by force: the principle of effective power holds sway. Virtually no legal fetters exist to curb the resort to force; international legal standards afford minimal protection. Responsibility for cross-border wrongful acts is a ‘private matter’ concerning only those affected; no collective interest in compliance with international law is recognised. All states are regarded as equal before the law: legal rules do not

in Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy
Elana Wilson Rowe

change’ (Young, 2009), the familiar narrative of competitive geopolitics lent itself well to popular imagination. ‘Race for the Arctic’, ‘Arctic scramble’ and the ‘new Cold War’ have been common newspaper headlines when it comes to the coverage of Arctic affairs (Wilson Rowe, 2013a; Powell and Dodds, 2014 and Steinberg et al., 2015). By contrast, the Arctic states have, in recent years, become a coordinated chorus extolling the peacefulness of the region and the sufficiency of existing international law for dealing with eventual issues (Bailes and Heininen, 2012

in Arctic governance